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The Cashew Nut Industry in Mongu District: Origins, Development, and Impact, 1972–2011

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This article explores the contribution of the cashew nut industry to the economic development of Mongu district. The industry was introduced in Mongu district after the Zambian government embarked on the creation of agricultural schemes to reduce the economic imbalance, inherited from the colonial government, between urban and rural areas. The new United National Independence Party government, which came to power in 1964, wanted to develop rural areas through an improved peasantry class. This led to the establishment of agricultural schemes in various rural parts of the country. Due to the sandy terrain of Mongu district, the cashew nut industry was chosen for that area. Contrary to other studies which portray agricultural schemes to have failed completely, this article argues that the benefits accrued to the local people should not go unnoticed. Despite facing various challenges, peasant farmers in Mongu were resilient enough to continue growing cashew nuts. In this way, Mongu district benefitted from the industry economically through employment provision, women's financial empowerment, promotion of local trade, and improved food security. The article relies heavily on primary sources of information available in the National Archives of Zambia, the Zambia Agricultural Research Institute Library, and oral sources from key informants from Mongu district.

Keywords: cashew nut, industry, Mongu, agricultural schemes, development

Introduction

The cashew nut industry is one of the state-led agricultural schemes which was introduced to improve the livelihoods of the majority of Mongu residents. The introduction of the state-led agricultural schemes in Zambia has been traced back to the colonial era. The Northern Rhodesian government embarked on the

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establishment of agricultural schemes aimed at achieving economic diversification, peasant development, and improved food security during the post-World War II period. This led to some prosperity in areas such as Southern Province and Eastern Province, where African peasant differentiation began to emerge as a result of such schemes (Chipungu, 1988; Dixon-Fyle, 1976; Hellen, 1968). This development was not experienced in other parts of the country that lacked these schemes. Therefore, after gaining independence in 1964, the new Zambian government realised the need to reduce this economic imbalance (Wood & Shula, 1976; Shula, 1987; Zambia National Commission for Development Planning [ZNCDP], 1987, p. 21). Agricultural schemes such as the cashew nut industry were adopted to rectify this economic anomaly. Furthermore, the government regarded such schemes as the best strategy for improving food security. As a result, agricultural development was prioritised for developing rural areas, especially as most people there were already involved in peasant farming.

Globally, the agricultural sector has played a critical role in the economic development of various nations and their rural areas, through the establishment of state-led agricultural schemes. In countries where this strategy was successfully implemented, the results benefitted not only the peasant farmers involved but also the entire nation (Petrick & Weingarten, 2004). The cashew nut crop is one such crop that has played a critical role in providing economic benefits to the rural masses and various national economies. The Indian economy depended on the agricultural sector as it contributed a huge share to India's gross domestic product (GDP). By 1950 for example, agriculture's contribution towards the country's GDP was 51% (Guledgudda, 2005). The main contributor was the cashew nut industry. Cashew nut export earnings generated employment for the majority of people in the rural areas of India. This helped to improve the living standards of rural people.

In Africa, the cashew nut industry contributed to the economic development of Mozambique. The industry was an important venture which contributed to the export earnings of that country (Vijfhuizen et al., 2003). Furthermore, the cashew nut industry not only injected cash into rural areas of Mozambique but also played a critical role in empowering women and the youth of Mozambique (Vijfhuizen et al., 2003, p. 16). Women and the youth formed the majority of the workforce in the cashew nut industry. They were involved in work such as planting, weeding, pruning, and harvesting (Vijfhuizen et al., 2003, p. 16).

Zambia adopted state-led agricultural schemes as a means of developing rural areas immediately after its attainment of independence from Britain in 1964. Various agricultural schemes were initiated in rural parts of the country, including the cashew nut industry in Western Province. The cashew nut industry

in Mongu district had the potential to thrive, and to alleviate the poverty of the local people. However, some scholars such as Reuben K. Samunyina argued that the cashew nut industry in Mongu district could not reach its full potential due to government interference (Samunyina, 2009). This agrees with various studies, conducted on agricultural schemes in Zambia, that found that these projects were a failure. Such studies included those by Gear Mumena Kajoba and Charles Kakulwa (Kajoba, 1988; Kakulwa, 2012). Kajoba argued that agricultural schemes failed because of too much government interference, while Kakulwa noted that the schemes were a failure mainly due to poor planning, the poor economic status of the nation, and political interference. Despite the cashew nut industry facing some challenges, the peasants of Mongu district were resilient enough to persevere with the industry for about two decades until the government came back to provide them with financial and technical aid in 2011. As such, they continued to benefit from the industry even during the years of neglect.

Cashew nut exports had the potential to contribute to the economic development not only of Mongu district but also of the entire Zambian economy. Like Samunyina, Ng'andu Peter Magande highlighted the commercial value of cashew nuts. In his autobiography, he demonstrated that cashew nuts fetched a higher price on the world market than copper, the country's main foreign exchange earner (Magande, 2018, p. 117). Further, Magande outlined the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government's commitment in developing the Western Province through the cashew nut industry. This was done through the importation of 14,000 hybrid cashew nut seedlings from South America in 1974 (Magande, 2018, pp. 113–118). The local people of Mongu district, which was the cashew nut hub, received this gesture with excitement, and benefitted from it.

The highlighted studies have shown the role that the agriculture sector through cashew nut production played in the economic development of rural areas. Despite acknowledging the cashew nut industry's potential in the attainment of rural development, they have not shown specifically how Mongu district benefitted from this venture. It is for this reason that this article tries to bring to light the barely glimpsed economic effects of the cashew nut industry on Mongu district.

Origins and Spread of the Cashew Nuts

Cashew (*Anacardium occidentale* L.) is an evergreen nut-bearing tree which has its origins in South and Central America. As Portugal had colonised Brazil, it

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was Portugal that spread cashew nuts to other parts of the world (Guledgudda, 2005, p. 37). Cashew nuts were first grown in Brazil but were later introduced in India in the sixteenth century. The crop reached East Africa at about the same time (Adeigbe et al., 2015, p. 199). Figure 1 shows cashew nuts at different stages of development. There are different varieties of cashew nuts, as seen in the colours of the ripe apples which include red, orange, and yellow.

Figure 1

Developing and Ripe Cashew Nuts



Note. From *Shea versus cashew: A case study of land use change and socio-economic differences between two industrial crops in northern Ghana* by Tabatha Rood, 2017, M.A. dissertation, University of Washington.

Cashew trees were spread by the Portuguese to different parts of the world in the sixteenth century purely for afforestation and the control of soil erosion in coastal places, and not for their economic value. For example, in India the trees were initially used as a means of controlling coastal erosion by enhancing afforestation (Tanzania, 1973, p. 1). With the passage of time, the cashew crop was discovered to have many uses including as food, medicine, and feed for livestock and poultry. It was also discovered to be a raw material in many industries such as construction, cosmetics, confectionary, and manufacturing (Schuiling, 1983, p. 2). This led to the crop receiving wide recognition as economically valuable.

Having received global recognition, the cashew nut was embraced by many countries and became one of the major sources of foreign exchange. Cashew nuts appeared on the global market in the mid-1920s, with India as the sole exporter and the United States of America (USA) as the only buyer (Dendena & Corsi, 2014, p. 765). By the 1960s, Brazil, India, Mozambique, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Kenya were among the major cashew nut exporters (Tanzania, 1973, p. 30). This resulted in the cashew nut's international market being dominated by eastern Africa and India.

Mozambique and Tanzania topped the global list of major cashew nut producers in the 1960s and 1970s. However, this scenario changed as many other countries invested heavily in the industry, and that led to different countries being top producers interchangeably over the years. By 2000, India, USA, China, and Japan had also become major consumers of cashew nuts (Rood, 2017, p. 35). By 2004 India was rated the world's largest producer, processor, consumer, and exporter of cashew nuts (Guledgudda, 2005, p. 11). Vietnam also started to dominate the industry in terms of the production of raw nuts. In 2005, for example, it topped the list, followed by India, Nigeria, Brazil, Tanzania, and Indonesia in that order.¹ By 2011, Vietnam still led the industry. Zambia was among the world's cashew nut exporters as early as the 1970s.² However, her capacity to export was not consistent due to various challenges such as political interference, the poor economic status of the country in the 1970s and 1980s, and poor management, especially before 1972 and after 1991.

Cashew Nut Production

Cashew nuts can be intercropped with other crops for economic reasons. They take three to four years or more to mature, depending on the variety. Intercropping is advisable especially during the infant years of cashew trees, in order to allow for better land utilisation, enhancement of food security of growers, as well as the provision of economic returns before the trees start producing (Dendena & Corsi, 2014, p. 759; Latis, 1986, p. 4). Some of the crops ideal for intercropping with cashew nuts include early maturing cassava, legumes, millet, and sorghum.³ Cashew nuts could also grow well with other trees such as mango, *mungongo*, eucalyptus, and grevillea (Jacob, 1990, p. 10). In Mongu district, some cashew nut farmers intercropped their trees with other crops such as beans, groundnuts, and maize.⁴ When such crops were intercropped with cashew nuts, it encouraged the plantation owners to take care of their fields as they expected short term benefits. In this way, the cashew trees benefitted as the fields were free from weeds and bush fires, which could damage the trees.

¹ Guledgudda, 2005, p. 11. Different weather conditions such as heavy floods and severe droughts affected cashew nut production in most cases. Therefore, it was not possible for particular countries to top the list of producers all the time.

² Food and Agriculture Organisation Production Yearbooks, as cited in Jaffee, 1994, p. 6.

³ Interview of Masiye Mulele, cashew nut grower, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 15 April 2019).

⁴ Interview of Masiye Mulele, cashew nut grower, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 15 April 2019).

Cashew nut production in Mongu district was mainly done by the women and the youth, who were considered to be effective in picking cashew nuts. A similar scenario occurred in other African countries, such as Mozambique and Tanzania, that were major cashew nut producers. In Mozambique, the cashew nut industry played a critical role in empowering women and the youth (Vijfhuizen et al., 2003, p. 16). There was a similar situation in Tanzania, where hired labour of women per acre was two times that of men (Lieuw-Kie-Song et al., 2020, p. 8). In Mongu district, more women were employed in the factory and were considered for harvesting tasks than their male counterparts. This was because women were considered to be efficient. They were a large proportion of the nut pickers, assisted by the youth, and the ratio of men to women in the factory was 1:3.⁵ This accorded women the opportunity to earn a wage for themselves. This was a good development in an area where job opportunities for women were rare.

A Short Historical Background of the Agricultural Schemes in Zambia

After gaining independence in 1964, the new Zambian government adopted the establishment of agricultural schemes from the Northern Rhodesian government. It regarded this as the best solution to reduce rural poverty. As a result, agricultural development was made a priority for developing rural areas, especially as most of the rural people were already involved in peasant farming.

The government prioritised agricultural production as one of the most important economic sectors in the First National Development Plan (FNDP) of 1966 to 1971. The FNDP considered agriculture as an aid to diversify the economy away from copper, and to increase personal incomes and employment opportunities, especially in rural areas (Elliot, 1971, pp. 9–13). Due to this critical resolution adopting the agricultural sector as the main drive for national economic development, different measures were adopted. The agricultural sector budgetary allocation was increased from the initial sum of ZK19 million contained in the Transitional Development Plan (1963–1966) to ZK47,214,000 in the FNDP (1966–1971; Elliot, 1971, pp. 9–13). Thereafter, the FNDP and the plans that followed implemented various measures to enable the agricultural sector to contribute positively to the country's economic development. One of

⁵ Interviews of Agreyidraye Hampane, former farm supervisor, Mabumbu Plantation (Mongu, 25 April 2019); and of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former Zambia Cashew Company (ZCC) employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019). See also Mwase (1998, p. 18).

these measures was setting up the cashew nut industry in Mongu district in Western Province (formerly Barotseland; *Rural Development*, 1974).

The cashew nut industry was meant to produce nuts for both local consumption and the lucrative export market. However, the main target was the export market because the crop was known to have high returns on the international market. High foreign exchange earnings from cashew nut exports, in this way, were meant to increase cash inflows in Mongu district and the country at large, thereby contributing to a reduction in poverty levels. In the government's plan to develop rural areas through agricultural schemes, the cashew nut industry proved the most suitable scheme for the Western Province.

Why the Cashew Nut Industry was Established in Mongu District of Western Province

Other rural areas were receiving different agricultural schemes, but the cashew nut industry was chosen for the Western Province because the province could not support conventional crops, such as maize, groundnuts, and tobacco, on the wide scale that other parts of rural Zambia could (International Rural Development Centre [IRDC], 1987, p. 33; Wood, 1989, p. 3). Additionally, the government's objective in the agricultural sector was to encourage crop cultivation based on the type of soil available in a given area (Kaunda, n.d.-a). In this regard, the cashew nut was adopted in the Western Province.

Mongu district is a flat and sandy region. This kind of terrain supports the production of cashew nuts, which is a tropical crop. Western Province lies between latitude 13° 45' S and 18° S, and longitude 22° 30' E and 25° 30' E (Lima Bank, 1990, p. 22). Since the province lies in the tropical belt, it is suitable for growing cashew trees, whose distribution extends from 27° N to 28° S. Mongu district receives an average annual rainfall of 945 mm, which is suitable for cashew nut production ("Mongu," 2019). The crop requires a minimum of 500 mm rainfall per year but can withstand extremes of 3,000 mm to 4,000 mm (Guledgudda, 2005, p. 37). The sunny and hot climatic environment of the district equally enables it to support the growth of cashew trees. The crop requires a minimum temperature of 20 °C and a maximum of 36 °C (Ohler, 1991, p. 47). Mongu district experiences a maximum temperature of 35.4 °C in October and a minimum of 11.8 °C in June. Mostly, the area is within the climatic requirements for cashew nut production. Furthermore, the area is free of frost and extreme cold, which are threats to growing cashew nuts. The district experiences high temperatures from September to October, which coincides with the flowering and fruit-bearing stage of the cashew trees.

The district possesses three types of vegetation and soil. The first type is the Zambebian flooded grasslands found on the plain and river banks. The second type comprises a mosaic of central Zambebian miombo woodlands covering the sand-veld of the higher dry ground. The last type is the *Cryptosepalum* dry forests, which cover the widespread Barotse sands. The Barotse or Kalahari sands cover the greater part of Mongu district (IRDC, 1987, p. 33; Trapnell & Clothier, 1996, p. 6). Despite being infertile for growing conventional crops, this soil type supports cashew trees. These trees have extensive root systems which develop well in large volumes of sandy soils and are thus able to draw nutrients from a wide soil coverage.

Introduction and Development of the Cashew Nut Industry in Mongu District of Western Province of Zambia

According to local folklore, cashew nuts were first introduced in Mongu district by a man named Simbangala, who was an Angolan migrant. He is believed to have brought the nuts from Angola, a Portuguese colony, and presented them as a gift to *Litunga Yeta III* (king of the Lozi people of the Barotse Royal Establishment in Western Province, 1916–1945) in the early twentieth century. The litunga then instructed that the seeds be grown so that people in the province could benefit from the nutrition provided by the rare nuts. To honour the man who brought the cashew nut seed to him, the litunga named the tree *simbangala*. Since then, the cashew nut has been known as simbangala by the local people of Western Province (Kayuwa, 2015; Lima Bank, 1987). People in Mongu received the cashew nuts with excitement as it was their first time seeing nuts obtained from tree branches, and not from the ground as they always did with groundnuts. The local people started to grow the trees mainly for providing shade and for consumption of the nuts at the household level.⁶ The nuts were used as a snack, and the pounded nut meal was used for cooking vegetables.

In the late 1940s, David Urlin Peters, the Provincial Agricultural Officer for Barotseland, adopted the cashew nut as a tree crop of economic value. He conducted experiments using seeds from the trees that were already growing at Namushakende. After realising that these trees were less productive than expected, in 1951 he obtained seeds of different varieties: small sized seeds from Angola and large sized ones from Tanzania. He trialled these seeds at Namushakende Training Institute, 30 km south of Mongu district, and in the

⁶ Van Eijnatten and Roos (1982, p. 1); interview of Chabalanga Ng'ambi, District Agricultural Coordinator (Mongu, 12 April 2019).

neighbouring Kataba area (ZNCDD, 1979, p. 22). The cashew trees at Kataba failed due to frost (*Ministry of Rural Development*, n.d., pp. 101–102). Those at Namushakende did well. Later, some trials at Mount Makulu research station also failed, due to the type of soil which could not support cashew nut growth successfully (*Ministry of Rural Development*, n.d., p. 101). In the 1940s, the Colonial Office instructed the colonies to produce edible oils, fats, and other commodities to reduce the colonies' reliance on British reserves, which were committed to war. Peters' efforts of growing cashew nuts, to be used in the production of oil, fats, and other products, were in line with the post-World War II British policy of making colonies self-sufficient in food production (Peters, 1960, pp. 35–39; Tembo, 2015, p. 159; Zeleza, 1985).

Following the death of Peters in 1954, his successor, J. A. Allan, continued with the project. Once the trees produced mature nuts, Allan collected and distributed them to village headmen along the edges of the Barotse plain, from Namushakende to Limulunga.⁷ The soil along the edges of the plain, locally called *matongo*, supported the growth of various fruit trees (Barotse Protectorate Development Commissioner, 1955; Barotse Protectorate, n.d., p. 2; Peters, 1950–1951; Trapnell & Clothier, 1996, p. 25). Therefore, cashew trees grew well there, which led to the expansion of tree planting in Mongu district.

To enhance the spread of the cashew crop in Mongu district, different measures were put in place. Before they received the cashew nut seeds, all village headmen who were earmarked to participate in the project attended a short course to prepare these would-be growers for the task which lay before them. The courses were run with the help of the Department of Agriculture, which offered extension services and training to all those involved in growing cashew nuts (Mubita, 1983, p. 7). The strategy enabled the local people to learn about this alien crop. The trainees gained knowledge of planting techniques, general management, and processing the crop. They were also trained on the various uses of cashew tree products, such as the oil, apple, and leaves, which could be used for flavouring the local rice variety as was the custom in Malaysia and India (Samunyina, 2009, p. 27; Zambia Cashew Company, 1986, p. 12). The training exercise was followed by seed distribution by the extension staff.

