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Optimism Versus Pessimism: An Exploratory Analysis of China in Zambian Media

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The huge interest in Zambia-China relations globally, both in academia and popular press, inspires several inquisitions. How have these relations changed and panned out in the present, from a Zambian media perspective? Would a Zambian media approach help provide insights into the ebb and flow of perceptions about China inside Zambia? What can we gather from the Zambian media on the September 2011 regime change in Zambia vis-à-vis China’s engagement? In other words, how did Zambian media craft perceptions on and of China in the era of late president Michael Chilufya Sata’s leadership? To answer these questions, this exploratory study applies a framing theoretical approach to analysis of content from three Zambian news media: Daily Mail, The Post Online and Zambian Watchdog. The objective is to offer perspectives from this sample of the Zambian media scene with a view to determining optimistic versus pessimistic perceptions on China’s image. Selected international media are included for a transient, loose comparative comment. The news framing analysis is fore grounded by literature review to set the background and context in which the selected media reported China between January 2013 and January 2014. After a systematic content review, this article concludes that the three newspapers frame China in more optimistic than pessimistic terms. The article concludes by arguing for the need for audience-based fieldwork as an important next step.

Introduction

Even the most cursory of glances at the Africa-China relations would yield Zambia as one among few other African countries to have attracted an above-average amount of media reporting and scholarly research output. Alden (2007:72) for instance characterizes Zambia as ‘China’s perfect storm’, while Sautman and Yan (2010:746) reckon Zambia as one of the countries ‘held up in Western discourse [of which media is all pervading] as exemplars of negativity about China in Africa’.

Park (2013:153) points out that Zambia is one of the countries where ‘Chinese in Africa are becoming targets of increased anti-Chinese sentiment led by opposition political parties and civil society organizations’. Noted Africa-China scholar Deborah Brautigam explains her choice of Zambia (as well as Tanzania) as the site for her fieldwork on the basis that its relations with China are long-standing (Brautigam 2009:20). For both Zambia and Tanzania, bilateral relations with China were established immediately after their independence from British colonial rule in 1964 and 1962, respectively.

A viewing of television news programmes, documentaries, and films on the Africa-China topic available on YouTube, the open source video content platform, show generous space allocated to Zambia relative to other African countries in a good number of the episodes. Focus on Zambia by global broadcasters can be seen in the documentary, The Chinese are Coming (BBC, March 2011), as an example among many others in which China is portrayed as inimical to Zambia’s interests. In balanced productions such as Al Jazeera’s People and Power: King Cobra and the Dragon (November 2012) and When China Met Africa (February 2011)⁹ one sees a dichotomy

⁹ Accessible at www.whenchinametafrica.com/distrify
between China as force for good in Zambia and a more deleterious side of things on the other hand. Zambia is equally a popular subject in proliferating blogs and podcasts on Africa-China two of the perhaps most significant ones being Cowries and Rice\(^2\) and China Africa Project\(^3\).

The huge interest in China-Zambia relations globally, both in academia and popular press, inspires several inquisitions. How have these relations changed and panned out in the present from a Zambian media perspective? Would a Zambian media approach help provide insights into the ebb and flow of perceptions about China inside Zambia? What can we gather from the Zambian media on the September 2011 regime change in Zambia vis-à-vis Chinese engagement? In other words, how did Zambian media craft perceptions on and of China in the era of former president Michael Chilufya Sata’s leadership?

**Historical Background**

Why is China – at least in some section of Africa-China intelligentsia - portrayed as an all-weather, long-standing, south-south partner of Zambia and why is this so important today? Along with Tanzania, Zambia is one of the sub-Saharan African countries where China’s engagement registered a pioneering Chinese presence with the Chinese state/party, under Chairman Mao Zedong providing material and ideological support (Brautigam, 2009). This was in the form of the well-acknowledged construction of the 1800-kilometre Tanzania-Zambia railway (from Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean coast to Kapiri Mposhi in northern Zambia’s copper-belt, between 1967 and 1975).

Zambia is a landlocked country and copper has been its economic lifeline since the period before independence. At independence, Zambia’s neighbours, namely, Zimbabwe, Angola, and South Africa remained under colonial regimes (apartheid regime in the case of South Africa). The colonial regimes in Zambia’s neighbourhood and which had access to international waters were unfriendly to the newly independent nation. This meant that Zambia was hard put exporting copper – the lifeblood for a fledgling nation – through the hostile neighbouring territories and on to the international markets. Tanzania was the only Zambian neighbour under a friendly independent African regime. Thus Tanzania was the only feasible route through which Zambia could export its copper, but the challenge was the uncharted territory marked by poor transport infrastructure between the Copperbelt hinterlands in Zambia and the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. It is in this context that China’s construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway was a crucial undertaking and this is the springboard of the historical solidarity between Zambia and China (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:324).

Over and above the construction of the railway, China established bases in Zambia for the training of liberation fighters in southern Africa nations that suffered delayed independence. Further, close ties were cultivated through China’s construction of the United National Independence Party’s (UNIP) headquarters in Lusaka in 1987 (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012: 325). As it is, therefore, China is anything but a new, twenty-first century player in Zambia’s socio-economic space, although it trailed western powers, particularly Britain, which set that base in Zambia’s Copperbelt in 1928 (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 17).

Under Zambia’s founding president, Kenneth Kaunda, the copper mining sector was nationalised in the late 1960s with the state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) as the sole copper management entity (Spilsbury, 2012). A combination of factors however led to Kaunda’s ouster from power via democratic means in 1991. It is largely acknowledged that Kaunda’s

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\(^2\) Accessible at www.cowriesrice.blogspot.com

\(^3\) Accessible at www.chinaafricaproject.com
political fortunes tumbled on the back of the collapse of the copper-based economy (Human Rights Watch, 2011; Spilsbury, 2012).

Chinese leaders wasted no time in embracing the regime of Zambia’s new leader in 1991, the late Fredrick Chiluba (subsuming political party ties), and soon China entered the Zambian mining sector as part of the ensuing, ‘ruinous’ IMF-World Bank-backed privatisation of the mining sector, better known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (Sautman and Yan, 2007:78; Spilsbury, 2012: 251-52; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:325-26; Alden, 2007:73). At the inaugural Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in 2000, Chiluba apportioned blame for the poor state of his country’s economy on the West (which is sometimes bundled with Bretton-Woods Institutions) ostensibly in the context of welcoming Chinese investors who were making forays into the Zambian sphere (Spilsbury, 2012: 253; Kopinski and Polus, 2011:184).

**Chinese Investments in Zambia**

The point in time during which Zambia was shifting from a nationalised economy to a liberal one coincided with a period during Chinese companies were stepping up a search for opportunities abroad in what is known as the ‘going out policy’. In turn, it has been pointed out that China’s going out policy had the objective of providing a market for Chinese products, improving resource security, enabling technology transfer, and promoting research and development (Brautigam, 2009:74-75; Human Rights Watch, 2011:14). One company that best illustrates Chinese interests in Zambia – both on the positive and negative continuum – is the state-owned China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC).

CNMC purchased an initially government-owned mine in Chambishi, northern Zambia in 1998 and operates it under the name Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCA). After initial investments, the Chambishi mine was revived in 2003 after being out of operation for more than a decade. In quick succession, CNMC opened four more mining and related operations: Sino Metals Leach Zambia (Sino Metals), a copper processing plant, 2006; Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), also in Chambishi, became the first special economic zone in Africa with an extension in Lusaka, 2007; Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS), 2009; and China Luanshya Mine (CLM), an underground, open-cast mining operation, 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2011:3; 21; Spilsbury, 2012: 255; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012: 325; Brautigam, 2009: 82; 201; Alden, 2007: 73).

Such is the strength of Zambia-China partnership that the China Development Bank’s and China Export-Import Bank’s have a strong presence in Zambia providing low interest loans for a host of projects (particularly infrastructural). The China Development Bank established an office in Lusaka in 1997 (Brautigam, 2010: 8; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:325). China has also cancelled a number of Zambian loans (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2013: 34; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012: 324-328).

**Controversial Events and Issues in Zambia**

That labour relations generally constitute the epitome of harsh judgment on the China-in-Zambia discourse is hardly contestable. Literature however shows four incidents as standing out in the defining of the negative dimension of the otherwise embraced Chinese investment, all of them in the mining sector. The most tragic of these is the 2005 explosion at the CNMC/NFCA Chambishi explosives manufacturing plant where many Zambian workers died – in literature; the number varies from 46 to 51 (Human Rights Watch 2011; Spilsbury 2012; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012; Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). The second incident relates to the 2006 riots in the same Chambishi area that ended with the shooting of five Zambian miners allegedly by a Chinese manager. In the third incident, 11 workers were shot at the privately owned Collum Coal Mines,
(which though Australian owned, has strong links with Chinese interests), in the southern region town of Sinazongwe. Fourthly, a Chinese manager was killed at the same Collum mines in August 2012 (Human Rights Watch, 2011:22-23; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:325; Alden, 2007:74; Brautigam, 2009:5-6). Conflated with myriad other issues, these incidents shone media, civil society, and scholarship spotlight on China in Zambia like nowhere else on the continent. Distinguishing circumstances under which Chinese interests have been targeted in Africa as falling in the categories of criminal, labour, political, and maritime/piracy motivated (Yun Sun 2014:9-10) suggests the Zambian case falls in the labour disputes category, although as the literature makes clear, the labour disputes went into political discourse.

While the Chinese involvement in the Zambian copper and coal-mining sector draws the most analysis, Chinese investments in other sectors also make it to the controversially framed list of issues. The Chinese are seen being on-and-off in terms of support for the Mulungushi Textile Corporation from the mid 1980s to present (Alden, 2007:73; Eliassen, 2012:84; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:325). Chinese funding for various infrastructure projects such as China Exim Bank’s funding of the Lower Kafue Gorge Dam, are seen as deleterious for the environment (Strange et al., 2013:10-11). The number of Chinese migrants is seen as disconcerting, including their failure to assimilate in Zambia as well as the allegedly poor quality of products and the potential of importation of manufactured products from China to undermine Zambia’s manufacturing sector (Spilsbury, 2012:238, 257; Alden, 2007:48; 73; Jura and Kaluzynska, 2013:96; Lee, 2009). Chinese state-owned and private companies investing in the agricultural sector are seen as improving Zambia’s food security but also introducing competition with local farmers (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:138; Brautigam, 2009:254-55, 266-69).

Arising out of these engagements, various scholars suggest a paradox in China-Zambia relations. This is best exemplified by the Human Rights Watch report’s binary characterisation of ‘the Chinese’ as: ‘good investors, but bad employers’ (Human Rights Watch, 2011:3; 30-31). In June 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chastised China for pursuing a neo-colonial agenda in Africa. She made the remarks on the sidelines of an African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) conference in the Zambian capital, Lusaka (see Bloomberg, 2011). The charge of Chinese neo-colonialism in Zambia has been woven into ‘human rights’ issues relating to labour relations and encompassing low pay, excessive working hours, poor health and safety standards, frequency of accidents, environmental destruction, barring workers from joining labour unions, summary dismissals, etc. (Human Rights Watch, 2011:4; Strange et al., 2013:10; Salisbury, 2012:238). According to Shinn and Eisenman (2012:325), the negative perceptions emanating from the above mentioned challenges have left ‘a legacy of ill will’.

But on the upward looking continuum, it has been noted that Chinese capital played a pivotal role in breathing life into some of the mines that had been abandoned by previous investors, for instance the 2002 departure of Anglo American (Moyo, 2012:150). Chinese capital is seen to have helped with revamping the efficiency of mining technologies as well as expanding operations (Human Rights Watch, 2011:30).

**China in Zambian Politics**

Sautman and Yan (2010:749) attribute ‘international media depiction of Zambians as anti-Chinese’ on Michael Sata, during his opposition leadership period. It has been well noted in literature that in challenging his also deceased competitor, Levy Mwanawasa, for the presidency in 2006, the late president Sata mobilised, launched, and sustained a scathing, fierce attack on the Chinese, taking advantage of ‘...[of] disenfranchised, fiery hearts that were already burning with anti-Chinese sentiment’ (Sautman and Yan, 2010:749-52; Human Rights Watch, 2011:26; Spilsbury, 2012:264).

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One of Sata’s often quoted statements on the campaign trail was the reference to Chinese as ‘infesters’ rather than ‘investors’ (Strange et al., 2013:6; BBC, 2011). He framed the ‘China question’ as ‘Zambia is becoming a province – no a district – of China’ (Alden, 2007:75). Shinn and Eisenman (2012:72) point out that ‘in the run-up to Zambia’s 2006 presidential elections the CPC (Chinese Communist Party) publicly supported the MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy)’ – the latter party being the one Sata’s Patriotic Front (PF) was campaigning against. Observers of China-Zambia relations identified a change in both Mwanawasa and Beijing’s policies – somewhat improved labour practices for instance – in view of the anti-Chinese sentiments during the 2006 electioneering (Spilsbury, 2012:260; Fraser and Larmer, 2007:611-12).

Probably to the alarm of the Chinese officials in Beijing, Sata went so far as to touch a raw nerve by pledging recognition for Taiwan’s independence from Mainland China ‘alarming’, given the never-ending Beijing-Taipei decades-long sovereignty tug-of-war (Brautigam, 2009:151). Chinese ambassador to Zambia at the time, Li Baodong, dispensed with diplomatic etiquette to threaten China’s withdrawal from Zambia in the event Sata won. While concluding that ambassador Li’s public altercations with Sata amounted to ‘a political misstep’, Shinn and Eisenman (2012:327) also imply Beijing may have given tacit approval to this diplomatic incident in view of Li being allowed to stay on ‘for a face saving period and then (being) transferred to a senior position in Geneva’. In the end, Sata and the PF party lost to Mwanawasa’s MMD at the 2006 plebiscite and the matter went to the back banner. Nonetheless, the fact that Sata’s PF emerged victorious in the Copperbelt indicated that the anti-Chinese message had indeed sunk in areas of Chinese investment heft (Human Rights Watch 2011:26; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:73 and Brautigam, 2009:150-51).

Mwanawasa – a staunch supporter of Chinese investments in Zambia – passed on in 2008 (with former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi attending the state funeral) and his deputy, Rupiah Banda, took the reins of power in an acting capacity in lieu of a snap presidential election held in October the same year. Banda won the election with a waver thin margin; Sata lamented electoral malpractices for his loss. But ‘King Cobra’, as tenacious Sata was known, was not done with presidential ambitions and would emerge victorious in the subsequent elections of September 2011.

A distinction has been made between the Sata of 2006, whose political stock in trade was to lay Zambian economic woes at the feet of ‘the Chinese’, and the much more mellowed Sata of the 2008 and 2011 election, who though still critical of the economic model, was less acerbic of the Chinese (Human Rights Watch, 2011:27; Spilsbury, 2012:261; Carmody et al., 2012:224; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:327-28). There are those who surmise that Sata’s anti-Chinese rhetoric of 2006 had such a staying power as to contribute to his 2011 victory (Spilsbury, 2012:238). Many recent works and journalistic pieces have concluded that Sata embraced a pro-China stance once he became president (Spilsbury, 2012:263; Africa Asia Confidential, 2013:1), although he occasionally made nationalistic or patriotic moves (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:328).

Some suggested that Sata’s anti-Chinese rhetoric was no more than the antics of a populist politician whose criticism was meant to satiate a burning hunger power (Spilsbury, 2012:259; 263; Fraser and Larmer, 2007). According to Spilsbury (2012:264) citing a local newspaper – The Post – ‘Sata (was) a populist who (would) say what he (thought) newspapers want(ed) to hear...he (had) no morals to defend, no principles to fight for’.

What Communication Scholars Say

The preceding review suggests Zambia-China relations have been studied with a measure of depth from economic and geopolitical perspectives. The missing link for the current paper is
communications/media review. Wekesa (2013:27) points out that Zambia was the second most ‘talked about’ country in East African newspapers in 2011 with respects to China (after Sudan and followed by Zimbabwe; Wekesa, 2013a:27). This is consistent with social science literature indicative of Zambia as a hotspot for the overall China-in-Africa phenomenon. Citing Chinese migration and reclusiveness, Sautman and Yan (2010:735-36) found that Zambia is a country where negative sentiments against China are comparatively higher, though this should not be confused with Zambians being more negative than positive about China. Indeed the survey pointed out both ‘a beneficial and harmful’ sentiment about China but with approval supplanting disapproval ratings (Sautman and Yan, 2010:738). Yu-Shan Wu (2013:17) brings in a proximate view but from a Chinese social media perspective, in the sense that the 2012 killing of a Chinese coal mine manager may have forged negative attitudes in social media.

The use of Chinese capital to establish a Special Economic Zone in Lusaka can be seen through economic rather than say, cultural lenses. However, as Kim (2013) demonstrates, this can be interpreted from a soft power – largely a communicative consideration – point of view and within that, as either salutary or negative. In their study of Chinese soft power in Zambia (and Angola), Jura and Kaluzynska (2013:48) concluded that not only were Zambian perceptions on China were positive, but also that ‘economy, business and development occupy a central position in the media’. They further observed that discussions on economic matters tended to be ‘concrete’ (mines, investments and energy for instance) rather than ‘abstract’ (economic terminologies such as GDP and inflation for instance). As Sautman and Yan (2009:734) have argued, the Zambia-China schisms are obviously a negative perception builder but perhaps not to the extent of blighting a positive view as received wisdom would have us believe and as evident in the fact that Sata lost both the 2006 and 2008 elections in which his pitch was an anti-Chinese fervour. We may argue that other factors rather than the China question might have spurred Sata’s 2011 election victory contrary to claims that his win was a no confidence vote in China. At any rate, some analysts point out that Banda’s tenure in office was marred by factors such as the global recession that lessened global copper demands in turn touching off a spate of redundancies that made him unpopular (Spilsbury, 2012:262).

Jura and Kaluzynska (2013:65) also concluded that issues revolving around Chinese labour and human rights practices were highly localised or domesticated rather than bundled with other global developments on this score such as the Tibet question, the sagas of Chinese dissidence, or any number of human rights issues. It would indeed appear – as we saw in the analysis on the Chinese question in Zambian politics above – that this localisation percolates deeper into Zambian geography with some areas more favourable of China than others. Flipping the analysis to the Chinese dimension, Shubo Li and Ronning (2013:115) reveal that an article in the Chinese newspaper, the Southern Weekend of 8 April 2010, concluded thus: ‘[f]or ordinary Zambians, the image of China is far from perfect. Local people told us frankly that in their mind, China is associated with cheap, low-quality products and low wages’.

