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A Good Measure of Sacrifice*: Aspects of Zambia's Contribution to the Liberation Wars in Southern Africa, 1964-1975

Clarence Chongo
University of Zambia

From the early 1960s, and throughout the 1970s, southern African liberation movements successfully waged wars of national liberation, forcing white minority regimes to negotiate independence under black majority rule. This success partly stemmed from extensive diplomatic, military, and material support extended to various liberation movements by regional alliances such as the frontline states and transnational state actors and solidarity movements. This article examines salient aspects of Zambia's contribution as a prominent regional actor to the liberation wars in southern Africa. In doing so, it underlines the nature and significance of Zambia's support for the liberation movements. I argue that Zambia's authorities employed a dual strategy, war and diplomacy, in seeking to secure black majority rule in the region, but for mainly economic reasons, they were more inclined to pursue diplomatic approaches rather than exclusively relying on violence. They backed armed struggle only to the extent that it was a necessary instrument to coerce the white minority regimes to the negotiating table, but this strategy had limited success, and created numerous tensions and contradictions. Some nationalist leaders accused Zambia's authorities of undermining the liberation wars. Based extensively on new Zambian archival documents and interviews with former Zambian leaders, this article brings fresh evidence about the intricacies of Zambia's contribution to the liberation wars in southern Africa.

Key words:

Armed struggle, liberation war, southern Africa, liberation movements, Lusaka Manifesto, Zambia's government

Introduction

There is an extensive array of literature on liberation wars in southern Africa. This scholarship invariably emphasises the importance of diplomatic, military, and financial aid extended to liberation movements by international state

** I borrowed this part of the title from P. Mgadla (2008) who did a similar study on Botswana entitled 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice: Botswana and the Liberation of Southern Africa, 1965-1985' *Social Dynamics* 34, no.1: 5-16.

and non-state actors. There is consensus among scholars about the role and significance of Scandinavian countries in southern African liberation struggles (Saunders, 2009). Sellstrom (2002 and 1999), who examines the role of Sweden in the liberation wars, argues that the formation of broad and active political opinion prior to 1969 was vital for parliament's decision to endorse a policy of direct official humanitarian assistance to liberation movements. While Eriksen (2000) documents the role of Norwegian authorities and solidarity movements such as churches and trade unions in the liberation struggles, Morgensteine (2003) and Peltola (2009) examine the contribution of Denmark to the struggle for black majority rule in the region.

Although this scholarship focuses on the contribution of international state and non-state actors to the liberation wars, there is an appreciable collection of studies that recently emerged underlining the significance of regional actors in the liberation wars. The most prominent is Hashim Mbita's project on *Southern African Liberation Struggles, 1960-1994* sponsored by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It not only traces the history of liberation struggles as they unfolded in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, but in a series of volumes also analyses the regional and international dimensions of southern African liberation wars (Temu and Tembe, 2014). Similarly, the volumes of the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) project on *The Road to Democracy in South Africa* examine the history of South Africa's liberation struggle and its regional and international aspects (SADET, 2014). Other studies focus on the roles of Botswana and Tanzania in the liberation of southern Africa (Morapedi, 2012; Oitsile, 2010; Mgadla, 2008; Osei-Hwedie 1998; and Ishemo 2000). There is certainly a wide collection of historical studies on liberation struggles from regional and international standpoints, but there is conspicuously little that has been written from the Zambian perspective, despite it being a prominent regional actor. Except for Chris Chirwa's work (2013) which discusses Zambia's role in South Africa's liberation struggle, the few available published works examine the role of Zambia in liberation wars only in the context of the frontline states regional alliance (Temu and Tembe, 2014, Thompson, 1985). Yet, Zambia's contribution to liberation struggles in southern Africa did not begin with the establishment of the frontline states alliance in 1974. It began much earlier, dating to pre-independence days when prominent nationalists in the region regularly collaborated during the anti-colonial struggles in their respective territories (Rotberg, 1966; Hall, 1965; Gann, 1964; and Mulford, 1967). Thus, a deeper appreciation of Zambia's role can only be yielded when the story is told from 1964. Currently there is growing emphasis to shift focus away from approaches that previously underlined the importance of national governments

in liberation struggles and towards examining exile histories of liberation movements (Sapire, 2009; Macmillan, 2013; Williams, 2015; Alexander, McGregor, and Miles-Tendi, 2017). However, given an array of rich Zambian archival evidence that has emerged, it has become more imperative to revisit and interrogate salient aspects of Zambia's contribution to the liberation wars, and cast new light on issues previous scholars glossed over and sometimes took for granted. This article seeks to interrogate the nature and significance of Zambia's contribution to liberation wars in southern Africa.

Origins of Armed Struggles: A Synopsis

The origins of armed struggles in southern Africa varied in time and space, but the pattern and processes which spurred armed resistance movements were similar. During the colonial period, Africans were systematically exploited and denied fundamental human rights. They served as tools of exploitation, furthering the economic interests of the ruling elite within the colonial system (Rodney, 1990). The colonial political system also excluded them from participating peacefully in the political processes. Africans were often denied opportunity to promote their political interests and seek changes in the political system by constitutional means (Afigbo, 1990). What hardened the attitudes of Africans was the fact that, whilst their counterparts elsewhere in Africa were being decolonised by metropolitan powers, white minority governments in southern Africa sought to reverse this process by tightening their grip on political power.¹ In May 1948, an Afrikaner nationalist regime led by Dr. D. F. Malan was elected into office in South Africa and shortly afterwards began to introduce apartheid, a system which promoted separate development and social exclusion of races (Nolutshungu, 1975, 98). White supremacy was given further impetus by white minority settlers in Rhodesia when they unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965, effectively rolling back any progress towards black majority rule. Elsewhere, the Portuguese authoritarian administration, led initially by Antonio Salazar and succeeded by Marcello Caetano, tightened the grip over its African empire. In 1951, it incorporated Angola and Mozambique into Portugal as overseas provinces (Oliver and Atmore, 1981, 269). The intransigence of white minority regimes, coupled with many years of social inequalities, ruthless economic exploitation, and intense political repression, fuelled resentment among Africans. Consequently, Africans in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (now Namibia) organised armed resistance movements in order to overthrow white minority regimes.

Thus, by the mid-1960s, southern Africa was on fire. The brutal and repressive nature of white minority regimes compelled nationalist movements

to seek asylum in countries with independent black governments for purposes of further organising armed struggle. Apart from Tanzania, Zaire, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in the region, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), member countries further afield, including among others Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, and Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, liberation movements also found strong support in Zambia, where authorities allowed them to establish bases. They included the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Zimbabwe, African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa, South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, and Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique and Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) of Angola. However, Zambian authorities had to deal with domestic concerns prior to accepting to host liberation movements.

Domestic Debates and Quest to Support Armed Struggles

Zambia's quest to back liberation wars was a highly contentious issue in domestic political discourse. The decision was contested less by Cabinet Ministers within the governing United National Independence Party (UNIP) and more by opposition and independent Members of Parliament (MPs). Sikota Wina insisted that during discussions on foreign policy matters, including the question of supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa, Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive about pursuing such a policy. They often expressed concern about the possible risks that supporting armed conflicts in neighbouring countries might entail for the country's economy.² These concerns were based on the fact that Zambia's economic survival depended, to a large extent, on supply routes controlled by white minority regimes it was trying to overthrow.

Such anxiety emanated from the dilemma Zambian authorities confronted in the wake of the Rhodesian crisis and the mounting pressure to support armed struggles. Although the Zambian government, in line with OAU decisions, was willing to support armed struggles in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, its economy was heavily dependent on supply routes controlled by neighbouring white minority regimes. If the Zambian government remained neutral, or at best decided for economic reasons to cooperate rather than oppose white minority regimes by refusing to assist liberation movements, it was bound to lose face among African countries. The magnitude of this dilemma was highlighted during Cabinet meetings in August 1965. One Cabinet Minister said:

Withdrawing our support from...freedom fighters would be in conflict with...avowed aims of...OAU and other...states in Africa, apart from being in violation of our fundamental principles upon which Zambia was founded. Such action would...make Zambia one of the most sinister

nations that...ever polluted the pages of the history of...independent movement in Africa. Zambia has the moral duty to help in the historic movement of wiping out colonialism in favour of the democratizing process.³

While Zambia did not want to lose face and appear a weak link in the OAU's confrontation with white minority regimes, it was deeply concerned about the potential damage to the economy of pursuing a confrontational course. At stake was the country's economic survival. Here was a case in which the government sought to strike a balance between its economic interests and pursuing a revolutionary course. Thus, as another Cabinet Minister argued:

...the question of keeping the Congo/Angola route open depends...in part on whether or not we provoke the Portuguese in Mozambique. It is necessary for us...to be more cautious in our pronouncements on Rhodesian issues in order not to encourage action of aggression from that country which would lead to the closure of the southern route in the event of UDI, for it is my firm belief that an adverse reaction by Mozambique would [inevitably] have further adverse repercussions on the Angola section of the western route. It is noted that we have a moral duty to help...Rhodesian nationalists, but this should take into account the difficulties of keeping the machinery of our economy running smoothly in the interests of this nation. In this respect I suggest that as little as possible is said about Rhodesia unless we are forced to make a reply.⁴

Despite apprehension expressed by Cabinet Ministers, it can be argued that there was more consensus than disagreement on policy in the UNIP government regarding the decision to support liberation struggles. In fact, from government and party documents examined by this author, there is no evidence to suggest there was open, intense disagreement within Cabinet or UNIP Central Committee on foreign policy, especially on the question of supporting liberation wars.

If Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive, opposition and independent MPs were more vocal in contesting government policy of supporting liberation movements. Their concerns were often expressed during parliamentary debates on foreign policy. As early as 1965, Harry Nkumbula, president of opposition African National Congress (ANC) and parliamentarian for Monze, described government's decision to back liberation wars as a "very unwise policy" which amounted to quarrelling with neighbours.⁵ Another opposition ANC MP, Edward Liso, questioned government policy of allowing liberation movements to open offices in Zambia because it amounted to "provocation" where the safety of citizens would not be guaranteed if neighbouring white minority regimes carried out "retaliatory measures" against Zambia.⁶ In mid-1966 the Independent MP for Ndola, Cecil Burney expressed concern that government was "taking an

open risk” by supporting liberation movements (De Roche, 2009, 77-97). Again Nkumbula feared the prospect of Zambians paying a high price for government’s decision to support liberation struggles.⁷ In 1967, Burney wondered whether government’s willingness to back liberation movements was in the best interest of the country and urged it to “defuse this situation so we could get back to a more normal form of life.” Hugh Mitchley, an Independent MP representing the Midlands advised government that “what is needed is a policy for all countries to stop arguing with their neighbours and get on with their development.”⁸ In 1968, ANC MP for Mbabala, Edward Nyanga, urged government to negotiate with the white minority regimes in a peaceful manner instead of threatening war. Similarly, Richard Farmer, Independent MP for Copperbelt Central advised government to reassess its foreign policy on southern Africa and see whether “the policy cannot be modified into a more conciliatory one.”⁹

The MPs criticism of government’s policy on southern Africa reflected the general concern of ordinary Zambians about the potential damage to the country’s economic stability as a consequence of supporting liberation struggles. Despite these concerns, Zambia implemented OAU’s policy and backed armed struggles in southern Africa.

Nature of Support for Liberation Movements

Zambian support for liberation movements included offering them recognition, transit and broadcasting facilities, and financial and material aid. The government also accorded diplomatic backing to leaders of liberation movements. These forms of support must be understood within the framework of the Liberation Committee which Zambia joined shortly after independence becoming an active member.¹⁰ African leaders established the Liberation Committee in 1963 with a mission to accelerate the liberation of African countries from white minority rule. Based in Dar-es-Salaam, capital of Tanganyika (from 1964 Tanzania), the Liberation Committee was mandated to i) coordinate material and financial support sent to liberation movements from independent African states and from abroad; ii) give recognition and financial assistance to selected revolutionary movements; iii) reconcile differences among rival insurgent groups so that they may present a united front; iv) facilitate formation of revolutionary alliances across national boundaries; v) publicise the struggle through diplomacy in international circles (El-Khawas, 1977, 25-41).

Providing recognition to liberation movements was a vital aspect of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars, but such recognition was informed by the Liberation Committee.¹¹ Zambia’s leaders often accepted liberation movements which had been previously recognised by the Liberation Committee. That they supported nationalist movements that had received formal and prior acceptance

by the Liberation Committee remained a rule rather than a norm. In practice, Zambian authorities sometimes backed nationalist organisations that had never been recognised by the Liberation Committee.¹² The degree of militancy and level of effectiveness on the battlefield were two important yardsticks which governed the Liberation Committee's decision whether or not to recognise a particular liberation movement. Recognition was an essential qualification for eligibility to receive other forms of assistance from the Liberation Committee.¹³

The initial form of support Zambia rendered to liberation movements was to host them in Lusaka.¹⁴ Towards the end of 1965 government acquired a new office building at Charter Welfare Hall, in Kamwala, Lusaka and placed it at the disposal of liberation movements for use as their headquarters. This followed previous unsuccessful attempts to purchase an office block on Bradford Street in Lusaka from Irving and Johnson for approximately £7,000. The government did not purchase this property because it was not suitable for the accommodation of all the liberation movements.¹⁶ The Zambian authorities designated the new office building as the African Liberation Centre (ALC) and appointed Mukuka Nkoloso as director. As a personal representative of President Kaunda at the Liberation Centre, Nkoloso was responsible for coordinating the activities of the liberation movements, ensuring that they were provided with office space to conduct day-to-day operations, as well as organising publicity campaigns, and facilitating distribution of aid to the organisations. He reported directly to Kaunda. Nkoloso worked closely with the executive secretary of the Liberation Committee based in Tanzania by screening the cadres to ensure those who went for military training and came back to join the struggle at the battlefield were genuine freedom fighters.¹⁸

Since liberation movements were a potential threat to Zambia's internal security, the Zambian authorities strictly controlled their operations in the country by formulating rules and regulations to govern and regulate their activities.¹⁹ Due to the security implications, matters involving the operations of liberation movements were handled and coordinated at the highest level. The principal office responsible was the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. It worked closely with the Office of the President (OP), and the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Local Government, as well as the director of the Liberation Centre.

The provision of transit facilities for transportation of cadres, and shipment of war materials, was another vital form of support Zambian authorities accorded to liberation movements.²⁰ Throughout the period under review, the cadres were granted the right of passage to undergo military training in East Africa and beyond in socialist countries such as China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. In the sub-region, major military training camps were located in Tanzania. The earliest

training camp was established in 1961 at Kongwa, situated in the central part of the country. Here, almost all the liberation movements sent cadres for military training. However, as the liberation struggle gained momentum and the number of freedom fighters seeking training increased, it became necessary to open more camps. Consequently, Wami, Nachingwea, Itumbi and Mgagao were set up. The latter two hosted ANC and PAC militants as well as freedom fighters from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Nachingwea was reserved for the FRELIMO fighters because of its proximity to Mozambique, while Tundura and Bagamoyo were established as education training centres; Mtwara was a rearguard hospital.²¹ The ANC also secured a training camp at Kingolwira and a residential site at Msanvu, while PAC trained its cadres at Masuguru but later moved to Msungura. Both camps were in the coastal region. In the 1970s, Masuguru became a settlement camp for PAC cadres who migrated in larger numbers into the country in that period. In 1976, more South African refugees flocked to Tanzania following the Soweto uprising in South Africa, so the ANC requested additional settlement and training camps from the government of Tanzania. Through the coordination of the Liberation Committee, the ANC was granted an 100 acre stretch of land at Mazimbu in Morogoro which was later extended to 250 acres. On this site in 1978, the ANC built its first educational institution, to teach the young cadres who had fled South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto killings.²² Conducted by Chinese military instructors recruited by the Liberation Committee, military training for the cadres lasted between four and six months. The recruits were trained in elementary knowledge of regular army tactics, modern guerilla warfare, and combat operations. Other forms of training included physical fitness, use of small arms, rocket launchers, light mortars, and plastic explosives. They were also taught field engineering, sabotage, ambushes and patrols, defence and attack up to platoon level, principles of guerilla formations, situation of guerilla actions, and general tactics.²³ After completing training, cadres were granted safe passage and deployed for military action at the battlefield. Both Zambia and Tanzania worked closely with the Liberation Committee in transiting and training cadres. They established rules and procedures to govern transportation of cadres through Zambia to Tanzania and back. For example in 1967, G. S Magombe, the executive secretary of the Liberation Committee addressed a letter to Vernon Mwaanga, the permanent secretary in the Office of the President. He noted that:

I have informed all leaders of liberation movements that with immediate effect all their requests for allowing their cadres to come to Tanzania for military training should be routed to the Minister for Presidential Affairs [in Zambia] who will give them a "Recruitment Form" to sign and that it is only after completing this form that their trainees would be allowed to come to Tanzania.²⁴

By signing the recruitment forms, the cadres agreed to undergo voluntary military training and pledged, upon completion of training, to return to their home country and participate in the struggle against the colonialists. In the initial stages, trained cadres earmarked for deployment to the battlefield were allowed to transit Zambia only in small units of six people per group. Until such a group was infiltrated into the enemy territory, no other group of trained cadres was allowed to cross.²⁵ These procedures were important because they served various purposes. Firstly, they allowed both Zambia and Tanzania to maintain strict control over transportation of the militants in and between the two countries. Secondly, they helped cadres uphold a sense of discipline and dedication to the struggle. Thirdly, it was vital to maintain secrecy, speed, and security while transiting the guerrillas.

Another key feature of Zambia's contribution to the liberation wars was that it allowed safe transmission and storage of military materials, including arms, ammunition, and other logistics for the liberation movements in the region. Military weapons mainly came from two sources, namely, the stockpile purchased by the Liberation Committee, and donations by countries from within Africa and abroad.²⁶ Shipment of military weapons was a highly sensitive issue because of the security nature of the exercise. For instance, as early as September 1965, Zambia Police at Kapiri Mposhi in Central Province impounded a vehicle carrying a large quantity of arms destined for the FRELIMO depot in Lusaka (Morris, 1974, 249). The reason for impounding the vehicle was that it was transporting arms without police escort, raising fears about the possibility of weapons finding their way into the hands of unauthorised persons, consequently posing a serious security threat to local communities. However, once police established the source and destination of the arms, and security guarantees for their transportation, they released the vehicle.