The strategy of offering training to peasant farmers prior to embarking on the project worked so well that it led to the expansion of cashew tree cultivation. However, this practice was short-lived due to financial constraints, so the local people were denied the much-needed knowledge of cashew nut production.

⁷ Mubita (1983, p. 3). Allan took advantage of the *matongo* soils, found on the edges of the Barotse floodplain, which had successfully supported other fruit trees, such as mango trees, that were grown there earlier.

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Apart from agricultural extension staff and the few trained village headmen and villagers, not many people and organisations knew the economic importance of cashew nuts.⁸ This lack of a local market meant growers' enthusiasm to expand their plantations waned. Those who had not started growing the cashew trees were even more discouraged.

Furthermore, the political turbulence associated with the struggle for independence disrupted most projects in the country, and the cashew nut industry was not spared. Rural agricultural projects that were established before independence were seen by African politicians as a hindrance to the emancipation of the local people (Gould, 1989, pp. 144–145; Ng'andu (1998, pp. 24, 49).⁹ As such, the cashew nut industry did not perform well in its formative years.

In the years immediately after the attainment of independence in 1964, the state of cashew nut production in Mongu district did not improve rapidly because opposition political parties aimed to disrupt government-sponsored projects. One of the opposition political groups was the United Progressive Party (UPP) led by Nalumino Mundia, a member of the local Lozi ethnic group. Robert H. Bates observed that the disgruntled leader of the opposition UPP was one of the nationalists who decided to frustrate government developmental projects in the Western Province (Bates, 1974, p. 35). The UPP discouraged cashew nut growers from continuing with the project as the party leadership alleged that government would dispossess people of the land on which they had planted trees from the free cashew nut seeds obtained from the Department of Agriculture (Leistner, 2005, p. 36). In view of this, the local people were discouraged from actively engaging in cashew nut production, as they feared losing their land in the future.

Furthermore, as an opposition stronghold, Western Province was earmarked for development as a way of winning support from the local people. In its effort to build the nation and lessen rural/urban income disparities, UNIP embarked on ambitious and costly new projects in remote areas, especially in opposition strongholds (Pesa, 2017, p. 297). This led to existing schemes, such as the cashew nut scheme in Mongu and the pineapple scheme in Mwinilunga, not receiving necessary support from the government. Hence, they failed to expand fully and achieve the intended objective of alleviating poverty among the rural people (Pesa, 2017, p. 297).

⁸ Interview of Chabalanga Ng'ambi, District Agricultural Coordinator (Mongu, 12 April 2019).

⁹ The African nationalists saw the introduction of rural projects as one way of distracting Africans from their fight for independence, hence the nationalists opposed the move.

During the one-party state (1972–1991), the government interfered in the running of developmental projects in rural areas. The ruling UNIP constantly interfered with the activities of all government-funded projects. The cashew nut industry was not spared. From 1972 to 1991, the appointment of agricultural camp masters in Mongu was done not on merit but on party inclinations and, as such, some unqualified personnel were appointed.¹⁰ The government used the industry to woo mass support. As such, people without technical knowledge were employed in positions in which they could not perform effectively.

The ruling party wanted to use such rural agricultural projects to gain political mileage. This was evident in speeches by President Kaunda in which he encouraged the party to take full responsibility for rural development initiatives undertaken by his government. In one of his speeches, he pointed out that “all our party leaders, from village to the Central Committee, must now be the torch bearers as we march forward along the long and tortuous road of rural development” (Kaunda, 1974). On another occasion he said, “I cannot end my statement without emphasising once more that our agricultural programmes cannot succeed without the full participation and commitment of the party cadres at all levels” (Kaunda, n.d.-b, p. 8).

Such encouragement was good, but it was abused by implementers at the grassroots level. Instead of these projects serving their intended purpose, they became centres of local political patronage networks (Moore & Vaugan, 1993, p. 137). Such influence partly ignited opposition political parties to destabilise those projects, which were seen as political ventures for the ruling party.

Interference by UNIP members in rural industry development was not restricted to the cashew nut industry. For example, Kawambwa Tea Company and Mununshi Banana Scheme were also negatively affected by the activities of UNIP members, as the formal responsibility for policy making and implementation was invested in the hands of the party’s National Council and Central Committee (Scott, 1980, p. 150). This affected the operations of the schemes negatively as all the decisions were made by UNIP and its cadres.

Owing to such disturbances, the Mongu cashew industry remained without remarkable growth until 1972, when the government put in place measures to develop the industry as a way to uplift the livelihoods of the people of Mongu. To show determination, a survey was carried out by the Department of Agriculture on about 800 cashew trees in Mongu (van Eijnatten & Roos, 1982, p. 1).

¹⁰ Interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC Employee, cashew nut farmer, Kalangu, and chairperson for Cashew Growers Association of Zambia (CGAZ), (Mongu, 12 April 2019); interview of Mukela Nyambe, Malengwa Resident, Mongu, 25 April 2019.

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Furthermore, the Department of Agriculture purchased all the harvested nuts from tree owners. In 1972, a total of 880 kilogrammes of raw nuts were purchased (van Eijnatten & Roos, 1982, p. 1). The purchased nuts were later distributed to various villagers as seed, with the objective of expanding the cashew nut project into a viable industry. In 1973, the Department of Agriculture aimed to have an area of about 2,850 hectares of mature cashew trees to support a viable processing industry (IRDC, 1987, p. 46).

By 1974, the Department of Agriculture had changed from distributing free seeds to selling the seeds. Since some people had understood the importance of cashew nuts from the training by the Department of Agriculture, they bought seeds, which fostered the expansion of their plantations. During the same period, the government imported 14,000 hybrid cashew trees from South America, in its quest to expand the industry (Magande, 2018, pp. 113, 118). Thus, between 1972 and 1975, a total of fifteen thousand cashew trees were planted along the edges of the Barotse floodplains in Mongu district (Austin, 1991, p. 23). So successful was the expansion of the industry that a pilot processing plant was installed by the government, in Mongu in 1976 (Mubita, 1983, p. 6). This had a positive bearing on the cashew nut industry, as growers were assured of a ready market for their produce. In the first year of production, 1,147 kernels were sold to areas around the Line of Rail, especially Lusaka and the Copperbelt.¹¹ Between 1976 and 1981, the Department of Agriculture embarked on a vigorous programme of raising cashew nut seedlings, which were sold to the cashew nut growers around Mongu and in other areas. By 1982, the number of cashew trees in the area had reached about 45,000 (Mubita, 1983, p. 6).

The Cashew Nut Industry Under Zambia Cashew Company Limited, 1985–1997

Having noted the economic potential of cashew nuts for poverty alleviation, Litunga Ilute Yeta IV engaged the government on the topic. In 1984, he implored the permanent secretary for the Western Province, Silumelume Mubukwanu, to find a suitable way to expand the industry in the area.¹² The combined effort of

¹¹ Leistner (2005, p. 32); Mubita (1983). The Line of Rail, Lusaka, and the Copperbelt provided a market for most products from different parts of the country due to the commercial farming and mining activities which took place there that attracted many people from various parts of the country.

¹² Interview of Induna Inyundwana, Barotse Royal Establishment, Mongu 17 April 2019; interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019).

the Barotse Royal Establishment and the government led to the establishment of the Zambia Cashew Company (ZCC) in Mongu in 1985. The company was registered the following year (“West Cashew Industry Oozes Potential”, 2019; Zambia Cashew Company, 1989; Zambia Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 2012). It was established with an authorised share capital of ZK20 million (Duncan, 2002, p. 6). The ZCC was charged with the sole responsibility of commercialising the cashew nut industry by improving its production, processing, and marketing of the kernels and cashew nut shell liquid, both locally and internationally.

The ZCC was a subsidiary of the parastatal Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), which was mandated to manage all government-run industries throughout the country. ZIMCO was charged with building a sound commercial and industrial base in the country, which was vulnerable to upheavals in the world economy (Kaunda, n.d.-a, p. 27). ZIMCO’s aim was to reorganise the country’s economy as a way of strengthening its economic structure and developing resources at the domestic level. In this vein, ZIMCO provided financial and management support to many industries in the country, including the cashew nut industry.

Besides the support from ZIMCO, the ZCC received financial help of ZK2 million from Zambia State Insurance Company Limited and Zambia National Provident Fund, which were also government parastatals.¹³ Additionally, to ensure a broader financial base, three private firms, namely the Commonwealth Development Corporation, British Petroleum Africa, and Landell Mills Associates,¹⁴ invested about three million dollars in the cashew nut project in 1986 (Lima Bank, 1987, p. 16).

To realise its objectives further, the Zambia Cashew Company was given 10,000 hectares of land by the litunga in the Mabumbu area of Mongu district.¹⁵ This land was meant for the establishment of a plantation and a cashew nut processing factory. All this was aimed at benefiting the majority of Mongu residents by creating employment. The litunga wanted his area to be developed economically so that people would benefit economically. Furthermore, he knew that if the industry were to expand, he would also benefit financially.¹⁶ Following

¹³ Samunyina (2009, p. 34); interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019).

¹⁴ Interview of Moses Shimbilibili, Nandusu Cooperative managing director (Mongu, 17 April 2019); interview of Wamundila Mwendabai, cashew nut grower, Malengwa (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

¹⁵ Interview of Induna Inyundwana, Barotse Royal Establishment (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

¹⁶ Interview of Induna Inyundwana, Barotse Royal Establishment (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

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this donation, the ZCC set up a factory in Mongu with a processing capacity of five tonnes of cashew kernels per day. The ZCC also established four large commercial plantations in Mongu, Senanga, Kalabo, and Lukulu. A total of 265,000 trees were planted on those plantations (Ching'ambu, 2019). Furthermore, an out-grower scheme was established as a vehicle to provide agrochemicals, cashew seedlings (rootstock), and extension services to farmers. In Mongu, the ZCC established six cashew nut demonstration plantations, in Namitome, Nalinanga, Malengwa, Kalangu, Mabumbu, and Nambwata (Ching'ambu, 2019).

Demonstrating his desire to see the cashew nut industry expand in Mongu district and empower the locals, the litunga also offered land to individuals who wanted to engage in cashew nut production. It was in this vein that individuals such as Gorebrown Kashumba Kayuwa and Mapani Chabinga jointly managed to acquire over 60 hectares of land in Nambwata area for cashew nut plantations. However, the duo only managed to plant cashew trees on 40 hectares of land between 1985 and 1989, while the remaining 20 hectares were not attended to.¹⁷ The plantation provided employment to the local people of that area.

Graham I. Mann, an expert in cashew nut production, was employed as the manager of the ZCC from its inception. He established cashew nut nurseries on company plantations. Some seedlings were given to the local people who wanted to participate in the industry. Some of the cashew nut seedlings that the ZCC planted at its Mabumbu plantation were taken from the first trees grown at Namushakende.¹⁸ However, these seedlings were later condemned as they were of an unknown variety, borne out of a mixture of varieties. They resulted in low yields of poor quality. This forced Mann to source different varieties of cashew nuts from Senegal, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Malawi—varieties which were more productive. Later, he also brought the Brazilian dwarf variety which adapted very well to the climatic conditions of Mongu district, and produced high yielding nuts of very good quality.¹⁹ When Mann departed in 1992, the district was left with many varieties of cashew trees.

The cashew nut industry registered some remarkable growth at the time it was under ZCC management, and many Mongu residents benefitted economically. However, after a steady growth of the industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a sharp decline which led to a point where the

¹⁷ Interview of Gorebrown Kashumba Kayuwa, cashew nut grower, Nambwata (Mongu, 15 April 2019).

¹⁸ Interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019).

¹⁹ Interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019).

industry almost closed down, but for a few resilient cashew nut farmers. As shown in Appendix 1, the cashew nut industry under the ZCC reached its peak in the year 1991 when 155 metric tonnes of nuts were produced. Thereafter, it started to decline. However, to salvage the industry from total collapse, peasant farmers used their own resources. Their efforts were complemented by the work of private firms such as the Western Cashew Industries (WCI) and the Barotse Cashew Company (BCC).

The Cashew Nut Industry Under Private Firms, 1997–2006

The cashew nut industry was not spared from the privatisation of parastatal entities, which the Movement for Multiparty Democracy government embarked upon in 1991 after ascending to power. The cashew nut industry in Mongu was among the Zambian state-owned industries that were privatised in the Structural Adjustment Programme, which was adopted by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in 1991 with the intention of rescuing the ailing economy. Most government parastatals were privatised, and ZIMCO, which was the overseer and corporate financier of most rural industries countrywide, was not spared. It was abruptly dissolved in 1993, thereby leaving a very big gap in those industries which could not stand on their own (Kakulwa, 2012 p. 86; ZNCDP, 1987, p. 24). The dissolution of ZIMCO meant that all its subsidiaries, such as the ZCC, were left without financial and technical support. This posed a serious challenge to the operations of the cashew nut industry. The ZCC received its shock in 1993 when the government withdrew its financial and technical support in anticipation of a private takeover. In 1995, the company was shortlisted for privatisation (African Development Bank—Zambia, 2015) and was sold to the WCI two years later, by tender, at a cost of ZK100 million (“Cashew Nut Industry Rejuvenation Underway,” 2013; Craig, 1999, p. 216).

When the ZCC was shortlisted for privatisation in 1995, some local people, who had experienced the rise of the cashew nut industry and benefitted from it, could not remain spectators while the industry went into a spiral of decline. By 1996, they had organised themselves and come up with a new entity, the WCI, which took over the remains of the ZCC a year later. The company’s shareholders were local people.²⁰ The WCI aimed to rehabilitate the cashew nut industry, which was falling apart. Being a company with limited resources, the WCI

²⁰ Zambia Cashew Company (1989); interview of Allan Ching’ambu, CGAZ coordinator (Mongu, 17 April 2019); interview of Moses Shimbilimbili, Nandusu Cooperative managing director (Mongu, 17 April 2019); interview of Akushanga Mukelabai, former ZCC employee, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 21 November 2019).

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introduced some reforms in the running of the cashew nut industry. The reforms were aimed at enabling the company to survive the effects of privatisation. One major reform involved a reduction in wages and doing away with other privileges.²¹ In this way, the workers no longer received the working kits and free bags of mealie meal that the ZCC used to provide.

The reforms were received with mixed feelings by the employees, who were used to the favourable ZCC conditions. They boycotted the move and devised coping strategies which enabled them to hedge themselves against hunger. They abandoned company employment. Some engaged in different economic activities such as fishing, and farming of other food crops with quick returns, such as maize, sweet potatoes, and cassava.²² Others resorted to stealing raw cashew nuts, which they sold to private traders so as to meet their daily needs (Mubita, 1983, p. 16). The situation led the WCI to operate ineffectively as it was exposed to rampant theft and reduced labour. The coffee estates in Northern Province experienced a similar situation following the removal of mealie meal subsidies, as work stoppages by employees became frequent. Suffice to mention that those who remained as employees of the WCI and some cashew nut growers who continued to supply the company with raw nuts were still able to sustain their livelihoods in the cashew nut industry.

After struggling to sustain the cashew nut industry on their own, local people hoped for the revival of the industry after the ascendancy of Levy Mwanawasa to presidency in 2001. From 2003 onwards, the Mwanawasa-led government showed keen interest in reviving the cashew nut industry. This enthusiasm was prompted by presidential visits in 2003 to the cashew-growing countries of Tanzania and Mozambique, because both countries had amassed immense benefits from exports of cashew crops.²³ Cashew nut exports had in 2003 contributed about US\$50 million and US\$70 million to the economies of Tanzania and Mozambique, respectively (Duncan, 2002, p. 86). Such benefits showed the Zambian government that the industry was beneficial not only to individual farmers but also to the country as a whole.

²¹ Interview of Akushanga Mukelabai, former ZCC employee, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 21 November 2019); see also Samunyina (2009, p. 40).

²² Interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019); interview of Akushanga Mukelabai, former ZCC employee, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 21 November 2019).

²³ Tanzania, (1973, p. 2); "Cashew Nut Stand-off in Tanzania" (2018); interview of Sixto Komba and Bashim A. Nanyanda, technicians, Export Trading Group from Tanzania (Mongu, 11 April 2019). The duo were cashew nut specialists from Tanzania engaged by the Zambian government through the Cashew Infrastructure Development Project to help in reviving the industry in Western Province.

Learning this, the government focussed greater attention on the agricultural sector than before. Through the Fifth National Development Plan (2006–2010), the government planned to achieve strong economic growth as a major prerequisite for poverty reduction (Zambia, 2006, p. 1). Agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, and mining were expected to contribute to national economic growth. To achieve this growth, the government put emphasis on increased productivity, value addition, and increased competitiveness in local, regional and international markets. The cashew nut industry benefitted from this initiative. A Cashew Nut Committee was created in October 2006 and was headed by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Revival of the Cashew Nut Industry, 2006–2011

To revive the cashew nut industry, the Cashew Nut Committee recommended, among other things, the creation of a cashew nut development trust to oversee the whole process. Further, the committee recommended that the trust should adequately be funded and supported, materially and otherwise, by the government as well as by private firms operating in the Western Province. Private firms in the province were expected to participate and acquire a sense of ownership of the cashew nut industry. As a result of these recommendations, a consortium of three organisations emerged to spearhead the project. These were the Lyambai Agricultural Development Trust, the Cashew Growers Association of Zambia (CGAZ), and the already existing WCI (Samunyina, 2009, p. 43).