**Framing China in Zambia**

From a cautious viewpoint, analyses of China in Africa along optimistic and pessimistic lines, is, in a general sense, also true for Zambia-China relations. In the multifarious Sino-Africa literature (Wasserman, 2011; Alden, 2007; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012), there are typologies and metaphors that attempt to nail down the phenomenon, in a word, to ‘frame’ the China Africa relations. Wasserman (2011), in a study of China in South Africa, points out that discourses on China’s role in Africa falls into a stark binary (read, framing) as either an exploitative, predatory force or a benevolent development partner.

The above insights dovetail with Alden’s (2007) assessment of China in Africa along three poles: Is China a development partner, an economic competitor, or a colonizer? Shinn and Eisenman
(2012) depict the relations as either optimistic or pessimistic. These metaphors that have been used to describe China in Africa can be theorised as frames of reference. We propose to undertake a qualitative analyse China in a representative sample of Zambian media, specifically, the Zambia Daily Mail, The Post Online, and Zambia Watchdog, for the entire period of January 2013 to January 2014 using deductive sociological (rather than psycho-cognitive) framing theoretical concepts. We take a qualitative rather than quantitative turn because a proper measurement of media-driven perception of China in Zambia would require access to all media forms, including broadcast media, for it to meet validity thresholds. In addition, a proper understanding of the Zambian media system would be required if a quantitative study is to reveal meaningful results. Yet an incisive understanding of the Zambian media scene would have distracted from the core objective of the study: what are the media-charted perceptions of China in Zambia. Nonetheless, this study could provide entry points for measurement of media perceptions of China in Zambia.

We also use a generic, relaxed rather than a specific, strict, or reductionist-framing approach drawing on framing scholars’ counsel that overarching issues – such as one country in another – are better analysed this way (Wekesa, 2013:18). Of the distinctions made on China in Africa, we propose to leverage Shinn and Eisenman’s (2012:10-14) optimism versus pessimism framing bolstered by Alden’s (2007) partner, role model on the one hand and competitor, exploiter for on the other hand. Thus the two frame categories are: 1) optimistic, partner, role model and 2) pessimist, competitor, exploiter.

Space constraints limit us from giving a full account of how news media frame issues as a consequence of which they come to shape opinions and perceptions. Suffice to mention that framing was seminally defined by Entman (1993:52) as ‘the selection of some aspects of a perceived reality (making it) more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal relationship, moral evaluation, and/or treatment’. Four decades of framing as a significant theory in the communication field indicate that frames have the following qualities: persistency/frequency/consistency, selection/placement, unique contextualisation, inclusion/exclusion/insertion, emphasis/elaboration (Wekesa, 2013:17).

In a nutshell, the optimist perspective is motivated by the perception that China needs what Zambia is naturally endowed with, while Zambia needs investment capital to exploit her natural resources especially with respect to copper (Spilsbury 2012:254). Optimism, therefore, subsumes considerations such as China as partner, role model, benevolent force, etc. The pessimist frame reclines on the understanding that Zambia might not be extracting a fair share from its natural resources or that the relations are slanted in favour of China, to the detriment of Zambia. It would include considerations such as Chinese malevolence, exploitation, China as a predator and China as a competitor.

In their study of agencies of Chinese soft power in Angola and Zambia, Jura and Kalusynzyka (2013: 44) rely on articles derived from online editions of newspapers and internet portals. Among other factors they advanced for this choice was ease of access to archives. We similarly find this approach worthwhile for the current study. We applied the framing/content analysis approach to Zambia Daily Mail, The Post Online, and the Zambia Watchdog. We selected headlines with the ‘China’ keyword/code in them published between 1 January 2013 and 23 January 2014 to capture the ebb and flow for a whole year’s period. We collected a total of 91 articles. Using frame analysis, we deduced the inclination of articles towards a pessimistic, competitor, exploiter frame or optimistic, partner, role-model frame on the basis of the nature of the Zambia engagement and the tonality of the words and phrases used. With frame analysis as

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4 All content was collected from the online editions of these news media.
the theoretical approach of choice, we did not undertake discourse analysis given that our objective was to categorise the content and demonstrate how selected words, phrases, sentences, language use, and episodes contribute to the overall optimistic or pessimistic themes. Indeed, framing analysis scholarship identifies five signifying devices that can be used in the study of media content namely; ‘metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1987). We liberally used these devices save for visual images, which would have required a different analytical framework. A quick note here is that future research might find it useful to triangulate frame analysis and discourse analysis or indeed use discourse analysis on its own. For the current paper – focused on determining whether Zambian media frame China in optimistic or pessimistic terms – we deemed it sufficient to mine evidence from the content that supports the polarity of the two positions while only transiently commenting in what may be referred to as interplay between optimistic and pessimistic frames.

After collecting the articles, we read each one of them, keeping an eye on language, instances, and topics that would support either an optimistic or pessimistic view. We created a matrix and using researcher-discretion, placed the most telling instances that speak to optimism, role model, partnership, pessimism, competition, and exploitation in their relevant columns. Again, in the interests of space, we decided not capture all the headlines but to cite the publication dates with the understanding that readers interested in particular headlines can obtain them from the online archives of the papers. We capture publication dates as ‘month’ and ‘date’ and leave out ‘year’ except for the month of January which traverses 2013 and 2014 in the understanding that the rest are all for the year 2013. For a good number of articles, the optimism or pessimism starts at the headline level; however, we still went into the body of the articles to mine evidence on either side. We kept fidelity to the fact that some articles had both optimistic and pessimistic framing and duly captured this in the placement of evidence of pessimism and optimism in the relevant columns of the matrix.

After presenting the main findings, we proceed to analyse the contribution of these news media to the framing of perceptions about China. We conclude the study with a discussion on some of the questions posed in the introduction of this article.

**Data Analysis and Findings**

**Zambia Daily Mail**

This newspaper has the highest amount of coverage on China in Africa at 38 articles for the study period. A government-owned newspaper, it overwhelmingly frames China in Zambia from an optimistic dimension. Such is the positive framing of China by this newspaper that incredulity would be entertained as to why there is no negative view in line with normative journalistic values, especially balance. Nonetheless, the mere fact of optimistic framing by Zambia Daily Mail (hereafter referred to as Daily Mail) is indicative of the close ties between the Sata administration and the Chinese partners in government and business. Indeed the editorial bent of Daily Mail towards an optimistic framing of China is decipherable in a commentary article: ‘Chinese in Schools to Narrow Gulf between Zambia and China’ (17 April), by the newspaper’s editor, Charles Chisala, hailing the commencement of Hanban classes in schools as means of enhancing the partnership.

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5 Space limitations do not allow for the appending of the matrix but it can be availed on request.
Chinese firms’ involvement in infrastructure development in Zambia is generally a celebrated trope (for instance, 14 June; 28 July; 27 December). An insight gleaned from the reporting is that Chinese firms cultivate close relations with Zambian officials as seen for instance in the courtesy call by a manager of China Henan International Industry Group, Chen Zhiqiang, on Luapala Province Minister, Brigadier General Benson Kapaya. In a series of articles (14 June; 28 August; 24 September; 27), we learn that the cultivation of close ties with Zambian officials by China Henan might be quid pro quo as the company has won contracts for the construction of an airport, a car park, and a major road, as well as offering to design a new town and create a preferential economic trading zone all in the Luapala Province. Indeed, seeking mutual partnership can be seen in a Zambian official ostensibly ‘appealing’ to China-Henan company to help build a university in rural Zambia (27 December). China-Henan emerges as a major player in Zambia’s Luapala Province, its influence spawning the creation of a formal twinning programme between Luapala and the Chinese province of Henan with an eye on increased investments from the latter to the former (24 September).

To the extent that the Daily Mail covers China in positive light, it can be said to be a platform for Chinese media-based-public-diplomacy towards Zambia and vice versa. Further still, one sees explicit efforts to tap media for a Zambia-China political partnership project. We learn for instance that the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party youth visited China to hone skills such as ‘how to clearly articulate party policies to the public through the media’, at the invitation of (China’s) State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) (26 June; 10 July). Quite interesting in terms of how PF and CPC have buried the hatchet and embraced is the candid words of the Chinese ambassador: ‘the Patriotic Front has been in touch with China more than the MMD (the former ruling party) was’ (10 July). At the time of the PF youth media strategy training in China, the Zambian leaders who had been hosted by the CPC included former vice president Guy Scott, PF national chairperson Inonge Wina, and secretary general Wynter Kabimba; the latter being of strategic significance by dint of his being president of the Council of African Political Parties (CAPP) (May 29).

A good number of articles can be seen as China unleashing her soft power through donations, assistances, and cultural linkages. These include: China donates 25 motor vehicles to Zambia Police (October 23); China boosts police operations (June 23); China pledges to paint Chingwele Clinic (August 10); China gives Zambia 480 solar panels for rural areas (April 17); China, Brazil and India up aid to Zambia (March 17); China keen to train stadium managers (June 27, as part of the soft power package attendant to the Lusaka stadium built through a grant) and China gives Zambia 480 solar panels for rural areas (April 17).

As a strategic illustration, a donation of vehicles to Zambian police – overseen by China’s ambassador to Zambia Zhou Yuxio – is on the occasion of Zambia’s 49th Independence Day. Zhou used the occasion to reinforce the Zambia-China ‘all weather’ partnership via reference to the two nations’ historical solidarity while the Zambian Home Affairs Minister, Lungu’s, response was reciprocal. Another article to demonstrate the ambassador’s media-based public diplomacy mission is the optimism he expressed in the robustness of the Zambian economy in 2014 in an exclusive interview (September 26).

Indeed, trawling through the content, it is evident that a major remit for the Chinese ambassador is to shape positive perceptions and in the case of Zambia, this is against the backdrop of the diplomatic fall out of earlier years. Various framing scholars point out that inclusion and exclusion/presence and absence are some of the strategies used to create frames in audiences. It is evident that Chinese officials (and some extent their Zambian counterparts) are long on the earlier history of the close ties – with the role played by founding president Kenneth Kaunda...
particularly primed – while Sata’s anti-Chinese vituperation between 2006 and 2011 appears to be a no go zone. In the same breadth, while official narratives are silent on economic disputes, the longevity of the Tazara project is nearly a standard mention in speeches as reported.

Space does not allow accounting for all direct Chinese investment articles, thus we shall illustrate the articles that frame the relations as partnership with just two exemplars. An August 15 2013 article highlights the Zambian Development Agency’s interests in seeking opportunity for small businesses in China via the globally acclaimed, annual China International Fair for Investment and Trade (CIFIT), also known as the Canton Fair. Quite proximate is the reporting on a business match-making initiative by China Ministry of Commerce that would see Zambian and Chinese companies collaborating in seeking international markets (including the African products exhibition centre in Yiwu, China) for Zambian produced goods (August 12). Investments in the tourism sector can be seen in the headline: China intends to promote Sino-Africa tourism (August 28).

In some respects, Chinese economic links with Africa are construed more favourably than those from the West. An article commenting on US President Barak Obama’s visit to Africa paints an optimistic picture of China. It lambasts US’ preoccupation with what has been termed ‘Western Consensus’ ideals (July 12). An article critical of the West and supportive for China is tellingly entitled: ‘Friendly dragon: China’s investments in Zambia’ (June 11). An analysis of all the opinion articles in Daily Mail in which China and the West are compared holds up China-optimism against decided West-pessimism.

An interesting point to note with regards to opinion articles is that while they generally carve a positive perception for China, opinion articles by their very nature must respond to or argue the case against certain topical issues. In so doing the opinion writer is constrained to include or at least touch on the position he or she is contesting. This, in news framing terms, ends up availing a counter frame to the audience. Such is the case with an opinion article by Qu Xing, president of the China Institute of International Studies (Qu Xing, 2013) in which he counters the widely discussed article by Nigerian Central Bank governor Lamido Sanusi and published in the influential Financial Times. Sanusi (2013) pointedly wrote that Africa ‘must see China for what it is: a competitor’ and ‘fight predatory policies’. The sting in the negative framing occasioned by Sanusi’s treatise is not just that he is the chief executive of Nigeria’s reserve bank of but also the fact that his father was Nigeria’s ambassador to Beijing. A quick observation here as well is that most opinion articles in Zambian papers are likely to analyse China not just from a Zambian pigeonhole but from a wider Pan African standpoint.

Based on the definitive consideration of news frames as charted by the consistency and frequency of topics and rhetoric, the single most important event in positive framing of China-Zambia relations and therefore the height of the China optimism is the ten back-to-back articles reporting or based on former president Sata’s maiden, week-long visit to China published between April 3 and April 19).

The optimism, partnership and role model aspects of the trip are seen in the following sample of evidence: The signing of several multimillion agreements with potential for Zambia’s economic development (for instance discussions for establishment of a Zambian national airline); the special treatment accorded Sata (in a manner to suggest he was treated ostensibly better than other past African visiting heads of state); the fact that he was the first African head of state to meet then newly elevated Chinese leaders, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang; Sata’s pledge to recognize the one-China policy and CNMC’s sponsorship of the Zambia-China Economic and Investment Forum.
Pessimist, Competitor, Exploiter Frame

The few articles in the Daily Mail in which salience is placed on the pessimist frame seem to revolve less on ideological matters and more on the competence of Chinese firms or failure to extract maximum value out of natural resources (August 28; April 26).

As we saw earlier, China-Henan officials have forged close ties with officials from the Luapala Province. Interestingly however, the same company may be seen in reverse as authoring a pessimistic view of China in Zambia. The headline: 'China-Henan risks being blacklisted' (August 28) is particularly instructive. It transpires that the China Henan officials’ visits to Luapala government officials in December 2013 and the twinning program of this Zambian province with China’s Henan Province in September 2013 followed a threat to rescind a road construction contract awarded to the company apparently in another region of Zambia (Kafue-Lusaka road) in August 2013. Even without the benefit of finer nuance, it is evident that China Henan’s contribution to positive framing in one region of Zambia may be offset by charges of shoddy work and delays in other parts of the country (it appears the company had attracted the ire of Zambian officials on at least two other infrastructure projects). Caution would however be exercised before judging the company harshly in that one project for which China Henan was criticised was funded by the World Bank in addition to the plausible reasons advanced by the company for the delays. But this does little to remove the sting in the words of a Zambian minister: ‘when I heard that China Henan has been awarded this contract I was very worried’.

In what amounts to an exception to the rule, the lone article critiquing the failure of Zambians to extract maximum value from their natural resources is by Anthony Mukwita, then managing director of Daily Mail (March 31). In a visit to a company in southern China, Mukwita realizes that its globally competitive products are made from copper mined in Zambia. This insight motivates him to pen a piece decrying Zambia’s failure to add value to her copper while the Chinese company in question boasts a balance sheet ‘several times higher than Zambia as a country’. This then introduces probably the only potential China-as-exploiter plank in the corpus of articles from Daily Mail for the study period.

The Post Online

We collected 25 items from The Post Online. It is privately owned news media thus would be expected to take a much more independent editorial bent in covering China in Zambia; thus, it would be expected that the newspaper would frame China in both positive and negative hues. Evidence from data however presents a contrary picture in that most stories are positive (optimistic) rather than negative (pessimistic). The reasons of this would require further investigation to appreciate this rather startling finding. A quick finding is that The Post Online seems to have changed from bashing Sata before he became president (as we saw in the literature review) to being positive about links with China during his presidency.

Because The Post Online resembles and reflects Daily Mail in more respects than one, we decided to discuss only framing considerations peculiar to it (The Post Online), leaving out those that bear a ‘cut and copy’ outlook with Daily Mail.

Optimist, Partner, Role Model Frame

Erroneous or otherwise, the perspective that the Chinese state encourages state-owned firms to compete with their private counterparts in the Zambian market rather than lobbying for them, charts an optimistic frame (November 26). The gist of this article is that Zambians should learn from factors that have made China an economic powerhouse key among them the culture and ethics of diligence, tenacity and hard work as opposed to Zambian workers’ lethargy and
indolence. Other articles with a similar ‘China as a role model framing’ were published between January and April 2013.

If events play an important role in optimistic framing of China, then the Chinese Spring Festival presents a particularly opportune moment. During the January 2014 edition, no less than the Zambian first lady, Christine Kasemba, graced the celebrations to extol the strides made in China-Zambia relations in 2013 with expectations that 2014 held even better prospects (January 26 2014). We see a cultural turn to public diplomacy perspective when the Chinese ambassador to Zambia inaugurates the 2014 spring festival (January 24 2014).

A November 1 article highlights three optimistic framing perspectives: the Chinese ambassador doing public diplomacy in the sense of damage control, China as a responsible force for good in Zambia and Chinese firms as helping Zambia overcome infrastructure challenges. The training aspect embedded in a contract awarded to China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation – the company that is the subject of the story – furthers the optimism. Along the same lines is China Gansu (company’s) building of the first government secondary school in a rural Zambian region (April 24).

There is a surfeit of other items constructing the optimistic frame and which we saw in the analysis of the Daily Mail above. These include investments and development partnership such as the potential for Zambia to emulate China in rice production or the commendation of Chinese investments reported April 12 and April 28; political solidarity/partnership such as the headlines, ‘PF inspiring, protecting citizens - Communist Party of China’ (June 25) and ‘Communist Party of China urges caution on West forces’ (July 1); assistance such as ‘China pledges continued support to Levy hospital’ (September 19) and ‘Chinese care for Zambia’s development – Ling’ (April 19); cultural partnerships such as ‘Chamanga, Katongo on target in China’ (April 16) and ‘Chinese club prunes Chansa’ (March 30); infrastructure development partnership such as ‘TAZARA acquires new locomotives from China’ (December 31), ‘China Jiangxi spends $2.5m on Green equipment’ (June 13) and ‘China Jiangxi imports road equipment worth $25m’ (April 4) and geopolitics such as ‘China, old friend or new colonialists?’ (July 18).

Pessimist, competitor, exploiter frame

In some cases, a negative sentiment about China emanate from straightforward legal disputes as in the case of a contempt of court proceedings against China Jiangsu instituted by a Lusaka businessman (August 1). Rational audience would give the benefit of doubt to either party. However, the possibility for Zambian readers to see the legal clash from a nationalistic, patriotic viewpoint might mean a negative view on the Chinese company.