During the early years of the struggle, liberation movements lacked adequate arms. Out of desperation, they sometimes used unorthodox methods to obtain and transport weapons. In April 1966, Zambia Police again impounded a vehicle carrying a large number of weapons from Tanzania and destined for a dispersal base in Zambia. One of its occupants was sentenced to one year imprisonment for illegally possessing 200 grenades, 200 detonators, rifles and a revolver (Morris 1974, 249). Evidence suggests that, as liberation wars in the region raged, the presence of freedom fighters in the country increased and the cases of unauthorised movements of weapons became more frequent, posing a serious security threat to local communities. For instance in July 1966, the Zambian government was forced to revoke recognition of Noel Gabriel Mukono as a ZANU representative after, for reasons unknown, he shot a local Zambian man with a pistol in Chieftainess Waitwika's area in Isoka District.²⁷ Zambia's

decision to establish weapons' dumps in specific areas of the country's Eastern, Northwestern, Southern and Western provinces was partly a response to, and an expression of concern with, unauthorised proliferation of weapons in the country. It was also partly a decision taken in response to recommendations adopted by the OAU in July 1969 regarding the establishment of depots and storage of war materials in member countries.²⁸

It is important to emphasise the significance of providing transit facilities to liberation movements. The border between Zambia and Rhodesia became highly militarised after white settlers declared UDI. It was policed on a regular basis by both Zambian and Rhodesian security forces. Consequently, many ZAPU, ZANU, ANC and PAC militants could only be recruited and transported for military training in East Africa and abroad through Zambia via an independent country, Botswana. However, the militants frequently experienced difficulties transiting through Botswana mainly because, during the early days of independence, the authorities refused to grant them transit rights for fear of provoking white minority regimes in neighbouring countries (Mutambara, 2014, 99, and Morapedi, 2012, 73-90). Similarly, and perhaps for economic reasons, the governments of Malawi and Lesotho were reluctant to allow freedom fighters to transit through their territories. They refused to implement the OAU's long-standing policy calling on member states to assist African liberation movements. Rather, the two countries chose to collaborate with the white minority regimes. The Congo Kinshasa government also for some time prevented MPLA from using its territory to transmit weapons and cadres to the battlefield essentially because it supported a rival nationalist movement, the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA).²⁹ Given the above scenario, the nationalists mainly depended on Zambia for transmitting weapons and cadres and later, establishing guerrilla training camps. The deliberate policy of providing unrestricted transit facilities to the military cadres by Zambian authorities significantly helped liberation movements to successfully prosecute the liberation wars.

Support for liberation movements was not confined to providing transit rights and operational bases. It extended to provision of broadcasting facilities. As in other matters concerning liberation movements, Zambia sought to provide these facilities as a response to the OAU's appeal that:

*independent African countries in whose territories freedom fighters operate...should place at the disposal of such movements facilities for informing and stirring nationalist opinion...and make available an allocated time per week for the dissemination of propaganda on their radio and information media into occupied territories.*³⁰

Zambia realised that armed struggle could not be prosecuted only on the battle field but that it also needed an effective propaganda machinery, a crucial tool for conducting psychological warfare. Zambia allowed use of its broadcasting facilities by the liberation movements. In May 1966, the Zambian Cabinet endorsed UNIP Central Committee's decision to allow ZAPU to make broadcasts on Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS), subject to vetting by the Minister of Information and Postal Services.³¹ By December 1966, Zambian authorities approved ZANU's request to use broadcasting facilities on Radio Zambia on condition that broadcasts would be scrutinised by the Minister of Home Affairs.³² In January 1971, MPLA was allowed to begin a daily 45-minute programme on ZBS called "Angola Combatente." It quickly acquired a wide audience. By May 1973, Zambia formally inaugurated its new external services, "The War of Words Channel", with the aid of powerful Chinese transmitters. FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, MPLA, ANC and SWAPO were each allocated one hour a day. Consequently, as Anglin and Shaw (1979, 243) noted, Radio Zambia blanketed the sub-continent for more than forty hours a week in twenty-two languages with the liberation movements accepting responsibility for all the content. This constituted assistance on a massive scale and undoubtedly had a significant impact on African opinion throughout southern Africa.

Zambian authorities also supported the liberation wars in the region by providing material and financial aid to the liberation movements through the OAU. On a bilateral basis, they accorded freedom fighters medical facilities, food, and accommodation. For instance in 1969, the MPLA expressed gratitude to Zambia "for the important role which they did not cease to play in the struggle to liberate Angola", adding that "at present MPLA sends to the Zambian hospitals sick and wounded persons who do not find medical care inside Angola."³³ Similarly, SWAPO emphasised that wounded militants on the battlefield were often brought to Zambia for medical treatment.³⁴ Providing financial and other forms of material aid was crucial for the day-to-day operations of the liberation movements and maintenance of cadres in Zambia. Bilateral aid was usually drawn from Zambia's own resources. Given the limited resources at the disposal of the Zambian government at a time when it was consolidating its own independence, drawing upon its coffers to finance activities of the liberation movements placed an extra burden on state resources. For this reason, in 1968, the government was compelled to seek financial relief from the Liberation Committee to meet ever increasing emergency needs of the liberation movements based in Lusaka.³⁵ The request was approved. It was, in fact, in this context that in March 1969, the Liberation Committee decided to open a sub-office in Lusaka. The sub-office was required to manage contingency funds to meet emergency needs such as the supply of medicines for freedom

fighters, transportation of food and arms to the war front, infiltration of freedom fighters, and management of vehicles at the war front. Apart from making payments of fixed amounts to liberation movements based in Lusaka, the sub-office also supervised all forms of assistance and weapons given by the Liberation Committee to different liberation movements. It also supervised the infiltration and training of cadres in Lusaka.³⁶ This office drew its administrative funds from the Liberation Committee Special Fund and worked closely with the African Liberation Centre. Liberation movements also benefitted from Zambia's bilateral financial aid in the form of tax relief. As early as mid-1965, the Zambian Cabinet approved a recommendation from the Ministry of Finance to waive import duty on all items imported by liberation movements, including motor vehicles and office equipment. The principal object was to grant financial relief to liberation movements and enhance their effective operations.³⁷

Zambian authorities also assisted liberation movements indirectly by directing financial aid through the Liberation Committee's Special Fund. The Liberation Committee derived its revenue for financing liberation movements from three principal sources, namely, contributions by OAU member countries in accordance with the established scale of assessment, subventions from OAU headquarters on a quarterly basis, and donations by institutions and organisations in Africa and abroad.³⁸ For its operations and budgetary allocations to liberation movements, the Liberation Committee relied almost exclusively on the goodwill contributions made on a regular basis by OAU member states. That the Liberation Committee often experienced financial difficulties, partly as a result of lack of financial contributions, and partly because of possible mismanagement of resources, constitutes an important theme that characterised the period of its existence (Mononi, 1975). The Liberation Committee frequently lacked adequate financial resources partly because of lack of contributions by member countries, but throughout the period under review, Zambia consistently met its financial obligations to the Special Fund. Its financial commitment to the Liberation Committee was clearly visible. Although Zambian authorities pledged in 1966 to continually honour their financial obligations to the Liberation Committee and since then consistently did so, by 1970, they became increasingly disillusioned and frustrated by the failure of OAU members to meet their financial obligations to the Special Fund. In particular, Kaunda accused independent African countries of letting down Zambia by "failing to give financial support to the liberation struggles in southern Africa". He complained bitterly: "you see our economy is in tatters because of the liberation struggles. We are still able to pay the little that we are asked to the Liberation Committee" (Times of Zambia, 1970). He charged that "those countries which failed to honour their financial obligations to the

Liberation Committee were being unfair because the struggle in southern Africa was for the dignity and emancipation of Africa as a whole" (Times of Zambia, 1979). If consistency and regularity of payments to the Liberation Committee formed part of the criteria of assessing a country's commitment to the liberation wars in southern Africa, then Zambia fully met the criteria.

Zambian Diplomacy

At global level, Zambia's leaders used diplomacy to help legitimise liberation movements, routinely urging world leaders to accord nationalists a hearing and extend recognition to nationalist movements. At international fora such as the OAU, United Nations (UN), Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO), Zambia's representatives implored other leaders to support policies aimed at promoting black majority rule in southern Africa. Despite strong opposition from Western powers, Zambia's diplomats at the UN often took a leading role in sponsoring resolutions calling on the international community to take effective measures against white minority regimes which denied Africans the right to self-determination. They backed economic sanctions designed to isolate white minority regimes, and consistently applied diplomatic pressure on western governments to exercise influence over white minority regimes to accept the principle of black majority rule. The significance of Zambia's diplomacy at international level was evident. It helped to legitimate armed struggle in southern Africa thus attracting transnational assistance for liberation movements. It also served to publicise and clarify the problem of white minority rule as one requiring global attention.³⁹

The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa

For Zambia's leaders, one of the key diplomatic successes in galvanising international solidarity for liberation wars in southern Africa was the hosting of the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States (CECAS) in April 1969, which was attended by fourteen African leaders. The significance of the conference was the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa.⁴⁰ The key aspect of the manifesto was that it gave priority to negotiations first, as opposed to violence, as the basis for achieving change. This strategy became the basis of Zambia's diplomatic efforts in promoting the struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa. The Manifesto was a collective statement of fourteen African leaders, but Anglin (1975, 471-503) claimed the principle authors were Kaunda and Nyerere, reflecting the strategic role of the two leaders in regional affairs. The Manifesto was subsequently adopted by the OAU and endorsed both by the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1970.

Although the manifesto was designed to express solidarity with liberation

movements, on the diplomatic front, Zambian-based nationalist leaders expressed concern with the tone of the manifesto, and questioned some of its provisions. The nationalists were concerned with the perceived lack of pugnaciousness expressed in the manifesto by African leaders. For instance, in paragraph 3, African leaders stressed the importance of, and recognised the inevitability of, “transitional arrangements” in transforming southern Africa from white minority rule to black majority rule.⁴¹ However, the nationalist leaders rejected the notion of transferring power from the whites to the blacks under transitional arrangements. Rather, they underlined the need for immediate, effective transfer of power.⁴² A major concern was that it was drawn up by African leaders without consulting the nationalist movements. The nationalist leaders opposed the principle of negotiations accepted by African leaders, insisting it weakened the case for freedom fighters.⁴³ Although Zambia’s authorities ferociously defended their position by insisting that “Heads of State were under no obligation to consult liberation movements” and that the “manifesto took into account the aspirations of freedom fighters for whose benefit it was declared”,⁴⁴ the nationalists refused to accept it because of its explicit emphasis on negotiations. They would later call for its withdrawal by “those who adopted it”,⁴⁵

Although the manifesto was condemned by nationalist leaders, its significance from the diplomatic perspective can not be underestimated. It enhanced Zambia’s standing in Africa as a strategic player in the struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa (Mwanakatwe 1994, 64, and Anglin 1975, 471-503). This culminated in the election of Kaunda as the OAU Chairman in Addis Ababa in September 1970, where he was mandated by African Heads of State to lead an OAU delegation to countries supplying arms to South Africa to dissuade them from doing so.⁴⁶ Prior to undertaking his European mission, Kaunda successfully hosted the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka which extended his mission to include members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Non-Aligned Summit was attended by more than fifty countries including representatives of liberation movements from around the globe.⁴⁷ Addressing the conference, Kaunda stressed that “imperialism, colonialism, and racial oppression” persisted in southern Africa mainly because western countries continued to provide overt political, economic, and military support to white minority regimes. He warned western countries of the inevitability of violence if they delayed in “discharging justice” and “stood in the way of peaceful change towards majority rule”.⁴⁸ The conference produced several resolutions which dealt with the pertinent issue of white minority rule in southern Africa.⁴⁹ Three important themes were dominant in all the resolutions on southern Africa. Firstly, the Non-Aligned leaders condemned white minority

regimes for perpetrating racist and oppressive policies, but they also called for strengthening of economic sanctions against them. Secondly, they expressed solidarity with oppressed Africans in dependent territories. And, thirdly, they pledged renewed commitment to providing material and moral support to liberation movements.⁵⁰ That Zambia successfully hosted the Non-Aligned Conference, attended by a huge number of world leaders, represented a key diplomatic achievement.

Meanwhile, Kaunda visited a number of Western countries in 1970, to dissuade NATO countries from supplying arms to South Africa, and to formally present to the United Nations resolutions and declarations of the OAU and Non-Aligned Summit.⁵¹ During his visits to Italy and West Germany, Kaunda urged the two countries to stop supporting firms participating in the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric scheme because the project was designed to “consolidate Portuguese colonialism” in Africa.⁵² In Britain, he advised the British prime minister, Edward Heath, to halt his government’s intention to sell arms to South Africa because it would give the apartheid regime “a badge of respectability” (Times of Zambia, 1970). The theme of arms sales to South Africa dominated Kaunda’s speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1970. He pointed out that to supply arms to South Africa “is to cast a vote for apartheid” because the sales would support “South African expansionism and dominance” and give her “authority to establish her military presence in the rest of southern Africa”.⁵³ He challenged the Portuguese government to dismantle its African empire, insisting Zambia and the OAU were “prepared to assist” it “in any efforts to prepare the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau for self-determination and independence”. Kaunda warned the Portuguese that if they continued with their “inflexible policy”, Zambia and the OAU would be prepared to “continue supporting the freedom fighters in their struggle for freedom, peace and justice” and that Portugal was “bound to lose the war”.⁵⁴

Kaunda’s mission to NATO countries met with limited success. He failed to dissuade Britain from supplying arms to South Africa and equally failed to secure a meeting with Richard Nixon, the US President. Upon returning to Lusaka, Kaunda, in apparent reference to Edward Heath, called on Zambians not to hate the British people “for the stupidity of one man even if he is their leader” (Times of Zambia, 1970). Notwithstanding his international diplomatic efforts aimed at highlighting the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa, Kaunda felt frustrated by western countries for according low priority to resolving the problem of white minority rule in the region. That he succeeded in clearly articulating the position of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement on white minority rule in southern Africa constitutes the most significant outcome of his European mission.

Zambia's diplomatic efforts to exert pressure on western governments to act in favour of justice for the vast majority of blacks in white minority controlled territories in southern Africa did not end with the mission to NATO countries. It was extended to other international fora, including the Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 1971, during which the question of arms sales again featured prominently and threatened the very existence of the organisation, Kaunda's diplomatic skills prevailed. Under his influence and leadership, the Heads of State and Government approved the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. The large part of the declaration was based on the draft introduced and presented by Kaunda. Part of the text of the declaration criticised white minority governments for promoting racial discrimination and oppression, and called upon all Commonwealth members to support the principles of self-determination in southern Africa.⁵⁵ The Commonwealth Conference in Singapore provided a vital platform for Commonwealth leaders to denounce racial discrimination globally, but it also offered another opportunity for African leaders, led by Kaunda, to exert pressure on Britain to resolve white minority rule in Rhodesia and exercise influence on South Africa to dismantle apartheid.

Dialogue with South Africa and African Unity

Throughout the 1970s, Kaunda emerged as the leading critic of white minority regimes and particularly South Africa's apartheid system. He was well placed to spearhead the OAU's campaign to dissuade governments in Africa and elsewhere from collaborating with South Africa (Nolutshungu, 1975, 231). However, while addressing parliament in April 1971, South Africa's prime minister, John Vorster seized the opportunity to "expose" Kaunda as a "double talker". He explained that it was in the interest of southern Africa that people should realise that Kaunda had been talking to South Africa since 1968 while urging other countries not to hold a dialogue with her. Kaunda had condemned trade with South Africa, while Zambia, itself, traded with South Africa.⁵⁶ Zambia's authorities responded by publishing details of the correspondence that took place between the two leaders.⁵⁷ The exchange of letters suggests it was, in fact, Vorster who had been making overtures for a meeting to Kaunda through secret envoys but failed due to "irreconcilable political philosophies" between the two leaders on the "central question of the dignity and equality of man". Wina dismissed Vorster's accusations as "an utter fabrication at a very high level" (Times of Zambia, 1971).

Vorster's systematic attempts to discredit Kaunda, and the subsequent disclosure of his secret diplomacy with the Zambian leader, must be seen in context. During this period, South Africa was implementing what Sam

Nolutshungu (1975, 256) described as new “outward-looking policies”. The concept of dialogue formed a vital element of these policies. South Africa sought, by patient persuasion rather than defiance, to win over African and Asian states to a new attitude towards South Africa. First proposed by Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, and later adopted by Vorster, the concept of “dialogue first” came into South Africa’s political vocabulary in 1969, when it began to be used by South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller (Legum, 1972, 66). Vorster hoped to win over Kaunda, especially because Kaunda was not only the Chairman of the OAU, but also a virulent critic of South Africa’s racist policies. Vorster’s failure to change Kaunda’s attitude to South Africa’s policies perhaps produced feelings of frustrations. Thus, his disclosures were calculated to embarrass and discredit Kaunda and plant seeds of discord within the OAU. The timing of his announcement was also critical. It coincided with a press conference held by Ivory Coast President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the new victim of the “outward-looking policy”, at which he launched his campaign of dialogue with South Africa.⁵⁸ Houphouet-Boigny’s endorsement of dialogue with South Africa set the stage for the struggle which almost divided the OAU between the pro-dialogue club led by Ivory Coast and the rest of Africa. However, the Eighth OAU Summit held in Addis Ababa in June 1971 overwhelmingly rejected dialogue with South Africa.⁵⁹ The victory against the pro-dialogue club was consolidated at the Seventh Conference of the East and Central African States in Mogadishu in 1971.