Upon formation, the consortium held a cashew nut strategic workshop in Mongu in 2006. After the workshop, the consortium received financial support from the government through the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and its cooperating partners, especially the Netherlands Development Organization. A sum of ZK28 million was received from the Netherlands Development Organisation, and the government contributed ZK12 million.²⁴ The consortium also acquired a ZK500 thousand loan from the Citizen Economic Empowerment Commission in 2007.²⁵ Some of this money was used to complete the purchasing of ZCC assets from the Zambia Development Agency. In 2008, the government further gave the CGAZ a grant of ZK100 million for importation of cashew tree

²⁴ Samunyina (2009, p. 45); interview of Moses Shimbilibili, Nandusu Cooperative managing director (Mongu, 17 April 2019); interview of Allan Ching'ambu, CGAZ coordinator (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

²⁵ Interview of Moses Shimbilibili, Nandusu Cooperative managing director (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

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seedlings from Mozambique (“Cashew Nut Industry Rejuvenation Underway”, 2013). Part of these funds enabled the consortium to embark on an aggressive cashew-tree planting programme that saw over 20,000 seedlings distributed to small-scale farmers. The consortium distributed the early maturing and high yielding cashew tree varieties, such as the Brazilian dwarf, which the consortium imported.²⁶

Further, the consortium signed an agreement with a renowned crop seed supplier, Crop Serve Company, to supply cashew nut sprayers and chemicals, as well as to offer training to farmers. This company had provided similar undertakings in Tanzania and Mozambique (Samunyina, 2009). The consortium also bought a motorised sprayer for cashew nuts from these funds. Using this sprayer, cashew trees began to be sprayed on a communal basis at a small fee. A ten-tonne truck and tractor were also purchased to facilitate transportation of cashew nuts.

In addition, some of the money was used to improve the factory facility in Mongu. To improve the flow of information, which was cardinal in the success of the industry, the consortium established a central information centre at the Mongu factory. The centre was aimed at facilitating easy access to information, new technology, and market trends at the international level.²⁷ The centre was improved, and a warehouse was built which could store over 50 tonnes of raw nuts annually. Additionally, the consortium embarked on repairing and reviving the only processing plant based at Mongu. This resulted in a complete facelift for the facility by November 2008, as seen in Figure 2.

To enhance effectiveness and improve productivity, the consortium also sponsored three personnel for a study tour to Tanzania in 2007. The tour gave the participants renewed energy to revive the cashew nut industry. Brenda Mwanamwalye, one of the tour participants, used the knowledge she gained from that tour to start and grow her own cashew nut business. She said that the tour was beneficial and it helped in the growth of her cashew nut business (“Brenda Revives Cashew Nut Growing,” 2018).

As the cashew nut industry’s revival process continued due to the efforts of the consortium, a private firm, the BCC, was established in Mongu in 2008 and became fully operational the following year. This company aimed to empower local people by buying their raw cashew nuts which could not be bought by the WCI due to inadequate capital.²⁸ As such, the BCC saw a business opportunity,

²⁶ Interview of Allan Ching’ambu, CGAZ coordinator (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

²⁷ Interview of Moses Shimbilibili, Nandusu Cooperative managing director (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

²⁸ Interview of Austin Madhveko, BCC managing director (Mongu, 22 April 2019).

and extended its operations to other districts such as Kalabo, Lukulu, and Senanga, where cashew nut production would have stopped after the privatisation of the cashew nut industry in 1997, had it not been for a few resilient farmers who continued taking care of their trees and hence continued to benefit economically.

Figure 2

The Cashew Nut Factory Building and Warehouse at Mongu



Note. Picture taken by author on 18 November 2019.

To effectively benefit from the cashew nut industry, the BCC resorted to offering extension services to cashew tree growers. Its emphasis was on the need to produce quality nuts.²⁹ The BCC's main objective was to maximise profits, which could only be possible when the product was of good quality. According to Sixto Komba and Bashim A. Nanyanda, technical knowledge in the cashew nut industry was very important as it resulted in the production of quality nuts which could fetch higher prices on the international market.³⁰

The determined, resilient cashew nut farmers continued to produce for the available market, and this provided them with an income that they used to fend for their families. With the help of the consortium, they decided to engage with the government. By 2011, the government had heard the appeals of these resilient cashew nut farmers and the consortium. This renewed the government's enthusiasm to revive the cashew nut industry.

²⁹ Interview of Austin Madhuveko, BCC managing director (Mongu, 22 April 2019).

³⁰ Interview of Sixto Komba, and Bashim A. Nanyanda, technicians, Export Trading Group from Tanzania (Mongu, 11 April 2019).

Impact of the Cashew Nut Industry on Mongu district

Although the cashew nut industry experienced numerous challenges, it did have noticeable positive effects which brought economic development to Mongu district. The industry created employment, so local people earned an income, which led to increased money in circulation in the district.³¹ Furthermore, employees in the cashew nut industry gained production and processing skills, which were beneficial to them even after they left formal employment. Additionally, women's involvement in the industry led to women being financially empowered and equipped with various skills.³² Due to increased money in circulation in the district, local peasants attained improved food security as they were able to spend part of their earnings on food. Table 1 shows the incomes accrued to the local people through their cashew nut sales to the ZCC.

Table 1

Incomes Acquired from Cashew Nut Sales to the ZCC, 1985–1992

Year	Raw nuts purchased (tonnes)	Income accrued (ZK)
1985/1986	2	2,000
1986/1987	18	36,000
1987/1988	21	84,000
1988/1989	30	240,000
1989/1990	31	465,000
1990/1991	60	1,500,000
1991/1992	155	6,200,000

Note. Compiled from *Cashew Nut Cultivation Manual* by Zambia Cashew Company, no date, unpublished, p. 20.

Incomes from the industry were used by local people to build houses, and sponsor their families' education and medical expenses, while some reinvested the money in other businesses, such as grocery stores. Most local people were

³¹ Interview of Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019); interview of Moses Shimbilimbili, Nandusu Cooperative managing director (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

³² Interview of Akushanga Mukelabai, former ZCC employee, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 21 November 2019); interview of Masiye Mulele, cashew nut grower, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 15 April 2019).

able to meet their daily needs using such income.³³ Furthermore, the country also benefitted from the cashew nut industry through foreign exchange, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Zambian Foreign Exchange Earnings from the Cashew Nut Industry, 1989–2001

Year	Trees planted	Raw nut production (tonnes)	Foreign exchange earnings (US\$)
1989/90	712,331	45	100,000
1991/92	820,000	164	505,000
1993/94	1,009,000	2,005	1,999,000
1995/96	1,200,000	5,000	6,250,000
1998		3,000	1,682
2000		4,000	285
2001		850	5,742,239

Note. Compiled from the wall of the Zambia Cashew Company factory building; Ministerial Statement to Parliament, (22 November, 2016); and the Zambian Central Statistics Office, *Cashew Nut Exports for Western Province, 1998–2001*, (email to author, 30 September 2019).

Conclusion

The cashew nut industry produced great economic benefits for the local people of Mongu district. Remarkable growth in the cashew nut industry was experienced from 1985 to the early 1990s because the industry was managed by the ZCC, which received financial and technical support from the government. Additionally, the cashew nut specialist Graham I. Mann managed the industry. In view of this, the industry expanded during that period, with a production of 155 metric tonnes of raw nuts. This led to the industry exporting some of the produce on the international market to Namibia, South Africa and Ireland. As a country, Zambia was thus able to earn the much sought-after foreign exchange. Steady growth in production was still seen even during the time the industry was under private companies. In 2001, production stood at 850 metric tonnes with foreign

³³ Interview of Masiye Mulele, cashew nut grower, and smallholder cashew nut processor (Mongu, 15 April 2019); interview of Kopano Maswenyeho, Namatuta village headman, former ZCC employee, CGAZ Chairperson, and cashew nut grower, Kalangu (Mongu, 12 April 2019); interview of Induna Inyundwana, Barotse Royal Establishment (Mongu, 17 April 2019).

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exchange earnings of about US\$ 5,742,239. This shows that the local people still continued to benefit from the cashew nut industry.

Furthermore, despite challenges, the cashew nut industry continued to thrive as the WCI and private buyers continued operating. They were supplied with raw nuts by local people who resiliently continued in the venture because it had become a major source of their livelihood income. The income acquired from the industry helped them to provide for the household, educational, and medical needs of their families.

Additionally, beginning from 2003, the government's efforts to revive the cashew nut industry were evident as they were later embraced in the Fifth National Development Plan, 2006–2010, which aimed to achieve strong economic growth through viable industries such as agriculture. In view of this, the development plan emphasised support of all agricultural-based sectors, and the cashew nut industry was no exception. By 2007, the government, working with the Lyambai Agricultural Development Trust, the CGAZ, and the WCI, had made a significant contribution to reviving the cashew nut industry. Funding from the government and its cooperating partner, the Netherlands Development Organisation, helped to revive the cashew nut industry.

The BCC engaging in the industry from 2008 was another milestone. Starting its operations in 2009, the company contributed to sustaining the cashew nut industry as the local people were provided with a wider market for their raw nuts. The company also contributed to improving the living standards of local people by providing employment. To achieve its objective of profit maximisation through quality production, the BCC provided extension and technical support to peasant farmers. Also, the perseverance of the local people, the CGAZ's efforts, and the contribution of private companies won the government's interest in reviving the cashew nut industry. By 2011 the government reached a turning point and showed great zeal for reviving the cashew nut industry.

Finally, despite the various challenges faced by the industry, it still contributed positively to the development of Mongu district. Through provision of employment, promotion of local trade, financial empowerment of women, teaching of skills, and improvement of food security, the industry benefitted Mongu district socially and economically. The development of the cashew nut industry was ultimately successful, and this suggests that agricultural schemes, when well-managed, are an appropriate panacea for rural underdevelopment. Therefore, state-led agricultural schemes, such as the cashew nut industry in Mongu, are an important way to foster rural development, and should be adopted by all well-meaning governments.

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
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Appendix

Annual Cashew Nut Production under ZCC



Note. Adapted from *Cashew Nut Cultivation Manual* by Zambia Cashew Company, no date, unpublished; *Cashew Growers Association of Zambia (CGAZ): Cashew cooperative movement* by A. Ching'ambu, paper presented at the Inaugural Annual Cashew Conference, Mongu Trades Training Institute, Zambia on 19 January 2019, p. 3; and "West Cashew Industry Oozes Potential" in *Zambia Daily Mail*, 6 March 2019.

“Blood and Fire” in Chikankata: An Idiosyncratic Approach to Religious Conversion by the Salvation Army in Colonial Zambia, 1945–1964

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This article examines distinctive strategies used by the Salvation Army to convert Africans to Christianity in the Chikankata district of Zambia. Using data from both primary and secondary sources, the article argues that the Salvation Army largely relied on African agents and the use of open-air meetings, march pasts, uniform wearing, and brass bands as methods of evangelism. This stands in contrast to academic lenses that have viewed and endorsed missionary education and healthcare provision as principal methods of evangelism in colonial central Africa.

Keywords: Salvation Army, Chikankata, evangelism, education, healthcare, religious conversion, Christianity

Introduction

This article examines the unique strategies used by the Salvation Army to convert Africans to Christianity in the Chikankata district of Zambia.¹ This was at a time when various missionary groups heavily depended on education and medical care as levers for converting Africans to Christianity in colonial Zambia. The article augments our historiographical understanding of the distinctive methods of conversion used by the Salvation Army to win Africans to Christianity—a departure from the heavy reliance on education and medicine practised by various missions. It is also premised on the advice that

¹ The Salvation Army was founded in 1865 by William Booth and his wife, Catherine. The mission entered Northern Rhodesia in 1922. Its first mission was at Ibbwe Munyama in the Gwembe Valley but was later relocated to Chikankata in 1945. With its motto, “Blood and Fire”, the Salvation Army won African converts using its unique strategies.

"the study of mission must ... take careful account of the historical specificity of each mission, including the beliefs, practices and strategies of the missionaries" (Spear, 1999, p. 5). Thus, the idiosyncratic approach to African conversion by the Salvation Army was shaped by its history, period of entry into colonial Zambia, as well as its practices and beliefs. Using data from both primary and secondary sources, the article demonstrates that Africans themselves were active agents in spreading Christianity in Chikankata. This strategy was coupled with the use of open-air revival meetings and its attendant attractions, such as march pasts, brass bands, timbrel displays, and uniform wearing. This is contrary to academic lenses that glorify missionary education and medical therapy as having been the cornerstones of African conversion to Christianity (Carmody, 1988, 1999, 2013; Naali, 2003; Tiberondwa, 1978; and Landau, 1996).

The historiography of missionary enterprises in central Africa includes studies of religious conversion. One of the insightful studies is Robin Horton's theory on African conversion. Horton (1971) postulated that traditional African cosmology included two tiers, that is, the microcosm and the macrocosm. The microcosm included cults, rituals, and beliefs that were endemic to local villages and focused on the spirits understood to control the local environment. The macrocosm, on the other hand, included "the wider society where a supernatural being as opposed to local spirits had overarching powers" (Horton, 1971, p. 95). African conversion was, therefore, a consequence of major social changes where the world views of people were expanded. To Horton, the shift in traditional lenses and acceptance of the domination of the supreme being by Africans was a consequence of factors of modernity, such as nationhood and mass development of commerce. Horton further argued that the rapid acceleration rate of African conversion in the twentieth century was largely the result of the growth of modernity linked to the development of the mission school (Horton, 1971; see also Baur, 1994; Carmody, 2013, 2018; Hastings, 1994). Although Horton's theory has come under severe criticism (Fisher, 1973), a spectrum of scholarly voices have supported the view that missionary schools were agents of modernity that greatly aided African conversion—a discourse that this article dispels.

Like Horton, who believed in education for social change, scholars such as Fay Gadsden, Edward Berman, Michael Gelfand, Brendan Carmody, Nathan Nunn, and Paul Landau have noted in separate accounts that education and medical therapies were the major methods through which missionary groups won African converts (Berman, 1974; Carmody, 1999; Gadsden, 1992; Gelfand, 1973). For example, Carmody observed that schools during the colonial period undoubtedly were a source of new members for the Catholic Church at Chikuni,

as new members were mainly school converts. However, their conversion to Christianity was not because of the religious message but because of the mission's ability to launch members into modern sectors of the economy (Carmody, 1988).

Carmody's view has been echoed by Fay Gadsden, who noted that "mission schools were intended to, and indeed did, provide the major source of converts to Christianity" (Gadsden, 1992, p. 108). In another study, Gadsden observed that, in the colonial period, education was considered a major tool of evangelism (Gadsden, 1994). Such a view has also been advanced by Richard Lupiya Banda who investigated the educational policy and activities of the Dutch Reformed Church Mission in Zambia from 1899 to 1976. He argued that the primary objective of the mission's educational work, to which the demands of secular education took a second place, was to convert people to Christianity (Banda, 1981).

Similarly, Nunn (2010) observed that one of the initial strategies of conversion used by missionaries was simply exposing Africans to the word of God by providing access to the Bible. However, it soon became apparent that this strategy was ineffective. Missionaries realised that Africans were most successfully converted when conversion came with benefits, most notably, Western education, but also healthcare and other forms of training. According to Nunn, these benefits, rather than the word of God alone, "were the most effective means of conversion" (Nunn, 2010, p. 152).

Furthermore, some studies have demonstrated that the "Gospel of the syringe", as coined by Kalusa (2007, p. 78), was one of the foremost means used by various missionary groups to win converts. Gelfand (1973), for example, observed that the care of the sick was in most cases one of the most popular methods by which missionaries brought Africans under their influence. Similarly, Paul Landau noted that the therapeutic practices of the London Missionary Society missionaries among the Tswana immensely helped to convert Africans to Christianity. He observed that between 400 and 500 patients were treated on a monthly basis by Rev. Lewis—many of them were converted to the Christian faith (Landau, 1996, p. 267).

Authoritatively expounding on the Salvation Army in Zambia, Beverley McInnes explored the history of Chikankata Mission from 1945 to 1997 with an emphasis on church growth and the development of educational and medical services (McInnes, 1997). Her work proved pertinent to this article as it provided useful insights into the evangelical work of the Salvation Army in the region. However, McInnes did not document the strategies the mission used to win converts in Chikankata. In addition, her work was silent on African agents who helped to extend the Salvation Army in Chikankata and its periphery. This

omission denied Africans their own history. Finally, her work was methodologically weak as it lacked adequate archival sources to provide a thorough account of the mission's work in Chikankata.

While this article appreciates the thesis advanced by the proponents of missionary schools and medical institutions as salient conversion strategies, it overtly demonstrates that not all missionary groups in colonial Zambia were wholly dependent on education and medical care as a means to conversion. It postulates that later missionary groups that entered Northern Rhodesia in the 1920s, such as the Salvation Army, were less reliant on schools and hospitals as proselytisation arenas. This was due to increased government control over education at the time of their entry into Northern Rhodesia. As such, missionary groups such as the Salvation Army used unique strategies for converting Africans to Christianity in ways that reflected the Salvation Army's historical background and inspiration.

The Role of African Agents

The years between 1945 and 1964 were a period of growth for the Salvation Army in Chikankata. McInnes (1997, p. 35) reported that, by the 1950s, "the mission had close to 40 centres in Chikankata district and the surrounding areas". The growth in the number of centres was a result of the methods devised by the mission to win converts to Christianity. From the early days of the Salvation Army in colonial Zambia, African agents such as Gunduza Tembo, Matthew Mbiri, Paul Shumba, and Matthew Kunzwi Shava were instrumental in spreading the evangelical work of the Salvation Army long before schools and medical institutions were established.

In Chikankata, too, African agents played a significant role in both the opening and the running of Salvation Army centres. For instance, informant Jairos Magaya recalled that Hezekiah Habanyama, a former migrant worker at the Urungwe mica mines in Southern Rhodesia, carried out vigorous evangelical work for the Salvation Army in the Gwembe valley. This led to the establishment of a number of outposts including the one at Matula, in the mid-1940s. Habanyama also helped to reorganise the Moonga centre in the valley; this saw it attaining the status of a corps.² Hezekiah Habanyama contributed

² Jairos Magaya was an eye witness to the establishment of Chikankata Mission in 1945. A corps is a group of Salvation Army soldiers numbering 50 and above, worshipping together at a particular centre.

not only to the growth of religious work in the Gwembe valley but also to the development of girl education there.³

The same can be said about Andrew Handila who fell under the influence of the Salvation Army while working in Southern Rhodesia as a labour migrant. Upon returning in the 1940s to Malala, his home village in Mwenda chiefdom, Handila helped to develop a local corps there. As a soldier of the Salvation Army, he was opposed to the practice of beer drinking, which was rampant at that time in Malala village. He achieved little in this regard, but his influence was markedly visible among his close relations. Isaac Chikandi⁴ reminisced:

I knew Andrew Handila personally. We used to admire his vigour for the things of God. He was an influential soldier in his home village of Malala and was among the founders of the Salvation Army there. His influence was evident even among his family members such that one of his sons, John Handila, ended up becoming an officer in the Salvation Army. (2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza])

The development of Malala Corps under Handila and other African agents led to the opening of subsidiary centres by the end of the 1940s and early 1950s at Syakantu, Nameembo, Ngangula, Shapwaya, Nkaba, Simwaba, and Hamwimbu.