To the extent that small-scale Chinese traders entering local markets to sell goods are considered an illegality, this forges a pessimistic framing of China. Indeed no less than the Zambian trade and then industry deputy minister, Miles Sampa, is reported warning dire consequences for Chinese nationals found ‘trading chickens and vegetables’ (August 26). A closer look reveals that the minister’s ire might have been tied to his political interests in that he represented a constituency in which the market in question is located. A trader is quoted posing the question as to whether a foreigner would be allowed to ‘sell things like sweets (candy), vegetables or chickens in China?’

Another China-as-exploiter frame is presented in the implied flouting of a stipulation requiring foreign contractors to give 20% of their work to Zambian firms (August 27). Indeed the PF government’s enactment of this policy – known as 8,000 Link Zambia Project – may have been spurred in the first place by the clamour by local contractors to be protected from their more competent counterparts in a manner to suggest the negative side of infrastructure contracting. The 8,000 Link Project is Zambia’s plan to construct 8,000 kilometres of roads and was
developed with legal backing for the implementation agency – The Roads Development Agency – to ensure that Zambia engineers and other technical professionals and companies get a mandatory 20% sub contract. The plan is to ensure that Zambians gain monetarily from the infrastructure project as well as enhancing their skills and in terms of technology transfer. In the article, the Chinese companies specifically accused of resisting this requirement were mentioned as AVIC International Project Engineering Company and Sinohydro Company Ltd (August 27).

A fairly innocuous negative framing is with respect to speculation that the Zambian government intended to import maize from China, dismissed by the government spokesman as a mere rumour (December 13). This would fall in the pessimistic column on the back of allegations of corruption and collusion – real or perceived – between Zambian officials and Chinese firms whenever a tender for procurement of goods and services is on the cards.

In ‘expressing shock at allegations that Chinese-run mines produce more of Zambian copper but contribute little to the country’s economic growth because profits are being taken to develop China’, the Chinese ambassador Zhou may have been on a mission to furnish a counter frame. However the possibility that this would only serve as confirmation of this potentially deleterious allegation cannot be discounted out of hand thus contributing to an exploiter view (September 9).

**Zambia Watchdog**

We collected 28 items from Zambia Watchdog. It is an independent online platform that places itself in opposition to the government. It collaborates with yet another online platform – Zambia Reports – and between them constitutes critical, gate-keeper-against-government voices. Because of its stance, Zambia Watchdog attracted a backlash from the Sata administration and as of the time of this study was being hosted outside the country. Some of the articles from the site use rough-hewn expletives that must have tested the tolerance levels of both the Sata regime and Chinese authorities’ tolerance to the limit.

**Optimist, Partner, Role Model Frame**

The rare occasions when Zambia Watchdog charts an upward looking sentiment for China is when undertaking straightforward reporting on events. One article, (May 28) starts with subtle negative valance: ‘Zambian army commander fully supports the so-called ‘one China policy’. We notice the use of ‘so-called’ as frowning on ‘one China policy’, which is in quotes in the original text. Also, satirical mention is made of ‘General Mihova visiting China as part of Zambia newly gained love for countries like China, Cuba, Sudan’ (May 28). However, the greater part of the article reports the positive aspects of long term friendly Zambia-China cooperation in the military and political fields. Optimistic framing, although inserted in critical articles, continues the pattern we saw in the Daily Mail and The Post Online, of extolling China’s involvement in the infrastructure development arena (roads railways, ICT, energy and sports facilities) and Sata’s invitation of Chinese investors (May 7).

Equally, much as a lingering negative tone is perceivable in headlines relating to Sata’s visit to China as seen in the sarcasm in the headlines, these remain some of the few occasions when Zambia Watchdog represents China in positive terms (April 11; April 6; April 1; 22 March 22).

While Zambia Watchdog may be through-and-through an anti-establishment platform, the fact that it allows a Chinese national to push back on some of the accusations made against his nation reflects positively on it along fair-comment-normative-journalistic principles (April 18). Among the positive frame elements that ‘China man’ propounds is: China as ‘the only country in the world that shows...willingness to invest in Africa’, China availing low interest loans as well as aid,
the affordability of Chinese goods, and the disinterest or incapacity of countries such as 'USA, UK and India' to help Africa in similar ways.

Pessimist, Competitor, Exploiter Frame

Analysing Zambia Watchdog articles, it is evident that this web-based media is both a news provider covering other sources as well as engaged in defence of its own role as a vanguard of Zambia’s democracy. Taking an advocacy approach, the news site accuses China of supplying equipment to the Zambian government for internet surveillance and blockage of critical content flow (September 6; February 21). The articles indicate that the Zambia Watchdog and a kindred online site, Zambia Reports, are some of the targets of the alleged surveillance. The implication here is that China is aiding information and press repression and rolling back media freedoms in Zambia.

Citing anonymous sources the article makes sweeping assertions: ZTE is involved in corruption over a security camera surveillance contract in Lusaka and Huawei is ‘a Chinese military and secret service wing of the Chinese government that was barred ‘from operating in America and other major Western Nations’. Apparent responses to these allegations on the Huawei website are treated with utter incredulity. Ultimately ZTE and Huawei are used to frame a thoroughly pessimistic image of China bordering on antagonism (September 6; February 21).

A related article sees the launch of a newspaper to serve the Chinese community in Zambia - The Oriental Post – as ‘borrowing repressive media trends from the far East’ (July 19). Within this pessimistic frame, criticism is levelled at ‘President Michael Sata’s dictatorial regime (which) has praised China’s media record despite that country’s repressive media laws’ (February 21). This activist/advocacy journalism is appreciable when one reads further in the article that ‘the popular Zambian Watchdog is inaccessible in Zambia, ostensibly blocked by the regime. Thus, we are invited to see the Zambia Watchdog as a defender of free press and related democratic ideals as well as, ostensibly, a victim of ‘bad press laws’. The message here is that China is not good for Zambia’s press freedom. It is probably in the interest of protecting the identity of the ‘investigative journalists’ writing these stories for Zambia Watchdog that nearly all articles have no by-lines, supposedly to protect them from reprisals.

The Zambia Watchdog positions itself as an anti-corruption crusader. One article written without a by-line purports to ‘expose’ a top Zambian army officer destined for China allegedly found with ‘elephant tusks in two of the suitcases’ at the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport (June 5). The dramatic article suggests collusion between Zambian and Chinese military officers under the cover of diplomatic immunity in the illegal trafficking of wildlife trophy and further implies impunity in the ostensible allowing of the army officer to proceed to China despite being ‘caught red-handed’.

From a geopolitical viewpoint, Sata’s embrace of China and his criticism of the West are seen as a case of double standards (June 3), and why would Sata give potential Western investors a wide berth while embracing their Chinese counterparts? Zambia Watchdog posits the following pessimistic hypothesis: investors from the West would not condone corruption; Western investors would demand respect for human rights as pre-condition; Chinese investors ‘invest where there are loopholes and room for bribing government officials’ (June 3).

Zambia Watchdog is both an enterprise news media as well as an aggregator of news from other sources. In an article sourced from Africa-Asia Confidential magazine, one sees a blend of both optimism and pessimism. The balance however swings towards a pessimistic valance especially with respect to instances of Chinese firms’ – such as Sogecoa, a subsidiary of Anhui Foreign
Economic Construction Group – allegedly bribing former president Rupiah Banda to win lucrative contracts, among a litany of other cases (May 7).

While the prosecution of former president Banda is presented as old corruption, the Sata regime is seen as having fallen in the same trap it sought to cure. The above article (May 7) quotes a Zambian university professor saying: ‘we still see Chinese waiters, bartenders, even guards at gates in Chinese hotels and buildings... and these are the jobs Sata and the PF promised to grab and give to the one million Zambian youths who voted for them in 2011., and who is issuing work permits to those Chinese nationals to come and do donkey jobs here? It’s the PF government’. In a nutshell, this lengthy article implies a let down, some kind of betrayal on the part of Sata and ends up painting a pessimistic view of China.

With respect to Chinese nationals competing with locals for jobs, a similar perspective is seen in a heated exchange between a Zambian writer and a Chinese commentator (April 18 and April 18) with the latter article explaining that poor work ethics is the reason why Chinese companies hire Chinese nationals even though it would have made economic sense to hire Zambian workers.

Whilst we do not see reportage on labour unrest in Daily Mail and The Post during 2013, it is only in Zambia Watchdog that such an incident is reported (January 3). This not only reinforces the widely reported variants of labour schisms of yesteryears but also dovetails with allegations of failure to employ locals to further cement a pessimistic outlook on China.

In terms of China’s image in Zambia, what can we make of a story that claims Sata is involved in nepotism by sending his niece to China as an ambassador (November 25)? At the surface level, it may appear that China has little to do with the nepotism charge. However, when read from the perspective of Sata being keen to have a reliable relative as envoy in Beijing, an interpretation could be made to infer the significance of China in the Sata administration's international relations architecture. By extension, an inference could then be made that having a niece for plenipotentiary to the Great Hall of the People court may have ominous albeit not immediately decipherable goals. But then we learn that the niece-ambassador is related to Sata by being a relative of the Zambian first lady. On another more direct pessimism front, Sata is indeed quoted as saying: the ‘Chinese (are) cleverer than Zambians so (the niece-ambassador) should be careful’ (November 25).

An equally abrasive article claims that President Sata is sinking Zambia into a debt trap by borrowing money used to pay civil servant salaries (August 8). Sata is first labelled as an ‘ailing dictator’ and then an implied complicity of China in Zambia’s debt burden is made. While the writer’s criticism is directed at Sata and not China, China still suffers collateral damage. Even more abrasive to frightening proportions is an article that alleges that Zambia has borrowed US$19 million for the production and supply of bombs and gunpowder (April 15).

Given its historical importance, can anything negative be said about China in reference to Tazara? Nay, so goes received wisdom, given the ardours sacrifices in blood and money that the Mao Zedong/Zhou Enlai generation expended to build the railway at a time when China herself was in need of development resources. Zambia Watchdog thinks otherwise. In one article, a writer wonders how many times Zambians should thank China for Tazara (April 12). In other words, the writer implies Zambians have already thanked China enough about Tazara and need not belabour it any further. What reasons are advanced in attempting to convert this iconoclastic exemplar of positive framing for China into a pessimistic one? Among others, the following can be delineated: it is as if Zambians are being reminded that they are beggars; the project was built through a loan being paid for to date; a substantial amount of the money went back to China in terms of paying for Chinese construction workers; the railway is strategic for transporting
copper to China...in sum, the article turns an optimistic framing of Tazara into a pessimistic one. The negative portrayal coming out of the positivity associated with Tazara is further bolstered in an article that claims that Chinese trains acquired by Tazara had been found to be faulty (April 12).

Discussion

The key finding of this study is that collectively, the three Zambian media outlets – constituting a substantial section of the Zambian media system – are more optimistic about China than they are pessimistic. Even though this is a limited study to extent that it does not cover the Zambian media lay-of-the-ground in its entirety, we can cautiously conclude that the selected media are a reflection of the optimistic inclination of the Zambian media in general in lieu of a more thoroughgoing study. For the current study, it is sufficient to conclude that the government-owned Daily Mail crafts an optimistic perception by dint of Zambia’s good relations with China, while, and as we see below, The Post Online, is virtually a government-allied newspaper and therefore equally optimistic on and for China.

While we can affirm Zambian media as a source of knowledge, information and data on Zambia-China relations, we must exercise caution on the basis of this article’s findings. Using only a government paper such as Daily Mail or an oppositional news site such as Zambia Watchdog may present images of China in Zambia so divergent as to give pause to a reader, an analyst or a researcher. Additionally, huge discrepancy on balance and fairness from the sampled news media suggests the audience research dimension cannot be ignored if the real perceptions of Zambians on the China question are to be appreciated with a measure of comprehensiveness.

While The Post Online is closest to editorial independence on the China theme, evidence abounds to demonstrate that this editorial independence is only relative in the Zambian media ecology, as it swings decidedly to a pro-China stance. China optimism is quite fine and in some instances should be applauded. However, for a sophisticated reader, the ululation and gushing towards China in some of the The Post Online content may be overly optimistic as to forge suspicion on the dalliance between this outlet and Zambian and Chinese officialdom. The same would apply to Zambia Watchdog whose take-no-prisoner approach is, in many a case, too abrasive as to raise suspicions about the possibility that this site’s default is to be a China-basher.

A related observation is that, as we saw in earlier sections, The Post Online (as well as Daily Mail) were critical of Sata during his opposition heydays but switched to a pro-Sata stance once he took power (see Spilsbury 2012: 264 for instance). This may indeed be a function of Zambian media aligning themselves with the regime in power for a variety of political economy factors that further research could reveal. One line of inquisition would be whether supposedly independent newspapers such as The Post Online are so dependent on the Zambian government for economic survival that they can’t dare ‘bite the hand that feeds them’ and thus willingly lose their independence. With respects to China, it is worthwhile noting that indeed Sata had transformed from an anti-China crusader to one who cautiously embraces China and with the government-owned Daily Mail and ‘independent’ The Post Online, following suit.

In light of the many instances of open partisanship of Zambian media questions arise about fidelity to normative journalistic models in view of the fact that Zambia follows a Westphalia modus operandi. For instance, while the Daily Mail and The Post Online are long on the historical links between China and Zambia, the Zambia Watchdog glosses over this agency of positive framing for China in Zambia. Indeed, Zambia Watchdog goes so far as to question the benefits of the relations in a manner analogous to Alden’s (2007) characterization ‘China’s perfect storm’, or Shinn and Eisenman’s (2012) conclusion that certain aspects of the relations have left ‘a legacy of ill will’.
While literature indicates that the copper industry is the main source of negativity about China, this study finds that as of 2013, things may have changed. Indeed, articles to do with investments promotion and attraction hog much more space than the already established mining sector. Only one incident of labour action related to mining is reported while a dispute over mining regulations is reported in the context of the problem having been solved. Could this be an indication that the mining woes of yesteryears are on the way to a smoother ride under Sata? Indeed, the China Non-Ferous Mining Company, which is critiqued for labour mishaps and controversies, is the same company that hosts Sata during his state visit to China with discussions decidedly upbeat. This trope indeed dovetails with charges in the Zambian Watchdog that craft the character of Sata as an opportunistic turncoat whose earlier criticism of China were in the pursuit of political power by all means.

An interesting observation is that Zambia and China have entered cooperation in the media sector beyond the hardware media assistance that we synthesised in the literature review section above. The ruling Patriotic Front youth invited by China’s State Administration for Radio Film and Television (SARFT) to learn how to package and channel media messages is a demonstration of this collaboration. A top manager-editor of The Post Online is invited to China from where he writes a positively framed opinion piece. This ‘capacity building’ assistance can be distinguished from the material support that China offered Zambia in the past such as China’s donation of radio transmission equipment to Zambia in the 1960s, 1980, 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2011 (Yu-Shan Wu 2012:13-15; Shinn and Eisenman (2012:324). Would this capacity building dimension of Chinese assistance to Zambia serve as confirmation of the suppositions by writers such as Farah and Mosher (2010) and Banda (2009) that there is an ideological ‘reshape’ of African and Zambian media underway? An extension of this media dimension of cooperation can be seen in the wider context of Zambia-Africa-China cooperation at political party level in the case of the Zambian politician, Wynter Kabimba reported as securing the position of president of the Council of African Political Parties (CAPP) coincidentally headquartered in Khartoum, Sudan (Daily Mail May 29). Investigation reveals that a Chinese Communist Party graced the occasion of the launch of CAPP with Western representatives missing at the event (Raziq and Hai, 2013). This is an important development to note because literature indicates that Sudan and Zambia are the polar countries where Chinese involvement in Africa has been framed controversially.

As with other forms of Zambia-China links, Chinese media assistance – whether of the hardware or software variety - has been framed in a Manichean way. For instance, Brautigam (2011:10) argues that Radio transmitters apparently supplied by China were ‘delivering primary education to out of school children’ many of them orphans. However, Farah and Mosher (2010:16) see the Chinese media support for Zambia in the context of China attempting to prop up regimes keen on rolling back press freedom and democracy and aiding despotic regimes. In ‘gotcha journalism’ fashion, they conclude that this support was ‘awarded during election years [and] timed to support the pro-Beijing MMD in its electoral campaign effort’, a viewpoint advanced by Shinn and Eisenman (2012:73) who state that: ‘the Chinese side also gave the MMD FM transmitters to help get out the vote in rural areas’. From Franks and Ribet (2009: 131) we get the perspective that Chinese media support was meant to ‘potentially diffuse the electoral power that the opposition parties might have had’. The instances of media cooperation that we see in the content analysis of this article, however, demonstrates that Chinese media assistance is not necessarily timed to coincide with electioneering periods but one that is temporally continuous as equally argued by Brautigam (2011:9-10).

China-Africa literature indicates that Chinese media are in Africa on a public diplomacy mission. Indeed, Ngomba (2012:58) sees Chinese media support for Zambia more as ‘media-focused public diplomacy’ rather than as an ‘ideological commitment’. Less appreciated is the fact that African media can themselves serve as platforms for Chinese public diplomacy in Africa. This
media-based public diplomacy is seen in the case of the Chinese ambassador’s interviews with Zambian media as well as the coverage of several Zambian elites in full praise of China. Indeed, the content analysis in this study sustains our earlier literature review findings that economic assistance by China to Zambia is the source of Chinese soft power (Yejo Kim 2013; Jura and Kaluzynska 2013). In the particular context of this study, it would appear that efforts are made to ensure that as many of Chinese assistance to Zambia are reported as possible.

What can be said of Zambian Watchdog reporting, heavily slanted towards pessimism? In their critical report, the Human Rights Watch report (2011) mentioned in its methodology that it relied in part on journalistic sources in painting a grim picture of China in Zambia’s mining sector. Sautman and Yan (2013) fault the Human Rights Watch methodology charging that in an apparently premeditated agenda, the advocacy organisation ‘sees what it wants to see and thus again fosters the entirely predictable result of feeding anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia’. Brautigam (2009:151) points out the role of journalists in the misrepresentations over the 2006 fall out between Sata and Chinese authorities. This is a perspective analogous with Franks and Ribet’s (2009:134) argument that Sata’s anti-Chinese political campaign platform may have been latched on to forge negativity in Western media. Against this background, this study finds that Zambian Watchdog may be more inclined towards a Western view of China in Africa in such a manner as to regurgitate some of the suppositions of China’s bashing that are often not backed by fact.