From Lusaka Manifesto to Mogadishu Declaration

At the Conference of East and Central African States in Mogadishu in October 1971, African leaders reviewed the decolonisation process and issued the “Mogadishu Declaration” which affirmed the necessity of intensifying armed struggle as the only method of liberating southern Africa.⁶⁰ Whereas the Lusaka Manifesto was primarily a statement of principles, the Mogadishu Declaration outlined the strategy of liberating southern Africa. The emphasis on armed struggle impressed liberation movements. For instance, the ANC of South Africa welcomed the declaration as “a revolutionary document” which would serve both as a “call and a rallying point for all revolutionary African States and liberation movements to close their ranks”.⁶¹ Similarly, the PAC described the conference as “the best conference ever held in East Africa”, underlining that “the shift from the Lusaka Manifesto to the Mogadishu Declaration” represented “a qualitative change from the euphemism of the former to the revolutionary rhetoric of the latter”.⁶² The revolutionary character of the Mogadishu Declaration had a psychological impact on the liberation movements. The renewed promise by African leaders to provide military and material aid encouraged liberation movements to intensify armed struggle in southern Africa. The collapse of

Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola in 1975 directly resulted from the escalation of armed struggle waged by FRELIMO and MPLA respectively.

Zambia's leaders participated in drawing up the Mogadishu Declaration, but the document had limited impact on their own perception of the anti-colonial struggle in southern Africa. At least up to 1974, Zambia's authorities continued to regard the principle of negotiations enunciated in the Lusaka Manifesto as the basis for dismantling white minority rule in the region.⁶³ In this context, Zambia did not hesitate to seize every opportunity to mediate between liberation movements and minority regimes, especially when they demonstrated willingness to talk to each other. Zambia's favourable response to South Africa's initiative to resolve peacefully white minority rule in Rhodesia was a classic example (Anglin, 1975).

In September 1973, while FRELIMO intensified armed struggle in Mozambique, Kaunda opened secret contacts with the Portuguese colonial administration. The goal was to find a political solution rather than continuation with the armed struggle.⁶⁴ Thus, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial administration, partly as a result of a coup d'état staged by General Antonio Spínola in April 1974, was a welcome development to Zambia. Kaunda facilitated talks between the new Portuguese government and liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola which culminated in the installation of transitional governments leading up to independence of the two countries in June and November 1975, respectively.⁶⁵ However, Kaunda's inclination to facilitate a rapid political settlement of the war in Portuguese colonies, and later in Rhodesia, must be read in the correct context. At the time, Zambia's economy was undergoing enormous strain, aggravated partly by the Rhodesian border closure in 1973, and partly by external forces, including the declining commodity prices of copper and a rise in oil prices on the international market.⁶⁶ A rapid end to armed struggle would reduce the country's economic problems as it was dependent on trade routes via Rhodesia to Mozambican ports, and by Benguela Railway in Angola, for its export and import trade with the outside world.

Angolan Crisis and Zambia's Ambiguous Attitude

While Mozambique proceeded to independence, a new political reality, civil war, emerged in Angola, posing a serious challenge to the OAU and exposing divisions in the organisation. The contest for political power among the three Angolan liberation movements—MPLA, Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)—had its immediate roots in transitional arrangements constituted a few months prior to independence. In December 1974, Kaunda facilitated a meeting in Lusaka attended by MPLA leaders Agostinho Neto, and UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi,

and the Portuguese High Commissioner, Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho to discuss transitional arrangements. Neto and Savimbi agreed, with OAU support, to jointly establish, with Holden Roberto's FNLA, "a common political platform" which would "serve as a basis for the discussion with the Portuguese government on the formation of the transitional government".⁶⁷ In January 1975, Portugal and the three liberation movements signed an historic Independence Agreement in Portugal. The salient feature of the agreement was "Portugal's recognition of all the three liberation movements as sole representatives of the Angolan people" and the "establishment of a Transitional Government composed of the Portuguese High Commissioner and the three liberation movements".⁶⁸ This was a fragile arrangement essentially because, as Shubi Ishemo (2000) has shown, the FNLA and UNITA maintained certain ambitions and sought to utilise their presence in the interim government to prepare to take power. Moreover, the political situation in Portugal was unstable as the conservative forces of General Spínola and the "progressive" Armed Forces Movement in the armed forces contested for state power. Thus, it was not long before the transitional government collapsed.

The ensuing civil war seriously divided the OAU, reflecting new political alignments and a global contest for influence by Cold War arch rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. At an emergency OAU Summit convened in Addis Ababa, in January 1976, to deliberate on the Angolan situation, unambiguous differences emerged between countries supporting MPLA backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, on one hand, and those supporting the pro-western alliance of FNLA and UNITA, on the other. The crucial issue was whether to recognise MPLA as a legitimate government representing the Angolan people, or to recognise a government of national unity incorporating all three liberation movements. The Summit reached a deadlock as out of 46 countries, 22 supported recognition of MPLA while an equal number of countries expressed preference for a government of national unity. Two countries remained neutral.⁶⁹

Former UNIP leaders (Zulu, 2007) and government official accounts have long propagated the view that the basis for supporting a government of national unity was to forestall the escalation of the conflict which not only attracted foreign intervention but also threatened to engulf the entire sub-region into super-power conflict.⁷⁰ With the benefit of hindsight, Zambia's attitude on the Angolan crisis was informed by OAU long-standing policy which urged the membership to provide support to liberation movements recognised by the continental body. MPLA, FNLA and UNITA had all been recognised by the OAU. Yet on the challenge presented by the Angolan crisis, the OAU lamentably failed to produce a unified stand, allowing individual countries to interpret and define their approach to the conflict. For Zambia, the position it assumed was politically embarrassing, a

reflection perhaps of its failure to correctly interpret the situation. Yet it may also be argued that underlying its attitude strong economic interests were at stake. The position it adopted was revealing. By supporting an inclusive government in Angola, Zambia assumed a stance consistent with the position adopted by South Africa and the United States. The two countries intervened in support of UNITA and FNLA to counteract what they referred to as “communist threat” in Angola in view of the fact that both Cuba and the Soviet Union had intervened and provided massive military support for MPLA. By aligning itself with the pro-western alliance in the conflict, the Zambian government came under severe criticism from Zambia’s students who accused it of serving western imperialist interests. In retrospect, it can be argued that Kaunda’s real position on the Angolan situation was not merely that of advocating a government of national unity, nor was he neutral. He backed UNITA under the guise of supporting a government of national unity. A transcribed record of Kaunda’s meeting with the United States president, Gerald Ford in Washington, in April 1975, suggests that he desperately backed a “compromise proposal” to ensure Savimbi became President of Angola after independence in November. In this scheme, Kaunda solicited American support. He told Gerald Ford that:

We almost ignored Jonas Savimbi ...Our colleagues [in the OAU] had ignored Savimbi in the past, but this time he emerged as someone who could save the situation ...The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would be the compromise leader of all three...Savimbi does not even know of the compromise proposal for having him as President although it may have leaked. We have not yet told Savimbi. We must convince him of the rightness of it...Regardless of the outcome of the elections, Savimbi would be the President...We look for leadership on the question of Southern Africa.⁷¹

Zambia’s authorities switched their support to Savimbi when they realised that the MPLA, backed by thousands of Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers, was about to capture Luanda, the Angolan capital. Kaunda persuaded the United States to provide military assistance to Savimbi in his fight against the MPLA. For Kaunda, the US military support for UNITA was essential to counteract the MPLA and frustrate Soviet designs in Angola (Zukas, 2002, 144). Kaunda’s intervention in the Angolan crisis had a profound effect in escalating armed tension in the region. It not only led to intensified involvement of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Angola with massive arms deliveries, but also led to the American encouragement of the South African invasion of Angola (Zukas, 2002).

Because the Zambian government was determined to secure Savimbi's leadership of Angola, it also provided military support to UNITA. There is sufficient evidence that while Zambia's leaders publicly backed the establishment of a government of national unity in Angola, they secretly allowed Tiny Rowland's Lonrho jet to fly arms to Savimbi via Lusaka Airport. There was also proof that at the height of the crisis, a Zambia Airways plane laden with ten tons of arms and ammunition from the Zambia Army had taken off for Huambo, UNITA's headquarters in southern Angola (Chisala, 1994). Embarrassingly for Kaunda and more generally the Zambian government, the pro-western alliance was defeated by the MPLA. It took a while before Zambia's authorities recognized the MPLA government in Angola.

Conclusion

The struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa could not have been successfully prosecuted without the intervention of international and regional actors, who extended vital military, material, financial, and diplomatic assistance to the liberation movements. Yet, as a prominent regional actor, the role of Zambia in liberation struggles is often underestimated and sometimes misinterpreted partly because of the apparent contradictions in its policies towards the liberation movements. The idea of seeking to negotiate with white minority regimes as the basis of securing change in southern Africa was intolerable in the eyes of liberation movements and some radical OAU members who insisted on the primacy of armed struggle. Zambia's authorities entertained negotiations mainly for national security reasons. Since Zambia's leaders were more concerned with securing the country's economic interests, I have argued that they maintained their own approach to resolving the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa. Their approach was not fixed on the employment of a single method. It oscillated between fiery revolutionary rhetoric, plausibly as a response to OAU pressure, and conciliatory offers when the situation dictated. This approach was consistent with the Lusaka Manifesto. While affirming their support for armed struggle, they always demonstrated willingness to secure a negotiated political solution to the problem of white minority rule in the region. They only supported armed struggle to an extent that it was a necessary instrument of coercing white minority regimes to the negotiating table.

End Notes

- ¹ UNIP 7/3/9 National Leaders Seminar Mulungushi Hall, 15-18 March 1989 "Military Developments in the Southern African Region and their Implications for Zambia and Regional Security" presentation by F. D Muyawala, p.5.
- ² Interview with Sikota Wina, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 September 2013.
- ³ NAZMFA 1/1/16 Loc. 494 Report of the Cabinet Meeting, 24 August 1965.
- ⁴ NAZMFA 1/1/16 Loc. 494 Report of the Cabinet Meeting, 24 August 1965.
- ⁵ Zambia Hansard No.5f Daily Hansard, Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Second Session of the First National Assembly (Resumed), 15 December 1965 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1965), p.233.
- ⁶ Zambia Hansard No.7 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the First National Assembly 20 July-23 September 1966 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), p.639.
- ⁷ Zambia Hansard No. 7d Daily Hansard Thursday 28th July 1966 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the First National Assembly (Resumed) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), p.150.
- ⁸ Zambia Hansard No. 11 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Fourth Session (resumed) of the First National Assembly, 17th-20th October 1967 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967), p.8 and 25.
- ⁹ Zambia Hansard No. 16g Daily Hansard Wednesday 16th October 1968 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Fifth Session of the First National Assembly (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), pp.332-333 and Zambia Hansard No. 15k Daily Hansard Thursday 29th August 1968 Official Verbatim Report of the Fourth Session of the First National Assembly (Resumed) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), p.555.
- ¹⁰ NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966 Speech by Hon. Mr. R. Sikasula, M.P, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, January 1966.
- ¹¹ NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967. Extract from Cabinet Draft Minutes Item 9 Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties, 13 January 1965, (CAB (65) 3rd Meeting, signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet).
- ¹² NAZMFA1/1235 Loc. 527 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1967-1968.
- ¹³ Ibid
- ¹⁴ NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967 Appendix 'B' Secret circular captioned "Control of Alien Nationalist Parties" 24 November 1966, addressed to all Resident Secretaries, District Secretaries, Commissioner of Police by A.S Masiye, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President.
- ¹⁶ NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, see Memorandum by the President presented to the 18th Cabinet Meeting, 28 April 1965, Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).
- ¹⁸ Interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 10 June 2013.
- ¹⁹ NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, letter dated 28 June 1966 addressed to the Chief Representatives for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A), COREMO, ZANU, PAC(S.A) and AAC and UM by D.C Mulaisho, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President.
- ²⁰ NAZMFA1/1/261 Loc. 532 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1968, Report of the Executive Secretary to the 13th Session of OAU Liberation Committee, Algiers, 15 July 1968.
- ²¹ NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 OAU Committee of Five, 1967, Report of the Action Team of the Committee of Five of the Organisation of African Unity.
- ²² http://www.swapoparty.org/the_role_of_the_oau_liberation_committee.html accessed on 18/05/2015.

- See "The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the Southern African Liberation Struggles" by Paul T. Shipale.
- ²³ NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 OAU Liberation Committee, 1964-1968, Report of the Action Team to the Committee of Five on Rhodesia, July 1968 and NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 OAU. Committee of Five, 1967 "Top Secret" Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) Suggestions and Viewpoints for Consideration by the Action Team on the Training of Cadres, 3 April 1967.
- ²⁴ NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 OAU. Committee of Five, 1967. See letter dated 13 May 1967, addressed to Mr. V.J Mwaanga, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President by G.S Magombe, Executive Secretary, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. See also NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Political Parties/Rhodesia, 1966-1969, confidential letter dated 23 March 1967 addressed to the Chief Representative, ZANU Office, Lusaka by L.P. Chihota, Chief Representative, ZANU office, Dar-es-Salaam.
- ²⁵ NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 OAU. Committee of Five, 1967 Report of the Action Team of the Committee of Five of the Organisation of African Unity.
- ²⁶ NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 O.U Liberation Committee, 1969, Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the OAU. Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 20 March 1969.
- ²⁷ NAZMFA 1/1/191 Loc.521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969, Confidential letter captioned "Withdrawal of Recognition of Noel Gabriel Mukono by the Zambia Government" dated 4 January 1967, addressed to the Zambian High Commission, Dar-es-Salaam by H.S. Meebelo, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- ²⁸ NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc.538. OAU Liberation Committee, 1969 Report of the Committee of Military Experts to the Liberation Committee and to the Council of Ministers, 12th Session, Dakar, 16-21 July 1969.
- ²⁹ NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 Liberation Committee, 1969 Memorandum dated 15 July 1969, submitted by MPLA to the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) 15th Regular Session, Dakar, Senegal; and NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 Liberation Committee, 1969, Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defence, 26 June 1969; and NAZMFA1/1/261 Loc. 261 OAU Liberation Committee, Minutes of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on Information, Administration and General Policy, Thursday 20 June, 1968.
- ³⁰ NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966. See letter dated 17 December 1965, addressed to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU by the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee together with a cover letter dated 5 January 1966, addressed to the Ministers of Foreign/External Affairs of all OAU Member States by the General Secretariat of the OAU in Addis Ababa.
- ³¹ NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969. See confidential letter dated 24 November 1966 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services.
- ³² NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969. See confidential letter captioned "Granting of Broadcasting Facilities" dated 3 December 1966 addressed to the Publicity Chief, ZANU, Lusaka by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- ³³ NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969, Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defence, 26 June 1969.
- ³⁴ NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969, Memorandum Submitted by the South West People's Organisation (SWAPO), Dakar, Senegal, 15 July 1969.
- ³⁵ NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969 Report on the 14th Session of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, 10-14 February 1969 by G. Chipampata, 18 February 1968.

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- ³⁶ NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, 15th Regular Session, Report of the Executive Secretary and Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, Thursday 20 March, 1969.
- ³⁷ NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) - Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969, Cabinet Memo No. 26 CAB 3/65, signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, 14/09/65.
- ³⁸ NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 301 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Report of the Executive Secretary to the 14th Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 8 February 1969.
- ³⁹ NAZMFA1/1/70 Loc. 503 OAU Summit, Accra Conference, 1965. See letter dated 13 November 1965, addressed to Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia by His Excellency M. Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, Dakar, Senegal.
- ⁴⁰ UNIP 6/7/24 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka, 14-16 April, 1969.
- ⁴¹ UNIP6/7/24 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14-16 April 1969.
- ⁴² NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969. See letter dated 9 December 1969, captioned "the April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto" addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia's High Commission, Nairobi, Kenya by A. N Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- ⁴³ NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969. See letter dated 28 October 1969, addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by R. M. Kapangala, Acting High Commissioner to Kenya.
- ⁴⁴ NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969. See letter dated 9 December 1969, captioned "The April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto" addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia's High Commission, Nairobi, Kenya by A.N Chimuka.
- ⁴⁵ Zimbabwe Review (1976), 5, no.2: 13.
- ⁴⁶ NAZMFA1/1/24 Loc. 512 International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa, 1965-1970, Republic of Zambia, Inward Telegram No. 932 sent to Foreign Affairs Ministry, Lusaka from Foreign Ministry Nairobi on 21/07/1970 by Dr. Mungai. See part of the statement on the resumption of arms sales to South Africa by Sir Alec Douglas Home, British Foreign Secretary.
- ⁴⁷ Africa Research Bulletin (1970) 7 no. 9: 1877C-1878A.
- ⁴⁸ UNIP7/19/3 Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K. D. Kaunda on the occasion of the opening of Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 8 September 1970.
- ⁴⁹ UNIP7/23/16 Heads of State Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka, September 1970 NAC/CONF. 2, 3, 4 and 6.
- ⁵⁰ UNIP7/23/16 Heads of State Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka, September 1970 NAC/CONF. 2, 3, 4 and 6.
- ⁵¹ Africa Research Bulletin (1970) 7, no. 10: 1891A.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Africa Research Bulletin (1970) 7, no. 10: 1892C.
- ⁵⁴ Africa Research Bulletin (1970) 7, no. 10: 1892A.
- ⁵⁵ Africa Research Bulletin (1971) 8, no.1: 1978B-1978C.
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Copper Mining and Football: Comparing the game in the Katangese and Rhodesian Copperbelts c. 1930 – 1980

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Throughout the twentieth century, colonial authorities believed in the power of sport as a tool for moulding submissive labour. Belgian and British colonialists, industrialists and Christian missionaries introduced football to the Katangese and Rhodesian Copperbelts respectively towards the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century and attempted to use it as a tool for controlling, and 'civilising' colonised Africans. This paper argues that Africans found alternative ways of eluding colonial and capitalist exploitation in the mining towns, appropriated football, used it to build urban networks and sometimes even to express aspirations for independence. The two Copperbelts exchanged football tours that played a role in strengthening existing commercial networks for the Europeans and comradeship for colonised Africans. Interestingly, even the post-colonial African leaders Joseph Mobutu and Kenneth Kaunda attempted to use football that was dominant in their copper mining regions as a tool for bolstering their political power and popularity. This paper reveals the complex relationships between football and social change in the copper-rich regions of Katanga and Northern Rhodesia.