Other African agents who had considerable influence among their families and communities were Johan Jairos Chilala and Japhet Magaya. Chilala attended the school at Ibbwe Munyama shortly before its relocation to Chikankata in June 1945. In early 1945, Chilala went back to Hampande village, where he converted not only his entire family but neighbours as well. Chilala's congregation was a forerunner to what would become Cifwankala Corps. Chikandi observed:

It was my brother, Johan Chilala who introduced the Salvation Army in Hampande village after attending school at Ibbwe Munyama. Every Sunday, we sat under a tree, beating the drum and singing, "*Enda kusalala kwa Leza*" [Walk in the light of God]. Within a few weeks, the number grew to about 30. When Major Philip Rive and his party came to Chikankata in June 1945, it was our congregation that welcomed them with drumming, songs and dances. That was how we moved our centre to the

³ Jairos C. Magaya, 2019, March 24, *The evangelical work of the Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Moonga Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

⁴ Chikandi was among those who welcomed Major Philip Rive and his party from Ibbwe Munyama in June 1945 and witnessed the establishment of Chikankata Mission. He later worked as a cook at the Mission.

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mission. Since then, I have never departed from the Salvation Army. (2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza])

Like Chilala, Japhet Magaya was influential in introducing some Africans in Moonga village to the Salvation Army in the mid-1940s. The members were added to the centre that was established at the mission.

Another African agent who contributed significantly to the development of Salvation Army centres was Shadreck Cheenda, a trained officer at the Howard Officers’ Training College in Southern Rhodesia. Cheenda pioneered the opening of a centre at Namaila in Chief Sianjalika’s area in 1943 (Magande, 2018). Towards the end of the 1940s, Cheenda helped to establish three other centres, at Munjile, Mainza, and Cilengo, in Chief Sianjalika’s area. In the early 1950s, he helped develop centres in Mwanza chieftom, where he had an illustrious career. His evangelical work led to the revitalisation of Mwanza Corps after a period of evangelical work being stalled there due to apathy in the local people. He also served in other centres such as Syanyoolo, Chikani, and Simwaba, and finally Malala, where he retired from active service in 1962.⁵ Thus, African agents were key in furthering the work of the Salvation Army in Chikankata. McInnes (1997, p. 143) noted that “much of the work in new centres and outposts is owed to local officers who despite inadequate training could lead worship and witness.”

Open-air Meetings and March Pasts

Undoubtedly, open-air meetings and march pasts were the anchor strategies of conversion practised by the Salvation Army world over. In the East End of London, William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, enlisted a following by holding revival meetings in open air and in rented rooms (Eason, 2009).⁶ From the early years of the Salvation Army in Europe and the Americas, mounted leaders, flying banners, and disciplined battalions filled city streets with the sights and sounds of a conquering army. Salvationists first marched and then preached, invoking what they called “the cathedral of the open-air”

⁵ Joster Cheenda, 2019, July 28, *The life of Shadreck Cheenda* [Interview, Kafue Town, with A. Mwanza].

⁶ March pasts or parades were also called marches of witness. They involved soldiers marching in designated files imitating a military brigade. On the sidelines were usually Sergeant Majors (elders of a local congregation) commanding the soldiers and giving orders as they marched.

(Winston, 1999, p. 40). Since then, open-air meetings became one of the principal means of winning converts to the Salvation Army.

In Chikankata, too, the Salvation Army relied heavily on march pasts and open-air meetings to win converts. Unlike education, which targeted young people for conversion, march pasts and open-air meetings cut across age groups. While Catholics had given up on the older generations as being stiff-necked and difficult to convert (Carmody, 1988), the Salvation Army appealed to them through military processions and open-air meetings as shown in Appendix 1. Chikandi and Bexter Magaya both recalled that, in the early years of the Salvation Army in Chikankata, march pasts and open-air meetings were key to the proselytisation of Africans.⁷ The meetings were held during weekdays as well as on Sundays. Salvation Army officers, teachers, and soldiers of local assemblies conducted weekly village meetings at strategic points, such as waterholes and markets. Once people had been charmed by the marching soldiers, the gospel was preached and converts were won.⁸

Marches and open-air revivals were also a common feature on Sundays. Soldiers clad in cream-white uniforms could march to a designated place where the Gospel was preached. Those who got attracted were encouraged to accompany the marching soldiers to the hall for the salvation meeting (see Appendix 2). Precious Habeenzu narrated how she was converted to the Salvation Army through this method in about 1963:

One Sunday morning as I was coming from visiting a bereaved friend near Malabo, I met a group of Salvation Army soldiers marching, drumming and singing joyfully. They were singing, “*Ilaenda, Ilaenda, Nkondo Ya Lufutuko Ilaenda, Ba Lwani ba Jesu kamuyuma, Nkondo Ya Lufuko Ilaenda*” [It is marching on, marching on, the Salvation Army is on the move, Soldiers of Jesus, be strong, the Salvation Army is marching on]. I got attracted and joined the marching soldiers. That was how I got converted. (2019, July 24, *The Salvation Army and African conversion* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza])

It was under such circumstances that Africans in Chikankata were converted to Christianity and became members of the Salvation Army.

⁷ Isaac Chikandi, 2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza]; Bexter Magaya, 2019, March 24, *Salvation Army's conversion strategies* [Interview, Chikankata Village, with A. Mwanza].

⁸ Isaac Chikandi, 2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

Drum, Brass Band, and Timbrel Display

Drum or brass bands were as favoured as the marches of witness and open-air meetings. During the initial establishment of the Salvation Army in Chikankata, brass bands were non-existent. The drum was, therefore, used to send a message of invitation to prospective converts. Chikandi reminisced how two African Salvationists, Captain Kunzwi Shava and another only remembered as teacher Ngoma, beat the drum much to the delight of potential converts:

Captain Shava and Ngoma did a lot to see to it that the Salvation Army succeeded in this area. He could organise open-air meetings during weekdays. With a drum hang around his shoulders and beating it with all his mighty, many people found themselves attending his meetings. Thereafter, he could preach, entreating the people to abandon ancestral worship and become Christians. (2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza])

Africans became attracted to the drum as it tended to blend aspects of African culture with Christianity. The use of the drum was not unique to Chikankata, however, as this strategy was also widely utilised in Western Kenya and colonial Ghana (Sundkler & Seed, 2000; Boapeah, 2010).

In the 1950s and 1960s, march pasts and open-air meetings in Chikankata were enhanced by brass bands. The instruments were donated by friends of Chikankata Mission in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The use of the brass band in the Salvation Army dates back to the 1870s when Charles William Fry, a leading member of the Salvation Army in London, along with his three sons, Fred, Ernest, and Bert, introduced the use of trumpets within the movement. It was then that the Salvation Army marches began to make a significant visual and audible impact, with the flag at the front of the procession followed by officers (Blyth, 2015). This practice in Chikankata is illustrated in Appendix 2.

Brass bands, therefore, became an important point of attraction during march pasts and open air-meetings in Chikankata. Soldiers marched behind the band singing along with bandsmen, to the delight of onlookers. Informant Jairos Magaya recalled that:

The coming of the brass band in the 1950s added vitality to our marches of witness in that they were able to pull large crowds than was the case before. With the band leading the procession and marchers singing along, we produced an irresistible spectacle of musicians which attracted others to join us. (2019, March 24, *The evangelical work of the Salvation Army in*

Chikankata [Interview, Moonga Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza]

The popularity of the brass music helped to convince onlookers to join the ranks of the Salvation Army. In Chikankata, brass music attracted students and community members alike. Tapson Malingapatsi narrated that “I joined the Salvation in 1954 because of the band of which I am still a member today” (2019, July 10, *Evangelism through music* [Interview, Ndeke Village, Kitwe, with A. Mwanza]).

However, an African becoming a member of a brass ensemble was not limited to the objective of the mission. To the Africans, membership of the brass band met various personal aims that were not necessarily attached to spiritual life.

Firstly, the band brigade was elitist in the eyes of both church and community members. The band led the congregation during open-air meetings and corporate worship through songs. It also had a special place close to the pulpit in the church, overtly labelled “Bandsmen”. In addition, the brigade had a special and attractive uniform. This made bandsmen distinct from the soldiers and officers.⁹ As a result, bandsmen enjoyed a certain social status above that of ordinary soldiers. Malingapatsi recalled that “being a member of the brass band gave me a feeling of being unique among my peers. ... I was able to get even the attention of girls in the church” (2019, July 10, *Evangelism through music* [Interview, Ndeke Village, Kitwe, with A. Mwanza]). This demonstrates that membership to the brass band reinforced one’s social standing.

Secondly, brass-band members toured and adventured in far-flung areas. Whenever the mission opened new centres, the band was there to help lead march pasts and open-air revivals.¹⁰ Perhaps what was attractive to bandsmen during such outdoor activities was the hospitality they received. Realising that man could not live on the word of God alone, bandsmen relished the time of sharing food. It was a moment of replenishing the energy lost during the long marches and continuous blowing of trumpets. A tour devoid of food was deemed unsuccessful by band members regardless of the number of converts the campaign yielded. Major Bexter Magaya, a retired officer of the Salvation

⁹ Isaac Chikandi, 2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza]; Jairos C. Magaya, 2019, March 24, *The evangelical work of the Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Moonga Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

¹⁰ Isaac Chikandi, 2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

Army, observed that food was an indispensable component of campaigns with bandsmen.¹¹ Similarly, Malingapatsi commented:

One good thing about being a member of the band was that it gave us an opportunity to travel extensively. I personally enjoyed the hospitality we received during our tours. Food was usually plenty to help us replenish the lost energy. It was an attraction that made others to join the band. (2019, July 10, *Evangelism through music* [Interview, Ndeke Village, Kitwe, with A. Mwanza])

It can thus be argued that Africans joined band ensembles not only to meet the objectives of the church but also for social and physical gain.

Brass bands blended well with timbrel brigade displays. These were initially the preserve of girls and women. Junior and senior timbrel brigades accompanying brass bands formed a spectacular army of musicians. Time was given to the timbrel brigade to play tambourines in a coordinated, systematic and patterned way, much to the excitement of spectators. Thus, girls and women were attracted to join the Salvation Army in order to become members of the timbrel brigades. Delite Mweemba said, “I was attracted to join the Salvation Army in 1962 because of the hilarious display of timbrels by the Women’s Brigade” (2019, March 25, *Impact of the Salvation Army on Chikankata* [Interview, Hayingwa Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza]). Timbrel brigades also played the key role of elevating the church atmosphere during services. Each time timbrels were played, church members were left in high spirits.

Uniform Wearing

Another source of attraction to the Salvation Army was uniform wearing by its members. The wearing of the uniform was initiated in 1878 by an early English Salvation Army pioneer, Elijah Cadman, who declared that “I would like to wear a suite of clothes that would let everyone know I mean war to the teeth and salvation for the world” (Boon, 1966, p. 175). Thus, by 1890 a standard uniform of a blue tunic with black braid and red trimmings was adopted in England (Blyth, 2015). The love for the military in Victorian England influenced the pattern of the uniform. However, although the style of dress reflected the militarism of the late nineteenth century, it had a much deeper significance for those within the movement. The uniform was not only a popular means of

¹¹ Bexter Magaya, 2019, March 24, *Salvation Army’s conversion strategies* [Interview, Chikankata Village, with A. Mwanza].

attracting attention but also a crucial symbol of Salvationists' separation from the world. To Booth, "it was a security against the snares and influences of fashion" (Blyth, 2015, p. 32).

In Zambia in the 1920s, the Salvation Army adopted a cream-white tunic with blue trimmings for soldiers. The uniform was characterised by the "S" insignia for "Salvation" and signified "Saved to Serve". The choice of the colour of the uniform was influenced by the weather pattern in Zambia. Applying science, it was believed that the cream-white colour would help reflect heat, especially in summer when temperatures were quite high (see Appendices 1 and 2). However, uniform wearing was a preserve for officers and soldiers. Bexter Magaya observed that "any willing adherents aged 15 years and above could enrol in the recruit classes and eventually be sworn in as senior soldiers."¹² March pasts and open-air revival meetings were made attractive by soldiers in uniforms. Chikandi commented that:

Uniform wearing has been one of our strengths as a church. You may want to know that we were the first church in Zambia to begin wearing uniforms. I remember teaching five recruits in 1963 that joined the church because they were attracted by the beauty of our uniform. Several other people joined *Inkondo Ya Lufutuko* [The Salvation Army] because of the uniform. (2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza])

Africans had their own reasons for wearing the uniform. Their reasons transcended the spiritual connotation. To many African converts, the uniform provided the latest trend in fashion, especially at a time when cloth was still highly coveted. The uniform made them appear to be of a higher class than their kindred. Since the only way to uniform wearing was to join the Salvation Army, Africans were trapped into becoming Salvationists. Jairos Magaya observed that "during the colonial period when cloth was not as abundant as it is today, uniform wearing came with a special status in the community".¹³ Thus, uniform wearing became a coveted means to social mobility in the community.

Furthermore, uniform wearing raised the status of Salvation Army soldiers to the level of African policemen, soldiers of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment, messengers, and district cadets. Oftentimes, community members addressed uniformed Salvationists as *basilumamba* (soldiers) or *basilikali* (police). This was partly influenced by their love for the military which sometimes passed

¹² Bexter Magaya, 2019, March 24, *Salvation Army's conversion strategies* [Interview, Chikankata Village, with A. Mwanza].

¹³ Jairos C. Magaya, 2019, March 24, *The evangelical work of the Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Moonga Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

through Chikankata while on training. In 1956, for example, the Mazabuka District Commissioner notified Chiefs Mwenda and Naluama about the presence of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment that was marching through the two chiefdoms as part of its training (Mazabuka District Commissioner, 1956).

Africans, therefore, wore uniforms to create the imagery of the military and to attain a certain social standing in society. A full tunic made African converts stand out even among messengers and African authority police, whose uniforms were arguably inferior to those of the Salvation Army. Although uniform wearing as a conversion strategy was not common in colonial Zambia, it was nonetheless practised by *Manyano* (prayer group) women in some churches in South Africa, not only as a symbol of corporate identification but also as a proclamation of spiritual allegiance and marital respectability, and as a reward for upright living (Haddad, 2016; Brandel-Syrier, 1962). As a result, more women, notably within the Anglican churches, were tempted to join the prayer groups, with the uniform being the major source of attraction.

Indigenisation and Popular Culture

One of the strengths of the Salvation Army was its ability to adapt and localise the church in the different parts of the world. The Booths drew inspiration from a transatlantic revivalism that encouraged the use of adaptive measures. It was this principle that helped them to embrace and endorse many features of African life, such as popular tunes, food, shelter, and polygamy (Eason, 2009). However, while the Salvation Army was ready to compromise on and bargain over some aspects of African tradition, it took a strong stance against others, particularly beer drinking.

In Chikankata, the Salvation Army embraced some of the traditional aspects that had been part of the Africans' belief and value systems. For instance, the church accepted polygamous men without making them divorce their co-wives. This was contrary to what was preached by other missionaries such as the Catholics, Adventists, and Wesleyan Methodists.¹⁴ Polygamous members became known as adherents, and had a special section in the soldiers' roll book where their names were captured. They were regarded as friends of the Salvation Army even though they had not yet made a decision to become soldiers. Some polygamous adherents became soldiers although they were not allowed to lead congregations (Eason, 2009). This methodological flexibility helped the Salvation Army to attract membership. For instance,

¹⁴ Other missionary groups encouraged converts to practice monogamous marriage. For details, see Carmody, 1988; Naali, 2003; *Mazabuka District tour report no. 6, 1952*.

Cifwankala Corps had 46 adherents in 1959 (Salvation Army, 1959). At Chikani in Naluama's area, there were 16 adherents in 1963 (Salvation Army, 1963).

Although most of the popular forms of entertainment offered in Victorian England and American cities were absent in a rural setting like Chikankata, the Salvation Army still used the strategy of appropriating popular culture, especially music. The mission adopted some aspects of traditional music and incorporated them into the local hymn book for the church. In the 1960s, songs from the English Salvation Army Song Book were translated into Tonga by early mission-educated Africans such as Kenneth Maguswi and Morse Ng'andu.¹⁵ This led to the production of the first-ever Tonga Salvation Army Song Book with 288 songs of which 31 were composed by Africans at Chikankata Mission (Salvation Army, 1991). Thus, African Salvationists were not only translators of Christian liturgy but also composers of hymn songs. The composed songs were modelled along African popular tunes.

In line with the Tonga religious life in colonial Zambia, the songs composed by Africans replicated those performed at *malende* (shrines) and festivals. Popular tunes were accompanied by clapping that simulated worship at shrines and accorded respect to the supreme deity. For example, the first song in the Tonga hymn book depicted Africans entreating *Leza* (God) to send rains for all creation and agricultural crops, during a prolonged dry spell (Salvation Army, 1991). This suggests that the Salvation Army appropriated some aspects of African culture to help the local people make sense of the new religion within existing cultural values and belief systems. In this way, Africans accepted the Salvation Army since little had changed concerning their conceptualisation of the supreme deity except for the substitution of ancestral spirits with Jesus Christ as the intermediary between men and God.

Education and Evangelism

Having established first the Ibbwe Munyama and later the Chikankata missions, the Salvation Army set up schools which could have acted as centres of conversion. This view is supported by McInnes (1997, p. 35) who noted:

In all the villages in which The Salvation Army was at work was a corps [church] and a school—the school being the greatest attraction—with either an officer [pastor] or a teacher in charge. Thus the officer must also do the work of a teacher, the teacher the work of an officer.

¹⁵ Isaac Chikandi, 2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

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To McInnes, therefore, the Salvation Army schools, especially in the early days at Ibbwe Munyama, served as sites of conversion—a narrative that this article rebuts.