It will be important going forward for proper audience research to be undertaken to prime insights that the internet with all its conveniences can never reveal. Not even the fact that ‘internet coverage in Zambia is relatively high by African standards’ (Jura and Kalusynska, 2013: 48) replaces the efficacy of an audience dimension to a perceptions study such as this. Thus this article, as well as many others of a similar nature, must be considered as work in progress. The audience survey could sample not only Zambians from different age, social and geographical cadres but also media practitioners would also be targeted in order to hold up today’s China-Zambia relations against the global headline grabbing events of yesteryears.

References


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Determinants of Active Ageing in Zambia

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This article investigated determinants of active ageing proposed by the WHO 2002 Active Ageing Framework using data from a developing country - Zambia. Up to date, there is little or no evidence of studies conducted to answer whether or not determinants proposed by the Active Ageing Framework of 2002 apply to developing countries like Zambia. This article set out to (1) explore which of the determinants of active ageing apply to Africa and Zambia in particular and (2) the influence of HIV/AIDS on active ageing in general. A non-experimental cross-sectional research design was used to collect data for this article. Snowball and purposive sampling was employed since there is no available sampling frame for the aged population. The article reveals that income accessibility (Economic Determinant), functional limitations (Health Determinants), low self-esteem and loneliness (Personal/Behavioural Determinants), low family and peer interactions (Social Determinants) and HIV/AIDS determine active ageing in Zambia. The article suggests focused research needed to clarify and specify the role of each determinant, as well as the interactions between determinants in the active ageing process. In fact, the framework proposes that for such studies, a life course approach is required so as to take advantage of transitions and ‘window of opportunity’ for enhancing health, participation and security at different stages. The article also recommends that policies on ageing should be structured to incorporate main determinants of active ageing to reflect the Zambian context.

Introduction

The World Health Organization (2002) conceptualised ‘Active Ageing’ as ‘...the process of optimizing opportunities for health, participation, and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age...’. The idea, dating as far back as 1990, was a concerted effort between WHO and several other government and non-governmental organizations to help explain linkages between activity, health, independence, and ageing well (Constana et al., 2012). Since this inception, several articles and papers have been written to highlight contextual as well as practical aspects of active ageing. In this process, it has been highlighted that scientific interests on the empirical dimension of active ageing has been scarce on the international level (Borsch-Span, 2013). This assumption is even more critical to Africa where ageing is still being perceived as a ‘farfetched dream’ and a problem of concern to western countries. However, notwithstanding this downplay of ageing in Africa, there clearly exists evidence to the contrary.

For example, Kalasa (2005) states that although Africa will remain relatively young for some time, old age dependency burden will increase by about 93% by 2050. In the same way, while the ratio of the population aged 60 years and above to the population aged 0-14 years was 0.169 in 1950 and 0.212 in 1995 (a change of 25%), the ratio will be 0.914 in the year 2050 (a change of 441% from 1950 and 331% from 1995). In essence, therefore, the ‘window of hope’ may not be as permanent as most people would like to think, and this signals the need for African countries to critically focus on elderly populations (Kidd, et al., 2009) and active ageing becomes an important input to this process. Quite frankly, the concept of ‘active ageing’ has not been measured to assume its importance and contribution to overall ageing in most parts of Africa (Leive, et al., 2008). Moreover, there is little evidence to indicate whether or not research has surfaced to confidently apply ‘active ageing’ with a focus on Africa and whether or not proposed determinants of active ageing could be applicable to most parts of Africa. In the same way, Africa is currently facing a huge challenge in the form of HIV/AIDS which consequently is affecting older people. The question therefore is: how can we locate HIV/AIDS within the Active Ageing Framework? And to what extent is AIDS a determinant of Active Ageing. Rephrasing
Constana et al. (2012), this paper explores Determinants of the WHO 2002 Active Ageing Framework that embraces positive outcomes of the ageing process using data from Zambia. We intended to understand determinants of active ageing using data from a developing country as well as introduce HIV/AIDS as one of the determinants of active ageing. This paper sets out to (1) explore which of the determinants of active ageing apply to Africa and Zambia in particular, and (2) the influence of HIV/AIDS on active ageing in general.

Methods

We conducted a non-experimental cross-sectional population-based survey of participants aged 60 years and older in communities and within the five homes for the aged namely: Matero, Kandiana, Maramba, Mitanda, and Chibolya located in Lusaka, Sesheke, Livingston, Ndola, and Mufulira districts, respectively. The sample comprises both a rural and urban dimension, men and women proportions, respectively. Kandiana is predominately in a peri-urban rural setting of Western Province whereas Matero, Mitanda, and Chibolya are within the heart of the urban settings. Respondents in homes for the aged were included or excluded based on the ability to communicate, and conversely the very sick or incontinent were excluded.

Data Collection

An interviewer administered questionnaire was used to collect data on individual, socioeconomic, HIV and AIDS, behavioural, and health/functional indicators of active ageing. Men and women aged 60 years and older institutionalised (those found in old people’s homes) as well as un-institutionalised aged people living in study areas were selected and interviewed.

Standardised procedures of purposive and snow-ball sampling were employed in identifying respondents for the study. Purposively, all residents in existing old people’s homes were targeted for the study. In addition, samples of the aged living in communities were selected through snow-ball sampling (Goodman, 1961; Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004). The approach was useful, as the study population has no known sampling frame as well as taking into account the sensitivity associated with ageing in Zambia. Lusaka had the highest number of respondents (296), followed by Ndola (195), Sesheke (125), Mufulira (50), and Livingstone (24). In total, a sample of 690 men and women aged 60 years and older was surveyed.

Defining Old Aged

In the early 1970s, the Zambian government defined aged persons as generally any woman above age 40 and above or any man over 50 years (Zambia’s Report for the 1982 World Assembly on Ageing, 1982). However, after setting the statutory age for retirement at age 55 for females and 60 years for males, and with similar requirements for admission to the homes for the aged, a new concept to determine old age was created (Kamwengo, 2004). Unfortunately, even up to now, there is no clear guide as to who qualifies to be classified as an ‘old person’. Retirement age in Zambia is 55 years for both males and females; the discriminatory clause where females were required to retire earlier than males was eliminated from the statutory instruments.

The actual chronological age attainment for one to qualify to be ‘old’ still remains a debatable concept and varies with region and context. For example, the United Nations defines an old person as one who is 60 years and older; Zambia’s Health Policy on the other hand states that for one to have free access to medical services, one has to be at least 65 years or older. Thus, the synchronisation and the meaning of chronological age attained to be classified as aged still lacks a universally acceptable threshold. However, this paper is situated within the UN definition of the aged, which states that ‘any person aged 60 years or older is aged’.
Model for Determinants of Active Ageing

Determinants of active ageing were measured using proxy indicators including gender and residence. In this paper, residence was measured by either urban or rural areas (in Zambia, the plight of the aged and active ageing differences are reflected easily by one’s residence), while gender was reflected or measured through one’s sex. Behavioural and personal determinants were measured using indicators such as feeling hopeless, useless, unhappy, or lonely, and dignity and self-image, among others. Health and functional determinants were measured using the following indicators (say either ‘yes’ or ‘no’): ability to squat, ability to walk freely, and ability to clean own house. Economic determinants were measured using indicators such as: having worked in the past 12 months, having opportunities for work, and having a steady flow of income. Indicators on social determinants included information on care takers, living arrangements, peer and family interactions, and receipt of any support. Finally, HIV/AIDS was included as a determinant, unique to Zambia and Southern Africa in general, but not reflected in the Active Ageing Framework (WHO, 2002). HIV/AIDS was measured using indicators such as: staying with dependents; staying with orphans; whether these were HIV/AIDS orphans; and whether they had lost children due to AIDS. These indicators were used to reflect the effect of HIV/AIDS on active aging and were collapsed as ‘Reports HIV/AIDS’.

In this model, as well as in the Active Ageing Framework, these determinants were or are treated as independent variables while active ageing (measured by participation, self-fulfilment, independence, and dignity) was measured as the dependent variable. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of determinants of active ageing and indicators of active ageing.

Results

A total of 700 participants were surveyed; 10 were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete data (age, sex data), leaving 690 (284 males and 406 females) representing 98% response rate. The socio-demographic characteristics of the study population are shown in table 1. Table 1 shows that the sample contained more females than males; the mean age for the population was 72 years, with more respondents from the urban settings than rural areas. Majority of respondents were widowed with females exhibiting a higher percentage compared to males. Similarly, more males than females reported being married. In fact, this is a reflection of the norm in most African societies. Overall also, primary education attainment is more prominent (52%) compared to higher education (15.8%) and those reporting never having attended school (32%), respectively.

Table 1: Description of sample of elderly Zambians (60 years and above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>56.34</td>
<td>21.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the Active Ageing Framework, active ageing depends on a variety of influences or 'determinants' that surround individuals, families, and the nation (WHO 2002). These determinants are varied and are known to affect active ageing differently. Among the varied factors are; gender and residence, economic, health, social, physical environment and psychological or behavioural, as central to the active ageing framework. This study also endeavoured to situate the influence of HIV/AIDS in the active aging framework, particularly the lives of older people in Zambia. HIV/AIDS was included because of its influences on the lives of older people, particularly because they are expected to look after orphaned children if or when their parents die due to HIV/AIDS or indeed any other causes. This situation in most cases exacerbates poverty levels of already impoverished old people's households. We excluded the 'physical environment' determinant because the context in which it is used in developed countries is very different from what could be referred to as physical environment in an African setting. For example, the determinant in question proposes that for people to age actively, there is need to build structures which take into account their physical limitations (i.e. all buildings should have escalators and not just stairs). In the modified framework, we replaced culture with residence. This was so because issues of culture were not measured accurately and due to various differentials in understanding culture, the study was not structured to measure common acceptable applications for different areas sampled. Figures 1 and 2 are the original and modified 2002 WHO Active Ageing Framework, respectively.

Figure 1. Original WHO Active Ageing Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divorced/Separated</th>
<th>11.45</th>
<th>13.03</th>
<th>10.34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>48.99</td>
<td>26.41</td>
<td>64.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It should also be borne in mind that Active Ageing is not a concept measurable using a single variable - it is complex. Using the definition of the concept itself, active ageing should include: independence, participation, self-fulfilment, dignity, and care. Out of these, four – independence, participation, self-fulfilment and dignity – were captured in the data collection process. Independence for example was measured by asking respondents to state whether they were free to make their own decisions without being coerced or forced; participation was also measured by asking respondents to state whether they were free and allowed to participate in community activities such as church gatherings, community meetings, etc. Any ‘Yes’ response to these questions meant that they were participating in community activities and therefore fulfilling partly the active ageing process requirements.

Table 2. Percent Distribution of Determinants of Active Ageing and Selected Indicators of Active Ageing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants of Active Ageing</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Selected Indicators of Active Ageing</th>
<th>Self Participation</th>
<th>Self Fulfilment</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Dignity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal/Behavioural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feels’ Hopeless</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhappy</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonely</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health/Functional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill past 12 months</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can squat</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 shows that for almost all indicators of active ageing proposed identified primary determinants seem to have influences. For example, the respondent’s sex influences how older people participate (88.8 and 91.2% for males and females, respectively) in communities; it also influences how independent (79.7 and 72.1% for males and females, respectively) they are as well as whether they live dignified lives or not (72.6 and 67.5% for males and females, respectively). Similarly, for almost all determinants of active ageing, self-fulfilment seems to be the least affected. Except for ‘receiving support’ (100%), and ‘interacting with peers’ (100%), other influences are less effective. Except for participation where females seem to report more (91.9%), males are more self-fulfilled (16.1%), more independent (79.7%), and more dignified (72.6%).

The rural-urban divide of residences of old people brings to perspective differentials in the concept of active ageing. Residents in urban areas appear to participate more in community activities (92.1 against 84.5%), are likely to be more self-fulfilled (10.2 against 7.7%), and more independent (76.8 against 68.2%) compared to their rural counterparts. However, in terms of dignity, older people in both rural and urban areas seem to enjoy relatively similar treatment (70.6 and 69.2%, respectively).

While it is clear that other determinants play important roles in explaining active ageing, there are few or exceptional variations amongst and between them. Behavioural and personal determinants also affect the way older people participate in community activities. Being unhappy and reporting loneliness, for example, is associated with the respondent’s independence (68.2 and 70.8%, respectively) and dignity (75 and 73.3%, respectively). Health determinants also indicate associations with active ageing indicators relating to participation in community activities, independence, and dignity. About 88.6% of respondents stated that while they were ill in the past 12 months prior to the study, they were free to participate in affairs of society. Economic determinants, especially having a monthly income (from any source) is associated with active ageing indicators of participation (96.2%) and independence (91.7%). Similarly, social determinants appear to effect active ageing indicators differently. However, this association is more visible with participation in community activities and independence than with other indicators.

The influence of HIV/AIDS in the active ageing process cannot be ignored, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa region. HIV/AIDS appear to affect participation activities (93.8%) more compared to other determinants. However, HIV/AIDS appear to have no clear influence on the active ageing indicator of self-fulfilment. In other words, one’s report that they are affected by HIV/AIDS or are taking care of HIV/AIDS orphans does not suggest a clear influence on fulfilment.
Determinants of Active Ageing relative to Active Ageing Indicators

In order to measure the influence of each of the determinants on indicators of active ageing, a multiple regression model was used. All outcome and independent variables remained as they appear in descriptive Table 2. Details of these relationships are in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants of Active Ageing</th>
<th>Selected Indicators of Active ageing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal/Behavioral</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feels’ Hopeless</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhappy</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonely</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health/Functional</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill past 12 months</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can squat</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk freely</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean house</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work past 12 months</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp/work/income gen</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has caretaker</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with anyone</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interact with peers</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives support</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIV/AIDS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports HIV</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***P<0.0001 *P<0.05 **P<0.01 *+P<0.001

Opp/work/income gen = opportunity for work or income generating activity

Associations in the table show that gender influences active ageing indicators of independence (p<0.05) and self-fulfilment (p<0.0001). However, there is no association between one’s sex and active ageing indicators of participation and dignity. On the other hand, residence has no bearing on older people’s dignity and self-fulfilment, but is statistically associated with both participation (p<0.01) and independence (p<0.05).

Personal/behavioural determinants of active ageing are associated to active ageing indicators of participation, self-fulfilment and independence. In this example, almost all measures of personal/behavioural determinants are associated with the active ageing indicator of participation (hopeless (p<0.05); useless (p<0.001); lonely (p<0.05)) except for ‘being unhappy’. Similarly, the relationship between the personal/behavioural determinant indicator of ‘feeling useless’ is significant with both the active ageing indicators of self-fulfilment (p<0.05) and independence (p<0.01). Given these results, it is clear that the main problem in as far as older people are concerned is low self-esteem. Low self-esteem inhibits old people’s full participation in several activities taking place at community or society level.
The active ageing framework proposes that health and functional abilities have substantial effects on ageing in general. Results in Table 3 show that there is no significant association between the respondent's report of being 'ill in last 12 months prior to the study' and any other indicator of active ageing. This finding is at variance with the propositions in the active ageing framework, where health is a key determinant. However, this may mean that ill health may only affect active ageing if and when it is experienced over a long period of time. Ability to 'clean the house' is related to the active ageing indicator of 'participation' (p<0.0001) and independence (p<0.001); while 'being able to squat' is only significant with the active ageing indicator of 'independence' (p<0.0001). This shows that while health indeed affects the ageing process, this relationship can best be measured by a life course approach and is more factual when it relates to actual physical activity where older people have to perform more physical abilities, rather than reports of being ill for example. As a result, while it could be argued that health is a significant challenge in old age, the effect it has on the actual active ageing process is minimal except where one has lifelong health challenges.

Economic determinants are also said to have a bearing on the active ageing process. However, the economic determinant indicator measured by proxy of whether or not someone 'worked in the last 12 months prior to the study' is not statistically significant on active ageing indicators. The working in this respect refers to any work done by the elderly and is paid for irrespective of the duration of the work done. The economic determinant indicator of 'having opportunities for work or income generating activities' has no bearing on almost all active ageing indicators except that of independence (p<0.05). The main economic (determinant) indicator influencing participation, self-fulfilment and independence is 'monthly income'. Monthly income refers to income/money received either from work done, retirement, or any other source. In fact, respondents' report of having a steady 'monthly income' affects their participation (p<0.05), self-fulfilment (p<0.01) and also their independence (p<0.0001).

Besides the forgoing, Table 3 also shows an association between social indicators of determinants of active ageing and active ageing indicators. Self-fulfilment and dignity are not statistically associated with the social determinants proposed in the active ageing framework. However, all, except for two of the measured indicators of social determinants of active ageing (living with anyone and receiving support) seem to affect active ageing indicators of participation and independence. Participation is affected by whether or not a respondent has a caretaker (p<0.0001) and whether or not a respondent interacts with peers (p<0.0001). In the same way, the active ageing indicator of independence is related to all social determinants of active ageing with 'having a caretaker' (p<0.01), and 'receiving support' (p<0.0001) being negatively related.

Lastly but not least, our study looked also at the effect HIV/AIDS is having on active ageing. This situation is not proposed through the active ageing framework but thought through to have effects on the active ageing process. Table 3 shows that HIV/AIDS is related to the active ageing indicator of participation (p<0.01) and independence (p<0.0001). However, HIV/AIDS has no bearing on one's self-fulfilment and dignity. This means that old people's report of HIV/AIDS affects how they participate in community activities as well as their independence. What this shows is that older people who could be keeping orphans, for example, are not as independent to be able to do what they want and whenever they want because they have to take care and look after orphans. This is a serious and daunting challenge affecting older people in Zambia and other African countries where the HIV/AIDS pandemic is highly pronounced and generalised.

In summary, Table 3 suggests that active ageing is a function of most of the determinants proposed in the active ageing framework or model. Even with the presence of HIV/AIDS, the
relationship with indicators of determinants of active ageing and indicators of active ageing itself is quite strong.