Introduction

From the beginning of the twentieth century, colonialists, industrialists, and missionaries, particularly those in the British tradition, were convinced that sport was a vital part of cultural power that could be useful in shaping and controlling colonised African labour (Fair, 1997; Stoddart, 1988; Martin, 1995; Alegi, 2010; Guttman, 1994)¹ Like elsewhere in Africa, European missionaries, capitalists, and colonial officers introduced modern sports such as football to the central African Copperbelt regions of Katanga in Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesian (hereinafter called Katanga and Copperbelt respectively) in the early 1900s as a form of leisure and a tool for educating, 'civilising', and controlling Africans. Separately, as Europeans arrived and settled in the two regions, they formed 'whites only' soccer teams that played competitive matches and attracted large numbers of both European and African spectators (Akindes and Alegi, 2014; Baker and Mangan, 1987; Chipande, 2009).

Despite the colonial racism that permeated football, locals found the game appealing, adopted soccer, and turned it into a black urban popular culture. This paper argues that Africans appropriated football and used it to

build urban social networks, and sometimes even to express aspirations for independence. It is also interesting that post-colonial African leaders of the two copper-rich regions – Joseph Mobutu and Kenneth Kaunda – continued where their European predecessors ended by attempting to use the game as a tool for stimulating their own political ideologies, power, and popularity.

European Football in Katanga and the Copperbelt

As Belgian and British miners settled in Katanga and the Copperbelt, they began to play soccer among themselves and formed ‘whites only’ clubs that played competitive matches and attracted large numbers of both European and African spectators. The introduction of the game in both Katanga and the Copperbelt is attributed to these early colonists.

Following the Berlin Conference (November 1884-February 1885) that divided Africa into colonies of the European powers, King Leopold II of Belgium acquired the Congo Free State, which he treated as his personal property in a brutal manner until 1907 when the Belgian state took over and the name changed to Belgian Congo (Reeves, 1909; Honchschild, 1999; Musambachime, 1990). King Leopold and Cecil Rhodes, a British financier through his British South African Company (BSAC), were both interested in the Katanga. Rhodes lost the race and ended up with a vast territory below the Katanga that came to be called Northern Rhodesia (Guene, 2013). The *Campagne du Katanga* managed the Katangese Copperbelt from 1891 to 1900 when it was taken over by a semi-private concessionary company the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* (Guene, 2013). The booming copper mines in Katanga led to an influx of Belgian miners who brought with them Western leisure pastimes such as football (Akindes and Alegi, 2014).

Historian Peter Alegi reveals how football established roots in the Belgian Congo in the early 1900s particularly in the Katanga region where a ‘whites only’ *Ligue de Football du Katanga* was established in Élisabethville (now Lubumbashi) in 1911. ‘Whites only’ football matches were also being played in the capital Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) by 1912. Football clubs were few. Four teams competed in the B. Smith Cup in Katanga in 1925 and a formal football association, *Federation de Football Association du Pool* was established around 1920 and later affiliated with the Belgian football association in 1927 (Alegi, 2010). In Léopoldville where the white population was large and varied, Belgians, French, Flemish and British residents formed football teams and played competitive matches against each other to the delight of European and a majority of African spectators (Martin, 1995).

The diffusion of football to the Belgian Congo cannot be fully explored without paying attention to similar developments taking place across the Congo

River in French Congo's capital Brazzaville. According to Phyllis Martin, football activities had gained momentum in Brazzaville with a 'Europeans only' *Union Sportive Brazzaville* being formed in 1913. This organisation initiated several international football matches against teams from Léopoldville in the Belgian Congo. From 1914 onwards, soccer contests were played between European teams from Brazzaville and Léopoldville that also attracted large numbers of both European and African spectators (Martin, 1995). Football in the Belgian Congo was characterised by racial segregation as seen in the emergence of 'whites only' football clubs and seating areas in the playing grounds in both Léopoldville and Élisabethville. Despite racial discrimination, Africans found the game captivating and enthusiastically attended and watched European soccer matches, learned the game and started playing it in their communities (Akindes and Alegi, 2014).

In the early 1920s, European football was also introduced across the southern borders of Katanga, in the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. The colonisation of Northern Rhodesia by the BSAC in the late 1890s and the arrival of colonial officials and industrialists led to the game being played in the emerging mining towns (Chipande, 2009). The beginning of large-scale mining in the 1920s – after the development of a small mine in Bwana Mkubwa in Ndola, followed by the Roan Antelope mines in Luanshya in 1927, and later Mufulira, Chambishi, Nchanga and Kansanshi mines in 1930 – led to considerable industrialisation and urbanisation that created a good environment for the growth of European soccer (Ferguson, 1999; Chipande, 2016). The two major Copperbelt mining companies, Rhodesian Selection Trust and Anglo-American Corporation, developed an interest in the welfare of their white employees and heavily subsidised their social and recreation amenities. Duncan Money reveals how the Copperbelt became unique in terms of flourishing leisure and recreation facilities “as the wealth from the mines allowed the predominantly [white] working class population to do what they could not elsewhere” (Money, 2016).

Sport quickly emerged as the main pastime activity in Copperbelt European mining communities and mine owners encouraged the setting up of central sports committees, or councils, that became responsible for the development and maintenance of sports facilities. For instance, in 1936, Roan Antelope Mine heavily subsidised the Roan Antelope Mine Recreation Club with loans and grants that helped in developing first class sports facilities for rugby, football, cricket, hockey, athletics, bowling, and tennis in European communities (Matongo, 1992). This support was given to all European mining communities on the Copperbelt making it the best sporting region in Southern Africa. Bennie Evans, sports officer at Roan Antelope Mine, commented: “Few places in the

world can boast of such lavishly provided sports facilities at such a reasonable cost to sports men” (Horizon, 1963). Apart from the massive wealth from the mines that allowed the development of these facilities, mining companies heavily invested in leisure amenities to attract European miners to the Copperbelt. In addition, Money argues that the “Copperbelt social life was partly about creating a colonial experience like working class life elsewhere in the English-speaking world” (Money, 2016, 208). As in Katanga, early football on the Copperbelt was organised on racial lines.

In 1922, William Nelson Watson, who was working for the Broken Hill mines, formed a ‘whites only’ Broken Hill Amateur Football Association. The Broken Hill mines were opened in 1906 to mine lead and later zinc, leading to the emergence of a small mining town called Broken Hill (Kabwe today). As the town was positioned on the railway line that stretched from Kimberly in South Africa to Élisabethville in Katanga, it developed rapidly and popular football clubs emerged (Wilson, 1941).² The Broken Hill Amateur Football Association organised the earliest clubs in Northern Rhodesia such as Broken Hill Corinthians, Broken Hill Callies, Broken Hill Railways, and Broken Hill Thistle (Chipande, 2009). Alegi argues that the emergence of mines and construction of railways in southern, central, and east Africa from the end of the nineteenth century encouraged the formation of several football clubs and associations in the region stretching from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), through Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Congo to Uganda (Alegi, 2010). This was seen in Broken Hill where the population of white miners increased and led to the emergence of several soccer clubs for Europeans.

In 1927, a football association emerged on the Copperbelt that was called Rhodesia Congo Border Football Association. This body was responsible for administering whites’ football and rugby on the Copperbelt until rugby separated and formed the Rhodesia Congo Border Rugby Union. The Northern Rhodesia Football Association was formed in 1929 and became responsible for coordinating Europeans’ soccer in the whole territory. The huge investments that mining companies made in sports infrastructure led to the Copperbelt becoming the hub of ‘European’ football in Northern Rhodesia and probably made the region an attractive destination for European miners. By the end of the 1950s, the Rhodesia Congo Border Football Association dominated the game in Northern Rhodesia with Mufulira and Nchanga being the most competitive clubs (Horizon, 1959). Apart from local competitions, Copperbelt European soccer clubs exchanged football tours with European football clubs from neighbouring Katanga, which is examined in detail later in this paper.

This discussion reveals how soccer became one of the major leisure activities for European colonists in both Katanga and the Copperbelt, and how

mining companies in both copper-mining regions supported the development of 'Europeans only' sports revealing the racist nature of Belgian and British colonial and mining policies. This is in line with scholars who have argued that the careful study of leisure and sport can be useful in grasping issues that go beyond the players and playing field – wider “transformations associated with colonialism, post-colonialism, and the development of Capitalism” in Africa (Akyeampong and Ambler, 2002, 1-6; Guttmann, 1994; Martin, 1991). Despite social and sporting discrimination in both Katanga and the Copperbelt, local people keenly watched European football matches and were so captivated that they even gave the best European players nicknames (Alegi, 2010). This enthusiasm Africans showed for the game created fertile ground for the diffusion of soccer among the local people in the two regions.

Africans' Appropriation of Soccer in Katanga and the Copperbelt

As mentioned above, the introduction of soccer to the African populations in Katanga and the Copperbelt can be attributed to the arrival of European missionaries, colonialists and mineworkers (Guttmann, 1994; Chipande, 2016; Akindes and Alegi, 2014). In the Katanga Province of Belgian Congo, Gerard Akindes and Peter Alegi reveal that the Catholic Church's “civilising mission” provided Congolese youth with sports activities that were meant to “educate” and distract them from paying attention to colonial and capitalist exploitation (Akindes and Alegi, 2014). A Catholic priest by the name of Father Raphaël de la Kethulle de Ryhove who arrived in Léopoldville in 1919, spearheaded some kind of sporting evangelism. He formed the *Association Royale Sportive Congolaise* (ARSC) to formalise football clubs and organise competitions for African footballers (Dietschy, 2006, 31-41). As the Belgian colonial officials were reluctant to support African social welfare and education, Catholic missionary schools with priests such as De la Kuthulle provided African education with sport, particularly football, as one of the main leisure activities (Akindes and Alegi, 2014). Christian missionary education played an important role in the diffusion and development of modern sports in Africa, particularly in British colonial Africa where it was seen as “a highly valued component of a broader program of rational recreation, and ‘Muscular Christianity’ aimed at producing disciplined, healthy, and moral citizens” (Alegi, 2010, 8).³

In the Belgian Congo Christian missionaries (the Catholic Church), colonial enterprises (the Belgian mining giant *Union Minière du Haute Katanga*) and the colonial government formed what scholars have termed an “unholy colonial trinity” from the 1920s in order to “create a disciplined, efficient, moral and healthy African working class” (Alegi, 1999, 57). Modern sports, particularly football became integrated into the Belgian imperial project with colonialists

asserting that, “To colonise, is to civilise...[and] School of Sport is also a part of civilisation such as we understand it” (Dietschy, 2006, 39). The *Union Minière du Haute Katanga* (UMHK) adopted a motto “good health, good spirits, and high productivity” and deployed the European welfare system to control African leisure time and labour. Sport was part of an array of forms of social control that also involved brutal violence. One hundred African miners were massacred by colonial troops armed with machine guns in December 1941 on the Lubumbashi compound football ground during an African mineworkers’ general strike to demand for better conditions of service (Goldblatt, 2008, 507; Akindes and Alegi, 2014; Alegi, 1999).

The Catholic missionaries continued playing an important role in the development of football in Katanga, at the same time working together with colonial and mining authorities to use sport as a tool for controlling the Africans. In 1925, Father Gregory Coussement formed the Élisabethville Football Association and, by 1950, over 30 clubs were affiliated to the association. These included soccer clubs such as Vaticano, Union Sportive Militaire Saio, Lubumbashi Sports, Tout Puissant Englebert (TP Englebert), Saint-Éloi Lupopo and Empire Lunda among others. By the end of the 1950s, the Élisabethville Football Association had about 1,250 African soccer players registered, and thousands of fans, making soccer one of the most popular pastimes for African miners in Katanga (Alegi, 1999).

While Africans eagerly appropriated the game into their mining compounds, they could have been slowly alerted to colonial and mining officials’ goals of using the game as a tool for political and social control. Scholars have argued that, while African soccer was a creation of European imperialism and its self-professed “civilising mission”, the local people quickly recognised that the game could both empower and disempower (Akindes and Alegi, 2014). This was noticed in other regions, too, such as South Africa, where mine owners supported football because it boosted African miners’ morale, leading to increased production, and also offered an opportunity to control them. However, within a short time, the game became an avenue for tension and contestations for urban space, “race-consciousness, nationalism and [Africans’] assertive opposition to white stewardship” (Alegi, 2010, 41).

European colonial officials, mining industrialists, and missionaries introduced football to the Zambian Copperbelt following the colonisation of the area by the BSAC towards the end of the nineteenth century. Just as in Katanga, Africans who went to seek mining jobs became interested in European soccer and adopted the game in their communities. In the beginning, there were differences between colonial and mining authorities and African miners over the conceptualisation of leisure and leisure time in relationship with work.

Emmanuel Akyeampong and Charles Ambler reveal how mine management in Luanshya's Roan Antelope Mines in the 1920s and 1930s struggled when they introduced soccer because African miners saw it as an extension of their formal work and demanded to be paid for it. The Compound Manager complained, "We have had several instances of natives having failed to turn up for a game of physical drill and putting forth the excuse that they did not get overtime pay for doing work" (Akyeampong and Ambler, 2002, 5). This meant that African miners conceived leisure differently from their European employers. African leisure activities normally involved beer drinking in small groups, visiting neighbours, telling folktales and riddles, performing traditional dances and playing a variety of games. These activities worried Europeans who saw them as immoral and a cause of increasing misbehaviour and other disruptive social acts in the mining towns (Chipande, 2016, 59). Despite the initial resistance, Africans found soccer fascinating, appropriated it, improvised equipment and began to play it in their communities.

Community teams emerged in mining towns that initially took the ethnic identities and loyalties of urbanising African miners. This was shown by teams' names such as Bisa made up of migrants from Bisaland, Nyasa for people from Nyasaland, Nyika for those from Tanganyika and so on. Football clashes between these community teams was an athletic spectacle that sometimes brought hosting communities to a standstill as hordes of fans gathered around rudimentary football grounds to support their teams (Chipande, 2016). The game undoubtedly played a role in cultivating camaraderie and urban social networks among urbanised Africans (Alegi, 2010). Alegi further attributes the popularity of soccer in African communities to the game's low budget needs, as locals could easily improvise equipment such as balls and turn any available flat ground into a playing field (Alegi, 1999).

The popularity of soccer in the Copperbelt's African mining compounds quickly attracted the attention of colonial and mining authorities. It prompted the governor of Northern Rhodesia to sponsor a competition in 1936 that came to be known as the Governor's Cup. Mining and colonial officials attended African football matches and offered support for some of the competitions, not only to exercise political control over African leisure and labour, but because they were also afraid that local miners could use soccer gatherings as avenues for political agitation (Chipande, 2016). For example, the emergence of several football teams and competitions that attracted large numbers of fans in Copperbelt mining towns prompted authorities to introduce, organise and sponsor the Governor's Cup in 1936. Qualifiers for the Cup involved teams competing in each district to qualify to the finals that were usually watched by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia (Chipande, 2009: 62). The football passion in African

urban communities that compelled colonial authorities to react was not unique to the Copperbelt; Phyllis Martin tells how the popularity of the game in colonial Brazzaville's African townships of Bacongo and Poto-Poto in the 1930s also forced colonial administrators to give African soccer serious attention (Martin, 1995).

In order for Copperbelt authorities to have a firm grip over soccer in African mining compounds, they formed a Native Football Committee in 1936. This committee comprised white compound managers from Roan Antelope, Ndola, Mufulira and Broken Hill mines and aimed at monitoring and controlling football in African communities on the Copperbelt and in Broken Hill. In its first meeting, committee members said, "This committee constitutes itself a committee for the control and organisation of Native football All disputes, misconduct, [and] breaches of rules are to be referred to this central committee[,] whose decision shall be final".⁴ Later, the Native Football Committee evolved into the Copperbelt African Football Association that included early African football leaders such as Tom Mtine and it governed the African game in the whole of Copperbelt province (Chipande, 2016). This evidence from the Copperbelt supports Alegi's view that "by 1948 no other urban cultural practice in Africa matched soccer's force as a conduit for leisure, social control and popular expression" (Alegi, 1999, 73).

The Copperbelt strikes of 1935 and 1940 could have strengthened colonial and mining capitals' belief that colonial domination required an ideological or cultural component to complement rule by force. This was seen in increased development of recreational sporting amenities and activities in African mining compounds, particularly after the Second World War (Tenga, 2000). Similarly, the mining and colonial authorities on the Copperbelt developed welfare schemes they believed were useful for educating and controlling increasingly restless African labour. British interests were, therefore, determined to direct African leisure through local welfare schemes. Anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, who conducted research on the Copperbelt in Luanshya's Roan Antelope Mines in the 1950s, explained, "Management through the activities of its Welfare Department was obviously playing an important role in the induction of Africans into Western Culture" (Powdermaker, 1962.) Football became one of the most popular activities in the Copperbelt welfare schemes.