It is demonstrated here that using schooling as a means of evangelism, at a time when the colonial state had taken over the responsibility of funding African education, militated against the Salvation Army’s evangelical work of winning converts. During the thirty years of rule by the British South Africa Company, Northern Rhodesia had no coherent or constructive policy for education (Gadsden, 1992). Therefore, missionaries took it upon themselves to provide education services to Africans. The interest of missionaries was to provide rudimentary education which would enable converts to read the Bible. Each missionary group designed its own curriculum. This worked to the advantage of missionaries who were using education as a tool for conversion with little or no interference from the government.

In 1923, the British South Africa Company handed over the administration of the territory to the colonial office. At that time, the Phelps-Stoke Commission chaired by Dr Jesse Jones had made recommendations which eventually culminated in the policy on education in 1925. One of the main issues it addressed was the system of grants-in-aid in which financial assistance was to be given to voluntary schools. The new policy also provided boarding and building grants. In addition, the education department set territory-wide examinations for teacher certificates for Standard IV and above (Snelson, 1974). The implication of the new policy for missionary societies, as observed by Gadsden (1992, p. 111), was that “money was made available for education but the service providers had to concentrate on offering formal education as opposed to catechist lessons”. Therefore, by directing educational policy and the supervision of all educational institutions, the colonial state robbed mission schools of their prized role as centres of conversion.

The Salvation Army officially entered Northern Rhodesia in 1927, after the enactment of the policy, and had to operate in tandem with policy provisions. This meant that the mission could not fully utilise education to win converts to Christianity, due to the growing secularisation of schools. In view of this, Gadsden (1992, p. 120) noted:

The numbers of Christians continued to grow in the 1940s and 1950s, and after independence. This development was less dependent on evangelisation in village church schools than in previous periods. More of the [mission] schools received government assistance and thus became more secular. From 1952, all schools were subordinated to the local education authorities and a united teaching service was established.

Early missionary societies such as the Catholics, Free Church of Scotland, London Missionary Society, and the Adventists had enjoyed an almost unrestricted and relatively long period of evangelism through education; this was not the case for the Salvation Army.

The above thesis is buttressed by the fact that in the 1950s, when local educational authorities held a tight grip on education provision, some Salvation Army centres existed without schools. The colonial state had closed down centres that did not meet the standard requirements of the educational policy for the provision of sufficient and qualified teaching staff. In 1951, for example, the Provincial Education Officer (PEO) for Southern province made it clear that he “would oppose the opening of any new schools by the Salvation Army until the staffing position in its aided schools had improved” (PEO, 1951). In 1953, the Salvation Army closed Naleza, Cisimbi, Cileleka, Cilengo, and Simbayi schools for not meeting the requirements set by the Department of African Education (Department of African Education, 1953). The mission remained with only religious work at some of those centres. Furthermore, in June 1955 the PEO wrote to Major Leonard Kirby, Manager of Salvation Army Schools:

Please make no plans to open any new schools or reopen any closed schools in the coming school year. All projects must first be discussed at district Education Authority meetings and must take their turn after schools which have already been recommended but not approved for opening. (PEO, 1955)

The above reveals that the church had been subjugated by the colonial state and could not override the decisions of the educational authorities in matters regarding the running of schools. And whenever there was the need to open old or new centres, the church had to seek permission from the Department of African Education. For instance, in July 1955, Major Kirby wrote:

We closed Cisimbi a couple of years ago and I have someone who is ready to go immediately to do religious work. No schoolwork will be done. If there are sufficient children to warrant a school, application will be made in the usual way but nothing is being promised at this stage as far as schooling is concerned. (Kirby, 1955)

The foregoing evidence shows that the mission’s use of schools as centres of conversion was hampered by state regulation. It is an indication that evangelical work for the Salvation Army usually preceded the establishment of schools. This was the case at Dundu where a church was opened in 1955 but no school was attached to it.

The Salvation Army’s ability to run schools was severely constrained by lack of finance, and the Salvation Army was therefore heavily dependent on grants-in-aid from the colonial government. This weakened its position to use

schools as centres of conversion. Unlike other missionary groups such as the Catholics and Adventists that had strong financial support from their home countries, the Salvation Army had little. The mission's inability to fund educational work adequately should be understood in the context of its humble beginning. The mission started among the poor masses of the East End of London.¹⁶ It could not attract dignified individuals due to what was considered its unorthodox means of attracting converts. The mission depended largely on the good will of its poor converts, who made contributions for the financing of its evangelical work. Thus, like in other parts of the world where it operated, the Salvation Army in colonial Zambia depended on the generosity of its adherents and the community. In view of this, Major Railton Graver said:

It costs the Salvation Army well over £2,000 per year to maintain its evangelical and educational work in the villages of the Ba-Tonga. In return for all this service, we ask Salvationists and friends in the district to contribute no more than £400 per year. This is not too much. I hope they will not fail us (Graver, 1953).

With such financial challenges, it is probable that the Salvation Army hardly resisted the secularisation of its schools. This in turn compromised its position on using schools as centres of conversion. Therefore, the building of schools by the Salvation Army was meant to offer mere educational services, rather than as a platform for conversion.

Medical Evangelism

In 1947, Chikankata Mission Hospital was officially opened. The hospital began offering health services to the people of Mwenda chiefdom and those from peripheral areas such as Mwanachingwala, Sikoongo, Sianjalika, Naluama, Mwanza, Sinadambwe, and Simamba (McInnes, 1997). This meant that the Salvation Army had a wide catchment area for proselytising Africans through medical care. In addition, students in training for nursing, laboratory technology, or pharmacology provided a reservoir of potential converts. Despite the availability of these favourable clinical spaces for evangelism, the Salvation Army did not fully appropriate and utilise them. Personal communication with Dr Paul du Plessis, who served at Chikankata Mission Hospital from the 1960s to 1980, revealed that the Salvation Army did not consider hospital ministry as a mode of evangelism. Du Plessis remarked:

¹⁶ See Taylor (1963). East End of London consisted of unskilled and poor labourers who worked in brutal and unsanitary conditions in Victorian England. Because of their poverty, they were not received in churches for the middle and upper classes.

I do not agree with the statement that Hospital ministry was one of the major strategies through which TSA [The Salvation Army] won converts in Chikankata. The hospital and its related health services were established for principally two reasons: to express the love of Christ in action and in response to his call to both preach [the Gospel] and heal [the sick] (Matthew 10), and to support the health care of its staff, including educational and evangelistic workers. (2019, April 6, *Impact of the Salvation Army on Chikankata* [Interview, Personal Communication through email])

From this standpoint, it suggests that the hospital was not a centre for proselytisation but merely meant to cater for the health needs of its missionaries and Africans at large. Du Plessis' sentiments were echoed by Chikandi, who observed that the Salvation Army believed in the principle of "heart to God and hand to man".¹⁷ Hospital ministry was, therefore, an attempt by the Salvation Army to demonstrate their love for God by serving suffering humanity.

Apart from chapel devotions which were usually attended by hospital staff and other mission workers, the Salvation Army lacked specific programmes and strategies that could have enhanced medical evangelism. Du Plessis observed that Christian worship services held in the hospital were meant to provide a Christian framework for the work of the mission as a whole, but this had little to do with winning converts. Du Plessis noted that, in the absence of overt strategies, the task to evangelise was left to Christian staff, who, both by way of personal lifestyle and verbal testimony, could explain and discuss their faith.¹⁸ This approach had shortcomings because not all hospital staff were Salvationists.

During its early years, Chikankata Mission Hospital had few missionary doctors who could win converts as they carried out their medical roles. In 1953, Dr Sydney L. Gauntlett, the Hospital Superintendent, observed that the mission had only one doctor, and efforts to employ a second doctor were frustrated by the colonial government on the basis of nationality. The mission had employed Dr Gunter S. Gramsch, a German national with specialisation in tropical medicine. However, the continued strained Anglo-German relations in the post-Second World War era hindered the mission from recruiting more

¹⁷ Isaac Chikandi, 2019, July 21, *The Salvation Army in Chikankata* [Interview, Hampande Village, Chikankata District, with A. Mwanza].

¹⁸ Paul Du Plessis, 2019, April 6, *Impact of the Salvation Army on Chikankata* [Interview, Personal Communication through email].

doctors with nationalities of Axis powers (Gauntlett, 1953). Unlike missionary groups such as the Christian Mission to Many Lands and the London Missionary Society, which had university graduates as medical missionaries, the Salvation Army did not have adequate personnel of such calibre, due to being identified with slum dwellers.

The shortage of personnel sometimes prompted the mission to employ doctors who were non-Salvationists but originated from the Allied nations. For instance, Dr Gordon Carter and his wife, Baptists from Canada, arrived in April 1955 and served at Chikankata Hospital until the late 1960s (Chikankata Hospital Superintendent, 1955). The two were not evangelists and could have contributed little in this regard. This partly demonstrates that the Salvation Army considered hospital ministry not as an evangelical tool but a service to mission staff and the local people.

In addition, the Salvation Army was disadvantaged by the low number of indigenous students who trained as African nurses. One of the reasons for low enrolments was inadequate qualifications. Few prospective female students could meet the standard six qualification requirement for entry into training. In addition, cultural factors still influenced most parents' attitude towards girl education and parents were, therefore, reluctant to send their girls to school (*Ministry of Health annual report, 1961*). As a result, students from Southern Rhodesia and other missionary groups within Northern Rhodesia dominated the Chikankata Nurses' Training School. The provincial medical officer's tour report for 1953 indicated that, since 1948, only eight students had received their general training in nursing at Chikankata (Provincial Medical Officer, 1953). None of these students were Salvationists.

Further, the Salvation Army practised an open-door policy where it accepted non-Salvationists from other missionary groups. It could, therefore, not coerce students to become Salvationists if they were already adherents of other missions. The 1951 tour report by the provincial medical officer indicated that, after obtaining qualification at Chikankata, students returned to their parent missions (Provincial Medical Officer, 1951). Thus, despite the increase in the enrolment of student nurses in the latter years, the number of indigenous Salvationists still remained insignificant. For instance, in 1960, there were 21 student nurses, 11 from Southern Rhodesia and ten from Northern Rhodesia (*Ministry of Health annual report, 1961*). It was only in 1961 that Chikankata first enrolled an entire intake that had been educated in Northern Rhodesia and whose parents were residents of the country. The increase in the number of students was partly due to the slight increase in the number of schools offering secondary education in the country. The above evidence helps to demonstrate that, in its formative years at Chikankata, the

Salvation Army could not rely on the nursing school as a pool from which to draw converts, due to the Salvation Army's numerical disadvantage.

However, Salvation Army evangelists took advantage of the establishment of a leprosy settlement and were able to win converts, albeit to a small extent. Established in 1949, the leprosarium was the largest in the Southern Province. Lepers admitted to this settlement were from all parts of the country. To cater for the spiritual needs of the lepers, the Salvation Army opened a worshipping centre at Cifwankala where the patients regularly met for prayers. In 1959, the visiting General Wilfred Kitching officially opened and dedicated the hall there to the spiritual cause for leprosy patients (*Mazabuka District tour report*, 1959). This was the only form of organised evangelism that involved patients at Chikankata Mission Hospital. Even so, the establishment of the leper corps had little to do with conversion. It was simply a medical requirement to prevent the spread of the disease by secluding the patients.

In addition, the Salvation Army's principle of allowing members to join on a free-will basis, without coercion or undue influence, seems to have hindered the mission from winning large number of converts in the leper colony. The mission did not use medical services to enforce recruitment of Africans to Christianity. For instance, in the early 1960s, 13 leprosy patients, at their own request, were enrolled as senior soldiers while four children enlisted as junior soldiers (McInnes, 1997, p. 109). This number was low compared to the number of leprosy in-patients for the period which stood at 256 in 1961 and 411 in 1962 (*Leprologist Tour of Southern Province*, 1962). This suggests that medical evangelism was not a prized means of converting Africans to Christianity, despite the opportunities offered within clinical spaces.

Conclusion

From the study, several conclusions have emerged. One of these is that, contrary to the widely held view that schools and clinical spaces were anchor modes of conversion, the Salvation Army largely depended on Africans as active agents in the spread of its evangelical work. Both trained and lay African evangelists took a leading role in the opening and management of Salvation Army centres. To achieve this, a number of strategies such as open-air revivals, march pasts, uniform wearing, brass bands, and timbrel displays were introduced. Potential converts were attracted to join Salvation Army ranks because of the exciting atmosphere created by such methods. These strategies were unique to the Salvation Army because of its military-style background and organisation that were influenced by its founders in Victorian England.

By illuminating the mission's unique strategies of conversion, this article has disassociated itself from the academic lenses which view education and medical care as the primary methods of evangelism used by various missionary groups to win African converts to Christianity in colonial Zambia. This article has instead demonstrated that the Salvation Army belonged to the missionary groups whose later entry into colonial Zambia, in the late 1920s, coincided with increased control over education by the colonial government. The state's grants-in-aid to mission schools and its insistence on the schools meeting the requirements of the educational policy weakened the missions' capacity to use education as a means to conversion. The study has noted that the Salvation Army lacked explicit programmes of medical evangelism that could have been used to win converts in the same way Catholics and Adventists did. The lacklustre attitude towards the use of medical care as a tool of evangelism was notable from the early days of the mission and continued up to 1964. This article forges a new trajectory that examines African conversion techniques beyond education and medicine, by focusing on specific missions.

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Appendix 1

Soldiers on a March Past in Chikankata



Note. From Paul du Plessis, n.d., *Salvation Army–Zambia 1970s*, <https://thedups.com/the-dups-photo-gallery/zambia/salvation-army---zambia-1970s>

Appendix 2

Soldiers Returning from an Open-air Meeting



Note. From Paul du Plessis, n.d., *Salvation Army-Zambia 1970s*, <https://thedups.com/the-dups-photo-gallery/zambia/salvation-army---zambia-1970s>

Lusaka's Colonial Legacy: Town Planning, Public Health, and the Making of a Segregated City, 1913–1963. A Study of Power, Inequality, and Urban Development

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This paper explores the intersection of town planning and public health policy in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), during the colonial period (1913–1963), which was a time of significant urban growth and transformation. British colonial authorities adapted Ebenezer Howard's Garden City principles to design and manage Lusaka, but these measures perpetuated spatial control, segregation, and social engineering, thus exacerbating racial and socio-economic disparities. By analysing secondary and primary sources, including planning ordinances, zoning regulations, and public health policies, this study reveals how these measures shaped the city's development and reinforced inequalities. Despite colonial intentions for a white settler-city, Lusaka evolved into an African majority urban centre, with 89% of the population comprising Africans by 1963. This research offers valuable insights for scholars, urban planners, and policymakers grappling with the legacies of colonialism and urban inequality, thus informing strategies to create more equitable and sustainable cities.


Keywords: Lusaka; Northern Rhodesia; Zambia; racial segregation; spatial control; urban governance; colonial legacy; town planning; public health

Introduction

Map 1 illustrates the rapid expansion of Lusaka during the colonial period, depicting the town's growth from its founding as a Village Management Board in 1913 to a Township Board status by 1951. Lusaka's planning roots can be attributed to Ebenezer Howard's influential book, initially published in 1898 as *To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* and re-published in 1902 as *Garden Cities of To-morrow*, which addressed the urban challenges of industrial England, including substandard housing, overcrowding, and pollution. Howard proposed the concept of garden cities—planned suburbs that balanced urban and rural lifestyles, featuring greenbelt, residential, industrial, and agricultural areas, and

railway links to cities, thereby creating self-sufficient communities surrounded by nature (Vernet & Coste, 2017, p. 56).

Map 1
Lusaka's growth, 1913–1951



Note. From "Lusaka: The Historical Development of a Planned Capital, 1931–1970" by J. Collins, 1986, p. 100, in *Lusaka and its Environs: A Geographical Study of a Planned Capital City in Tropical Africa*, pp. 95–137, edited by G. Williams, Zambia Geographical Association.

Howard's innovative concept of greenbelts would serve four vital functions:

- **urban containment:** preventing city sprawl and preserving green spaces
- **recreation and leisure:** providing accessible areas for physical activity, relaxation, and nature enjoyment
- **agricultural support:** promoting local farming and food production for nearby urban areas
- **climate change mitigation:** absorbing rainfall, reducing flooding, and promoting carbon sequestration through reforestation and habitat restoration

In 1903, Ebenezer Howard founded Letchworth, the pioneering garden city that inspired a global movement in urban spatial planning. This approach was later transplanted to Africa by British colonisers, resulting in examples such as Ifrane in Morocco, Pinelands and Edgemead in South Africa, and Lusaka, the new capital of Northern Rhodesia (NR). Castell noted that urban planning's core aim is to optimise land use, balancing physical development with social welfare, to enhance community well-being (Castells, 1978, pp. 57–58). A comprehensive plan outlines future development, specifying space utilisation and permitted activities. Town planning and housing are intricately linked. Proper planning facilitates the building of suitable housing. Urban planning integrates a range of essential activities, including:

- population-growth forecasting
- zoning and mapping
- land-use analysis
- park-space and water-supply assessment
- transportation pattern-identification
- healthcare and social-service allocation

Urban planning ideally balances social, economic and environmental needs to create thriving and resilient cities (Duhl & Sanchez, 1999, pp. 8–9; Hebbert, 1999, p. 433; Mumbuna, 1979, pp. 3–4). By contrast, the colonial master planning of Lusaka conformed to the prevailing colonial approach in Africa by prioritising the separation and regulation of land uses to safeguard amenity in European-occupied areas. This approach was characterised by technocratic planning, minimal local participation and social segregation between the colonisers and the colonised (Harrison & Croese, 2023, p. 30). The British master planning of colonial-era Lusaka was crude, even by the standards of the time, reflecting colonial obsessions with racial segregation, public health, and urban aesthetics (Harrison & Croese, 2023, p. 7). Despite its limitations, this planning established

the basis for Lusaka's subsequent urban growth, and exerted a profound and lasting influence on the city's development.

This scholarship aims to fill a significant knowledge gap in the historical literature on Lusaka's town planning, an area that has been overlooked in preference for political and rural history. Two existing non-academic books on Lusaka's colonial planning history have notable limitations. This gap underscores the need for a thorough and scholarly examination of the subject, addressing a significant omission in current literature. Bradley's 1935 account, being an official government publication, presents a somewhat biased, propaganda perspective (Bradley, 1935/2014), while Sampson's 1971 work is more of a personal memoir, based on recollection rather than rigorous scholarly social research (Sampson, 2013). The present research-based paper examines the development of Lusaka's town planning, with particular emphasis on public health considerations. It argues that the garden-city principles of Ebenezer Howard significantly shaped the city's spatial planning. Furthermore, by revealing that European institutions implemented additional health protection policies that prioritised the welfare of European residents, and thereby shaped the city's development, this paper illustrates the complex interplay between urban planning, public health, and colonialism (Bradley, 1935/2014; Urban planning, 2020).