Discussions above are not conclusive. As a result, for the paper to accurately establish which of the determinants of active ageing are more significant, and also to establish 'pathways' affecting active ageing significantly, we generated a composite variable compressing all indicators of active ageing into a variable called 'Active Ageing'.

The input variables for all or most of the indicators of active ageing were generated by 'Yes' and 'No' responses. For example, for us to investigate whether any respondent was 'participating' in community activities, we asked them to confirm (yes) or disapprove (no) whether they were given chances to participate in community activities such as going to church; being given positions of authority; being considered to heard community groupings, etc. Any 'Yes' response to such a statement meant that a respondent was participating while a 'No' outcome meant the opposite. This process was followed through for other indicators of active ageing - self-fulfilment, independence, and dignity. In order to finally come up with the outcome variable of ‘Active Ageing’, all 'Yes' responses to the preceding conditions or questions meant a respondent was enjoying active ageing while 'No' responses meant the opposite. This process provided a demonstration of determinants of active ageing and pathways with influences on active ageing relating to Zambia. Table 4 shows multiple regression results of indicators (or pathways) of determinants of active ageing and active ageing as a single outcome variable.

### Table 4 Determinants of Active Ageing in Zambia – Single Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants of Active Ageing</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Active Ageing (exp)</th>
<th>β (exp)</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>sex</strong></td>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0070</td>
<td>-0.0173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residence</strong></td>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
<td>***0.0923</td>
<td>0.1796</td>
<td>0.0320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal/Behavioural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Feels' Hopeless</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td>*0.0517</td>
<td>0.1189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
<td>**0.0965</td>
<td>-0.2156</td>
<td>0.0389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhappy</td>
<td>311</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0307</td>
<td>-0.0765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonely</td>
<td>364</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0137</td>
<td>-0.0343</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health/Functional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill past 12 months</td>
<td>433</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0194</td>
<td>-0.0474</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can squat</td>
<td>487</td>
<td></td>
<td>*0.0438</td>
<td>0.1005</td>
<td>0.0415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk freely</td>
<td>522</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0054</td>
<td>-0.0116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean house</td>
<td>499</td>
<td></td>
<td>**0.0564</td>
<td>0.1263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work past 12 months</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0156</td>
<td>-0.0257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp/work/income gen</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0199</td>
<td>0.0432</td>
<td>0.0109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td>158</td>
<td></td>
<td>*0.0402</td>
<td>0.0843</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has caretaker</td>
<td>417</td>
<td></td>
<td>**-0.0614</td>
<td>-0.1409</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with anyone</td>
<td>523</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0413</td>
<td>0.0615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interact with peers</td>
<td>480</td>
<td></td>
<td>*+0.0754</td>
<td>0.1359</td>
<td>0.0499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives support</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0303</td>
<td>-0.0641</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 shows that gender does not influence active ageing, even if it does influence some individual indicators of active ageing (Table 3). This finding defies propositions given in the Active Ageing Framework where gender is an overarching variable influencing active ageing in general. Residence, however, influences active ageing (p<0.0001). It should also be noted that even after controlling gender against residence and vice versa, the relationships between gender and active ageing on one side and residence and active ageing on the other, remained the same – gender does not influence active ageing while residence does. To some extent, this revelation marries well with the Active Ageing Framework assumption stating the uncertainty with which one can predict or point out direct causation of anyone determinant on active ageing (Active Ageing Framework, 2002, p. 19). To be certain on this front, the framework proposes studies of a life course approach to take advantage of transitions and ‘window of opportunity’ for enhancing health, participation and security at different stages (Active Ageing Framework, 2002, p. 19-20).

Results in Table 4 also show that amongst personal/behavioural determinants of active ageing, only feelings of ‘hopelessness’ (p<0.05) and ‘uselessness’ (p<0.0001) explain variations on the outcome variable of active ageing. Actually, this model predicts that feeling useless is negatively related to active ageing (Beta=-215). Other indicators of personal/behavioural determinants of active ageing have no bearing on active ageing in general.

In the same way, health and some functional disabilities do not affect active ageing. However, ability to squat (p<0.05) and clean the house (p<0.01) affect older people substantially. In terms of economic determinants, the model suggests that only ‘having a steady monthly income’ (p<0.05) affects active ageing. Other economic determinants have no bearing on active ageing.

This model also suggests that the major social (determinants) contributors to active ageing, are ‘having a caretaker’ (p<0.01) and ‘interacting with peers’ (p<0.001). Others, such as ‘living with other adult children’ and ‘receiving any form of support’ do not affect active ageing. In the same way, the presence of HIV/AIDS, is associated with active ageing (p<0.01). Even after controlling for other determinants, the relationship between HIV/AIDS and active ageing remained significant.

**Discussion**

This paper set out to investigate factors associated with active ageing in Zambia. Using data derived from extensive investigation of determinants of active ageing, we employed both the bivariate and multivariate models to locate determinants of active ageing. In the Zambian context, personal/behavioural factors are associated with active ageing particularly relating to ‘feeling hopeless and useless’, health/functional factors are associated to the ability ‘to squat and cleaning one’s house’, whereas economic factors (access monthly income, paid work, etc.) were associated with active ageing. Similarly, social factors relating to ‘having a caretaker and interacting with friends or peers’ increases the probability of ageing actively. These results corroborate as well with the WHO framework on active ageing.

What is clearly different in these findings is that unlike the active ageing framework, the study has situated HIV/AIDS within the active ageing framework and confirms that in the Zambian
context and also in countries with a generalised HIV/AIDS pandemic, active ageing will for a long time be affected by HIV/AIDS. Suffice to say the influence of HIV/AIDS on active ageing is far-reaching, particularly that most of the old people not only suffer neglect, poverty, insecure housing in their old age, they are also left with the responsibility of taking care of orphaned children, which in most cases exacerbates the already dire situation.

Conclusion

The plight of old people should be re-looked at in order to ensure active ageing. Government effort should be geared towards eliminating location or regional disparities (rural/urban) in the ageing process. Health systems need to be re-aligned to prepare and accommodate challenges of the aged as the health or functional challenges among the aged are often inevitable.

The study has demonstrated the need to strengthen the weakening family ties and structure in an effort to curtail social factors that have arisen mainly due to the modernisation of the extended family system to a nuclear family system. However, this factor is not categorical in the active ageing framework. In order to measure active ageing with utmost acceptable precision, long term studies which will show exactly how and at what point each of these determinants affect ageing should be encouraged.

References

Kamwengo, M. 2004. Growing old in Zambia: Old and New Perspectives. New Delhi, India:
The Power of Politics for Zambia’s Public Sector Unions: A Case Study of the 2013 Nursing Strikes

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Cornell University

Recent pay reform efforts in Zambia have sought to generate more competitive wages and benefits for workers in the public sector. However, these efforts have been characterised by inconsistent policy decisions during wage negotiations. Such decisions produce distortions in the pay structure that result in industrial unrest from unions in the public sector. Previous literature has not examined how public sector unions influence these outcomes in Zambia. This article examines factors that affect public sector unions’ influence in Zambia. Seven factors were identified after analysing the 2013 wage negotiations and subsequent nurses’ strikes at the University Teaching Hospital (UTH) as an extended case study. Most variables decreased union influence. Outcomes that favour unions were found to be largely the result of the government’s political will. Therefore, political will was determined to be the strongest variable influencing outcomes, whether to the benefit or detriment of unions and their members.

Introduction

Efforts at Zambian civil service pay reform have attracted a considerable amount of controversy in recent years. Civil servants, who are characterised by some as being overpaid, received a 200% wage increase in 2013 (Mukanga, 2013). Still, there has been a high rate of industrial unrest from civil servants, as evidenced by all ten public sector unions declaring a dispute with government in 2014. At the centre of this controversy stand the unions, which represent public sector workers. Since negotiations and industrial unrest are often linked to unions, one needs to examine their influence during negotiations and in subsequent conflict to understand this seeming paradox of substantial wage increases and labour unrest.

These trends were illustrated in a case study spanning the 2013 public sector wage negotiations, where many civil servants were granted considerable wage increments, and the subsequent nursing strikes at the University Teaching Hospital (UTH) in Lusaka. By using this case study to theorise about variables that give unions influence, this article argues that public sector unions in Zambia are not influential for a multitude of reasons, and that many of the outcomes commonly attributed to unions are actually the result of the government’s political will. While the unions representing civil servants who received the largest salary increments clearly benefited from the government’s political will, those representing nurses lost relative standing, and were therefore harmed by the government’s political will to the point of industrial unrest. This resolves the apparent paradox by revealing that when the government’s interests are in line with unions’, as with those who were granted large increments, union-friendly outcomes occur, but when they conflict, as with nurses’ unions, outcomes are more harmful.

This article is organised into five sections. The Literature Review places this analysis in context by demonstrating the need for a systematic look at exactly what variables give public sector unions influence. The Methodology outlines how the 2013 wage negotiations and subsequent UTH strike were chosen as an extended case study and how interviews were conducted to learn more about it. The Background presents a relevant historical overview of public sector unions and a chronology of events related to our case study to illustrate what happened in 2013. The

1 ‘Strike Watch’, 2014.
Results discusses what variables the study found that affect union influence. The Discussion analyses these findings to show that unions do not wield much power, then summarises and concludes the argument.

**Background**

*Historical Trajectory of Public Sector Unions in Zambia’s Third Republic*

To understand the state of Zambian unions today, a brief history of the Zambian labour movement is useful. At Zambia’s independence in 1964, its labour movement was one of the strongest in the region, but it has since lost considerable power, especially after the Movement for Multiparty Democracy assumed office in 1991. Symptomatic of this weakening is the fragmentation that has plagued the Zambian labour movement since then. In 1994, the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Zambia was formed to rival the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, which was formerly the only union federation, and many splinter unions emerged (Fashoyin, 2008; Mulenga, 2011). As more rival unions surfaced, bargaining power of the unions relative to the government declined. This trend of diminishing union power also exists in the public sector.

Frustrations with worker pay and benefits have made the civil service a hotbed for industrial unrest. Admittedly, these strikes are often illegal (Fashoyin, 2008; Mulenga, 2011). But, as Fashoyin notes, ‘...in Zambia, colossal impediments are placed on the right of workers to strike’, making it practically impossible to engage in a legal strike in many cases where grievances are time-sensitive (Fashoyin, 2007, p. 2). Public sector health workers in particular have had a long history of striking (see, Leenstra, 2012). The government’s usual reaction to these strikes is characterised as ‘a messy combination of appeasement and repression’, where strikers are fired, sometimes with police involvement, but are later reinstated, sometimes with the government conceding workers’ demands, which sends mixed signals (Leenstra, 2012, p. 190).

*Before the Strikes*

One major issue with pay reform in Zambia’s civil service is the use of *ad hoc* and piecemeal policies by the government to rationalise pay structures. Instead of stabilizing annual pay levels for most jobs, government officials agreed to offer significant allowances to a few industries that eventually caused an inflated wage bill and formed incongruities between jobs’ content and their pay (Valentine, 2002). To solve this problem, the government introduced the Job Evaluation and Re-Grading (JERG) exercise. This exercise would identify the appropriate pay for each job in the public sector. However, the JERG exercise was largely unsuccessful because of poor implementation.

Decisions from some government leaders conflicted with the desired outcomes of pay reform efforts and offset the goals of the JERG exercise. During election seasons, for example, it is common for government officials to offer union leaders higher wages and allowances than anticipated by the Ministry of Finance in order to gain favour for re-election. Overly generous offers inevitably expand the wage bill and undercut the JERG’s purpose. At the same time, these promises force the Ministry to cut programs in order to find supplemental funds. Thus, the wage negotiations following the JERG exercise inflated the wage bill (Kabamba, 2013), and indicated that political motivations can go beyond only recommending austerity measures.

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2 Consultant for the JERG exercise, interview, June 2014.

3 Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
In April of 2012, unions in the health sector began the process of wage negotiations by collecting a list of demands from their members. These demands were then delivered to government representatives before the negotiations. Union leaders were all invited to a resort in Siavonga that was paid for by the government to negotiate.

Health unions representing professionals, like nurses, demanded an across-the board wage increase for their members. While the government agreed to provide a 100-200% wage increase for non-professional workers in the health sector, they would not grant a similar increment to the nurses. This was because of the favourable increment nurses received in 2012. The government’s efforts to harmonise wages in an effort to eliminate large gaps in the pay structure meant that the lower paid workers, including non-professional health workers, were given significantly larger increments than professionals, who were already earning much more.

Nurses were given a 4% wage increase coupled with a 17% total increase to allowances. Once the agreements were signed in April and May, unions informed their members of the negotiations’ outcomes. Many nurses responded with surprise, as they had expected more.

October Strike

In September 2013, while they were supposed to get a 4% increment on their basic salary, some nurses’ payslips amounted to only 1.1%. Health Minister Kasonde claimed this was merely a result of payroll errors. However, this was not enough to assuage nurses, who began their first strike on or about the 2 October. In addition to the payroll issue, nurses cited the issue of being paid similar wages as less-educated non-professionals. Operations at UTH were severely hurt by the strike. Both government and union representatives implored the nurses to return to work. On the 9 October, some nurses did return after their union convinced them to.

Political players were deeply involved. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the opposition party United Party for National Development, wrote to President Michael Sata siding with the striking nurses. Sata responded by accusing Hichilema of politicising the issue and even calling him a ‘Merchant of death’, revealing the degree of opposition to the strike from the ruling party. Meanwhile, on or about the 10 October, when Health Minister Joseph Kasonde tried to meet with strikers, they refused to meet with him. Around that same time, Kasonde threatened to charge striking nurses with absenteeism, calling the strike illegal. When Minister of Labour Fackson Shamenda visited strikers and viewed one nurse’s payslip, he appeared surprised at

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4 Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
5 Representative of National Union of Public Service Workers, interview, July 2014.
6 Neo Simutanyi, interview, July 2014; Union representative, interview, July 2014; Expert on Zambian labour relations, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Representative of National Union of Public Service Workers, interview, July 2014; Representative of Health Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
7 Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
8 Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
9 ‘Nurses Feel Cheated’, 2013.
10 ‘Nurses and Midwives’, 2013.
13 ‘Nurses Call’, 2013.
15 ‘President Sata Attacks’, 2013, para. 1.
16 ‘UTH Nurses Refuse’, 2013.
17 ‘Nurses to be Charged’, 2013.
how little they were being paid and promised to make the changes they were demanding. Union representatives also met with strikers to assure them they would address their grievances if they called off the strike. Soon after these meetings, all nurses returned to work.

**November Strike**

The second nurses’ strike began on the 22 November following the government’s failure to rectify the issues Shamenda promised to address. In addition to the issues carried over from previous strike, some nurses demanded a 100% salary increment. This strike further hurt operations at UTH. In addition to the government, union officials also pushed nurses to return to work to promote smoother negotiations with government. Immediately after they began striking, nurses demanded to meet with Minister Shamenda, but he refused. He later met with union representatives, telling them that the strike is illegal and that nurses can be fired.

The government gave an ultimatum on the 28 November that workers had to report by 17:00 or they would be charged with unexcused absences, but nurses refused to cooperate. When they were issued exculpatory letters, nurses even refused to collect them, suggesting strong animosity between nurses and the government. By December, some UTH nurses had returned to work. But by the 2 December, 100 UTH nurses had been dismissed. This crippled operations to the point that the main UTH operating theatre had been forced to close. By the next week, 234 nurses had been fired nationwide. In all, 570 nurses were fired. In the interim, an estimated 250 nurses were allowed to reapply as new employees, an unprecedented outcome in Zambia. Nurses were only fully reinstated in December 2014, about a year afterward. This further hurt operations at UTH in the meantime.

These issues continued to be politicised by opposition political parties. Representatives from both the United Party for National Development and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy

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18 Representative of UTH Department of Surgery, interview, June 2014; Union representative, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
19 Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
20 ‘UTH Nurses Strike Again’, 2013.
22 ‘Nurses Strike Continues’, 2013.
23 ‘Union Wants’, 2013; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
26 ‘Nurses’ Strike is Illegal’, 2013.
30 ‘Some Nurses at UTH’, 2013.
31 ‘Over 100 Nurses’, 2013.
33 ‘Re-instating Fired Nurses’, 2014.
34 Former World Bank expert, interview, June 2014.
36 Representative of the University of Zambia School of Medicine, interview, June 2014; Representative of the UTH Department of Surgery, interview, June 2014; Representative of the UTH Department of Medicine, interview, June 2014.
rallied around fired nurses. Despite this, the government held strong for a long time that they would not reinstate fired nurses.

Civil Service Pay Reform Efforts in Zambia

The Zambian civil service is in need of pay reform. Valentine argued for the need of more systematic pay reform as opposed to the ad hoc and piecemeal approaches that had come before and left many distortions in the civil service pay structure, where similarly qualified workers received different salaries. Without substantive pay reform, the government would continue to struggle to attract, retain, and motivate quality personnel, and would cause deviant work behaviours, such as leaving the workplace during work hours to engage in other income-supplementing activities and corruption (Valentine, 2002).

Valentine (2002) also argued for reform to correct an inflated public sector wage bill. Historically, civil servants have received substantial concessions from government (see, Kiragu and Mukandala, 2003). This has negative implications for Zambia’s economic standing. The Public Service Management Division, or PSMD, (2009) notes, ‘Given the current wage bill-to-domestic revenue ratio, Zambia has already approaching the upper limits of prudent wage bill growth’ (p. 2). As this takes away from Zambia’s financial capacity, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have long recommended against the Zambian government granting large wage increases to public servants, as they had been doing (Kiragu and Mukandala, 2003). Efforts to enact reform to address all of these issues, which entail limiting salary increases, are ongoing (See, e.g., PSMD, 2009; PSMD, 2012; GRZ, 2012).

Historically, pay reform efforts in Zambia have not come easily. Kiragu and Mukandala (2003) note, ‘The process of pay reform in Zambia has been overshadowed by policy reversals, slowness, hesitancy and at times inaction’ (p. 188). The public service unions that have historically won large gains for members are cited as one big reason for this inefficiency. Kiragu and Mukandala (2002) also observe, ‘Zambia fits the general observation that the more organised and militant the trade unions are, the stronger the influence of ‘politics’ in the pay reform process’ (p. 204), where ‘politics’, as used in this context, are a large factor hampering reform efforts. The apparent tradeoff between public sector union influence and pay reform success is also embodied in Fashoyin’s (2008) discussion of efforts to improve public service efficiency between 1997 and 2000 when he calls these efforts’ effects ‘destabilizing’ for unions, as they limited unions’ abilities to obtain large gains for members (p. 3). Current efforts are similarly aimed at improving efficiency, and therefore have the potential to come into conflict with unions’ claims to power (see, e.g., PSMD, 2009; PSMD, 2012; GRZ, 2012).