The popularity of soccer in African mine compounds forced mining authorities to support the game in order to have control over it. This was seen in the construction of the first football stadiums in all major mining towns: Roan Antelope's Kafubu Stadium in Luanshya; Rhokana's Scrivener Stadium in Kitwe; Nchanga's Gabbitas Stadium in Chingola; and Mufulira's Shinde Stadium (African Life, 1958). Every weekend, more than 2,000 spectators frequented these newly built arenas to watch their favourite clubs play in the Copperbelt league. In 1958 David Coyle, chairperson of the Copperbelt African Football and Athletic

Association declared, “there is no sport today, which is more popular among Africans than soccer. Every Sunday afternoon, thousands of people in every copper mining camp flock to the local stadium to watch football” (African Life, 1958). Similarly, Tom Mtine who was secretary of the association also boasted, “my association has been in control of adult African football on the Copperbelt since 1937, and caters for the entertainment of something like 50,000 African spectators weekly.”⁵

While the exact numbers are difficult to confirm, the massive popularity of the game was there for everyone to see. Powdermaker observed that sports, particularly soccer, track, and high jumping, were the most popular leisure activities in Luanshya in the 1950s (Powdermaker, 1962, 107). Without question, by the 1950s the game had become a major part of African urban popular culture and an inescapable feature of social life on the Copperbelt. Miners and other residents played, watched, and used soccer “to build patronage networks and alliances, as well as to legitimise their activities” such as hanging-out, beer drinking and strategizing on how to cope with colonial and capital domination (Alegi, 2010, 3).

Europeans played a central role in the diffusion of football in both Katanga and the Copperbelt. Africans in both regions were captivated by the game, appropriated it, and turned it into their urban popular culture. It has been argued that there was no other form of popular culture that could challenge football, in terms of generating excitement, that provided a city experience to newly urbanised Africans (Martin, 1995). While the game could have been introduced as a tool for “civilising” and controlling local people, the African miners introduced it themselves and used it to create alternative versions of their urban societies, and also to deal with the realities of colonial and capitalist exploitation (Akyeampong and Ambler, 2002). For example, during one of the African Urban Advisory Council meetings in Kitwe in 1951

E. Sampa questioned a welfare officer's failure to construct a proper schedule for football competitions ... [Lawrence] Katilungu, a member of the council, supported Sampa, saying that 'at present welfare was at low ebb and people did not know where and when football matches were to be played.' The white district commissioner (and chair of the meeting), P. D. Thomas, replied that the time had come for welfare activities to be managed by Africans themselves ... Katilungu curtly rejected the commissioner's suggestion arguing that Africans should not be doing work that European welfare officers were paid to do. Council members unanimously supported Katilungu's assertive statement and the district commissioner refrained from commenting further on the matter (Chipande, 2016: 61).

The above example shows how Africans in the mining towns used football and other colonial structures such as the African Urban Advisory Councils to challenge colonial and capitalist exploitation and lay a foundation for the liberation struggle. Meanwhile, both regions had several soccer exchanges that strengthened their historical relations.

Katanga and Copperbelt Football Exchanges

From the 1930s to the early 1960s there were several football tours of both European and African soccer teams between Katanga and the Copperbelt. These tours strengthened the social and economic networks between the two regions that go as far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The relationships between the two regions date back to the powerful centralised Luba and Lunda empires in Katanga of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from where most Northern Rhodesian ethnic groups such as the Bemba, Lunda, Luvale, Lozi, Chewa and others trace their ancestral origins. This link led to a complex network of languages, trading and labour connections between Katanga and the Copperbelt that continued after the arrival of colonialism towards the end of the nineteenth century (Larmer, 2016).

Furthermore, the copper mining industry in the two regions had been a joint affair between UMHK and the BSAC. From the inception of the Katanga mines, Belgians lacked familiarity in African enterprises. This caused the *Comité spécial du Katanga* that was managing Katanga to join hands with the Tanganyika Concessions Limited (TCL), which was owned by Cecil Rhodes' friend Robert Williams, to launch a chartered company that came to be called UMHK in 1906. Therefore, necessity made the UMHK a joint venture between the Belgians and the British creating a symbiotic relationship that linked the two regions (Guene, 2013). Initially, Katanga heavily depended on Northern Rhodesia for labour and food supplies. Africans traversed the border between Katanga and the Copperbelt to seek employment and other means of earning money creating a strong network between the two regions (Guene, 2013). These interactions were sometimes seen in the similarities in African leisure activities in the copper mining compounds. For instance, social anthropologist James Clyde Mitchell indicates resemblances in the Beni ngoma, a society of dancers, which helped musical band members who were in distress, and was found both in Katanga and the Copperbelt (Mitchell, 1956).

As already discussed, authorities in both Katanga and the Copperbelt shared much more than copper mining techniques, as seen in how they tried to use football to control African labour to maximise copper production and prevent political agitation. The large numbers of Europeans in mining towns

of both regions encouraged the Rhodesia Congo Border Football Association that controlled 'whites only' football on the Copperbelt, and its counterpart the *La Ligue Royale de Football du Katanga*, to start organising football matches between the two regions from the 1930s onwards (Horizon, 1959). These football exchanges were not limited to the two regions. In the 1950s, white South African soccer clubs such as Marists and Academia visited Belgian Congo and played several soccer matches against a mixture of black and white sides in *La Ligue Royale de Football du Katanga* competitions in Élisabethville and Jadotville. These contests attracted thousands of local spectators. Football tours were a common occurrence in this period (Bolsmann, 2010).

Apart from white teams from different regions that visited each other, colonial and mining authorities felt that subordinate black athletes were suitable cultural ambassadors who could play a role in improving mining companies' domestic and international images (Alegi, 1999). They organised several African soccer exchanges between the two mining regions. Katanga was the hub of soccer in Belgian Congo as it was the most industrialised region with thriving towns such as Élisabethville, Jadotville, and Kambove. Similarly, the Copperbelt was the heart of the game in Northern Rhodesia from the 1940s in the growing mining towns, Luanshya, Kitwe, Chingola, and Mufulira. The parallels between the two regions made it possible for the Copperbelt African Football Association and the Élisabethville Football Association to organise a series of African soccer exchanges from the 1940s to the early 1960s (African Eagle, 1957).

Copperbelt select soccer teams travelled as far as Léopoldville in Belgian Congo for matches. For instance, a Copperbelt select team was invited to Léopoldville for a competition in 1951; they lost all their matches. While in Léopoldville, the Rhodesians were given a great reception by the British Consul, Congolese officials, mining officials, and the Congo Football Association.⁶ The presence of these high-ranking officials suggests the powerful diplomatic and commercial roles of these football tours.

African football tours were not limited to Katanga and the Copperbelt but extended to the whole region. This is seen in the organisation of one of the very first known "unofficial sub-Saharan soccer championships" in 1950 in Élisabethville (Alegi, 1999, 56). This competition involved a team from the South African Johannesburg Bantu Football Association (JBFA), a Copperbelt team under the Copperbelt African Football Association, a team from Léopoldville, and a hosting team from Katanga. The host team Katanga beat Léopoldville 2 -1 in the final that was played in Leopold II Stadium watched by about 40 000 Africans and an unspecified number of Europeans (Alegi, 1999, 63). Such matches played a role in building international networks and promoting camaraderie among colonised Africans.

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw several African soccer clubs from Katanga, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa exchanging football tours. This created international football links. The sustained interest in African international soccer competitions from the 1940s to the early 1960s reflected the popularity of the game on the continent. Alegi argued that foreign soccer tours in the 1940s and 1950s played an important role in building camaraderie among colonised Africans and connections with “wider processes of industrialisation, urban migration and cultural exchange” (Alegi 2010, Alegi 1999). To date, there are Zambian players that are playing football for Katangese clubs such as Tout Puissant Mazembe popularly known as T. P. Mazembe. Similarly, there are Katangese players playing football in different Copperbelt football clubs.

Mobutu’s and Kaunda’s Post-colonial Football Politics

Following the independence of many African states in the 1960s, some post-colonial African leaders used football as a tool for uniting their new states and controlling their people. Football became a big part of independence festivities in many African nations in the 1960s and soccer stadiums were speedily constructed in their capital cities as “symbols of modernity and pride” (Alegi, 2010, 55). Since the game was more pronounced in Katanga and the Copperbelt, the two regions were unsurprisingly dragged into post-colonial football politics for their respective countries.

Following a bitter decolonisation process in Belgian Congo, Patrice Lumumba became President in 1960 and was immediately faced with a secessionist movement in the mineral-rich Katanga province, the *Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga* led by Moïse Tshombe (Larmer, 2016, Goldblatt, 2008). Lumumba was arrested and murdered in collusion with Western intelligence agencies, after which Joseph Mobutu, who was head of the armed forces, took over as president in 1965. When Mobutu became president of Congo, his populist character took him to football, as the game had already gained roots following the Catholic Church, the UMHK, and colonial authorities’ use of soccer as a tool for mobilising and controlling local people. He organised a football tournament to celebrate his ascension to power and invited Ghana’s national team, the Black Stars to Kinshasa for a competition. The Black Stars thumped the Congolese Lions 3 – 0. This tournament enthused Mobutu’s interest in the game and caused him to bring football authorities under his direct control. Further, he facilitated the Brazilian football star Pele to visit Congo, and also employed an expatriate coach from Hungary to coach the national team (Goldblatt, 2008, 507). Mobutu was not the first African president to use football in this way; other African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah of

Ghana, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, and Sekou Touré of Guinea also attempted to use football in their respective countries as a tool for boosting their political power and popularity (Alegi and Bolsmann, 2013).

With a lot of support for football from President Mobutu, financial investment started pouring into the Congolese game and it began bearing fruit (Goldblatt, 2008). A Katanga based football club TP Englebert from Élisabethville dominated club football, not only in Congo, but also across the continent as a whole, in the late 1960s. TP Englebert won the African Champions Cup in 1967 and 1968, and qualified to the finals of the cup a number of times in the years that followed. The Congo national team also won the 1968 African Cup of Nations held in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, qualified to the World Cup that was held in Munich, West Germany in 1974, and won the African Cup of Nations in 1974 held in Cairo, Egypt. To prevent Congolese players being recruited as professionals by Belgian and other European clubs, Mobutu nationalised the football federation and turned soccer players into national wealth at the same level with copper and diamonds, arguing that he was protecting them. He politicised the game and used it as a tool for challenging his former colonisers and strengthening his popularity in Zaire (Dietschy, 2006; Goldblatt, 2008).

During his so-called Africanisation process, he renamed the country Zaire and also changed the nickname of the national team from Lions to Leopards to match his leopard-skin headgear, a self-crafted symbol of 'African' power and authority. He renamed the powerful Katanga based football club TP Englebert (Tout Puissant Englebert), which was named after a brand of tyre to TP Mazembe. Unfortunately, the Zairian national team was eliminated from the 1974 World Cup finals without winning any match, thrashed 9 – 0 by Yugoslavia. Following this embarrassing defeat in Munich, Mobutu discarded his soccer project. This shows that he was not really passionate about the game, but only wanted to use it to propel his power and popularity (Dietschy, 2006; Goldblatt, 2008).

In Zambia, the Copperbelt also became the hub for nationalist politics towards the end of colonial rule, and later the politics of Zambian national unity in the post-colonial period. The African Urban Advisory Councils and African Welfare Advisory Boards, formed by colonial and mining authorities to replace the Tribal Elders of Native Courts and support the implementation of social welfare activities, offered emerging African nationalists opportunities to challenge the Europeans' monopolisation of power. (Epstein, 1958) These structures also offered Africans opportunities to demand more support for leisure activities in their communities, such as football, that had become popular. For example, Lawrence Katilungu challenged Kitwe District Commissioner, T. D. Thomas, during a Kitwe African Advisory Council meeting in 1951 saying that "welfare [in Kitwe] was at low ebb and people did not know where and when

football matches were to be played".⁷ The District Commissioner tried to suggest that Africans should take over welfare activities in their communities, but members of the meeting supported Katilungu's argument that Africans should not be doing work that European welfare officers were engaged to do. Katilungu later became leader of the powerful Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers Union that was formed in 1949 (Chipande, 2016).

Some of the African nationalist leaders who emerged from the Copperbelt had links to sports structures. For instance, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula who became the leader of the first political party in Northern Rhodesia, the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress, was a member of the Kitwe Urban Advisory Council and also a football referee. Kenneth Kaunda who became the first president of independent Zambia was a footballer during his school days at Munali School in Lusaka and worked for the Nkana Mine welfare department from 1947 to 1948 (Berger, 1977). These prominent men exemplify why Africans on the Copperbelt did not reject the European welfare schemes. Instead, certain individuals and interests used European welfare and football structures for a variety of reasons, such as to foster soccer development; and occasionally challenge harsh colonial and mining policies and gain leadership experience crucial for the independence struggle (Chipande, 2016, 62).

Like other post-colonial African leaders, Kenneth Kaunda, as president of Zambia, also employed football as a tool for nation building, articulating his political ideology of African humanism, consolidating power and authority, and to gain international visibility (Chipande, 2015). A few years after independence, in the Mulungushi Reforms (1968) and Matero Reforms (1969) Kaunda's government proposed to take 51% ownership of foreign-owned companies, including the copper mines. The strong control that Kaunda's government gained over the mines, through the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), made it possible for him to influence the mines to expand the welfare schemes that were introduced by colonial authorities in the late colonial era to provide miners with leisure activities. Football emerged as one of the main activities in the schemes (Mining Mirror, 1984). Colonial sports infrastructure such as soccer stadiums were renovated, recreation officers were employed, and each mining division sponsored at least two football clubs. Mine football clubs such as Mufulira Wanderers, Nchanga Rangers, Roan United, Nkana Red Devils, and Power Dynamos dominated the Zambian football league for a long time, with Power Dynamos regularly representing the country in the African Champions Cup (Chipande, 2015).

The emergence of government-controlled Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in the early 1980s, led to the evolution of a comprehensive football development programme that involved recruitment of sports advisors and full time coaches to identify young talented footballers and groom them into elite

players. Experienced British expatriate coaches such as Jeff Butler were hired as sports advisers, to coordinate and train fulltime football coaches in all mining divisions.⁸ Despite the collapse of the copper-dependent national economy as a result of the fall of the copper prices on the international market, Kaunda encouraged the mines to turn five Copperbelt clubs into professional football clubs in 1989: Nchanga Rangers, Mufulira Wanderers, Nkana Red Devils, Power Dynamos, and Roan United. (Times of Zambia, 1990) ZCCM chief executive officer Francis Kaunda (no known relative of Kenneth Kaunda) stated that the mines “will continue to support the development of sport in the country even in the face of existing financial difficulties” (Mining Mirror, 1982).

President Kaunda, as chairperson of ZIMCO, played an important role in encouraging the abundant flow of sponsorship money from the mines to the football clubs. Kaunda saw football as an opportunity to bring together different ethnic groups to make his new nation and make his “One Zambia, One Nation” slogan a reality, link football successes to his government’s independence achievements, and use the game to cement his philosophy of African humanism (Chipande, 2016). When sending the national soccer team to Cairo Egypt for the African Cup of Nations finals in 1974, where they emerged second to Zaire, Kaunda stated, “We send you to go and win and bring the Cup. But in case things do not go well, know that in humanism, we know how to win well and to lose well” (*Times of Zambia*, 1974). This shows how much he believed in the role of the game to propagate his ideology of African humanism, a positive image of his country, and his leadership in the whole African continent. While Kaunda loved football so much, it is also possible that supporting the game financially during a severe national economic meltdown could have been a plan to divert people’s attention from the critical financial challenges and lack of foodstuffs and basic necessities they were experiencing.

Katanga and the Copperbelt dominated football in Zaire and Zambia respectively, and were involved in post-colonial football politics. In Zaire, Mobutu used the game as a tool for asserting power and popularity, using the Katanga based soccer clubs such as TP Mazembe, and going as far as declaring national team soccer players ‘national wealth’. Similarly, his Zambian counterpart Kaunda used the Copperbelt mines to invest in football that he could use as a tool for uniting his country, propagating his ideology of African humanism, and cementing his power and popularity. Copper mining regions played critical roles in the development of football; they also demonstrate how soccer continued being used as a tool for political control in independent Africa.

Conclusion

Comparing the history of football in Katanga and the Copperbelt cannot be done without putting at centre stage Belgian and British colonial mining capital,

and Christian missionary racial hierarchies and paternalism. In both regions, Africans appropriated the game from Europeans who intended to introduce and use it as a tool for controlling, and 'civilising' them. This paper argues that, despite these efforts, Africans appropriated soccer, used it to build urban social networks and, sometimes, even to express aspirations of independence. Katanga and the Copperbelt exchanged football tours, which played a role in strengthening commercial networks for the Europeans and camaraderie for the colonised Africans who shared a rich ancestral and economic history.

Post-colonial leaders, Mobutu and Kaunda, also used the strong influence they had over the copper mines in their regions to sponsor and develop the game and use it as a tool for propagating their popularity and power. This shows a continuation of the use of football as a tool for controlling local people in both the colonial and post-colonial periods.

End Notes

- ¹ According to Allen Guttmann, "modern sports are best defined not by specific chronology, but rather by the presence or absence of a distinctive set of systematically interrelated formal-structural characteristics" that include: secularism, equality, bureaucratisation, specialisation, rationalisation, quantification and the obsession with records. (Guttmann, 1994)
- ² Godfrey Wilson points out how the territory was rapidly changing with Africans becoming urbanites and 'detrified' as part of the world community. He mentions the desire for European clothing as one of the main reasons that drove Africans to seek paying jobs in urban areas. Adoption of Western-style dress was an easy way Africans could acquire 'civilised' status in Broken Hill as racial segregation restricted them from investing in houses. (Wilson, 1941)
- ³ The ideal of 'Muscular Christianity' evolved in Victorian England and stressed a connection between 'healthy' sport and the civilising properties of Christianity.
- ⁴ Minutes, Native Football Committee, Ndola, 26 April 1937, SEC 2/174, National Archives of Zambia.
- ⁵ Letter from Mufulira senior welfare officer to the secretary, Copperbelt African Football Association, Mufulira, 12 May 1960, 10.7.10C, Mining and Industrial Archive, Ndola.
- ⁶ Luanshya African Welfare 2nd Quarterly Report, Luanshya, June 1951, WP 1/5/1 Loc. 5266, National Archives of Zambia.
- ⁷ Minutes of the Urban Advisory Council 1945-1947: "Dead Welfare Work," WP1/1/4 Loc.5271, National Archives of Zambia.
- ⁸ Minutes of Divisional Coaches meeting held on 5 September 1984, ZCCM 15.1.7E Sports Clubs & Councils, Mining and Industrial Archive Ndola.