NR's administrators and legislators, educated in the UK, brought British influences to urban planning in NR, thus shaping the colony's development.¹ English law also applied in South Africa, which was the primary source of white migrants to Lusaka, NR (Sapao, 2020, p. 89; Schreiner, 1967). As a result, these administrators and legislators were more familiar with English law than any other legal system (Mumbuna, 1979, p. 6). This shared legal heritage influenced the transplantation of urban planning ideas and practices from the UK to NR (Mumbuna, 1979, p. 13; Njoh, 2007, p. 59).² As shown below, spatial town planning in NR primarily served the interests of:

- white settlers
- the Northern Rhodesia government (NRG)
- the colonising British government
- the bourgeoisie mine owners based in London

As a result, this approach perpetuated the existing colonial power dynamics and socio-economic inequalities, privileging the interests of European groups

¹ The Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council had an exclusively European membership during the time under review.

² See, for example, Town Planning Amendment Ordinance No. 25 (1954), in which rigid zoning of European and non-European areas was effected in NR.

over those of the indigenous population, and further entrenching the disparities and injustices that characterised the colonial era (Castells, 1978, p. 71; Sapao, 2020, p. 344; *The Star*, 1952).

The British Parliament's Housing and Town Planning Act (1909) had a profound impact on urbanisation and development in former British protectorates, including NR, shaping the course of their growth for generations. By centralising power at the national level, the act influenced the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council (NRLC) to model its Town Planning Ordinance (1929) after British legislation. Professor Stanley Davenport Adshead, a proponent of garden-city planning, was commissioned in 1931 to develop a spatial plan for Lusaka, thus further entrenching British planning principles in the colony and shaping the city's growth according to British ideals.

This paper examines the intricate relationship between urban-planning decisions, policies and public-health outcomes in Lusaka during the colonial era, 1913–1963. By exploring the historical context and evolution of urban planning in Lusaka, this research reveals the profound impact of colonial policies on the city's public-health landscape. Furthermore, this study identifies potential areas of continuity between colonial and post-colonial urban-planning practices, providing a foundation for future research and analysis.

Lusaka's Foundational Period, 1913–1920

The city of Lusaka was named after a local Lenje village headman, Lusaaka, whose village was situated in the surrounding area. This naming acknowledges the region's rich cultural heritage and the significance of indigenous leadership (Sapao, 2020, p. 27). The Village Management Ordinance No. 11 of 1913 served as the legal basis for the British South Africa Company (BSAC) administration to establish rules for the white settler village of Lusaka, which were published in Government Notice No. 48 of 1913. This ordinance provided the foundational legal framework for the development and governance of the settlement (*Chilanga district rural notebook*, n.d., p 315; see also Gann, 1964, p. 141).

Initially, Lusaka fell under the administrative jurisdiction of the Chilanga sub-district of the Loangwa (sic) district (*Chilanga district rural notebook*, n.d.; Habeenzu, 2016, pp. 27–28; Kangwa, 2011, p. 60). Chilanga, named after a perennial stream, was administered by an assistant magistrate and a clerk of court, who oversaw African authorities and courts. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the African authorities and courts, and the population, in the Chilanga sub-district.

Table 1

African Population in Chilanga sub-District (Lusaka), 1914.

Ethnic Group	Chief/African authority and courts	Adults		Children		Totals
		Male	Female	Male	Female	
Soli	Undaunda (Soli wa Shamifwe)	503	617	475	463	2,058
	Chitetantaunga	792	917	717	691	3,117
	Chipwalu	336	393	247	239	1,215
	Kabwata (Soli wa Manyika)	143	160	138	120	561
	Shikoswe (Soli wa Malundu)	139	173	104	101	517
Total						7,468
Lenje	Mungule	469	531	373	297	1,670
	Apwaiya	291	334	261	229	1,115
	Shangara	319	348	225	197	1,089
Total						3,874
Sala	Mberere	278	314	225	186	1,003
Mbwera	Lilanda	119	153	105	97	474
Lamba	Msaula	112	109	88	88	397
Batwa	Shimungalu	33	42	17	18	110
Grand Total		3,534	4,091	2,975	2,726	13,326

Note. From *Chilanga District Rural Notebook*, n.d., National Archives of Zambia (KSA 6/1), Lusaka, Zambia, p. 16.

According to the 1914 census, the population comprised:

- **Soli:** 7,468 people (segmented under five chiefs: Undaunda, Chitetantaunga, Chipwalu, and Shikoswe)
- **Lenje:** 3,874 people (under chiefs Mungule, Apwaiya, and Shangara)
- **Sala:** 1,003 people (under Chief Mberere)
- **other groups:** 474 Mbwera, 397 Lamba, and 110 Batwa people

The total African population in the Chilanga sub-District was 13,326. These indigenous peoples lived in the vicinity of the area under the Lusaka Village Management Board's jurisdiction.

The Lusaka Village Management Board, appointed by the BSAC administrator, served as Lusaka's first local government, responsible for administering public health within its jurisdiction. Its duties included:

- maintaining street hygiene
- providing a bucket latrine sanitation system
- regulating buildings

Furthermore, Government Notice No. 48 of 1913 empowered the District Surgeon to enter any house or room suspected of harbouring a patient with a contagious disease, thereby enabling prompt public health interventions (Government Notice No. 48, 1913). Public health services were initially restricted to Europeans due to a lack of political will and limited resources. However, African domestic servants living on their employers' properties indirectly benefited from the Public Health Rules of March 1914, which made it an offence for household heads or employees to fail to report infectious diseases among family members or workers (Orde-Browne, 1936, p. 206).

African labour endured squalid living conditions (Orde-Browne, 1936, p. 206). Urban housing for Africans in NR catered exclusively to single and unaccompanied married men, whilst African women and children were prohibited from joining them in urban centres and could be forcibly deported to their villages. The Lusaka Village Management Board created an African compound west of the European township in 1914, which the residents called Mboyunga Compound. However, the Board did little to regulate the buildings or health in the area (Tait, 1997, p. 195; Williams, 1986, p. 87). The compound was situated on low-lying, swampy land prone to malaria-carrying mosquitoes during the rainy season (*Luangwa District Annual Report*, 1925, p. 10). A suggestion to raise the streets of the compound was dropped when the authorities responded that the cost would be passed to the tenants through hiked rent (Lusaka Township Management Board, 1926). The response of the Board was unenthusiastic. It was not until the mid-1930s that the Board began building houses for African labour in Lusaka (Wincott, 1966, p. 129). Domestic servants were typically accommodated in quarters on their employer's residential property. Architectural designs in the colonial era typically positioned small, one-roomed servant's quarters to the west of, and behind, the main house of the white master, near sanitary lanes and on the leeward side. This deliberate placement allowed prevailing winds to carry odours and potential health hazards away from the main house. The quarter lacked access to basic amenities like electricity and warm water, even if these were available in the main residence (*Luangwa District Annual Report*, 1925, p. 5).

The stark disparities in healthcare and living conditions between African and European labour in colonial Lusaka are striking. Despite municipal health regulations, some white employers, particularly those of Dutch origin in Lusaka, neglected to provide adequate living conditions for their African workers, leading to labour shortages (Rothman, 1972, p. 10; Williams, 1986, p. 78). This gap between health policy and practice was exacerbated by the lack of legal obligation for White employers to care for their African workers' health, with only burial fees provided in the event of death. This underscored the alarming lack of value placed on African lives. Consequently, many Africans in Lusaka relied on traditional herbalists in unofficial settlements for medical treatment, reflecting their trust in indigenous healing methods and limited access to colonial healthcare (Sapao, 2020, p. 158). Meanwhile, the Village Management Board prioritised maintaining order and public safety in the growing settlement, amidst these pressing healthcare challenges.

In accordance with the Pounds and Trespass Ordinance of 1920, the Lusaka Village Management Board erected a pound in the Lusaka Village settlement to impound stray animals and enforce trespass regulations. This initiative demonstrates the board's endeavours to maintain order and public safety in the burgeoning settlement.³

Public Health Related Nuisances, 1923–1927

The Pounds and Trespass Ordinance (1920) and the 1923 Public Health Regulation aimed to mitigate pressing public health issues in Lusaka. These regulations had two primary outcomes:


- **stray animal control:** The Pound Master was tasked with impounding stray animals, helping to maintain public safety and prevent the spread of diseases.
- **premises maintenance:** Occupiers were required to keep their premises clean, free from nuisances, and well-maintained. This included properly disposing of and not burning refuse and night soil. Occupiers were also responsible for providing and maintaining approved refuse receptacles at their own expense. The limestone terrain of Lusaka presented significant challenges for urban planners and engineers. Excavation for storm drains, latrines, septic tanks and waste disposal systems proved particularly challenging due to the cutter-and-pinnacled rock-head in the Lusaka marbles.

³ A pound was an enclosure for safe-keeping of stray animals in Lusaka Village/Township established by the Pounds and Trespass Ordinance No. 2 (1920).

At the time, septic tanks and pit latrines were impractical in Lusaka due to the shallow rock formations and the risk of groundwater contamination. As a result, a bucket latrine system was adopted, featuring nightly emptying and communal organisation. Figure 1 illustrates the bucket latrine, which was in use throughout much of colonial Lusaka's period. Residential plots were designed to back onto sanitary lanes, accommodating latrines and accessible buckets. The Village Management Board provided one sanitary pail for every five Europeans and one for every five Africans on the premises.

Figure 1

A Standard Bucket Latrine



Note. From *Colonial Urban Planning: Conflict in Urban Health Policies and Lifestyles in Lusaka, 1913–63* [Ph.D. thesis] by W. J. Sapao, 2020, *Zambian Open University*, p. 79.

Although unhygienic and cumbersome, bucket latrines offered a cheap alternative to conventional latrines, such as septic tanks. The system consisted of a non-corrosive container placed beneath a squatting slab or seat in a chamber with rear doors. Users deposited waste into the bucket, which was regularly emptied by night-soil workers using the sanitary lanes behind the buildings. However, overflowing buckets posed a significant infection risk. Night-soil removal took place between 22:00 and 05:00.

The laws in NR were quite specific when it came to protecting public health. The Food Destruction Ordinance No. 15 of 1921 prohibited trades detrimental to

human health or comfort, and allowed for the destruction of harmful food. Keeping pigs or other noxious animals in residential areas was deemed a public nuisance and punishable by law under the Pigs Ordinance No. 24 (1925). The public health regulations of 1923 mandated that the slaughtering of cattle, and meat inspection fall under the supervision of the Health Department in areas within municipal jurisdictions, such as the Lusaka Management Board, to ensure centralised control over food safety and hygiene practices (*Northern Rhodesia Government Gazette*, 1923, pp. 34–35, Pt. III, 1 (1)–(32); Lusaka Management Board, ca. 1932, p. 3). The legislation prohibited waste disposal into sewers, required inclusion of latrines in new buildings, and mandated separate latrines for each racial group in mixed-race workplaces, thus enforcing segregation and hygiene measures, with pail latrines conforming to approved standards. Consequently, public toilets in Lusaka were segregated, with signs designating European type conveniences, Asian type, and African type. The facilities in each category differed significantly, reflecting the entrenched racial segregation and discrimination prevalent at the time:

- **European type:** Toilets were mounted on a pedestal, providing a seat for users.
- **Asian type:** Toilets were squat-style, and equipped with a tap for personal hygiene.
- **African type:** Toilets were squat-style, but without a tap, reflecting the stark disparities in access to basic sanitation facilities along racial lines. (NRG, 1933, pp. 47–50).

Beyond the stark contrasts in sanitation facilities, the colonial administration implemented various public health measures to maintain urban environmental standards. For example, under Section 6 of the Public Health Ordinance No. 12 of 1930, failing to prevent mosquitoes from breeding on one's premises constituted a nuisance. Furthermore, although the Municipal Corporations Ordinance No. 16 of 1927 primarily focused on elevating townships to municipal status—granting municipal corporation status to Livingstone and Ndola, and later Lusaka—it also included significant public health provisions.

Municipal corporations in NR had a wide range of responsibilities and powers, particularly when it came to public health and services. They could pass and amend bye-laws related to public health, as outlined in the Municipal Corporations Ordinance No. 16 (1927). Some of their key responsibilities included establishing and managing public facilities and services, such as:

- **public health services: preventing and suppressing contagious diseases, preventing malaria and insect-borne diseases, and prohibiting noxious trades**
- **public facilities:** providing markets, parks, slaughterhouses, sewerage systems, refuse disposal, water, and electricity
- **urban planning:** regulating and planting trees in public streets, controlling hawkers, and regulating water sources
- **town planning:** proposing legislation to control the sub-division of private land into townships.

These powers and responsibilities enabled municipal corporations to play a crucial role in maintaining public health and providing essential services to their communities.

Informal traders, African labour hired by private contractors, and some domestic servants who opted not to be housed on their masters' housing plots constructed makeshift houses in unplanned settlements, including Chilenje, John Laing, and Salisbury Lines (now Kabwata). These one-roomed structures, typically with a radius of 12 feet or less, were built from temporary materials under thatch. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, and limited access to basic amenities characterised these unauthorised settlements (Department of Public Works, ca. 1928; Gann, 1964, pp. 245–257). The area's low-lying, swampy terrain made it prone to malaria-carrying mosquitoes during the rainy season (National Archives of Zambia, 1925, p. 10). Ablution facilities were non-existent, forcing residents to resort to using the bush or communal shallow pit latrines. The primary sources of water were shallow wells, streams, and rainwater collection, which were frequently contaminated and unsafe.

In stark contrast, European labour in colonial Lusaka enjoyed spacious, modern houses that epitomised the era's socio-economic divide. For instance, a headmaster's house built in 1927 measured 15' x 15' with four bedrooms, an iron roof, steel ceilings, a pantry, bathroom, and verandas (Department of Public Works, ca. 1928, p. 25). Teachers' houses had three bedrooms and comparable features. This housing disparity reflected broader social and economic inequalities.

Town Planning Ordinance, the Planning Board and Other Legislations

In 1929, the NRLC passed the Townships Ordinance, establishing an administrative system for small urban centres, including Lusaka, and creating a framework for town planning and development (Townships Ordinance No. 53, 1929). This was a significant milestone as it marked the first town planning

legislation in NR, which paved the way for organised urban development and growth (Town Planning Ordinance No. 60, 1929). The ordinance established the territorial Town Planning Board, which was responsible for:

- receiving and considering applications for new townships
- re-planning existing townships
- reviewing private township proposals
- advising the Governor on related duties (Town Planning Ordinance No. 60, 1929, Sec. 7)

The legislation introduced land-use controls and zoning regulations, enabling the management of land use and changes in land use.

The Town Planning Ordinance of 1929 laid the groundwork for Lusaka's transformation into a garden city, paving the way for the city's anticipated growth and development (Zulu, 2014, p. 144). The principal ordinance outlined the following general planning specifications:

- **topographic mapping:** contours of the affected area at intervals specified by the director of surveys
- **township design:** layout, street dimensions, sanitary lanes, and plot sizes
- **zoning:** allocation of districts or zones for residential, commercial, industrial, or other purposes
- **land allocation:** provision of land for health facilities, public spaces, government, and local authority purposes
- **scheme approval:** preparation of schemes requiring approval from the governor, after review by the Town Planning Board

The ordinance had significant public health implications, as it mandated the careful planning of townships, including:

- **urban design:** the general layout of the township
- **infrastructure:** dimensions of streets and sanitary lanes
- **land use:** size and allocation of plots

These provisions aimed to create a hygienic and safe environment, which would prevent the spread of diseases and promote public health (Town Planning Ordinance No. 60, 1929, Sec. 7). The general plan mandated the allocation of land within townships for specific purposes, including residential, commercial, industrial, educational, healthcare, and recreational uses.

Although the law prohibited unlawful land-use in designated zones, African migrants seeking land for housing and farming frequently disregarded the regulations. They occupied vacant land illegally, and established gardens near their housing areas, as evident in aerial photos from the 1930s (Rakodi, 1988, p. 502). The Town Planning Ordinance of 1929, which governed land use, was

heavily influenced by British town-planning legislation. This ordinance prioritised the health and well-being of the European population, reflecting the colonial priorities of the time (Siame, 2016, p. 42).

Local authorities enforced strict British-style building standards in expatriate areas, while African neighbourhoods were neglected and exempt from these regulations, reflecting the disparate priorities and unequal treatment of colonial rule (Mwimba, ca. 2002, p. 2; Rakodi, 1986, p. 198). From the 1920s onwards, the NRLC enacted a series of racial laws that severely curtailed Africans' freedom, economic opportunities, and social lives. These laws dictated:

- where Africans could work and reside
- what and where they could cultivate and trade
- how they could move within and between rural and urban areas

These laws institutionalised racial segregation and discrimination, entrenching a system of oppression that stifled African development and perpetuated inequality.⁴ Employers of African labour, including the Village Management Board, NRG, and Rhodesia Railways, prioritised cost-cutting over workers' welfare, providing substandard housing that failed to meet public health regulations (Public Health Ordinance Amendment Ordinance No. 1, 1931; Public Health Ordinance Amendment Ordinance No. 34, 1930; Public Health Ordinance No. 12, 1930).