However, some scholars posit that union-employer relationships need not be adversarial, and that allowing unions more power may in some instances actually help realise the interests of the employing class (see, Wright, 2000). Regardless of whether the relationship is adversarial or not, it is clear that unions and public sector reform efforts affect one another. Therefore, it is important to understand unions’ influence to fully understand dynamics surrounding public service reform efforts. However, no systematic study has looked at such variables for Zambian public sector unions. That is the void that this study looks to fill.

39 As one reviewer pointed out, it would be a mistake to assert that hampering reform involves politics while implementing reform is apolitical. This definition of ‘politics’ as hampering reform presents the connotation used by Kiragu and Mukandala, but should not be generalised to believe that implementing reform is not itself inherently political.
Methodology

The object of this report is to determine variables that affect union influence in the public sector in Zambia. In order to carry out this analysis, a useful working definition of union influence had to be determined. Edwards (1978), who speaks of union influence as union power, observes that ‘power has several dimensions or faces and it would be futile to attempt to encapsulate these complex processes in one operational measure’ (p. 1). Therefore, she argues, an indicator of power or influence that is amenable to measurement should be used, even if it is not all-encompassing. Given a largely qualitative study, as with this report, these measurements may not be fully quantified.

McDonald and Suen (1992), in their efforts to measure union power, present an economically-focused definition of union power as ‘the ability of the trade union to divide up to its advantage the rents arising from the production process given other parameters’ (p. 209). In the public sector, this could be translated to influencing the allocation of government revenue so that union members get a larger share in the form of pay and benefits. While this study was largely qualitative, moments when unions influenced pay and benefits were still apparent within the case study.

However, while influencing resources allocated to members’ pay and benefits is undoubtedly important, this limited definition ignores other important ways unions may be influential, even when they are not directly affecting the allocation of resources to pay and benefits. Unions’ influence may manifest itself in a number of other ways, both formally and informally, that are important when considering issues in the Zambian civil service. To limit the focus to a manageable number of verifiable factors, this study defines union influence as a union’s ability to effect tangible changes in the interests of its members. The major tangible changes identified in this study include gaining higher pay and benefits for its members and protecting members from unemployment.

To determine variables that affect union influence, a case study was utilised, which involved negotiations for the public service collective agreement enacted in September 2013, the subsequent strikes at the government-run UTH, and their after-effects. This case study was chosen because it gives a clear illustration of the ability of unions to effect change for members, and involves a clear portrayal of the apparent paradox outlined earlier. Unions seemed to ‘win’ during the negotiations but still saw the industrial unrest characterised by the strikes. The findings were then used to theorise about variables that affect union influence in Zambia’s public sector.

To learn about this case study, various online sources were consulted, including the Lusaka Times and Zambian Economist, to generate a basic timeline of events. To gain further insight, a total of 21 semi-structured interviews were held with academics, political analysts, and representatives from the Zambian government, various union leaders, doctors at UTH, and former UTH nurses. Questions were open-ended and dealt mainly with determining what occurred during these case studies and why alternative courses of action were not taken. Trends that emerged from these interviews were identified and used to theorise about variables affecting union influence. Of course, the trends identified are based on respondents’ perceptions, which may not always fully reflect reality. But even understanding how others perceive union influence can provide valuable insights regarding where this influence comes from.
Results

The following variables represent themes found across multiple interviews that seem to affect union influence. Most of these variables, including union splintering, relative information and preparedness, communication, finances, the law, courts, and norms, and external players, all worked to lower union influence. The political will of the government, however, was found to either increase or decrease union influence, making it a major determinant of outcomes for unions. When political will was aligned with unions’ desires, union-friendly outcomes were seen, but when they conflicted, outcomes were more detrimental to unions. Each of these variables is discussed here in greater depth from the perspectives of different parties.

Union Splintering

Union representatives consistently indicated the importance of union splintering in lowering their influence. Acting in congruence during wage negotiations optimises unions’ influence; as such congruence can have the psychological effect of making union demands appear stronger, thereby increasing government concessions. This can also increase the likelihood that each union benefits similarly from negotiations. However, this congruence is disrupted by the bargaining structure, which requires that unions negotiate with government representatives separately. For example, while Zambia’s three health unions bargain as one unit, that unit bargains separately from non-health unions at times, reducing how harmonised unions’ demands are and weakening their stances. If some unions are especially successful in negotiations, then there is less for the other unions to gain, incentivising this competition for government’s finite resources when bargaining separately, as each union wants to achieve the best outcomes for its members. This led to at least one union accepting the 2013 agreement, which benefited its members considerably, even though it was known to be at the expense of other civil service unions’ members.

We found that, for unions, the bargaining structure creating a ceiling for government concessions is problematic. Although they bargain as a joint team, bargaining outcomes are significantly diminished as concessions made by some unions set precedents for others. For example, the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) represents workers across various industries, including health. Since the CSAWUZ is the first to sign an agreement, if they accept a mediocre agreement, the government is unwilling to grant other health unions better outcomes, creating a ceiling for these unions. Some therefore signed the 2013 agreement only reluctantly.

Moreover, this trend of union splintering is so pervasive that some even go so far as to claim that unions are created by the government to mitigate the demands of other unions.

40 Union representative, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014.
41 Union representative, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
42 Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
43 Representative of National Union of Public Service Workers, interview, July 2014.
44 Neo Simutanyi, interview, July 2014.
45 Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
47 Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
occurs during times of industrial unrest when the government promotes emerging union leaders to administrative positions in newly formed unions to serve as echoing chambers for the government’s opinions\textsuperscript{49}. According to the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, only 100 members are required to register a union\textsuperscript{49}, making it easy for the government to proliferate these unions. As the presence of more government-friendly unions increase, demands at the bargaining table become less aggressive. This results in further decentralising the labour movement.

The politicisation of union membership is another component of union splintering that reduces union influence. When the 2013 Collective Agreement was released and it was discovered that professional health staff were displeased, some representatives from health unions were quick to blame others. In doing so, they hoped to attract members to their union from the blamed unions\textsuperscript{50}. This politicisation continued even during the strikes at UTH. While all health unions publicly condemned the illegal strikes, some union representatives allegedly justified the strikes in private discussions with workers\textsuperscript{51}. Thus, some unions may support a strike even if they are unable to protect workers from unemployment so that they might attract members by appearing to be on their side. This undermines the clarity of the message communicated to workers, which makes unions’ attempts to protect workers by condemning the strike less effective.

\textit{Relative Information and Preparedness}

Unions and government officials showed that the relative information and preparedness of unions and the government also hurts union influence. According to one union leader, unions generally have a limited access to and understanding of national economic information than the government. When the government provides an economic explanation for their decisions, some unions are unable to respond, which hurts their arguments because they do not address the alleged economic constraints faced by the government. Although unions have researchers tasked with preparing the union to understand and rebut economic arguments, their efforts are often in vain. This union leader even claimed that union researchers are researchers in name alone\textsuperscript{52}. The government, on the other hand, has the Ministry of Finance on its bargaining team specifically focusing on discussing economic and financial constraints\textsuperscript{53}. Moreover, outside organisations such as the World Bank are dedicated to equipping the government with financial information to take into negotiations so they are less susceptible to union pressure\textsuperscript{54}. This information imbalance means the government can make claims that unions have difficulty countering, leading to the government possibly even fabricating facts at times to affect outcomes, which the unions would have difficulty detecting\textsuperscript{55}. This lowers what unions are able to effectively demand.

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\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. Also see Mulenga, 2011 for a discussion of powerful labour leaders being co-opted into government positions, a similar tactic that further divides the labour movement.
\textsuperscript{49} University of Zambia labour law expert, interview, July 2014
\textsuperscript{50} Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #2, interview, July 2014.
\textsuperscript{51} Union representative, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #2, interview, July 2014.
\textsuperscript{52} Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
\textsuperscript{53} Representative of the Ministry of Finance #1, interview, June 2014; Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{54} Representative of the World Bank, interview, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{55} Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
\end{flushright}
Having information is not enough to effectively bargain. There is also a need for practice. Before negotiations, the government coordinates a series of mock bargaining sessions involving different ministries. This mock bargaining involved several meetings where the Ministry of Finance presents a sample budget and is challenged to test their ability to respond\(^{56}\). These practices ensure that the government is aware of and is ready to respond to possible union challenges. Without similar preparedness, it becomes increasingly difficult for unions to obtain higher wages and benefits. One union leader noted that if the International Labour Organisation provided training and technical assistance to public sector unions, labour leaders would feel more prepared during negotiations and there would perhaps be more labour-friendly outcomes. However, this does not occur\(^{57}\), so unions are left without the international support government receives. Public sector unions have been criticised as being ineffective in bargaining\(^{58}\), and these factors surely play into that characterisation.

**Communication**

Unions noted that miscommunication between the government and workers can inflate worker expectations beyond the unions’ ability to meet them, leading to a lack of faith in unions and a lack of an ability for the union to control members. To appear generous to its workers, the government announced that wages had been increased by 100-200% for public servants following the signing of the 2013 Collective Agreements without clearly explaining that the highest increments were concentrated among non-professionals. The announcement led nurses to believe that they were also receiving a large increment\(^{59}\). These targeted raises were part of efforts to pay all civil servants a living wage, which necessitated larger increases for the poorest-paid\(^{60}\). The fact that nurses only received a 4% wage increase created resentment because they were expecting much higher salary increments. This contributed to their motivation to strike against unions’ wills\(^{61}\). This strike without unions’ support hurt unions’ influence because it diminished their ability to protect members from unemployment when the government fired the nurses. It was hard for unions to prevent the illegal strike, which would have prevented the government from firing the workers.

Nurses especially showed that miscommunication from unions for political reasons can also play a role in decreasing trust. Once the negotiations ended in April, union representatives travelled throughout the country to explain the outcomes to the worker\(^{62}\). Some representatives told their members that they received a 21% increment without explaining that this entailed a 4% wage increase and 17% total increases in allowances in order to make the bargaining outcomes sound more impressive. In October, nurses were surprised to find that they only received a 4% wage increment on their pay slips, as they were expecting a 21% wage increase\(^{63}\). Some nurses had not heard the breakdown of the 21% increment until a meeting with their union the day before the October strike started to clarify the wage differentials. This was an

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56 Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
57 Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
58 Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014; see also: Mboozi, 2014.
59 Consultant to the JERG exercise, interview, June 2014; Union representative, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
60 Representative of the World Bank, interview, June 2014; Union representative, interview, July 2014; Expert on Zambian labour relations, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014; Representative of National Union of Public Service Workers, interview, July 2014.
61 Union representative, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014.
62 Representative of Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, Lusaka July 2014; Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
63 Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.

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issue for nurses because the taxation structure meant that the net take-home pay was less under the actual breakdown than it would have been if the 21% were a pure wage increase. Furthermore, Zambian law dictates that public servants’ allowances can be lowered, whereas base salary cannot, meaning nurses felt that this arrangement was more precarious than an increase only to basic salary would have been. Thus, the 4% wage increment provoked animosity towards unions because nurses felt their unions had cheated and lied to them, creating further distrust that made it harder for union leaders to quell the strikes.

A general lack of communication between unions and their members has further adverse effects on the union’s ability to protect worker interests. While some union leaders claimed that they request worker demands prior to bargaining in order to represent those demands at the bargaining table, many workers insisted that they were not kept abreast about developments during the negotiations. Infrequent meetings and an overall lack of sharing information after the negotiations, whether this is the result of apathy from the union or external constraints preventing more effective communication, cultivated animosity between nurses and their unions. Nurses were less likely to listen to the advice of their union representatives. Since workers lost faith in their unions’ ability to enforce their demands they resorted to striking despite union objections. This made it more difficult for unions to protect workers from unemployment.

The relationship between union leaders and their members is affected by this strained communication, which further diminishes union influence. A gap in trust between both groups exists, which adversely affects how well unions can protect their members from unemployment. The fact that nurses struck despite unions’ objections highlights a lack of trust in their unions, as the unions had allegedly failed to communicate the outcome of the 2013 agreement. Nurses tend to perceive their unions more as a business or a government apparatus than as an advocate for them. One nurse who was fired during the strike even speculated that her union was bribed by the government to remain idle during the firings. Symbolically, she no longer wears her union’s badge even though she had before, even after being offered the chance to reapply. Union leaders also recognise the distrust between unions and members. Some union leaders claim that certain unions are primarily focused on maximising revenue from members’ dues and no longer represent the voice of their members, meaning that there is a lack of motivation to bargain for what is best for members. As a result, members are no longer interested in working to improve the union. The prevalence of trust issues has harmful effects on the unions’ bargaining leverage because the government sees union leaders as incapable of controlling or representing their own membership. This makes the government less willing to take unions seriously in negotiations. This also hinders unions’ ability to protect workers from unemployment, as unions again do not have the strength and support necessary to override the governments’ decisions.

**Finances**

Interviews with government representatives revealed how their financial constraints limit what unions can get in the way of wages and benefits. The Ministry of Finance sets parameters for

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64 Former UTH Nurse #1, interview, July 2014.
65 Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014; Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
66 Former UTH Nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH Nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
67 Representative from the UTH Department of Medicine, interview, June 2014; Union representative, Livingsone, July 2014; Former UTH Nurse #1, interview, July 2014.
68 Former UTH Nurse #1, interview, July 2014.
69 Representative of Health Workers Union of Zambia, July 2014, Lusaka
negotiations that are based on the economic performance of the country. If the economy is struggling based on their metrics, margins for concessions become slim. Other financial interests can also limit concessions. For example, the government is aiming to purchase a $1 Eurobond. To build credit for this, it decided to limit the number of concessions it made during negotiations, leading to the imposition of a two-year wage freeze to seem more developmentally-minded. Additionally, the government was under pressure from the international players like the IMF and the World Bank to diversify spending habits, which also contributed to a desire to send the message that Zambia is working to become more fiscally responsible as it looks to purchase this Eurobond. The fact that unions sometimes resort to sharing ideas on how to broaden the tax base and generate revenue, which is outside their area of expertise, shows their desperation to overcome the limits on what unions can gain in bargaining set by the government’s financial limitations. Furthermore, the government is able to concretise their parameters because they pass annual national budgets before negotiating with unions that set ceilings for total possible concessions.

Union finances also affect their influence. Because all workers in the public sector are covered by the same terms of service regardless of union membership status, free riding, or benefiting from union negotiations without contributing to the union financially, is a sizeable problem. The government was able to leverage unions’ resulting financial desperation, which left them no choice but to rely on the government to pay for hosting negotiations. The government paid for accommodations for everyone involved during the 2013 negotiations in Siavonga. This meant that the government was able to decide when to hold negotiations. They scheduled them within a few weeks of the previous Collective Agreement expiring. If unions let it expire, their members would either go without pay or be paid by unions, which unions cannot afford to sustain for long. This created desperation to reach an agreement before expiration, leading to unions agreeing to worse terms than they would have liked in order to reach any agreement at all. Furthermore, an inability to pay means unions were unable to help fired nurses except in the most economically challenging cases, so nurses now see just how much they have to lose and are now less willing to put themselves in harm’s way. This lowers strike leverage and therefore bargaining outcomes, as the government would be more motivated to make concessions to avoid strikes if unions’ strike leverage were higher. In these ways, unions’ limited finances lowered their influence.

The Law, Courts, and Norms

Labour laws affect the level of influence unions have in wage negotiations by facilitating splintering. The Industrial and Labour Relations Act, for example, allows for the proliferation of unions in a single industry, as it takes only 100 workers to form a union. Although mandatory union provisions of the Act often go unenforced, it still facilitates significant splintering.

70 Representative of the Ministry of Finance #1, interview, June 2014; Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
71 Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
72 Representative of Health Workers Union of Zambia, interview, June 2014.
73 Representative of Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
74 Representative of National Union of Public Service Workers, interview, June 2014; Representative of Health Workers Union of Zambia, interview, June 2014.
75 Representative of Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers, interview, July 2014.
76 Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
77 Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
78 Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014; Representative of Health Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
79 University of Zambia labour law expert, interview, July 2014.
called ‘splinter unions’ end up competing with other unions for bargaining power and dominance in the industry. Assuming wage negotiations are zero-sum, splinter unions can hinder the ability of other unions to gain higher wages and benefits.

Strike leverage is also affected by the Act. It stipulates that any strike is considered illegal until a long list of dispute resolution alternatives is exhausted. On the one hand, this law helps maintain industrial peace by disincentivising strikes. On the other hand, it makes striking for immediate results virtually impossible. What is more, workers in ‘essential services’, including UTH nurses, can engage only in illegal strikes because the law bars such workers from striking legally. This is risky because the government reserves the right to enforce summary dismissal, an expedited discharge meant to protect public interests by firing any worker acting outside the law without the warnings that would otherwise be required. This makes it difficult for a union to protect members from unemployment. Admittedly, despite what the law says, the Industrial and Labour Relations Court has at times decided not to uphold such a firing when it deemed a strike reasonable. But such an outcome was not afforded to fired UTH nurses. This lowers strike leverage and hinders a union’s ability to protect workers from unemployment.

The court system also plays a role in determining union influence. At times, the government makes unilateral decisions that affect workers’ wages and benefits. For example, in 1998 the government announced a wage freeze. This meant that unions would not be able to bargain for higher wages the following year. The unions filed a lawsuit against the government alleging a violation of their collective bargaining rights given they were not consulted before the announcement. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the unions, establishing the union’s right to engage in discussions over wage levels. In October 2013, the government announced another unilateral wage freeze, which unions may challenge in court. If the freeze is found to be legal, then unions’ influence will be constrained for the next two years as they will be unable to affect any changes to wages and benefits. If it is found to be illegal, then unions will have cemented a greater ability to influence decisions governing pay and benefits. In both cases, unions referred to the courts for protection after their influence was diminished. However, court cases are expensive and time consuming which may limit a union’s ability to consult the courts for reinforcement when the government makes a unilateral decision affecting wages and benefits.