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Causality between Government Revenue and Expenditure: Empirical Evidence from Zambia

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We establish the causality between government revenue and government expenditure using Granger causality tests within the Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) framework. The estimated VAR model includes gross domestic product, exchange rate and Treasury Bill rates. Granger causality tests found unidirectional causality running from government expenditure to revenue. This work is founded in economic theory of public choice and the underlying causality of budget deficits. Knowledge of the revenue spending nexus will shed more light on the nature of the intertemporal relationship between government revenue and government spending and help shape the political economy of fiscal policies.

The results are augmented by forecast error variance decompositions which suggest that a one standard deviation shock to government expenditure will only explain about 15% variation in government revenue. The absence of social crises may explain the weak relationship indicated by forecast error variance. The spend-and-tax hypothesis is based on the premise of large-scale social disturbance, crises, or war, which make it easier for a political system to decide how much to spend and then adjust tax revenues. In the context of Zambia, these results may indicate that the political system makes spending decisions in the midst of peace and gets to adjust revenue policy to finance the budget deficit.

Zambia must emphasise policies that control or place limitations on government spending to effectively manage budget deficits. Policymakers, politicians, and civil society will have to prepare themselves and the general public on the importance of bringing the government budget in balance.

Keywords

revenue, expenditure, Granger causality, vector auto-regressive, Zambia, causality between government revenue and expenditure: empirical evidence from Zambia

1.0 Introduction

The Zambian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been in discussion over a possible IMF support programme for Zambia. The discussion comes after Zambia acquired a series of Eurobonds at a commercial rate to plug the budget deficits arising from spending stress for the government budget and is compounded by the delay in implementing cost-reflective pricing of petroleum and electricity (IMF, 2015).

The debt dynamics in Zambia closely track the performance of copper prices on the international market. The fall in copper prices in the 1970s brought about a corresponding decline in government revenue and led to an accumulation of substantial external debt during the 1970s through to the 1990s (Weeks and McKinley, 2006). During this period the government also depended on revenues from the mines to build hospitals and schools, general infrastructure development, and provide subsidies on production and consumption of food.

Fiscal deficits averaged 12.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1970s, 13.8% in 1980s, and 6% in the 1990s (Whitworth, 2012). By 30 September 1987, mounting debts and defaults on debt servicing forced the IMF to declare Zambia ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund (IMF, 1988). In 1990, Zambia held elections and multiparty democracy was ushered in from a one-party dispensation. With a change in the nation's leadership and upon negotiation with the IMF, the country was permitted to use the Fund's financial resources and loans were issued out to Zambia.

Zambia adopted radical structural reforms of the economy in which many state-owned enterprises were sold to become privately owned entities in 1992. These reforms were seen as part of the financing agreement with the IMF and World Bank. The performance of most of the privatised companies followed the standard privatisation curve: poor performance before privatisation, rebounding two to three years after privatisation and declining sharply thereafter (Serlemitsos and Fusco, 2003). The Zambian government was hesitant in privatising strategic institutions in the energy, telecommunications, financial and mining sectors. The losses from these state-owned enterprises, together with preparations for the 2001 general elections, and Organisation for African Unity (OAU) summit's exceptional expenditures created serious budget problems for the government (AFDB/OECD, 2003).

In 1999, the international financial institutions replaced structural adjustment programmes with Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The PRSPs involved three-year development plans with details of macroeconomic policies, government spending targets and social development programmes. This was meant to entrench ownership in the development process by all stakeholders such as government, civil society organisations, the church, and business. The international financial institutions then evaluated the PRSPs as part of the process of reaching the completion point of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Debt relief would be granted by the international financial institutions to countries deemed to have performed to the set standards in the PRSPs. The resources freed from debt relief were to be used to support poverty reduction strategies. In 2005, Zambia was deemed to have made satisfactory

progress, and the IMF and World Bank offered US\$ 3.90 billion in debt service relief. The remainder of the debt from multilateral and bilateral creditors was also expected to be reduced by the respective institutions/entities to provide their share of assistance required under the HIPC initiative (IMF, 2005).

This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the motivation for the paper; section 3 reviews the literature; section 4 presents the model and methodology; section 5 explains results, and section 6 concludes.

2. Motivation for the paper

In recent years, budget deficits have become chronic. Many countries the world over have to deal with huge budget deficits, i.e., Portugal, United States of America, Greece, etc. Zambia is no exception. Budget deficits have been rising, despite the government commitment to reduce them in the past few years (Ministry of Finance, 2014). To finance spending, the government has been contracting both domestic and foreign debts.

The execution of the government budget has its problems such as wasteful expenditure, un-vouched expenditure and unaccounted for revenue.s (Auditor General, 2015). Systems put in place to promote accountability of budget execution have not been satisfactorily implemented. The spending arrears rose to an estimated 10 billion Zambian kwacha by 2015. These arrears arose due to late payments to road contractors, pensions, and electricity imports. Provision for public participation in budget preparation exists, however the significant part of this participation only begins after the annual budget has been presented to parliament, leaving little scope to influence the budgetary outcome (CSPR, 2010). Fiscal discipline is vital to improve and sustain macroeconomic stability. Reduction in borrowing to finance fiscal deficit may lead to private sector investments rising, since lower interest rates are associated with a higher quantity of project proposals that qualify for implementation, which raises endogenous investment spending (Aisen and Hauner, 2008). It also helps reduce vulnerabilities of unexpected shocks to the economy. Large persistent budget deficits over time may lead to loss of credibility in policy making (The World Bank, 2004).

It is therefore important to understand the relationship between revenue and expenditure to enable one devise a strategy for reducing fiscal deficits. Should government achieve this through raising revenue or reducing expenditures? The Granger non-causality test can be used to pick out any underlying relationship that may exist between government revenue and spending in explaining budget deficits. Knowledge of the underlying relationship can help design appropriate policy responses in managing budget deficits.

3.0 Theoretical Literature Review

How budget deficits happen has generated considerable debate in scholarly literature. Friedman's (1978) tax-and-spend hypothesis suggests that increases in tax revenues lead to increases in government spending and therefore worsening budget deficits. Small interest groups each lobbying for spending to benefit its members lead to a budget deficit. Correcting budget deficits would require placing a limit on government revenues, as that would reduce the appetite for increasing government spending thereby bringing spending in line with revenues.

The spend-and-tax hypothesis is premised on a growing divergence between desirable public spending and the limits of the taxation system. Large-scale social disturbances make it easier for governments to run budget deficits and raise tax revenues to new levels initially thought impossible without resistance (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961). There is a likelihood that governments will spend-and-tax, engaging in deficit financing, increasing state activity during a period of crisis or social disturbance. Spending rises enable governments to raise and sustain higher tax revenues without much ado.

The fiscal synchronisation hypothesis suggests that it is the size of the mean income relative to the median income of the decisive voter that determines the tax rate and therefore the size of the budget (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In this model, individuals are utility maximisers, and it depends on incomes and leisure. If the decisive voter's median income lies below the mean income, there is an incentive for the median voter to choose candidates who favour a rise in taxes which favours redistribution which raises his utility. If the median income is higher relative to mean income, it provides an incentive for the median decisive voter to choose candidates who favour a lowering of taxes which lowers redistribution and raises his utility. Government spending and revenues are simultaneously synchronised by the median decisive voter's actions. The fiscal synchronisation hypothesis suggests that causality between government spending and revenue is bidirectional (Elhiraika et al, 2015).

The institutional separation hypothesis is premised on the theory that there is no causality running between government revenue and spending. The distinction between the allocation and taxation functions of the government creates separate institutions (Baghestani and McNown, 1994). The separation of institutions making revenue and spending decisions is influenced by their divergent interests and agendas (Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992).

3.1 Empirical Literature Review

Mupimpila et al (2015) used a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model on quarterly data to test for causality between government tax revenue and government

expenditure for Botswana. Variables employed included trade openness, per capita GDP and the interest rates. Findings suggest that past values of government tax revenues have a negative sign and significantly affect government expenditure. The results indicate that a fall in tax revenues will cause a rise in government expenditure supporting the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Past values of expenditure were also found to affect expenditure significantly. The error correction term was found to be significant and had the right negative sign.

Nyamongo et al (2007) using monthly data from October 1994 to June 2007 estimated an Error Correction Model to test for the relationship between government revenue and government expenditure in South Africa. They found significant error correction terms that indicated the existence of a long-run relationship between government expenditure and government revenue. The Granger causality evidence supported the existence of long-run bidirectional causality between government revenue and expenditure. However, the findings suggest a lack of short-run causality between the variables. The impulse response functions results indicate that government expenditure has a positive effect on itself and causes a permanent effect on revenue. A positive shock of one standard deviation to government revenue would have a positive permanent effect on government revenue and it has a permanent effect on government expenditure.

Eita and Mbazima (2008) performed the Granger causality test on the Namibian government's revenue and expenditure using time series data running from 1977 to 2007. Unit root tests suggested that government revenue and expenditure were stationary in levels and Johansen test for cointegration suggested existence of two cointegration equations. Using Vector Auto Regression (VAR) they found the existence of Granger causality from government revenue to government expenditure. The study failed to reject the hypothesis of no Granger causality from expenditure to government revenue. The impulse response functions suggest that government revenue responds positively to shocks from itself and government expenditure, and that government expenditure responds positively to shocks from itself and government revenue.

Aladejare and Ani (2012) used a VAR model to test for causality between government expenditure and government revenue in Nigeria. Annual data ranging from 1961 to 2010 was used for the study. The findings of the VAR model suggest that past values of government expenditure have a significant impact on government expenditure. Results of impulse response function suggest that government expenditure responds positively to its own shock and government revenue shock. Government revenue responds positively to changes in its own shock and expenditure shocks.

Richter and Dimitrios (2013) employed a vector error correction model on annual data for Greece for the years 1833 to 2009 to test for causality between

government revenues and government expenditure. Real GDP was included in the model to capture how the macroeconomy affects the intertemporal relationship between government spending and government revenues. Richter and Dimitrios (2013) defined the Granger causality test by reading the joint F-test for the significance of joint lagged values. The study findings indicated the existence of causality running from government spending to government revenues in support of the spend-and-tax hypothesis.

Maynard and Guy (2009) used quarterly data for Barbados from 1985 to 2008 to analyse causality between government spending and government tax revenue. They included interest rate and real output proxied by the GDP in the specification of the model. The results from the multivariate model suggest that there exists a long-run relationship between government spending, revenue, interest rates and GDP. The findings from the Vector error correction model indicate that government spending Granger causes taxes. Furthermore, real GDP and interest rate were found to be insignificant in causing taxes. In relation to revenue, the findings suggest that only real GDP Granger causes government revenue.

Manage and Marlow (1986) tested for causality between federal expenditure and receipts for the USA. Using a VAR model they found that that revenue causes government spending, while government spending does not cause revenue. In the second specification using real variables of government expenditure and government revenue, they found that real revenue causes real government spending while real government spending does not cause real revenue. Using a third specification considering nominal government outlays minus interest payment on debt and nominal revenue they found bidirectional causality between government spending and government revenue.

Dalena and Magazzino (2012) use VAR and VEC Models to test for causality between government revenue and government spending. Three homogenous annual data sets were employed spanning the years 1862 to 1913, 1914 to 1946, and 1947 to 1993. The findings of the VEC model for the years spanning 1862 to 1913 suggest unidirectional long-run causality running from government revenue to government spending. The error correction terms in the specifications for the sub year categories were either not significant, or did not have the right negative sign, and therefore could not form the basis for analysis. The Granger causality test and the Toda and Yamamoto tests were performed and produced similar results. In the period between 1862 and 1913 causality ran from government revenue to government expenditure. In the period from 1914 to 1946 causality ran from government expenditure to government revenue. The period from 1947 to 1993 showed bidirectional causality between government revenue and government expenditure. The results for the entire period between

1862 and 1993 showed bidirectional causality between government revenue and government expenditure.

Fosano and Wang (2002) use an error correction model to test for Granger causality between government revenue and government expenditure for all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The results from the error correction model show that Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Oman have unidirectional causality running from revenue to expenditure. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have bidirectional causality between revenue and expenditure.

In this study, we extend the literature by employing country-specific data on Zambia. The data set is recent and much longer than the data traditionally used in most studies on African countries. This enables us to generate additional insights for analysis which will bring out characteristics specific to Zambia underlying causality which ordinarily would be missing if we used cross country methodologies.

4.0 Methodology

Granger causality tests are performed in the framework of VAR and VEC models. If the variables are stationary, Granger causality can be analysed using the VAR framework. However, if the variables are integrated of order one $I(1)$, the VEC model becomes an appropriate framework to use. The VAR treats endogenous variables in the system as functions of lagged values of all endogenous variables. They provide the advantage of being flexible and simple alternatives to the traditional multiple equation models which impose strong restrictions on the dynamic nature between macroeconomic variables (Sims, 1980). In a world of rational, forward-looking economic agents, no variable can be viewed as exogenous. The reduced form of VAR can model macroeconomic data informatively without imposing very strong restrictions. We represent the VAR model as;

$$Y_t = G_t Y_{t-1} + e_t \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

Where;

$$Y_t = Y_{1,t} Y_{2,t}, G_t = g_{11} g_{12} g_{21} g_{22}, Y_{t-1} = Y_{1,t-1} Y_{2,t-1}, \text{ and } e_t = e_{1,t} e_{2,t}$$

Y_t is a vector of endogenous variables, Y_{t-1} is a vector of variables representing past realisations of Y_t , G_t is a vector of constants and e_t is a $(n \times 1)$ vector of white noise innovations, and are serially uncorrelated. The assumption about the error terms is that they can be contemporaneously correlated such that;

$$E(e_t e_t') = \Sigma \text{ where } \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & \sigma_{12} \\ \sigma_{12} & \sigma_2^2 \end{bmatrix} \neq 0$$

Σ is not assumed to be diagonal, i.e., the error terms of individual equations can be contemporaneously correlated. Innovations must be correlated with

their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all the right-hand variables of equations. However, the errors must be uncorrelated through time such that the variance-covariance matrix must equal;

$$E\epsilon_t, \epsilon_t' = 000, \text{ for } t \neq T$$

Therefore, $E\epsilon_t, \epsilon_t' = \Omega$, if $t = T0$ otherwise

4.1 Econometric framework

The multivariate VAR model was specified such that government expenditure is Granger caused by its own lagged value(s), the lagged value(s) of government revenue, exchange rate, GDP and Treasury Bill rate in equation (2). Government revenue is also specified to be Granger-caused by its own lagged value(s) and lagged value(s) of government expenditure, exchange rate, GDP and Treasury Bill rate in the VAR model in equation (3). In the empirical literature, we build on the specification of Dalena and Magazzino, (2012) and Mupimpila et al, (2015) and augment it with exchange rate and Treasury Bill rate variables:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LnGOVEXP}_t &= \theta_0 + i=1p \quad \alpha_i \text{LnGOVEXP}_{t-i} + i=1p \\ \alpha_2 i \text{LnGOVREV}_{t-i} + i=1p &+ \alpha_3 i \text{LnEXC}_{t-i} + i=1p + \alpha_4 i \text{LnGDPT}_{t-i} + i=1p + \alpha_5 i \text{LnTBILL}_{t-i} + \mu t \end{aligned} \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LnGOVREV}_t &= \theta_1 + i=1p \\ \beta_i \text{LnGOVEXP}_{t-i} + i=1p &+ \beta_2 i \text{LnGOVREV}_{t-i} + i=1p + \beta_3 i \text{LnEXC}_{t-i} + i=1p + \beta_4 i \text{LnGDPT}_{t-i} + i=1p + \beta_5 i \text{LnTBILL}_{t-i} + v t \end{aligned} \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

Where LnGOVEXP_t refers to the log of government expenditure, LnGOVREV_t refers to the log of government revenue, LnGOVEXP_{t-i} and LnGOVREV_{t-i} are lagged values of government expenditure and revenues respectively. LnEXC_{t-i} , LnGDPT_{t-i} and LnTBILL_{t-i} and refer to the lagged values of exchange rate, gross domestic product and TreasuryBill rates. P refers to lag length to be used in VAR Model and μt and $v t$ are white noise error terms.

4.2 Data

The data was obtained from the African Development Bank Social and Economic data and the World Bank database. We make use of data whose data points are from 1980 to 2016. Table 1 describes in detail all the variables whose data are employed in our study for analysis.

4.3 Growth of real Government expenditure and revenue

The %age growth rate of real revenue and expenditure in Zambia is given for the selected years in Figure 1. Real government revenues and expenditure on average were falling from 1981 to 2004. In 2005 onwards we observe some positive growth until 2012. In 2013, real government revenue growth turned

negative until 2016. On the other hand, real government expenditure turned negative in 2014 all through to 2016.

Table 1: Variable Description

Variable Name	Units of Measurement	Variable Description	Expected Sign
Real government revenue	United States dollar	Central government, total revenue, and grants deflated by CPI inflation.	(+)
Real government expenditures	United States dollar	Central government, total expenditure and net lending deflated by CPI inflation.	(+)
Exchange rate	Ratio	Local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar.	(+)
Gross domestic product	United States Dollar	Value of all goods and services produced in a particular period in Zambia	(+)
Treasury Bill rate	Rate percent	Policy variable on 90 day Treasury Bills	(-)




Figure 1: %age Growth of Real Government Expenditure and Revenue

Source: Author's computations.

4.4 Estimation Methods

4.4.1 Unit Root Test

A non-stationary series exhibits an infinite persistence of shocks to the autoregressive process (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). We tested all the variables in our model for the presence of a unit root. If a time series is stationary after we take its first difference, then it is integrated of order one $I(1)$ and if it is stationary after we take its second difference, then it is integrated of order two $I(2)$. Theory of stationary stochastic processes suggests that economic variables are usually integrated of order one $I(1)$ and rarely integrated of order greater than two (Kennedy, 2003).