According to Rakodi (1986), Africans were only permitted to reside in Lusaka if they served the colonial authorities, colonial private enterprise, or individual Europeans in capacities such as:

- manual workers, clerks and artisans
- domestic servants, including houseboys, gardeners, and cooks

This restriction highlights the colonial era's exploitative nature, where Africans were only allowed to enter urban areas like Lusaka in subordinate roles, perpetuating racial segregation and oppression. Rakodi stated that:

The colonial policy of discouraging permanent urban residence by the African population was enforced by requiring identification certificates, tax receipts, and visitors' permits; these documents provided a means of checking, through police raids, the right to urban residence. Illegal residents and women and children not living under the protection of a legally resident

⁴ Among some of these NRG ordinances were the following: the Employment Ordinance (1929), the Native Registration Ordinance No. 50 (1929), the Vagrancy Ordinance (1929), the Native and Private Estates Ordinance (1929), the Townships Ordinance (1929), the Municipal Corporations Ordinance No. 16 (1927), the Public Health Ordinance No. 12 (1930), and the Native Beer (amended) Ordinance (1930); see Hansen, 1980, p. 206.

man could then be repatriated to their villages. (1986, pp. 198–199)

The Townships Ordinance of 1929 sanctioned Lusaka and other local governments in NR to enact bye-laws desirable for the maintenance of public health beneficial to white settlers (NRG, 1930, pp. 208–217). Part II of this legislation stated that:

A local authority, subject to the approval of the Governor has the authority to take measures necessary for suitable lighting and public health of the Township through the provision and maintenance of public latrines, washing places, wells, water supplies, drains, tanks, pounds, streets, public recreation grounds and open spaces as well as any other works and conveniences in the area under its jurisdiction. (Townships Ordinance No. 53, 1929, Pt. II, p. 212)

The 1929 ordinance prioritised white settlers' health and security over indigenous populations', perpetuating inequalities and segregation. European areas received amenities like lighting and proper drainage, while African zones lacked these basics. The ordinance also entrenched colonial disparities through measures like impounding stray livestock.

The pounds aimed to keep urban areas clean and protect property by impounding stray animals, with owners required to claim them or risk the sale of their animals. Local governments regulated African eating houses, inspected food, and destroyed unfit food. However, due to housing shortages and the Great Depression's impact, police raids and health warnings failed to deter the misuse of kitchens as sleeping quarters in African compounds (Lusaka Management Board, ca. 1933, p. 3; Lusaka Management Board, ca. 1934, p. 1; Provincial Commissioner, 1934, p. 3). The Employment of Natives Ordinance passed in 1929 compelled employers to provide reasonable lodging for their African labour, but made no provision for their dependents (Employment of Natives Ordinance, 1929).

The law mandated hygienic sanitation in African labour housing, subject to medical officers' approval and regular inspections. Additionally, the Townships Ordinance No. 53 (1929) empowered the Governor to appoint and dissolve local authority boards via gazette notifications (NRG, 1930, p. 210). The township boards were responsible for managing infrastructure (highways, footpaths, and open spaces) and maintaining public health. They also regulated water supply improvements.

Meanwhile, the Native Registration Ordinance No. 50 (1929) required registration and identity certificates for all Africans entering urban areas, further solidifying colonial control and surveillance. This law heightened surveillance

over Africans in urban areas by requiring visitors' passes and mandatory employer registration, and by tracking their destination, purpose, duration of stay, identity, and personal details, thereby tightening colonial control over African employment and movement.

The Native Authorities Ordinance No. 32 of 1929 made it illegal under Section 18 for Africans to pollute water sources, including streams, wells, and watercourses, which highlighted the colonial administration's concern for environmental conservation; this ordinance also potentially criminalised traditional African practices and livelihoods (*List of Orders*, ca. 1929, Sec. 18, p. 151).⁵ There were further bye-laws criminalising Africans who felled trees near any river, stream or spring, or destroyed any large timber. Paradoxically, Africans saw Rhodesia Railways harvest timber in large quantities as railway sleepers (Baldwin, 1966, p. 173; see also Nawa & Mwansa, 2016). Moreover, the Public Works Department excessively harvested *mukwa* (Rhodesian mahogany) and other local trees for the internal decoration of European houses in Lusaka (Department of Public Works, ca. 1928). These practices reveal that environmental protection laws reinforced capitalism through the extraction of natural resources, either for export and the bourgeoisie railway owners, or for the comfort of white settlers. These environmental protection laws, designed to facilitate capitalist interests, paved the way for further legislation that solidified colonial control over land use, as seen in the enactment of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance No. 59 (1929).

This ordinance was enacted to address loopholes in the Private Estates Ordinance No. 57 (1929) and aimed to coerce compliance from non-conforming landlords by threatening land seizure by the NRG. However, the outcome remained unchanged, with Africans still managing to reside on white settler farmers' freehold land, circumventing the intentions of both ordinances.⁶ Squatters built simple grass houses on white settler farms in exchange for cash, labour, or produce. These houses failed to meet basic public health standards, as they lacked proper sanitation and water supplies. Residents relied on shallow, open wells for domestic water in private compounds where public health regulations were largely ignored, which created hazardous health conditions and

⁵ The *Chilanga District Notebook* at the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) in Lusaka is replete with public-health bye-laws that were steeped in discrimination against non-whites.

⁶ Freehold tenure was a landholding system where a person owned a right of beneficial occupation of the land. The Crown had a reversionary interest in the land when there was failure of successors to inherit the title.

exacerbated poor living conditions.⁷ Laws were enacted to control the presence of Africans in Lusaka and other emerging urban centres in NR. To combat the spread of diseases in rapidly growing urban areas, the Lusaka Management Board was responsible for maintaining public health and sanitary conditions, a vital component of effective urban management.

In theory, the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance No. 13 of 1931 granted the NRG control over public spaces in private townships. However, in practice, it denied landowners compensation for their acquired land, which was previously a guaranteed right. The government could initiate land acquisition once a general plan was filed with the Town Planning Board, facilitating Lusaka's expansion into surrounding areas. European residences were developed on subdivided farms, such as Teagles Plots and Kabulonga. Meanwhile, the NRLC enacted public health laws regulating abattoirs and meat sales; Africans were reluctant to follow these laws, seeing them as conflicting with traditional ways of life (List of Orders, ca. 1929, Sec. 18, p. 151). This resistance to colonial legislation was not unique, as Africans also navigated other laws and regulations that impacted their daily lives. Messengers, for instance, playing a crucial role in enforcing these laws, wielded significant power as both language interpreters and law enforcement officers with the authority to arrest.

However, the messengers were reluctant to enforce laws that conflicted with local customs. Their distinctive blue uniforms and red fezzes symbolised their elite status within the colonial hierarchy (Foster, 1987, p. 362). Despite the bye-law requiring authorisation for relocation, the Sala people largely ignored it, adhering to their traditional practice of migratory pastoralism in search of pasture for their livestock. Messengers tasked with enforcing relocation regulations and the ban on bushfires were not ineffective, but rather chose not to enforce regulations that clashed with the norms and practices of the indigenous communities they served (Provincial Commissioner, 1932, p. 152). Consequently, the unsanitary living conditions and inadequate water supply in Lusaka's private compounds became a pressing concern for public health officials.

⁷ This contradicted the provisions in the Water Ordinance No. 4 (1930) and subsequent amendments, namely Water Ordinance No. 4 Amendment No. 34 (1948) and Water Ordinance No. 4 Amendment No. 5 (1950).

Public Health Legislations, 1930–1936

The Lusaka Management Board was responsible for:

- preventing epidemic outbreaks
- maintaining and enforcing sanitary conditions in both public and private areas
- enacting key legislations that safeguarded the health and well-being of urban dwellers
- fostering a clean and secure environment
- ensuring a better quality of life for residents (Public Order No. 12, 1930, Secs. 6, 65)

Furthermore, the Board was responsible for:

- preventing health hazards related to unhealthy dwellings, including their construction and occupation
- curbing overcrowding in residential areas (Public Order No. 12 of 1930, Sec. 66)

These responsibilities aimed to decrease the risk of diseases and ensure a safe and healthy living environment for urban residents.

Except for Ndola, which built rental houses for Africans under its bye-laws, no local authority had the legal power to construct African housing. In Lusaka, landlords profited by allowing Africans to build on their land in exchange for rent, leading to unsanitary conditions. The Public Health Ordinance No. 12 (1930) aimed to prevent and control diseases in NR (Mwimba, ca. 2002, p. 2; see also Rakodi, 1986, p. 198). This law held local authorities accountable for:

- maintaining public health
- preventing nuisances
- preventing and controlling epidemic outbreaks

The ordinance ensured that local authorities took responsibility for protecting the health and well-being of their communities (Public Health Ordinance No. 12, 1930, Sec. 6).

The local authorities' obligations included removing and disposing of faeces and garbage. Additionally, the Lusaka Management Board, its officers, the Medical Officer of Health, or Sanitary Inspector were empowered to:

- enter premises at reasonable times to inspect for nuisances
- carry out demolitions and debris removal
- recover expenses from offenders (National Archives of Zambia, 1962, folio 83c)

These provisions enabled the authorities to enforce public health standards and address health hazards effectively. The ordinance also promoted the

prevention of water-supply pollution and conditions dangerous to health caused by the erection or occupation of unhealthy dwellings, as well as by overcrowding. This aimed to protect public health by addressing potential sources of contamination and unsanitary living conditions (Public Health Ordinance No. 12, 1930, Parts 2, 3).

The aforementioned ordinance promoted public health and safety in Lusaka. Prohibited practices under this law included sleeping in kitchens or rooms used for food preparation or storage. However, the Lusaka Township Board faced challenges in implementing these standards due to a lack of trained personnel and insufficient funds for training. The ordinance also required local authorities to clear long grass that could harbour mosquitoes in townships. At the onset of the rain season, grass grew rapidly in Lusaka, giving the township an untidy facade, and creating an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes. To mitigate this, grass cutting was mandatory three times a year: December, January/February, and April, with the Board's Road Department responsible for maintaining road verges (Sapao, 2020, p. 245). Additionally, Africans were required to:

- report deaths to the local *kapaso*⁸
 - refrain from involvement in prostitution
 - assist in maintaining inter-village roads

These provisions aimed to prevent the spread of diseases, including sexually transmitted infections, and maintain public infrastructure (NRG, 1944, p. 26).

The Public Health Ordinance amendments (1930, 1931) imposed building regulations in Lusaka, mandating permits and allowing authorities to demolish non-compliant structures, thereby prioritising European housing standards. Although the ordinances' wording appeared inclusive, they largely disregarded the housing requirements of indigenous people, perpetuating inequality in Lusaka and other urban centres in NR.

The challenges of enforcing colonial regulations in indigenous communities were soon eclipsed by a major development in the country's urban landscape.

Adshead's Quest for the Ideal Capital Site: Northern Rhodesia


In 1931, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia decided to relocate the capital from Livingstone, deeming its location in the Zambezi Valley unsuitable due to the sweltering summers and remote southern location. This decision was an opportunity to adopt Ebenezer Howard's garden-city planning model from

⁸ A *kapaso* was a local chief or leader appointed by colonial authorities to assist in governing, with responsibilities including tax collection, labour recruitment, law enforcement, dispute resolution and implementing colonial policies.

Britain, which subsequently influenced the development of the new capital, Lusaka, and transformed NR's urban landscape (Davies, 1969, p. 6).

Map 2

Lusaka Transport Linkage, 1930



Note: From *Chilanga (Lusaka): 1930 Annual Report*, circa 1930, National Archives of Zambia (KDC 6/1/7), Lusaka, Zambia, Annexure 5.

The NRG commissioned Stanley Davenport Adshead, a distinguished professor of town and country planning at the University of London, to identify a suitable site for the new capital. In 1931, Adshead recommended Lusaka as the ideal location, paving the way for the city's development and growth (Davies, 1969, p. 6; Hansen, 1982, p. 120; Kay, 1967, p. 112; Bradley, 1935/2014, p. 24). At the time, Lusaka's population stood at 2,433. Adshead's endorsement of Lusaka was largely influenced by its geography. The city's elevation of 4,196 feet above sea level offered a cooler and healthier climate, making it an ideal location for European settlement (Davies, 1969, p. 6; Wilson, 1963, p. 411). This was a significant advantage over Livingstone, which stood at just 1,000 feet above sea

level. Although Lusaka lacked nearby water bodies, its underground water reserves were abundant. The city's central location and proximity to the Kafue River, just 40 kilometres away, ensured accessibility to its water supply via a planned road and pipeline connection (Sapao, 2020, p. 123).

Lusaka offered ample space for expansion and boasted an existing airfield. Its strategic location facilitated easy access to the Copperbelt mines and Livingstone by air, rendering Lusaka a convenient hub between the two (Schlyter & Schlyter, 1979, p. 14). Furthermore, Lusaka's strategic location was enhanced by its accessibility via railway and road, as illustrated in Map 2. Situated at the intersection of the Great North Road and two other major arterial roads, one connecting to Fort Jameson in the east and the other to Kasempa in the north-west, Lusaka emerged as a key transportation hub (Bradley, 1935/2014, p. 8).

Upon selecting Lusaka as the potential capital of Northern Rhodesia, Adshead proceeded to identify a specific site within the Lusaka area. His report outlined four potential options: a high ground north of the railway siding, between the headwaters of the Chunga and Ngwerere streams, near Ngwerere Railway Station; the Munali area; Manda Hill; and his preferred site located on a ridge to the southeast of the siding (Collins, 1969, p. 88; Adshead, n.d.-b, p. 7).

Adshead's choice of the ridge site was multifaceted. The ridge offered natural advantages, including healthy winds and scenic wooded surroundings, making it an attractive and practical location for the new capital. Considering Lusaka's flood history, Adshead recommended building on the ridge to mitigate the risk of seasonal flooding. Thus, the elevated site would create a secure, sustainable, and resilient capital city, laying the groundwork for its modern development (Davies, 1969, p. 7; Nanchengwa, 1990, pp. 25–26).

Furthermore, Adshead projected that the small White settler village of Lusaka in the vicinity had the potential to serve as a nucleus for the growth and development of the new capital of NR, envisioning that the city would flourish, and eventually expand into a thriving metropolis (Kay, 1967, p. 112). Additionally, the ridge's natural slope presented a valuable opportunity for gravity-fed sewerage, making it an ideal location for a European residential area. The slope of the land enabled natural drainage, whilst the low density of the area made septic tank sanitation feasible. Consequently, efficient sanitation and public health could be ensured, and the wooded nature of the area made it relatively attractive for development (Kangwa, 2011, p. 78; Rakodi, 1986, p. 202). In Adshead's words (n.d.-a, p. 7), the site "is on Crown lands, and the development would be greatly assisted by its proximity to the existing township. ... [It is] well suited to the requirements of a residential area", as the slope of the land could facilitate natural drainage and the proposed low-density development made the

land suitable for septic tanks, while the wooded nature of the area made it attractive for development.⁹

The NRG promptly approved Lusaka as the site for its new capital through the Legislative Council in July 1931 and commissioned Adshead to develop the spatial plan for the capital (Government of Northern Rhodesia, 1931, p. 64; Home, 2014, p. 8). This decision marked the beginning of a new era in urban planning for Lusaka. Adshead's vision for the city would be shaped by his paternalistic and racist views on Africans, leading to the design of a racially segregated city.

Adshead's Spatial Vision for Lusaka: The 1931 Masterplan

Professor Adshead's paternalistic and racist views on Africans influenced his design of Lusaka as a racially segregated city. Adshead believed that Africans deserved to be treated as slaves—a harmful and dehumanising attitude that was prevalent during the colonial era (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1967, p. 18; Gann, 1964, p. 259). His judgement of Africans, as quoted by Gann, was a racist and dehumanising assessment, characteristic of the oppressive colonial mind-set, that:

[Africans] are lazy and stupid. ... It would be a mistake to treat them as if they were Europeans: it would be ridiculous to expect them to accept the responsibilities of the white man, and it would be foolish [to give them] those bodily comforts they have never known and which generations of habit have made necessary to the white man. (Gann, 1964, p. 259)

Professor Adshead designed Lusaka's first spatial plan, prioritising European needs while neglecting those of Africans. He adapted the garden-city model to favour Europeans, incorporating discriminatory elements that aligned with the colonial mind-set of white supremacy in NR (Njoh, 2000, p. ix). The plan envisioned a remarkably sprawling capital city, with dimensions equivalent to the combined sizes of Livingstone, Ndola, and Kitwe—a scale that seemed unnecessarily vast given the context (Bradley, 1935/2014, p. 16). This design diverged from Ebenezer Howard's original Garden City model, which emphasized compactness to facilitate accessible services, walkability, and cycling distances

⁹ Crown land was for non-African settlement and for mining development. It included land certified as a result of geological survey to be suitable for European development, and all land known to contain potential mineral resources. See Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1967, p. 20.

Note that the wooded vicinity on the ridge approximated a wooded area in Ebenezer Howard's garden-city plan.

for residents, as well as providing multiple job opportunities, high wages, urban amenities, and rural benefits like fresh air, countryside beauty, and affordable rent (Howard, 1902, p. 57; Hansen, 1980, p. 207).

Adshead's Lusaka design proposed low-density development with green spaces and large plots, aiming to merge urban and rural living for a privileged few (Howard, 1902, p. 16; Mcfadyen, 1970, p. 28). Davies noted that:

The best residences [were planned] between Government House and the Ridgeway government offices with some decline in standards towards the flat land near the railway. Africans would be accommodated at ... higher densities and much lower standards in separate locations sited generally west and south of the capital area. Although no law prevented Africans and Asians from residing in European areas, racial segregation was, for socio-economic reasons, virtually complete until the eve of independence. (1969, p. 28)

Lusaka's colonial design perpetuated racial segregation, with Europeans residing in elevated, surveilled areas, and Africans relegated to low-lying, flood-prone zones with health hazards, thus prioritising colonial power over African welfare (Collins, 1986, p. 96; Jaeger & Huckbay, 1986, p. 267). The provision in Adshead's Plan set European residential areas into three sub-zones that varied in accordance to different income groups. The 'superior' European housing area was on the Ridge schists at over 4,250 feet above sea level, and extending to Woodlands. Fairview was the second-class European housing area at 4,200 feet; Rhodespark and Northmead were the third class on lower land than the second class (Wilson, 1963, p. 412). High-cost low-density residences were planned on spacious, wide plots with a minimum coverage of 35m x 50m for Europeans. (Makasa, 1996, p. 44). Some smallholdings for those Europeans seeking to garden on the side, plots measuring between 4 hectares and 8 hectares, were available (Hansen, 1997, p. 1). European settlements were planned in the windswept eastern part of Lusaka.