External Players

Actors outside unions and the government showed how they and other external players helped shape the parameters of government concessions. Human resource shortages in Zambia’s health sector render each worker more essential to the public. This has the effect of protecting workers from permanent unemployment, especially in the absence of adequate replacements. Zambia’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) require that the country increase the number of

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80 Representative of the Ministry of Labour, interview, June 2014; Union representative, interview, July 2014; Representative from Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation #1, interview, July 2014.
81 Consultant to the JERG exercise, interview, June 2014.
82 Fashoyin, 2007.
83 Expert on Zambian labour relations, interview, July 2014.
84 Representative of the Ministry of Labour, interview, June 2014.
85 Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former UTH nurse #2, interview, July 2014.
86 Council of the University of Zambia and Another v. Allied Workers Union, no. 1 of 1999 (Zambian Supreme Court, 1 January 1999).
87 Banda, 2013.
89 Representative of Health Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
of health workers in order to ‘right-size’ the industry⁹⁰. While the government initially fired hundreds of nurses at UTH, patients were discharged from the hospital without full recovery. Many crucial operations were postponed because they lacked capable, experienced staff⁹¹. To solve these issues and appease the public, the government insisted that UTH hire graduate students. Although this solution seemed viable at the time it proved ineffective for certain departments. Operating theatres, for example, normally employ highly trained nurses with years of technical experience, whereas graduate students are generalists. UTH was, therefore, forced to close its theatre ward for two months following the strike⁹². The shortage of labour in such a crucial sector forced a response from the government. There was an agreement to slowly rehire fired nurses. It is unclear how much influence the unions had in this decision, mostly because the rehiring decisions and processes were not publicised in mainstream media, but many doubt that unions had anything to do with the rehiring decision⁹³. Thus, while the essential and human resource-deficient nature of the health industry might have been leveraged by unions to protect workers from permanent unemployment, it also contributed to the government’s quick firing of nurses.

Relatedly, the importance of the industry to the public also means that the government is more likely to cater to health workers’ interests for political purposes. Nurses work directly with patients, many of who are seriously ill. This creates the image that nurses and doctors are saving Zambian lives, an image that is hard to ignore given the prevalence of health issues such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For many, this ‘hero’ imagery is more potent than it would be in other industries. For example, while teachers help educate Zambian children to become productive members of society, the image of misbehaving children is not, from a public perspective, as worrisome as the image of dying patients. For this reason, many believe that the nurses carry more political clout than teachers. A representative from the Ministry of Finance went so far as to speculate that if teachers were to strike, they would be fired immediately and permanently because their image is not as powerful as that of the nurses⁹⁴. Politicians are largely aware of this clout, so they often try to appear sympathetic to nurses publicly. Some even believe this clout also explains why the Minister of Labour visited UTH after the strike. There were probably concerns he genuinely wanted to address, but the meeting was also an opportunity to boost his public perception using an image to which the public assigns importance⁹⁵. One might expect unions to be able to leverage the political clout generated by the nature of the industry, and that may occur at times, but the fact that nurses got relatively small wage increases in 2013 and were fired for striking without concessions suggests that this political clout is not a controlling factor.

International bodies that are specifically interested in the health industry can restrict the actions of the government. Health donors, for example, expect to see improved health outcomes in Zambia. Such outcomes become increasingly difficult when nurses are laid off. Thus, the government, which may have preferred to keep nurses unemployed to prove its point, ultimately rehired nurses in part because of the political pressure of donors what wanted a significant return on their investment⁹⁶. Donors can therefore help unions protect some workers from unemployment. However, the fact that striking nurses were all fired suggests that this variable does not work very strongly to unions’ advantage. On net, the influence of the public and other external players further worked to hinder union influence in this case.

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⁹⁰ Former World Bank expert, interview, June 2014.
⁹¹ Representative of the University of Zambia School of Medicine, interview, June 2014.
⁹² Representative of UTH Department of Surgery, interview, June 2014.
⁹³ Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Former World Bank expert, interview, June 2014.
⁹⁴ Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
⁹⁵ Two representatives of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia, interview, July 2014.
⁹⁶ Former World Bank expert, interview, June 2014.
Political Will

Political will stood out in many respondents’ eyes as an especially influential factor in determining outcomes for unions. While all of the preceding variables have been shown to work against union influence, this stands out as a variable that has both increased and decreased union influence. The fact that political will is unique among these variables merits a discussion of what affects political will. While this is likely an incomplete list of factors, three main factors were identified in this case study: the ruling party’s goals, public pressure, and donor pressure. The goals of the ruling party affected the political will of the government in two ways. For one, the party’s stated objective of increasing money in people’s pockets contributed to a willingness to allow the large wage increases seen in 2013. Their working class-focused campaign led to especially high expectations and pressure from public sector workers. Second, the government’s goal of maintaining a sense of order led to the desire to fire nurses who were seen as acting out. Public pressure, particularly from voters who did not approve of the firing of nurses, shaped the political will that allowed some nurses to be rehired. Third, as noted, donor pressure, especially from donors who want to see positive results in Zambia’s health sector, also pushed the government to want to rehire some nurses.

The numerous ways in which the political will of the government affected union influence in the case study prove illuminating. Political will can either enhance or undermine union influence in wage negotiations. The Patriotic Front (PF) administration ran on the motto that they would increase money in people’s pockets. This motto informed their approach to public sector pay in 2013. The government’s minimum wage policy led to large increments for non-professional workers in 2013. It seems that these increments came about for reasons other than union power. The General Secretary of the National Union of Public Service Workers, which represents many non-professionals, even gave credit to the government, not his union, for generating such a large increment. His praise went as far as thanking the government for ‘liberating’ his members. This language reflects the power of government’s political will over union outcomes.

The government’s political will sometimes works against unions. The Ministry of Finance suggests certain limits on bargaining outcomes. Still, the government’s bargaining team offered more than the Ministry of Finance wanted to in 2013, showing diverging tendencies between the Ministry of Finance and central administration. Unions can leverage the political will of some branches of government to generate increases beyond what other branches would prefer.

The government’s desire to win voters’ support affects unions’ ability to realise demands and protect workers. As a representative of the Ministry of Finance noted, ‘No politician wants to cause a strike’, as that would be unpopular with voters. Unions can presumably leverage this into increased strike leverage, especially when the ruling party takes as pro-worker lines as the PF administration has. Furthermore, the promises of wage increases and ultimate disregard for the Ministry of Finance’s parameters during the 2013 negotiations were in large part an effort to attract favour with voters who benefit. This meant that, instead of ‘rightsizing’ the civil service as had been recommended by experts, the government simply looked at raising

97 Representative of the World Bank, interview, June 2014.
98 Former World Bank expert, interview, June 2014.
100 Chanda, 2013, para. 5.
101 Representative of the Ministry of Finance #2, interview, June 2014.
102 Ibid.
salaries\textsuperscript{103}, making it easier for unions to see their demands met. The Minister of Labour has been seen as ‘aligned with unions against government’ as a proponent of the new minimum wage that led to such large salary hikes in 2013. The political appeal of siding with unions is also visible during campaigns, when candidates all play to unions. Furthermore, the fact that opposition parties play to unions as often as they do indicates that there are advantages in appealing to unions\textsuperscript{104}, which again makes it easier for unions to receive what they want.

The political desire to appeal to unions and their members can lead to overstatements, promises, and a misleading framing of issues. For instance, the Minister of Labour promised to change perceived injustices that had led to the October strike, at least in part to appeal to nurses\textsuperscript{105}. This took the matter out of unions’ hands, as nurses felt they had the government on their side, so they illegally struck despite union leaders’ objections, making it harder for unions to win benefits and protect their members.

Furthermore, the government’s ability to fire union leaders and other civil servants affects unions’ ability to protect workers and bargain effectively. The government’s will to instil a sense of order made them intent on sending a clear message that strikes are not tolerable. This desire was so strong that some innocent nurses were ‘caught in the crossfire’ and terminated\textsuperscript{106}. This makes it harder for unions to protect workers from unemployment as nurses were dismissed more or less indiscriminately to enforce the government’s political will.

**Discussion**

The factors examined in this study mostly worked to the detriment of union influence in the case study examined. This raises questions regarding how to explain Zambia’s large public service wage bill and the sizeable increases enjoyed by many civil servants after the 2013 negotiations. To explain this apparent inconsistency, one factor, political will, stands out as working heavily to unions’ advantage in the cases when unions benefited most, such as the 2013 negotiations. Conversely, it was aligned against unions in cases where they were most defeated, such as the firing of UTH nurses. One can therefore infer that this factor has had a major impact on outcomes for unions.

While this is an important factor that determines the degree of influence unions have, it is a factor whose degree is determined primarily by the government, unlike the other factors. While it may be influenced by outside factors such as voter pressure or lobbying, the final decision of whether or not the government supports wage and benefit increases or protecting workers from unemployment ultimately lies with the government itself. This resolves the seeming paradox of unions seeing large increases in pay during the 2013 negotiations but being unable to stop the government from firing all striking nurses at UTH. It is not so much that unions were especially powerful in the former case and were less powerful in the latter case, but rather that political will was aligned with unions in the former case and against them in the latter case. It seems, then, that government is the institution that is best able to influence outcomes affecting unions. Outcomes that seem to speak to unions’ strength are less a result of unions’ strength than political will. It is therefore fallacious to assume that, because outcomes in a certain case were in line with what unions wanted, that this imply that Zambian public sector unions are powerful. An alternate and more viable explanation would be that the government happened to

\textsuperscript{103} Former World bank expert, interview, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{104} Representative of the World Bank, interview, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{105} Former UTH nurse #1, interview, July 2014; Union representative, interview, July 2014; Representative of UTH Department of Surgery, interview, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{106} Representative of the UTH Department of Medicine, interview, June 2014.
support the same outcomes that unions did. Zambian public sector unions may therefore not be as powerful as they seemed.

This study encountered a number of limitations. First, logistical difficulties meant that the Public Service Management Division was not interviewed. As they are the employer for civil servants, this gap may mean that major trends and explanations were overlooked. Furthermore, because research was conducted within the span of only two months, other relevant stakeholders were not interviewed who could have contributed to this research. This study also focused on the Zambian public health sector to theorise about the Zambian civil service more broadly, but the nature of the health sector may present confounding variables that limit generalizability. Additionally, because this research took place in Lusaka, all interviewees came from Lusaka (except one union representative who was interviewed in Livingstone, but who works mainly in Lusaka), which may limit generalisability to regions outside Lusaka. Moreover, this case study focused on the strikes at UTH even though other hospitals in Lusaka and across the nation saw nurses strike as well, meaning some conclusions may not be generalizable to other hospitals. For these reasons, this study should not be treated as final and conclusive, but rather as a starting point for further investigations.

It is important to note that these findings are preliminary. Further research should examine other Zambian civil service sectors to determine the validity of these theories across contexts. These theories could also be quantified, perhaps with survey data, to determine if attitudes and trends suggested here hold true across larger populations. These theories could also be updated and adjusted as necessary in light of the outcomes future negotiations. Anything revealed by how future cases play out should be compared against these results and analyses, and conclusions should be updated as necessary.

That noted, these findings have implications for questions facing the labour movement, including Simutanyi’s (2011) question as to whether unions should forge an alliance with the ruling political party or remain autonomous and lobby for a pro-worker agenda. As he noted, ‘What strategy the labour movement will take will greatly depend on a strategic assessment of its relative strength and influence within the political process’ (24). Findings that the labour movement, at least in the public sector, has been unable to recapture much influence in the early PF years may suggest that alliances with even seemingly pro-worker political parties may not be as fruitful as unions would like.

Questions of union influence clearly have implications for workers and unions. But, less directly, they also affect ongoing civil service reform efforts, as unions wielding influence can affect what the government can do. Assuming the validity of this study’s conclusions, if reform is indeed being hampered, is the result of the government’s behaviour more than unions wielding excessive influence. This affects how pro-reform advocates could best go about making changes that look to push reform efforts.

References


For a more thorough discussion of the limitations of this study, see Appendix A.


ZAMBIA SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL


Some Observations on the Agrarian Question in the Era of Economic Liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa: Which Way Forward?

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This paper contributes to the debate on the way forward in sub-Saharan Africa with respect to the agrarian question in emerging markets under economic liberalisation. The point of departure is that since the peasantry is a temporary category which can be transformed into other social groups that can earn their living from incomes raised outside agriculture (such as from wage employment in mines, manufacturing industries, and the service sectors), not every rural dweller should be or is a farmer. Improved methods of cultivation especially with mechanisation, agricultural extension, entrepreneurship, and skills training and empowerment of women and youth; secure land tenure for collateral; infrastructure development to link farmers to markets; and finance can help a small proportion of the rural populations of Africa to graduate into commercial farmers who could produce enough food to feed the continent. The surplus population could be absorbed in wage employment in agro-processing industries, and in other value adding industries outside agriculture such as mineral processing, if Africa experiences industrial transformation. This is largely the experience of industrialised countries that have experienced such transformation in the last 50 years or so, the same period African countries have enjoyed political independence, but have lagged behind with respect to resolving the agrarian question.

Introduction

The purpose of writing this concept note on the agrarian question is to contribute to the debates at the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI), on the place of small-holder farmers with respect to the development of agriculture to ensure household and national food security and the reduction of rural poverty. Thus, the article provides the context of the debates at IAPRI, it deals with the conceptualisation that the peasantry or small-holders should be perceived as being a temporary category within the framework of agricultural transformation. The article looks at the opening up effect of foreign investment; the issue and place of agricultural land tenure, and what African countries can learn from recent developments from the Asian Tigers and others elsewhere.

With respect to methods, the concept note is based on the review of literature that the author has perused over a period of time as he searches for possible solutions to contribute to the resolution of the many challenges that the African continent faces and in the course of teaching courses on the development geography of Africa at the University of Zambia (Kajoba, 1997; Kajoba, 2001).

The Context of the Debates at IAPRI

The debates begun around 2001 when colleagues from Michigan State University (MSU) who were part of the Food Security Research Project that was the forerunner to Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI) presented arguments with respect to land distribution and government support or interventions to small-holder farmers in a number of African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zambia. It was pointed out that land holding size was strongly associated with household income for land holding between 0 to 1.25 ha. (Jayne et al., 2001); and that in Zambia and other African countries, improving access to land among the most land constrained small-holder households would directly reduce poverty. Land
access per household in Zambia by 1999/2000 for the bottom 25% of the population was 0.6 ha., as compared to the top 25% of the population with 8.85 ha., and the national mean of 3.05 ha. (CSO, 2001). Therefore, MSU proposed that there should be land redistribution in the country to deal with this unequal concentration of land. With respect to government intervention, it was argued that it was benefitting richer rather than poorer farmers and that focus should shift to the lower and poorer categories of rural producers at the bottom of the economic ladder.

Thus, in the discussions concerning these matters in one of the seminars in August 2012, the Zambian group led by the IAPRI chairperson, presented a different viewpoint in which it was countered that while it was imperative that African governments are expected to assist small-holder farmers, especially those that are vulnerable but viable, in order to improve and increase food production and reduce rural poverty. It was not correct for researchers to assume that every rural dweller is or should be a farmer. It was at this point that the author of this concept note was requested by the IAPRI chairman to prepare a position paper that would articulate this counter-veiling point of view.

The Peasantry/small-holders are a Temporary Category

In this concept note, it is necessary to state right from the outset that rural producers in sub-Saharan Africa, who are referred to variously as small-holder farmers or as subsistence farmers, constitute a peasantry group that is expected to grow and graduate from being small-scale farmers who produce largely for home consumption, to those who produce a surplus for sale on the market. Lombard and Tweedie (1972) designated such farmers in Zambia as emergent farmers, who marketed at least 50% of their harvest in each agricultural season.

Furthermore, these ‘graduates’ should in due course be able to expand their holdings; adopt modern advanced technology such as ox-drawn ploughs, tractors, and irrigation equipment; utilise soil improvement techniques like cultivation of legumes, the use of green and cattle manure, fertilizers, and hybrid seeds; and practice crop rotation. They are expected to become large-scale commercial farmers who are able to create employment for those who are unable to earn a living through farming for themselves. The produce from such farms should be processed in rural agro-industries that are established by both local and external investors to add value, especially in emerging liberalised market economies in sub-Saharan Africa, such as that prevailing in Zambia.

But what should happen to those who remain trapped in economic activity that is dominated and is based only on subsistence production, the ones who Hyden (1986) refers to as those guided by the law of subsistence rather than by the law of value? It is most likely that such ‘producers’ are part of the bottom 25% of the population who hold an average of 0.61 ha. as stated above, and depend on the use of rudimentary tools such as axes and hoes and are likely to harvest only small quantities that cannot even support them up to the next harvest. Such individuals are probably not farmers per se, and it is proposed in this concept note that they need an exit option that can make it possible for them to earn a descent livelihood. Such individuals are probably better off if they can be transformed into farm workers or into a rural proletariat or wage earners in agro-based industries that should be established by investors. Instead of remaining trapped in such a subsistence existence, there is need to provide them with an exit option so that they escape such crushing rural poverty. This can be done by redirecting their labour (especially if provided with some basic education and skills training by the state) into more relatively productive occupations like industrial construction, real estate, and infrastructure construction of roads, railways, bridges, harbours, and airports. They would be same as wage earners in the mines and related industries in which value can be added to mineral raw materials to produce industrial products as workers on agri-business farms and
industries. In the tourism and transport sector or even as micro and small entrepreneurs in the informal sector in urban areas, they can engage in trading, carpentry and joinery, brick laying, and welding and other services. Support through access to micro-credit/finance can help such entrepreneurs grow their businesses.

Writing about agricultural transformation, Timmer (1988), contends that in market oriented economies, there is a strong link between agriculture and industrial growth. Improvements in agricultural production which lead to an increase in agricultural productivity ensures that more food is produced with much less manpower. Such manpower or surplus labour is subsequently released for capital construction leading to the growth of manufacturing industries as part of the industrial revolution. In a 2015 Zambia’s Agricultural Budget Analysis Poster, the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute made an interesting analysis, which revealed that only 2-5% of the smallholder farm households contribute the bumper maize harvests that the country has been experiencing, such as the 3.3 million metric tonnes produced in the 2013/14 agricultural season. The maize self-sufficiency that Zambia has seen in recent years is as a result of the contributions of only a small proportion of our farming households.