4.4.2 Application of the VAR

Given that the unit root tests suggest that the variables are stationary in levels $I(0)$, we make use of the VAR model. The model was specified in Log-Linear form as in Dalena and Magazzino (2012). Government expenditure is Granger-caused by its own lagged value(s) and the lagged value(s) of revenue. Government revenue is also specified to be Granger-caused by its own lagged value(s) and lagged value(s) of government expenditure in the VAR Model. The VAR model has the advantage of treating all variables as endogenous, and therefore becomes useful in detecting the flow of causality

between the variables. We followed the Lag selection criterion in using the lag length of one (1).

5.0 Results

The full results from estimating equations (2) and (3) are as presented in Table 2. The Granger causality test is presented in Table 2.1. The autocorrelation test suggests that there are no serial correlations in the residuals. All the roots of the companion matrix values lie within the unit circle, indicating a stable VAR system¹. We also performed the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check for unit root. The findings suggest that the variables do not suffer from a unit root in levels. Performing the Dickey-Fuller test at lag zero, we find the log of government revenue, log of government expenditure, log of GDP, and log of Treasury Bills to be stationary at 5% level of significance. The log of exchange rate was also found to be stationary in levels at 1% level of significance².

We found unidirectional causality which runs from government expenditure to government revenue in the Granger causality test. Treasury Bill rate was also found to Granger-cause government revenue and expenditure. The result findings suggested that exchange rate and GDP do not Granger-cause government revenue and government expenditure.

The estimated coefficients with the associated standard errors for the VAR are also given in Table 2 below. Our target model suggests that the lag of government expenditure has a positive effect on government revenue at 5% level of significance. The lag of government revenue was found to have no effect on government revenue. The lags of GDP and exchange rate were found to have no effect in influencing government revenue. However, Treasury Bill rate was found to have a significant and negative influence on revenue.

Table 2: VAR Results

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	GOVERNMENT REVENUE	GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
GOVREV (L1)	-0.16	-0.46
	(-0.55)	(-0.59)
GOVEXP (L1)	1.07	1.41
	(0.43)*	(0.46) ^{*3}
GDP (L1)	-0.20	-0.13
	(-0.32)	(-0.35)
EXCH RATE (L1)	-0.17	-0.08
	(-0.28)	(-0.30)
TBILL (L1)	-0.28	-0.28
	(0.08)**	(0.08) ^{**4}
Constant	5.93	3.83
	(-4.94)	(-5.28)

Source: Author's computations.

In the non-target model, we found a positive and significant relationship between the lag of government expenditure and government expenditure. The lag of government revenue was found to have no significant relationship with government revenue. The lags of GDP and exchange rate were found to be insignificant in influencing government revenue. The lag of Treasury Bills rate is found to be highly significant in influencing government expenditure.

Table 2.1: Granger Causality Test Results


Equation	Excluded	Probability
GOVREV	GOVEXP	0.01*
GOVREV	GDP	0.53
GOVREV	EXCH RATE	0.54
GOVREV	TBILL	0.00**
GOVREV	ALL	0.00**
GOVEXP	GOVREV	0.44
GOVEXP	GDP	0.71
GOVEXP	EXCH RATE	0.80
GOVEXP	TBILL	0.00**
GOVEXP	ALL	0.00**

Source: Author's computations.

5.1 Impulse Response Functions Results

The results of the impulse response functions are reported in Figure 2. We direct our focus on impulse responses on variables that are found to be statistically significant in the VAR model. A one-unit shock to government expenditure raises government revenue in one year's time and permanently remains at that higher level, and a one-unit shock to government expenditure raises expenditure moderately and holds at that level throughout the eight-year forecast. A one-unit shock to Treasury Bills lowers government expenditure after about one year and continues falling throughout the forecast period. A one-unit shock to Treasury Bills reduces government revenue after about one year and continues falling throughout the forecast period.

Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions



Source: Author's computations.

5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition

The full results of the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) are reported in Table 3. We direct our focus on the FEVD's on variables that are found

to be statistically significant in the VAR model. In the short-run, a one standard deviation shock to government expenditure accounts for approximately 6% variation in government revenue only after two years, and it rises to 15% in the long-run (8-year forecast). A one standard deviation shock to government expenditure explains approximately 15% to itself in the short-run and rises to about 17% in the long-run. A one standard deviation shock to Treasury Bill rate will raise government expenditure by 3% in the in the short-run (second year) and 15% in the long-run (eight-year forecast). A one standard deviation shock to Treasury Bill rate will raise government revenue by 3% in the short-run and by 15% in the long-run.

Table 3: Results of Forecast Error Variance Decomposition

	Impulse:	Govtexp	Govtexp	TBill	TBILL
Step	Response:	GovtRev	GovtExp	GovtRev	GovtExp
0		0	0	0	0
1		0	0.148331	0	0
2		0.060864	0.155597	0.029388	0.026392
3		0.10168	0.160711	0.061597	0.057683
4		0.124032	0.163643	0.08833	0.08472
5		0.136491	0.165142	0.109632	0.106619
6		0.143748	0.165773	0.126607	0.124166
7		0.148129	0.165873	0.14026	0.138288
8		0.150815	0.165633	0.151355	0.149746

Source: Author's computations.

6.0 Discussion and Conclusion

The findings of the Granger causality tests suggest that causality is running from government expenditure to government revenue. These results are surprising given that spend-and-tax hypothesis is based on the premise of crises which is not the case for Zambia. These results are consistent with the findings of Richter and Dimitrios (2013) for Portugal. In the case of Dalena and Magazzino (2012), such results correspond to the interwar period in Italy's history. These results were puzzling; we sought to understand the strength of the causality running from government expenditure to government revenue. To do this, we augmented the Granger causality test with the forecast error variance decomposition.

The results of the forecast error variance decomposition suggest that a one standard deviation shock to government expenditure will explain about 6% variation in revenue in two years and will rise to 15% variation in spending in

eight years. These results suggest that the causality running from government expenditure to government revenue exists but is not so strong. What then could be explaining the forecast error variance results? The absence of social crises may explain the weak relationship indicated by forecast error variance. There has never been a social disturbance, or war, or epidemic of extreme proportions in Zambia. The spend-and-tax hypothesis is based on the premise of large-scale social disturbance, crises, or war which make it easier for the political system to decide how much to spend and then adjust tax revenues. In the context of Zambia, these results may indicate that the political system makes spending decisions in the midst of peace and gets to adjust revenue policy to finance the budget deficit. This may be partly explained by the various stakeholders' groupings who all lobby and expect to benefit from government expenditure (Bwalya et al, 2009). These findings are indicative rather than prescriptive for Zambia. Therefore, given that increases in government revenue are Granger-caused by increases in government expenditure, financing the budget deficit through raising revenues may not be the most appropriate tool to reduce budget deficits. Rather, efforts that lead to policies that control, or place limitations, on government spending must be emphasised. Policymakers, politicians, and civil society will have to prepare themselves and the public on the importance of bringing the government budget in balance. Perpetual budget deficits destabilize the macroeconomy in three ways: firstly, it raises the cost of borrowing in the economy; secondly, it limits resources available to the private sector for investment; and thirdly, persistent budget deficits can increase the national debt.

Endnotes

- ¹ See appendices A3 and A4
- ² See appendix A1
- ³ Implies coefficient is significant at 5% level of significance
- ⁴ Implies coefficient is significant at 1% level of significance

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APPENDICES

Appendix A1: Unit Root Test

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test

Variable	Test Statistic	1% critical value	5% critical value
log of government revenue	-3.348	-3.675	-2.969
log of government expenditure	-3.496	-3.675	-2.969
Log of GDP	-3.151	-3.675	-2.969
Log of Treasury Bill rate	-2.045	-2.453	-1.696
Log of exchange rate	-3.865	-2.647	-1.950

Source: Author's computations

Appendix A2: Normality Test

Jarque-Bera Test

Equation	Chi2	Df	prob>Chi2
log of government revenue	0.083	2	0.95927
log of government expenditure	0.189	2	0.91002
Log of GDP	2.077	2	0.35404
Log of exchange rate	1.316	2	0.51796
Log of Treasury Bill rate	0.912	2	0.63367
ALL	4.577	10	0.91761

Source: Author's computations.


Appendix A3: Autocorrelation test

Lagrange-multiplier test

Lag	Chi2	Df	prob>chi2
1	24.4164	25	0.49543
2	26.7128	25	0.37038

Source: Author's computations.

Appendix A4: Stability of VAR System



Source: Author's computations.

The Connection between Education and Sustainable Economic Growth in Nigeria¹

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This article considers the nexus between education and economic growth in Nigeria. Education here is seen as portraying one of the major components of human capital formation. Investment in the quantity of education, and more significantly in its quality is pivotal to achieving sustainable economic growth. Time-series data were collected from different sources for the period 1980-2015. Cointegration technique and error correction methodology were employed for the estimation of the chosen model. The empirical results reveal that educational investment impacts on economic growth in Nigeria in a direct and significant manner. Hence, amongst several recommendations, we propose that a forceful and pragmatic injection of funds by government at all levels into the different sectors of education is a key factor to increased and sustainable economic growth.

Keywords:

Budget allocation, Gross fixed capital formation, Educational enrolment, Economic growth.

1. Introduction

The notable role of education in governance and nation building is evident in advanced nations at various stages of their economic development. The importance of human capital and education in the economic growth of an economy has been emphasised in several works (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007; Barro, 2013; Hanushek, 2013; Benos and Zotou, 2014; Asiedu, 2014). Studies have revealed the returns that accrue from the various forms of basic education, training, research, and capacity building; these have shown that without substantial investment in human capital, sustainable economic development will only be a mirage (Emediegwu and Monye-Emina, 2016). Invariably, no country can develop without serious and sound financial commitment to education. Michaelowa (2000) states that any form of investment in education turns out to be very profitable to households at the micro level and society at the macro level. He further argues that such investment impacts on the system both directly *via* increase in individuals' wages, and indirectly *via* increasing externalities associated with education.

Todaro and Smith (2012) opined that human capital development can be considered a necessary condition for development, and indeed the only vehicle that can lead any nation to economic progress and prosperity. Education transforms a society's army of human resources into human capital. This is accomplished by equipping them with the requisite knowledge, competencies, techniques, and skills. This transformation makes them more functional and productive, thereby contributing to the overall advancement of the society. Additionally, education is key to poverty mitigation and an instrument for promoting fairness, equity, and social justice.

Harbinson (1973) emphasised that the ultimate basis for the wealth of nations is human resources. Physical capital and natural endowments are regarded as passive agents of production; human resources are the active factors as well as the gravitational force that attracts and accumulates, explores and exploits all the other factors of production to bring about national development. Thus, a society that proves incapable of developing its citizens and making them functional in bringing about transformation in the economy will not be able to develop anything else in that economy.

The increasing evidence of the significant role and importance of education in capacity building and national development has made investment in the education sector crucial to lasting growth and development. In Nigeria, the average percentage of the annual federal government budgetary allocation to education for the period 2010 – 2015 is 7.52% (World Bank, 2015). This is significantly below the 26.0% recommended by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Clearly, sustainable growth will not be realised because investment in education has not been given financial priority in the budgetary allocation of the government. For the same period (2010 – 2015), the average annual budgetary allocation expended on the education sectors for Ghana and Malawi are 28.07% and 24.67% respectively.

Several studies (Abiodun and Iyiola, 2011; Ehiogu, Okezie and Chinedu, 2013; Ifionu and Nteegah, 2013; Jaiyeoba, 2015) have assessed the impact of education on Nigeria's economy, but with data limited to 2012. Extending the time period, this article appraises the extent to which economic growth in Nigeria has been affected as a result of educational investment. Consequently, we will use the most current data on Nigeria's economy and education to ascertain if results obtained in previous studies are stable and robust over time. Additionally, we account for post-primary education which has been neglected in many Nigerian studies. The article is subdivided into six sections: Section 2 deals with stylised facts on education in Nigeria, while Section 3 presents the literature review; Section 4 consists of the theoretical framework and the model specification; data analysis and empirical results are considered in Section 5; Section 6 provides a summary and policy recommendations.

2. Stylised Facts on Nigeria's Educational System

2.1 Educational Development in Nigeria

Nigeria's educational system can be divided into formal and informal education. Formal education consists of pre-primary (nursery), primary, post-primary (secondary) and tertiary education. Informal education consists of indigenous and traditional methods of knowledge transmission, and is prevalent in the rural areas. Soon after independence, Nigeria's educational system was patterned after that of her colonial masters, that is, a 6-5-2-3 system. This entails six years of primary, five years of post-primary, two years of higher secondary and three years of tertiary education respectively. The current educational system of the country is based on the 6-3-3-4 system – six years of primary education, three years of junior secondary education, three years of senior secondary education and four years of tertiary education. Preparatory to entering primary school, pre-primary school children can attend educational institutions such as day-care centres, play groups and nursery schools.

Acknowledging the significance of educating human capital to achieve lasting economic development, the Nigerian government, after Independence, embarked on strategies of expanding educational institutions at all levels. Hence, the number of universities in the country increased from five in 1970 to 24 in 1986. In 2005, the number of educational institutions – primary, secondary and tertiary – stood at 59,340, 12,610 and 365 respectively, a monumental rise from the meagre 1970 figures of 14,903, 1,378 and five respectively (see Table 1). As at May 2015, according to the National Universities Commission (NUC) there are 153 universities (40 federal, 44 state and 69 private). The table further shows that adult literacy rates improved between 1986 and 2005 from 49.8% to 62.5% before falling slightly to 61.34% in 2010, and further to 59.57% in 2015. The pupil per teacher ratio in primary schools also exhibited a similar trend. While it stood at 34 in 1970, it peaked at 52 in 1997, before declining to 38 in 2010, thereafter rising marginally to 40 in 2015 – the same exactly as ten years earlier, 2005. This portrays an undesirable trend when compared to the United Nation's recommendation of 25. In summary the nation has not done so well over the years in consideration.

Table 2 similarly shows that the enrolments figures have continued to increase across the various levels of educational institutions. Enrolments at all levels maintained a steady increase from 1970 to 2015, except in the case of primary enrolment, where there was a decline of approximately one million between 2005 and 2010. This could be attributed to the insurgency and terrorism that erupted within the country, especially in North Central, leading to closure of many primary schools.

Table 1: Indices of Educational Development in Nigeria, 1970-2015

S/N	Indices	1970	1986	1997	2005	2010	2015
1	Adult literacy rate (%)	N/A	49.8	57	62.0	61.34	59.57
2	No. of pupils per teacher (primary)	34	44	52	40	38	40
3	No. of pupils per teacher (secondary)	21	30	39	27	33.08	19.32
4	Percentage of females in educational institutions	N/A	N/A	43.5			
	i. Primary	N/A	N/A	41.9	53	46.6	48.6
	ii. Secondary	N/A	N/A	38.9	44	45.8	53.48
	iii. Tertiary	N/A	N/A		43	38.2	44.12
5	Number of education institutions						
	i. Primary ²	14,903	35,434	43,950	54,434	58,348	62,406
	ii. Secondary	1,378	5,731	7,310	12,611	N/A	N/A
	iii. Tertiary ³	5	24	137	199	365	378

Source: CBN (2008, 2013); NBS: National Literacy Survey (2010); World Bank (2015)

Table 2: Enrolment Figures at School (1970-2015)

Years	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
1970	3,515,827	357,027	14,468
1986	12,914,870	3,094,349	135,783
1997	21,161,852	5,578,255	862,023
2005	22,115,432	6,534,000	930,000
2010	21,558,461	9,056,768	1,375,671
2015	23,129,927	12,500,000	1,391,527


Source: CBN (2008, 2013); World Bank (2015)

The summary of federal government expenditure on education between 1980 and 2015 as depicted in Figure 1 shows that in 1980, 10.35% of the federal government's total expenditure was allocated to education. It, however, fluctuated between 1985 and 2008. In 2008, 13% of total expenditure was expended on education. Thereafter, the allocation declined steadily before picking up again in 2012 with 10% before hitting an all-time low of 6.08% in 2015. This is well below the minimum measure of 26% of annual budget advocated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). These

figures reveal that insufficient investment in the educational system remains a key challenge that could stifle meaningful sustainable development in Nigeria.


Figure 2 further compares a 16-year (2000-2015) average of budgetary allocation to the education sector for 12 African countries as sampled by the World Bank (2015). While Nigeria is at the bottom of the ladder with an average of 6.0% allocation to education, nations such as Ghana top the chart with 31% allocation, followed by Cote d'Ivoire and Uganda with allocations of 30% and 27% respectively. These countries generate less income than Nigeria. Education should be given high priority in budgetary allocation since it produces effective and efficient manpower for all sectors of the economy.

Figure 1: Proportion of Total Expenditure Allocated to Education (1980-2015)



Sources: CBN (2008, 2015)

Figure 2: Average Budgetary Allocation to Education of some Selected African Countries (2000-2015)



Source: World Bank (2015)

2.2 Problems Besetting Nigeria's Educational Sector

Ifionu and Nteegah (2013) posited that inadequate funding, amongst other factors contributed to the failure of government initiatives aimed at improving educational provision. The oil windfalls of the early 1970s endowed the country with abundant financial resources. This accounted for the sudden rise in the number of educational facilities, especially the primary schools. However, the decline of the economy as a result of the price crash in world oil market in the 1980s, and the attendant adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) proposed and supported by both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has crippled the supply of finance available for education purposes (Omojimiti, 2010; Emediegwu and Okeke, 2017). Since the change from the military regime to democracy in 1999, successive governments always underscore the need to invest substantially in education, but do nothing substantive about it (Abiodun and Iyiola, 2011).

Essential economic theory suggests that it is necessary first to understand the cost and benefit analysis of education to an economy before fashioning realistic policies in line with sustainable development in the context of the global economy. This is exactly the case of Malaysia. The government of Malaysia allocates over 20% of its total expenditure to its educational sector, and the result has been tremendous technological development (HDR, UNDP 2003). Its reform of the educational sector, by way of funding, helped stimulate other aspects of the economy for development. The 6.06% allocation to education in Nigeria's 2015 appropriation budget has left one in doubt as to how Nigeria can attain the goal of Vision 20:2020 of becoming among the 20 most industrialised nations of the world.

The experience of Nigeria since independence in 1960 has been that of increasing rates of unemployment, both in terms of quantity and quality. This, according to Awopegba (2003), can be attributed to discrepancies in the production of high-level manpower and levels of employment. There has been a wasteful imbalance within the educational system; excessive demand for education (perhaps as an end in itself); increasing cost versus decreasing revenue from education; some non-financial bottlenecks; inadequate job opportunities for tertiary level graduates; and the provision of education which is not labour market oriented. All these buttress the fact that education is yet to produce the desired results of improving the human resource stock of the nation.

It is worth noting that Awopegba (2003) stresses that investment in people *via* education will not automatically translate to national development in any country if it is not complemented by sound economic policies. In other words, the economic framework within the nation must ensure a market which supports

trade and investment; a good incentive structure; effective social sector policies; and efficient and functioning capital and labour markets.

3. Empirical Literature Review

Education has become one of the most important investments towards national growth and development (Denison, 1966; Bowman, 1980; Barro, 2000, 2013). This is particularly so because of its impact on health, life expectancy, and wealth formation abilities. The 1996 World Bank Annual Report states that education has contributed to more than doubling household incomes in developing countries. In some countries, incomes have grown by a factor of even five or ten. The increase in life expectancy has been from 40 years to 63 years in the last four decades, while infant mortality rate has dropped by two-thirds.

In his pioneering empirical work, Barro (1991) investigated the nexus between educational spending and economic growth. His results showed that a positive relationship exists between per capita output growth rate and school enrolment level. He further argued that by increasing the human capital development investment rate, the development gap between the developing and developed countries can be closed.

In a later study, Barro and Lee (1993) constructed average years of schooling for adults using census and enrolment figures. Analysing 129 countries, they reported a significant and positive relationship between average years of secondary schooling for males and economic growth. (The relationship for females was negative, but insignificant.)

In their work, Baldacci, et al (2004) sampled 120 developing economies from 1975 to 2000 using a recursive system of equations to analyse the direct and indirect channels linking public education spending, human capital, and economic growth. Their result indicates that public investment in education positively and significantly influences education accumulation, thereby leading to higher economic growth.

Francis and Iyare (2006) used time-series data from 1964 to 1998, and the twin methods of cointegration and vector error correction to find out if there is a causal relationship between education and growth in three Caribbean nations (Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago). They found no positive and significant relationship between education and growth for Barbados and Jamaica, either in the short or long run. However, education in Jamaica led to higher growth only in the short run.

Employing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) method, Jung and Thorbecke (2001) studied the effect of public education expenditure on human capital, growth and poverty in Tanzania and Zambia. Their simulation results show a positive and significant relationship between the two variables.

In his Granger Causality analysis, Omojimate (2010) used Nigerian data from 1980 to 2005 to show that public spending on education Granger-cause economic growth but the reverse is not the case. He further proved that there exists a bidirectional causality between recurrent education expenditure and economic growth. However, there was no evidence of causality between capital education expenditure on economic growth, primary school enrolment and economic growth.

Using time-series Nigerian data from 1981 to 2011, Ejiogu, Okezie and Chinedu (2013) employed the VAR model to show that educational investment is positively related to GDP. They further used the Granger causality strategy as a robustness check, and proved that while GDP Granger-causes educational expenditure, no reverse causality exists from educational spending to GDP.

Prior studies on the impact of education on Nigeria's economic growth use data up to 2012. By extending the time period we intend to appraise the extent to which economic growth in Nigeria has been affected as a result of the educational investment. Consequently, we will use the most current data on Nigeria's economy and education to ascertain if results obtained in previous studies are stable and robust over time.

4. Methodology and Model Specification

4.1 Methodology

This study uses regression analysis to establish and quantify the relationship between economic growth and education. We tested for stationarity to ensure non-spuriousness of results, and thereafter employed cointegration to capture long-run or equilibrium relationships between (cointegrating) variables. Finally, we utilised error correction mechanism to reconcile the short-run behaviour of economic variables with the long-run behaviour.

4.2 Model Specification

$$RGDP = F(BAE, GFCF, PEE, PPEE) \quad (1)$$

Linearising equation (1) gives,

$$RGDP = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 BAE + \alpha_2 GFCF + \alpha_3 PEE + \alpha_4 PPEE + U \quad (2)$$

Where:

RGDP = Real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product

BAE = Budget allocation to education

GFCF = Gross fixed capital formation

PEE = Primary educational enrolment

PPEE = Post-primary educational enrolment

U = error term

Economic growth performance is proxied by real gross domestic product (RGDP) while budgetary allocation to education acts as a proxy for investment in education. Enrolment figures into primary and post-primary schools are used as proxy for educational enrolment. The choice of these proxies is founded on economic literature (Omojimate, 2010; Ifionu and Alwell, 2013; Benos and Zotou, 2014)⁴. The variables were examined in natural logarithmic forms in order to achieve the property of linearity. Equation (2) above is therefore re-specified as follow:

$$\ln rgdp = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln bae + \alpha_2 \ln gfcf + \alpha_3 \ln pee + \alpha_4 \ln ppee + U \quad (3)$$

The *a priori* expectations are $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_4 > 0$. This means that budget allocation to education, gross fixed capital formation, and educational enrolment which is proxied by the enrolment figures of primary and post-primary education have positive relationship with economic growth.

To estimate the short-run relationship that exists among the variables, if there is any, the corresponding error correction equation is evaluated as:

$$\Delta \ln rgdp = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_1 \Delta \ln rgdp_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_2 \Delta \ln baet_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_3 \Delta \ln gfcf_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_4 \Delta \ln ppee_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_5 \Delta \ln ppee_{t-i} + \phi ECM_{t-i} + U_t \quad (4)$$

Where:

ECM = Error correction term

This is to allow sufficient data points for the econometric analysis. The data were collected from several sources: Social Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), various issues of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) - Statistical Bulletin, and World Bank data bank

5. Analysis of Results and Findings

5.1 Empirical Results

Unit root tests, using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, were conducted on the natural logarithms of all the variables. This is to determine the level of stationarity of the variables. The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root are as presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for Unit Root

Variables	ADF Lag	ADF Test Statistics	95% ADF Critical Level	Remark
Lnrngdp	4	-1.4714	-3.6119	Non stationary
Lnbae	1	-2.8046	-3.6119	Non stationary
Lngfcf	3	-3.8046	-3.6119	Stationary
Lnpee	4	-3.3656	-3.6119	Non stationary
Lnppee	3	-2.8277	-3.6119	Non stationary
Δ lnrgdp	1	-3.1076	-2.9907	Stationary
Δ lnbae	1	-3.8883	-2.9798	Stationary
Δ lnpee	1	-5.1198	-2.9970	Stationary
Δ lnppee	1	-3.9306	-2.9970	Stationary

Source: Authors' Computation

From the unit root test in Table 3, we observe that only gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is stationary at level. The remaining variables, however, become stationary at their first differences, since the ADF test statistic of each is greater than the 95% critical value of the ADF statistic in absolute values. Thus, the last four variables are integrated of order one, that is, $I(1)$. This realisation leads us to draw the hypothesis that the series are cointegrated. This resolution emanates from the Engel and Granger (1987) postulation that "if two or more variables have unit roots, a linear combination of such variables would ensure that the resultant residuals would be integrated of order zero, that is, stationary at level". To verify this Engel and Granger (1987) postulation, we conducted an OLS regression of \ln RGDP on all the explanatory variables and the residuals were extracted and tested for stationarity at level using the ADF test.

Table 4: Unit Root Test for Residuals

Variables	ADF Lag	ADF Test Statistics	95% ADF Critical Level	Remark
RES	1	-3.6939	-2.9907	Stationary

Source: Authors' Computation

Table 4 confirms the above postulation as the unit root test conducted on the residuals shows that they are stationary at level. This reasoning stems

from the fact that the ADF test statistic of the residuals is greater than its value at 95% critical value. In all, we safely conclude that all the variables are cointegrated, implying the existence of a long-run relationship among them. Given the cointegration character of the variables, the short-run adjustment dynamics can be represented by an error correction model. From the over parameterized model, we use the Akaike Information Criterion to select the best fitting equation, which *ipso facto* yields the required parsimonious model. The estimated equation is represented in Table 5.

Table 5: Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model ARDL (2,2,1,1,0) Selected based on Akaike Information Criterion

Dependent Variable	Explanatory Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	T- Ratio
Dlnrgdp	Dlnbae	0.060184	0.023402	2.5718
	Dlngcfc	0.05373	0.034392	1.5629
	Dlnpee	0.063477	0.13052	0.43633
	Dlnppee	-0.3394	0.12388	-2.6956
	ecm(-1)	-0.22732	0.97671	-2.3274

R-Squared = 0.75545

R-Bar-Squared = 0,60260

F-stat (7,19) = 7.0607

DW-statistic= 1.8996

Source: Authors' Computation

5.2 Analysis of Results

An examination of the econometric results shows that the overall fit is satisfactory with an R-squared of 0.76 and an R-bar-squared of 0.60. R-bar-squared of 60% indicates that 60% variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables taken together. The remaining 40% can be attributed to the white noise (disturbance term).

The F-statistic of 7.0607 is significant at 1% level of significance since it is greater than $F_{table(0.01)} = 3.71$. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (H_1) that the overall model and its related R^2 are statistically and significantly different from zero is accepted. This means that the independent variables simultaneously explain the variation in the dependent variable.

The DW statistic measures for the presence of autocorrelation in the model. However, it is noticed that the model is fairly free from autocorrelation since the DW statistic observed in the model is 1.90, which is approximately 2. This means that the model is reliable in explaining the economic growth of Nigeria.

From the Akaike Information Criterion based parsimonious error correction model reported in Table 5, it is observed that post-primary education enrolment (PPEE) is not well behaved since its coefficient has a negative sign which goes against theoretical expectation. This anomaly, according to Abiodun and Iyiola (2011), may be attributed to the reasoning that the enrolment at this educational level has not fully attained the stage where it can positively affect economic growth. This may be as a result of truancy on the part of teachers – especially in the public schools; poor learning infrastructures; and lack of policies and programmes geared towards revamping the subsector.

Total expenditure on education (BAE), gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), and primary school enrolment (PEE) are well behaved because their coefficients meet their theoretical expectation. Table 5 shows the coefficient of each of the independent variables. A 10% increase in post-primary education enrolment will translate to a 3.34% decrease in real gross domestic product. A 100% increase in total expenditure on education will lead to a 6.1% rise in real GDP. A 5.4% rise in real GDP will result from a 100% increase in gross fixed capital formation while a 100% increase in primary school enrolment will yield a 6.3% increase in real GDP.

Furthermore, a careful look at the t-statistics of the independent variables reveals their levels of significance respectively. Total expenditure on education and post-primary education enrolment are significant at 99% confidence level while gross fixed domestic product is significant at 90% confidence level. However, primary education enrolment is not significant both at 95% and 90% confidence level.

The speed of adjustment from short-run to long-run equilibrium is shown by the coefficient of the error correction model $ecm(-1)$. From Table 5, the $ecm(-1)$ has a coefficient of -0.22732 and its t-value of -2.3274 is significant at 95% confidence level. Also since the $ecm(-1)$ has a negative sign, it therefore shows that it will rightly correct any deviation from long-run equilibrium

6. Summary and Policy Recommendations

The main arguments advanced in this paper can now be summarised with concluding remarks. The paper has endeavoured to investigate the nexus between education and economic growth. This was made possible by employing a range of econometric tools such as the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for unit root tests, cointegration tests, and error correction mechanism (ECM). Results from the study show that educational investment in Nigeria is well below the recommendation of the United Nations' 26% budgetary allocation to education.

Empirical results show that there exists a long-run relationship among gross fixed capital formation, investment in education, and economic growth

in Nigeria. All the variables of interest, with the exception of the post-primary education enrolment, appear with the expected positive signs. Moreover, with the exclusion of primary school enrolment, all other variables are significant in economic growth.

Based on the empirical evidence of the study, it is found that total expenditure on education contributes positively to economic growth in Nigeria, with a strong and statistically significant impact. The implication of this is that if Nigeria is to join the comity of nations that have achieved sustainable economic growth, it is of unqualified necessity to invest substantially in education. We therefore recommend that government should increase the budgetary allocation to the education sector to at least the standardised United Nations' 26% even if there has to be a trade-off with other types of investment. Secondly, education should be prioritised in the nation's developmental strategies, though more emphasis should be placed on basics, that is, primary and post-primary education. This will drive the economy to the path of productivity and efficiency, thus leading to sustainable growth. It is important to state at this point that we could not control for tertiary education in our analysis as we were unable to get complete data for the sample period. Hence, we do not rule out the possibility that the results of our analysis may change if tertiary education is controlled for.

Thirdly, an enabling environment in all educational institutions has to be created by the government. This can be realised if there exists Public-Private Partnership (PPP) where the government and the private sector make concerted efforts to mobilise resources to furnish educational institutions at all levels and provide them with adequate and appropriate facilities, laboratories equipment, libraries, computers, and modern instructional materials. This will invariably improve the quality and quantity of education and thereby boost labour productivity and human capital development, as well as guarantee lasting growth and development.

One of the aims of economists is to comprehend the factors that contribute – as well as those that do not contribute – to a country's economic growth. This is, partly, because a developing economy has the propensity to engender prosperity, progress, and well-being for its citizens while simultaneously laying the bedrock for a more equitable circulation of the dividends of growth. If, as revealed by studies, increase in the quantity and quality of education translates to accelerated economic growth, then investing in education would pay off in the long-run. Moreover, the dividends accruing from such investment could also be significant in alleviating poverty. Such premise could be pivotal in gaining political support for educational investment and guaranteeing its continuity.

Endnotes

- ¹ We are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
- ² The figures show only public primary schools.
- ³ Only those accredited by the Joint Admission Matriculation Board (JAMB) are counted and they include universities, polytechnics and colleges of education/agriculture.
- ⁴ Due to limitation of data, we could not use tertiary enrolment data. We acknowledge that this additional control can alter our results

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Book Review

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The Lusaka Years; The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963 to 1994. By Hugh MacMillan. (Johannesburg: Jacana Media (Pty), 2013), 357 pp.

Hugh MacMillan's comprehensive study of the African National Congress' (ANC) time in exile in Zambia fills a much-needed gap in the region's historiography of liberation movements. It also complements the author's previous work on the ANC's presence at the University of Zambia.*

The book starts with a detailed account of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of the 1960s, which aimed at establishing a corridor for freedom fighters to smuggle weapons to establish Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) units in South Africa. Their failure, the author argues, influenced Kaunda's policies towards liberation movements based in Zambia. He saw a danger in having armed and rival liberation movements in one place. The account further shows how the ANC's activities were influenced, and sometimes limited, by Zambia's domestic politics. Kaunda needed to juggle and prioritise multiple liberation struggles, the wars in Rhodesia and Mozambique being the first priority. Zambia's position as a frontline state created security and economic risks which were used to justify the introduction of a one-party state in 1972. The book details the period of the détente between 1974 and 1976, when Kaunda was in low-key talks with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. The policy of detente created uncertainty and restrictions on the ANC's activities in Zambia. South Africa's policy of détente and its illusion of progress ended with the Soweto Rising in 1976 which led to a new generation of South African political refugees entering Zambia. The ANC exile population peaked at 4,000 in 1990. It is clear that until 1980, the year of Zimbabwe's Independence, Zambia's main focus was on the Rhodesian war, which was fought right on its doorstep.

The book shows how Kaunda became much closer to the ANC after the mid-1980s. At a personal level, Kaunda's friendship with Oliver Tambo strengthened. In the face of security threats and ill-health, Tambo was invited to live in State House. A large regional conference of the ANC, held in Kabwe in 1985, was protected by the Zambian army. The conference led to a number of important reforms within the ANC. In the meeting a new National Executive Committee was selected, as well as a new constitution for the organisation, with a code of conduct to confront the occurrence of torture within ANC ranks. It led to appointments to a constitutional committee of the ANC in Lusaka, for a liberated,

non-racial and democratic constitution. Members included legal experts like Albie Sachs and Kader Kasim. While it was confirmed that no negotiations would be held with the South African government unless Mandela was released unconditionally, unofficially, the conference recognized that informal meetings were already being held, with Kaunda playing a mediating role.

Following the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, Lusaka was Mandela's first port of call. He visited Lusaka just two weeks after his release. This moment coincided with the end of one-party rule in Zambia resulting in multi-party elections in July 1991. The ANC now had to repatriate people back to South Africa, a process that took a couple of years. Some of the returnees continued their administrative work at ANC headquarters in Johannesburg, others struggled to reintegrate into South African society. Despite the suspension of the armed struggle, arms were being carried into South Africa from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana until 1993. When the ANC headquarters moved to South Africa it left a degree of disorder behind, leading to increased criminal activity. ANC members were involved in fatal incidents, one being the murders of John and Lorna Harvey in 1992, daughter and son in law of Gore Brown, an ally and friend of Kaunda. The ANC's presence was officially closed in 1994 and this marked the end of the ANC in exile.

The book dedicates space to the realities of day to day life for those living in exile, painting a picture of the exiles' housing, education, health, religion, racial relations, food and entertainment. MacMillan, who was an eye witness to these events being based in Lusaka and a friend to many ANC cadres during those years, wants to show that life in exile was not as 'cushy' as it often portrayed in South African media and literature. He argues that there is no single culture of exile either, as the ANC in Lusaka was a mixed community in terms of race and class, resulting in varying living conditions and experiences.

In conclusion, this book is an impressively detailed and nuanced document on the ANC's years in Lusaka, the first of its kind. It derives its nuance from examining historical phases within this struggle as opposed to trying to reduce it to a single and simplistic account.

* Hugh Macmillan (2014). 'The University of Zambia and the Liberation of Southern Africa, 1966-90'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40:5, 943-959, DOI: 10.1080/03057070.2014.946216