In other words, it can be argued that with increased soil improvement, mechanisation, irrigation, input provision, improved hybrid seeds of maize, sorghum, mille, and rice, the incorporation of root crops and agro forestry and provision of infrastructure to improve market linkages, and access to affordable agricultural credit, that theyield per hectare for the smallholder farmers can increase from 1-3 tons/ha. to that of between 5-10 tons/ha. for commercial farmers. Furthermore, only a small proportion of the farm households would be needed to produce enough staple maize and other cereals, fruit, and vegetables to feed the nation, ensure food security, and even export surpluses to neighbouring countries in order to earn foreign exchange through regional trade. This means that the energies of other farm households, those trapped in subsistence, with very small land holding sizes, and others who may not have interest in engaging in productive agriculture, would best be channelled into different activities to earn their livelihoods.

Writing about changing livelihood perception in South Africa, Bernstein (2005) points out that although many rural South Africans had emotional ties to the land, the situation has changed since the fall of apartheid. South Africans now increasingly think in terms of urban land opportunities and many would not choose agriculture as a career today. In another study, Herbinck and Van Averbeke (2007) state that in some parts of the Eastern Cape and possibly elsewhere in South Africa, the thrust towards agricultural based livelihoods is in retreat and there has been a shift to urban based industrial and government supported entitlements and livelihoods. Johnson and Mellor (1961) contend that there is a tendency to discuss issues in terms of a false dichotomy of agricultural verses industrial development. They argue that given the diversity among individual countries with respect to physical resource endowment, cultural heritage, and historical experiences, there is no universally applicable definition of the role that agriculture should play in the process of development. However, they go on to say that it is important to balance the role of agriculture and other sectors of the economy, especially with respect to direct government investment or interventions and budget allocations to research and agricultural extension and taxation.

Jonson and Mellor (1961) continue to point out that in many developing countries, about 40 to 60% of national income is produced in agriculture and about 50 to 80% of the labour force is engaged in agricultural production. These are very low levels of productivity, despite large quantities of resources in terms of labour and government financial support being committed to the sector. However, Johnston and Mellor (1961) state that a process of structural transformation takes place when improvements in modern technology reduce costs in the manufacturing industry. Advances in industrial development increase per capita incomes (and the steady growth of the middle class), and this leads to substantial reduction in the share of
agriculture. Thus, increase in the development of the level of manufacturing (i.e. value addition to the raw materials as part of the process of industrialisation to create jobs and wealth) contributes to a structural transformation of an economy that creates a necessary (and probably a sufficient) condition for cumulative and self-sustaining growth. In this process of economic transformation, Johnston and Mellor (1961) refer to the work of W. Arthur Lewis as having contended that there is a surplus of manpower in the subsistence sector of agriculture, and that the non-agricultural capitalist sector is the dynamic element, which absorbs this surplus of manpower (Johnston and Mellor, 1961: 568). The major challenge for developing countries, therefore, is to ensure that nonfarm job opportunities are created sufficiently rapidly to move ahead of population.

In the case of sub-Saharan African countries such as Zambia, industrial development that can contribute to improvements in the agricultural sector include, among other things, the adoption of appropriate agricultural technologies through mechanisation to help small-holder farmers (especially women) to cultivate more land efficiently. This would also involve encouraging them to practice conservation agriculture, to improve soil fertility through the use of legumes crop rotation, irrigation, and water conservation. They should also be encouraged to practice crop diversification to grow cereals like sorghum, millet, wheat, and soya beans in addition to maize (which is considered riskier due to droughts resulting from climate change). There is also need to incorporate agro-forestry, livestock production, aquaculture, and root crops like cassava, sweet potatoes, and yams to broaden the food base and produce more raw materials for agro-based industries (Ndandula, 2011; Nawa, 2015).

Thus, increased agricultural output and productivity can contribute to overall economic growth by providing food supplies for the increasing national populations to ensure household food security and nutrition as well as provide the necessary raw materials that can be processed in agro-industries in emerging markets. This can add value and create jobs, promote regional and international trade to earn foreign exchange, and raise the net cash incomes of farm rural population that should not only provide labour for the expanding manufacturing and other service sectors, but also provide an expanding market for industrial consumer products and services in the national, regional, and continental economies. Johnston and Mellor (1961) point out that according to W. Arthur Lewis, an increase in rural net cash income or purchasing power is a valuable stimulus to industrial development and by extension, this process can significantly contribute to the reduction of rural poverty and raise living standards in Africa.

With industrial transformation as the centre of our vision in Africa (i.e. Agenda 2063 or the Africa We Want), value addition to raw materials should be key to socio-economic development and job and wealth creation. In this way, there could be a small proportion of small and medium to larger scale commercial farmers, who can produce sufficient staple food and other economic/cash crops (raw materials) to feed the sub-region, while others can be transformed into a rural and urban industrial proletariat. In this regard, Hyden (1980) has observed that while in America and Europe the peasantry is virtually extinct (due to industrial transformation), the peasantry is captured and controlled by other social classes in Asia and South America. It is only in Africa where this category is till independent and free to do whatever it likes, especially since it has access to customary land without any obligations to the state or traditional authorities that control the land. In other words, it could be argued that with genuine industrial transformation, the peasantry as a category is supposed to be a temporary one that could be transformed into something else as we grapple to resolve the agrarian and development questions in Africa.
The Opening-up Effect

In recent years, some sections of the academic community seem to be alarmed by the coming of foreign investors in Africa in the agricultural sector, and they have tended to perceive this trend as bad for the people who are seen as victims of large-scale land grabbing (see, The Oakland Institute, 2011). While there is need to be cautious about land allocation for investment to avoid large-scale displacement of the locals, it is equally necessary to welcome investment and see it as playing a positive role in opening-up land in remote and other areas where there is abundant land that is unoccupied or is under-utilised by the locals.

In Zambia, for instance, the government is establishing Farm Blocks in all the provinces, where it will provide land to both local and foreign investors to produce cash (including food) crops that will be processed by the major foreign investors in order to add value to the agricultural raw materials. The government is to provide the necessary infrastructure like roads, dams, and electric power. Land will be allocated in different amounts, but it seems the idea is to deal with the agrarian question as to what farm size is ideal. It is expected that all the three categories of small, medium, and large farms will be demarcated, hoping to resolve the perennial question as to what is the optimum farm size that can ensure efficiency. Thus, there will be a Triple Farm size combination, and the locals will benefit from securing employment and participation in out grower schemes that will provide a market for what is produced. For instance, in the Nansanga Farm Block in Serenje District, Mulenga (2011) shows that out of a total of 310 farms that have been demarcated, 83.5% of the farms would be between 10-50 ha. each, 13% would be between 51-250 ha. Each, and only 3.5% would be between 251-900 ha. each. In terms of gender, 63.9% of the farms are allocated to men, while women got 28.1%.

In my view, these efforts to establish Farm Blocks in which both the government and the private sector will be involved is a good attempt at promoting public-private partnerships in rural development, and it is a way of creating growth pole centres that have an opening-up effect in remote parts of the country that are sparsely populated.

The Issue and Place of Agricultural Land Tenure

As land is made available for investment in commercial agricultural production, it is imperative that secure land tenure is guaranteed to both local and foreign investors. Furthermore, effort must be made to empower women small-holders, as the generative theme on this is that women farmers need to have access, ownership, and control over the land that they cultivate in traditional or customary areas as well (Wanyeki, 2003). In emerging market economies, both men and women and the youth need not only access to land, but also should enjoy secure tenure to guarantee their investments in labour, time, and effort as they endeavour to obtain credit from financial institutes using land as collateral to produce marketable surplus so as to earn agricultural incomes. (Kajoba, 1998; Kajoba, 2002). However, there should be provision for other tenure arrangements such as the availability for rented land where such circumstances permit in the context of land markets.

Although we have noted above the fact that the African peasantry is uncaptured by other social classes, the issue of tax is rather a sensitive issue. Instead of imposing a direct tax on land, which the small-holders cultivate, an indirect tax such as the maize levy could be ideal. Johnston and Mellor (1961) seem to suggest that tax on agriculture is one way in which a developing country can promote capital formation that is needed to expand investment and development in a market economy. Such capital formation is also needed for overhead investment in extension, research, and other development activities.
Efforts to resolve the agrarian question with respect to promotion of secure land tenure should be combined with the need to broadening the food base. Small-holders must be sensitised and assisted to diversify what crops to cultivate. The government, the private sector, the donor community, United Nations agencies, and multilateral organizations like the World Bank should promote agricultural diversification so that other cereals like rice, sorghum, millets, and root crops like cassava and sweet potatoes are brought back on the market as was the case before independence in Zambia. This would reduce the dependence on maize, which is more susceptible to drought, in view of climate change. There is need to interface traditional and scientific knowledge systems by promoting hybrids of the traditional crops that are drought tolerant, early maturing, high yielding, and are palatable, in order to ensure food security at the household, regional, and continental levels.

**What Can Africa Learn from the Asian Tigers?**

As we grapple with how to resolve the agrarian question in Africa, some writers have suggested that we need to look to Asian Tigers (like South Korea, Taiwan, and even China) to see what we can learn from them (see Smith, 2001; Versi, 2011; and Amoako, 2011). One of the major lessons is that these Asian nations promote value addition or manufacturing to achieve rapid industrialisation within the general framework of market based economies. Thus, they promoted entrepreneurship and managed to borrow and domesticate western technology. In addition, much attention was made to construct infrastructure, like roads. Massive investment was also made in education in order to educate, train, and equip the population with necessary skills to sustain industrialisation.

It is argued further that the Asian Tigers achieved transformation through value addition by carefully balancing the roles of the state and that of the private sector. The state played a major role in supporting the private sector to attract investment from the West and promote manufacturing. In undertaking these efforts, it is pointed out that these Asian countries did not abandon their culture based on the teachings of Confucius, who among other things taught about the need for merit, hard work, obedience to authority, self-improvement through education, integrity, and discipline. Kangai (2014) argues that Africa can draw inspiration from China by reforming its economies, draw from her cultural heritage to regain self-confidence that can achieve greatness and industrialise.

**Conclusion**

This article has taken the stand that in resolving the agrarian question in sub-Saharan Africa, the peasantry/small-holder farmers need to graduate and become large-scale commercial farmers that will have the responsibility of feeding Africa’s population. On the other hand, the surplus population on small and uneconomic units of land need an exist option into wage employment to make it possible for them to earn non-farm incomes in order to sustain their livelihoods. This process requires undertaking socio-economic transformation through value addition to Africa’s raw materials so as to promote manufacturing and industrialisation. It is further argued that large-scale investment in agriculture is not harmful, but good, as it has an opening-up effect in sparsely populated areas where land is under-utilised by the locals, who can benefit through employment and have access to markets that are established in out-grower schemes.

As Africa undertakes industrialisation, there is need to empower all the stake-holders, especially women, with secure land tenure to make it possible for them to have a sense of ownership and benefit from their labour on land within their local communities. The empowerment of women and the youth with secure tenure also requires sustained effort to diversify what is produced in order to broaden the food base and ensure food security and
nutrition, especially at household level. Finally, this article suggests that Africa can learn from what the Asian Tigers have managed to achieve in the past 50 to 60 years. During this period, the Tigers have experienced rapid industrialisation through value addition and the promotion of manufacturing, while Africa has largely lagged behind despite being well endowed with raw materials that continue to be exported and processed outside the continent.

References


Book Reviews


The last book I read that discussed Malawi and Zambia together as Central Africa was Robert Rotberg’s The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, published by Harvard University Press in 1965. and although the two authors ignore Rotberg’s book, it actually laid the foundation for their own work, which, despite the references to anthropology, theology, and belief systems, is mainly a political history. Rotberg studied the fall of the Central African Federation or of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but what is the reason for Kalusa and Vaughan combining Zambian and Malawian history today? I really cannot say.

This book is ‘a set of essays’, as the blurb says, and all of them are stand alone essays, as actually they have already been published as journal articles and that is how they should be read. The theme of death permeates everything in both ancient and modern history and so it cannot be ignored and by the same token cannot be made a special topic. There is no death without life and all that it entails. Clearly politics and belief are always present when death is discussed but so are health, or recreation, or even profit and capitalism.

In Chapter 1, ‘Translating the Soul: Death and Catholicism in Northern Zambia’, Megan Vaughan analyses how translation creates new and curious unintended meanings for both missionaries and the scholars who followed them. Take for example ukupyana. The literal meaning is succession, but the focus of both the White Fathers and the historians is on the rituals accompanying succession. Thus, when Bemba warlord Mwamba asked Father DuPont to succeed him and inherit his wives, there is no reference in the Catholic or historians’ versions of the story to ‘removing death from a surviving spouse’ - the preferred translation of ukupyana used by many in the HIV/AIDS industry for reasons we cannot discuss here.

Why is the life/death struggle translated as a sex/death link by the White Fathers and European scholars? This is a complex puzzle but for a better understanding of the African perspective, one would have to read Milingo’s discussions on the world in between or study the Lenshina doctrine, which also exposed the limitations of European religion abroad. The same applies to the references to previous anthropological work on shades, spirits, and ancestors covered in the second chapter.

Kalusa’s ‘Death on the Copperbelt’ in chapters 2 to 4 takes us over familiar territory of Zambia’s modernisation: social stratification, workers struggles, and the nationalist movement. I am sure the book will be an important reference for students of Zambian history. However, the ethnographic present has been dead in anthropology for a long time, so Kalusa’s strong belief that there is such a thing as an African culture of death and that anthropologists present it as static is simply not plausible as a close reading of even colonial era anthropologists like Al Epstein will show him. Take for example the Chisungu ritual. In the 1930s, Audrey Richards observed a ceremony in rural Bemba land already aware that things are not what they used to be (they never are). In the ‘50s, she returned to Zambia and was asked by banafimbusa for advice on how to conduct proper chisungu ceremonies for young women on the Copperbelt. But what is a correct ceremony? Participants may follow a certain template but no two weddings can be the same. Why should funerals be different? Even if we took away the colonial interference in African rituals, we would still have several ritual experts arguing about what is correct on such occasions., and one thing anthropology teaches is that ancestral culture and tradition are always about power and wealth today, no matter how far back in history.
contestants may go to find their precedence. As I have argued in another context, it is history and not anthropology that produces dead culture.

The final section on Malawi explores the themes of suicide and deaths of presidents and attempts to bring history back into the world of the living descendants of the recently departed. But having not done justice to the original clash of cultures between missionaries and African colonial subjects there is still no understanding of exactly why the Christianity of T. B. Joshua is in such close harmony with the local concepts of spiritual power. It would seem that death, belief, and politics are more closely interconnected than the historians imagined. Rituals and traditions are invented and contested not just in Central Africa. That is what most politics normally culminate in. Power struggles are power struggles and blaming the political confusion caused by power hungry contestants on some kind of tribal chief’s succession guidebook is just unfortunate. One would gain better understanding by looking more closely at the political economy of the Republic today.

By all means, study the book, but do read Rotberg, Chirwa, Englund, Meebelo, and Roberts as well to understand where the historical study of Malawian and Zambian political culture came from.

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Looking For Mrs Livingstone. By Julie Davidson (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 2012), 272

'We have one last relic to visit at Kolobeng before we leave the haunt of the wild boar... Albert Piet leads us down the hill towards the river and a thicket of wild mimosa, where there is a clearing staked with more posts linked with chain' (165).

Julie Davidson’s biography of Mrs Livingstone is rigorously and tirelessly personal. As Davidson herself mentions several times, sources that have solid facts about the wife of the famous David are few and far between. *Looking for Mrs Livingstone* is intended for a lay audience, and although it offers a certain quantity of evidence, its existence relies entirely on imaginative bridges. Davidson avoids excessive historical speculation, and instead uses her own journeys in Africa to fill the gaps. In the insert, historical photographic portraits of the Livingstone family bookend the author’s travel snapshots. She is writing two parallel stories, that of Mary Livingstone herself, and that of *her* search for Mrs Livingstone. The two are interwoven, roughly following the chronology of Mary’s life, from her childhood at the Moffat’s mission in Kuruman, through her marriage, her travels by Livingstone’s side, her ‘exile’ in Britain, and her final return to the continent. This double narrative means that the reader is ‘discovering contemporary Africa’ through Davidson being led down the hill towards the thicket of wild Mimosa, at the same time that she is ‘discovering history’. As such, large chunks of the book are likely to feel clunky and irrelevant to those whose lives are lived in Southern Africa. Nonetheless, Davidson brings sensitivity and imagination to the double narrative, and it meets with some success.

Firstly, Davidson is highly attuned to her own emotional relationship to the historical characters. This allows her to pick up on and draw out sentiment in other historians who have presented the Livingstones, from fame-seeking explorers such Devereux in 1869, to those writing lives as moral models. It also keeps her sharply aware of what everyone in the book—from pastors, to tourist agents to taxi drivers; those in Chupanga, like those in Aberdeen—might want from Mary Livingstone’s story. The power of historical biographies to make money and shape futures is a live issue and she addresses it head on.

Secondly, Davidson emphasises another component of historical writing that is often suppressed, the act of witnessing. She does this actively through her pilgrimages to various sites of Mary Livingstone’s life, but also stylistically: her writing resounds with ghosts, traces, spoors, and legacies. Romantic notions aside, Davidson’s pursuit of witnessing seemed to me to bear fruit. I think it would have been quite impossible for such a solidly pragmatic account of missionary life in that period to have emerged, had the author not made these journeys in her heroine’s footsteps. Both strands of the book, the story of Mary and the story of Julie, focus on moving, washing, mending clothes, eating, healing, and laughing. Davidson is careful to record efforts in the everyday toil of nourishment and nurture made by the whole cast of characters, male and female, living and deceased. I am pleased to say that this is an ever more common feature of historical writing, but Davidson does it skillfully and elegantly.

Finally, while governments, and institutions form part of the background of the book, the author focuses on political paths and networks created at a very intimate level. It is a history of personal responses to dramatic events, and follows the fates of white and black individuals and families from the nineteenth and into the twenty-first century as they move upstream, downstream, across rivers and state boundaries, searching for places to build lives that might work. These three aspects – the persistence of personal networks; the importance of the everyday; and the role of empathy in historical writing – are fluently woven through the book. For me, they saved it from the ‘lightness’ of the evidence, and the dangers of sentimentality, and
made *Looking for Mrs. Livingstone* an interesting and worthwhile perspective on stories that might otherwise seem well trodden.

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