The medium-cost, medium-density housing areas were built for Indians and Coloureds. The plot range planned for this house-type in Thornpark for Coloureds and that for Luburma in Kamwala for Asians averaged 22 m x 22 m covering 0.1225 hectares. Housing for Indians and Coloureds was of intermediate quality, ranking below that of Europeans but above that planned for Africans, and was strategically situated as buffer zones separating exclusive European areas from African townships. No-man's-land green zones were planned between racial housing zones to both accentuate the garden city aspect of Lusaka town and to segregate the races by restraining their movement. This spatial urban planning was comparable to other towns in NR. According to

Sardanis (2014, p. 20), “Each town [on the Copperbelt] was subdivided into black and white areas separated by huge tracts of no man’s land”. As a result, the ample buffer zones and vacant land inadvertently created opportunities for African informal settlements to emerge.

Table 2 outlines Professor Adshead’s population estimates in his plan for Lusaka. Adshead’s plan deviated from Howard’s Garden City model by segregating African and European areas, which contradicted Howard’s principle of integrated development. Adshead’s design for Lusaka perpetuated segregation, undermining Howard’s vision of inclusivity and equal access to social services. This outcome was evident in the limitations on equitable access to social and economic provisions, which reinforced the city’s social and spatial divides (Siame, 2016, pp. 43–44). Ultimately, Adshead’s spatial masterplan for Lusaka favoured Europeans, entrenching legal restrictions and exclusionary settlement policies that marginalised Africans.

Table 2

Adshead’s Planned Population Size for Lusaka

People	Estimated population	%
Europeans	5,000	50
African Police	1,000	10
Others	4,000	40
Total	10,000	100

Note. Adapted from “Lusaka: The Historical Development of a Planned Capital, 1931–1970” by J. Collins, 1986, p. 97, in *Lusaka and its Environs: A Geographical Study of a Planned Capital City in Tropical Africa*, pp. 95–137, edited by G. Williams, Zambia Geographical Association; *Lusaka: The New Capital of Northern Rhodesia* by K. Bradley, 1935/2014, Routledge, p. 168.

Adshead’s master plan for Lusaka projected an ultimate population of 10,000, which was a gross underestimation, as there were already 10,000 Africans living within a 10-mile radius of the town centre (Bremner, 2016, p. 77; see also Makasa, 1996, p. 48; Njoh, 2007, p. 164). The planned population breakdown consisted of 5,000 Europeans, 1,000 African police, and 4,000 others, including African domestic servants. The design featured a grand avenue, 122 m wide, spanning the ridge as the central axis of the new capital city’s layout (Njoh, 2007, p. 165). The plan envisioned a “generous and gracious city” with ample landscaping, expansive open spaces, and broad streets; this prioritised aesthetics and grandeur, but also perpetuated colonial-era values that favoured European

comfort over African needs (Makasa, 1996, p. 48). Without the prompt of an industrial revolution in Lusaka, the NRG accepted the garden-city spatial development plan, which highlighted the colonial administration's priorities and biases (King, 1977–1978, p. 16; see also Ravetz, 1981). We now present the salient features of Adshead's spatial plan for Lusaka, the new capital of NR.

Adshead's Lusaka master plan, that he prepared in 1931, included:

- **layout:** basic layout of roads and circles, with the Ridgeway as the main spine road
- **railway station:** prominent feature, with a 'new station' and formal avenue
- **government centre:** located next to the Gymkhana Club, the social centre for the British
- **native areas:** smaller than European and administrative areas, located at the southern edge of the layout
- **amenities:** included a 'native hospital', 'native industrial schools', and a 'site for Cathedral'

The global economic downturn led P. J. Bowling, the town planning engineer in the Public Works Department, to scale down Adshead's original plan for Lusaka, resulting in a revised plan that became the blueprint for the new capital's construction (Mulundano, 2023, p. 32). The New Capital project commenced in 1931 but faced significant delays due to budgetary constraints. Following a comprehensive review and revision by Bowling, the project resumed, paving the way for the development of Lusaka as the new capital. A comparative analysis of the Adshead and Bowling plans exposes the underlying racial segregation, social pretensions of colonial administrators, and austerity measures. These elements not only reflect the discriminatory practices of the time but also highlight the institutional racism that pervaded urban planning decisions.

In 1933, Bowling scaled down Adshead's master plan for Lusaka and made the following amendments:

- **layout:** built upon Adshead's basic layout, but with a greater emphasis on the proposed airport
- **airport:** clustered with 'residences' of senior officials, the Gymkhana Club, an arboretum, and a golf course
- **Government House:** larger site with a grander entrance drive
- **government and municipal centres:** smaller than in Adshead's plan
- **native areas:** similar to Adshead's plan, but with added details such as the 'Governor's village' and a 'personal servants compound'
- **amenities:** included an 'African trades school', a school site and hostel (presumably for Europeans), and a nursery

- **Map 3**
- *Old and New Lusaka*



- *Note.* Square lines represent Old Lusaka; horizontal lines represent New Lusaka. From "Lusaka: The Historical Development of a Planned Capital, 1931–1970" by J. Collins, 1986, p. 100, in *Lusaka and its Environs: A Geographical Study of a Planned Capital City in Tropical Africa*, pp. 95–137, edited by G. Williams, Zambia Geographical Association.

When Bowling left in 1934, Eric Dutton, then assistant chief secretary, oversaw the construction of Lusaka, the new capital. To give the city a garden appearance, Dutton imported around 60 species of trees and shrubs from various countries, including Australia, Kenya, and India (Appendix A). Lusaka was declared the capital of Northern Rhodesia on 28 May 1935, despite being incomplete. The city was characterised by strict racial segregation, with Africans facing arrest for using "European-only" facilities. Sanitation systems improved in European areas due to the Public Health Amendment No. 9 of 1934 Ordinance sanitary ordinance, but Africans had limited access to basic facilities, highlighting

stark racial disparities. By 1936, the Lusaka Management Board struggled to provide essential services in African housing areas, exacerbating the contrast in living conditions along racial lines.

Law, Health and Inequality: Discriminatory Public Health Instruments, 1936–1948

Some laws in the colonial era perpetuated deplorable public health practices, particularly in African labour compounds such as Mboyunga in Old Lusaka. A significant portion of the board's jurisdiction, approximately 18 km², overlapped with the New Lusaka capital site, which was administered by the central government under the auspices of the NRG through the Provincial Commissioner, as illustrated in Map 3. This overlap highlights that conflicting interests and priorities existed in urban planning and public health management. An NRG report in 1936 observed that:

The natives are housed in the locations. The houses themselves, in most cases, and their surroundings leave a lot to be desired. ... [In contrast], old and new government houses [for European accommodation] are brick buildings of bungalow-type with wide verandas, and many are provided with mosquito gauze. Domestic sanitation consists of earth closets. (NRG, 1936, p. 12)

The board's neglect of public health in Mboyunga and other formal African areas led some Africans to seek alternative housing on European farms, building makeshift homes in unsanitary conditions, but with a sense of independence. This proximity of Old and New Lusaka, including Mboyunga, meant that there were shared administrative, public health, and related challenges.

The Bushfires Ordinance No. 14 of 1939, which criminalised bushfires in the Northern Rhodesia protectorate to prevent soil erosion and conserve wildlife, was among colonial laws that Africans defied because they clashed with their traditional way of life. This law conflicted with the traditional agricultural practice of *chitemene*, which relied on controlled burning. Chitemene involved clearing land by lopping and burning tree branches and bushes to create a fertile, ash-rich soil ideal for maize, millet and sorghum cultivation. Even African colonial administrators, such as kapitaos and messengers, were reluctant to enforce this and other regulations that clashed with African values. However, colonial experts deemed the chitemene system unsustainable due to population growth, citing soil erosion and public health concerns caused by smoke, and thus successfully persuaded the authorities to ban the practice (European Commission, 2006). Interestingly, scholars such as Mackenzie (1998) have argued that the underlying

purpose of the bushfire ordinance was not only to undermine African agriculture, but also to uproot Africans from their traditional agrarian livelihoods and create a labour pool to serve colonial interests.

Decent and affordable housing is a crucial public health concern, directly affecting residents' physical and mental health. Substandard conditions can lead to respiratory issues, injuries, and mental health concerns, making access to safe, comfortable, and affordable housing essential for public health and well-being. The physical environment significantly impacts health, with factors like ventilation, sanitation, lighting, and safety either promoting or harming well-being. Well-designed and maintained spaces can foster health, while poorly maintained or hazardous spaces can lead to health issues, making this a crucial consideration in public health, architecture, and urban planning (Oluwabunmi Ige, 2019).

By 1943, 90% of African housing provided by the Lusaka Management Board consisted of one-roomed, windowless structures, which severely compromised residents' access to clean and fresh air. Poor ventilation in substandard housing led to a build-up of indoor air pollutants, worsening respiratory issues and other health problems. This unacceptable situation highlighted the need for improved housing conditions and prioritisation of residents' health and well-being (*Chilanga district rural notebook*, n.d.; Kangwa, 2011, p. 81). These dwellings, constructed from poles and mud, or brick and concrete, with thatched roofs, fell far short of minimal standards for decency and hygiene, particularly when occupied by married couples. The cramped and rudimentary conditions were woefully inadequate, perpetuating unsanitary and inhumane living conditions (Kangwa, 2011, p. 81). The housing structures provided for Africans were severely deficient, lacking separate bedrooms for children and adults, making it impossible to ensure a quiet and disturbance-free sleeping environment.

The Eccles commission of 1944 highlighted the deplorable state of these dwellings, which fell far short of minimum standards for decency and hygiene, and perpetuated inhumane living conditions for African families (Tipple, 1981, p. 71). The Eccles report described unauthorised areas as "squalid in the extreme, posing a significant threat to public health due to their proximity to the township" (NRG, 1944). Additionally, a housing and planning commission in 1945 reported that:

Lusaka municipal compounds presented poor planning [and it was] a tragedy to observe Africans living under adverse conditions. The community latrines ... serving Africans [were] poorly designed and in foul condition. ... The ground in the precincts of the latrines [was] littered with human excreta [and there was] no provision for children. (Jameson, 1945, p. 7)

Flooding of Lusaka created a mosquito-infested environment, which posed a significant health risk to residents. Standing water and flooded areas bred mosquitoes, spreading malaria and other diseases; this emphasised the need for effective drainage systems and public health measures to combat mosquito-borne illnesses (Myers, 2003, p. 337).

The Extermination of Mosquitoes Ordinance of 1944 was a landmark legislation in NR and Lusaka: It targeted malaria, the leading cause of death among both African and European populations. This statute sought to eliminate mosquito breeding sites, and reduce disease transmission, and thereby save lives and improve public health in the region (Extermination of Mosquitoes Ordinance No. 13, 1944). This ordinance was amended in 1945 and 1949 to declare mosquito breeding sites as nuisances. Residents in Lusaka and NR were required to:

- clear bushes and long grass around their homes
- cover wells
- prevent mosquito larvae from breeding, with failure to comply being a punishable offense (Extermination of Mosquitoes Ordinance No. 13, 1944)

Except for measures to prevent epidemic outbreaks, African labour in Lusaka saw limited benefits from town planning and public health ordinances, mirroring the modest gains from the labour stabilisation policy.

African Workers in Lusaka: Limited Gains from Labour Stabilisation, 1948

The Urban African Housing Ordinance No. 32 of 1948 was a ground-breaking law that enabled local authorities to build and rent houses, to address the severe housing shortage and deplorable living conditions in urban areas. Although primarily aimed at boosting Copperbelt mine workers' productivity, the ordinance had a broader impact, indirectly, and improved housing conditions for African labour across urban NR. (Urban African Housing Ordinance No. 32, 1948, chap. 234).

The Urban African Housing Ordinance No. 32 of 1948 mandated:

- local authorities and employers to use approved building materials and provide adequate sanitation in housing for African labour
- occupiers to maintain cleanliness inside and around the houses
- local authorities to ensure public health, prevent epidemics, and address unhealthy dwelling conditions and overcrowding (Heisler, 1970, p. 166)

The ordinance revolutionised housing provisions, as it expected employers to provide spacious, two-room houses for families; this significant upgrade from the previous single rooms for solo male workers recognised the importance of adequate housing for workers and their loved ones (Urban African Housing Ordinance of No 32, 1948, chap. 234).

The 1948 Urban African Housing Ordinance allowed women and children to join men in NR's urban centres, promoting labour stabilisation. Despite aiming to improve housing standards, many employers still provided substandard housing with communal facilities, thus neglecting the needs of the African labourers (Basila, 2005, p. 20). The ordinance led to a surge in women migrating to urban centres, which contributed to labour stabilisation in Lusaka. As a result, fewer African workers returned to rural areas, thus creating a more settled and stable workforce, and significantly impacting labour and family history (Sapao, 2020, p. 228).

The labour-stabilisation policy primarily benefited mine owners, such as Rhodesia Anglo American and Rhodesia Selection Trust, which were controlled and managed from London. Consequently, the policy prioritised British interests and those of the white minority in NR, rather than enhancing the welfare of African workers in urban areas like Lusaka and the Copperbelt. (*The Star*, 1952; Tembo, 2015, p. 200). Table 3 presents the taxes paid by mining companies to the NRG in 1947 and 1948.

Table 3

Income Tax Paid by Mining Companies to the Northern Rhodesia government, 1947–1948

Year	Total Revenue (£)	Income Tax paid by Copper Companies (£)	% of Revenue
1947	4,292,711	1,189,918	27.7
1948	6,318,677	2,841,900	44.9

Note. Data adapted from *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence* by E. L. Berger, 1974, Clarendon Press, p. 8.

The labour stabilisation policy was driven by the lucrative profits from copper and cobalt production, which yielded significant benefits for mine owners and the British government. Notably, a negligible portion of these revenues was allocated towards improving the welfare of Africans as the NRG, local authorities, colonial officials, and planners were all capitalist tools. Between 1941 and 1947, £7,092,483 in taxes was paid to the British Treasury, enriching mine owners

through dividends and generating revenue for the British government (Commissioner of Income Tax, 1948).

Although the labour-stabilisation was largely criticised, Chauncey's social research on the Copperbelt revealed that the policy had some positive trickle consequences on African labour. Notably, Chauncey found that the presence of wives in the urban working space had multiple benefits for labour (Chauncey, 1981, p. 140). Single men were twice as likely to be hospitalised as married men. This suggests that women's presence in urban centres including Lusaka enhanced African labour's value. Wives prepared nutritious meals, leading to healthier workforces, reduced absenteeism, and lower medical expenses. Married African labour was more productive, predictable, and reliable than single labour. The stabilising influence of women was crucial to the mining industry's efficiency and profitability. Prain noted that:

The old concept of rural inhabitants coming to the towns to work for shorter or longer periods and returning home for comparatively long intervals was a waste of man-power and an anachronism [causing African workers to] have a foot in two camps [and unable] to reach their full potential efficiency in either. (1956 p. 308)

The labour stabilisation policy yielded minimal benefits for Africans in terms of housing, education, and amenities. Despite the development of new suburbs such as New Chilenje and Matero by the Lusaka city authorities, the African workforce remained largely unskilled. Moreover, the demand for housing far exceeded the available municipal rental housing, forcing many workers into unauthorised African compounds. In response to the 1948 Urban African Housing Ordinance, the Lusaka Management Board devised discriminatory town planning principles, perpetuating unequal policies in urban spaces (Hansen, 1982, pp. 122-123).

The Lusaka Management Board's Principles: Segregation and Spatial Planning, 1948

The Lusaka Management Board's town planning principles aimed to guide future housing developments for both African and European communities. According to Rothman, the endorsement of the Lusaka Management Board Minutes explicitly stated:

1. It would be a fundamental error to block European development to the east or northeast.
2. African housing areas should be kept off the main approach roads.

3. African housing areas should be reasonably near the place of employment ... [but restricted] to the limestone areas. (Management Board Minutes, 14 December 1948, National Archives of Zambia Memorandum, in Rothman, 1972, p. 210)

Note that areas east or northeast of Lusaka, as per principle (1), boast superior soil quality on elevated ground, with a cooler and healthier climate. Conversely, principle (2) would strategically locate African housing to conceal poorer living conditions, preserving Lusaka's garden-city aesthetic. Meanwhile, principle (3) would relegate African labour housing to unhealthy environments, despite being situated near workplaces. The Lusaka Management Board's 1948 spatial planning principles connoted the segregated approach of the time, prioritising European development and marginalising African housing areas, despite receiving central government funding.

The 1949 Urban African Housing Ordinance allowed Lusaka to appoint medical inspectors, but, due to funding constraints, the role was combined with the role of a compound superintendent. The Lusaka Management Board's poor implementation of the ordinance, and inadequate funding led to the ineffective management of health standards, which caused friction between central and local governments when the governor intervened by sending medical inspectors. Meanwhile, African labour faced exorbitant rents for substandard housing.¹⁰ Subsequently, African labour engaged in piecemeal and crop cultivation to supplement their formal employment income (Rakodi, 1988, p. 502). Urbanisation continued to weaken public health in the formal African housing areas in Lusaka, and the situation was dire in the informal African housing areas, which had no public health services whatsoever.

In 1949, a significant amendment was made to the principal town planning ordinance (Town Planning Ordinance No. 8, 1949), designed to address the existing public health concerns and improve urban planning within the city. The legislation also mandated that the actions (1) to (3) listed below shall only be instituted with the permission from the territorial Town Planning Board:

1. constructing, altering, or adding to any building or structure
2. transferring ownership of any land
3. changing the existing use of any land

The Town Planning Board was empowered to enforce these regulations and prevent any violations. The focus now shifts to the 1948 Bowling/Floyd Plan for Lusaka, a key initiative of the NRG.

¹⁰ See the reaction of the Eccles report of the commission appointed to inquire into the administration and finances of native locations in urban areas (NRG, 1944).

The Bowling/Floyd Plan: Shaping Lusaka's Segregated Urban Landscape, 1948

In 1948, the NRG commissioned P. J. Bowling, then in private practice, to develop a spatial development plan for Lusaka. Bowling, in collaboration with his colleague Floyd, submitted the Bowling/Floyd Plan, which has been criticised for neglecting the needs of the African population (Collins, 1986, p. 112). The resultant 1948 Bowling/Floyd Plan deplored the sprawling development in Lusaka for two key reasons. Firstly, the sprawl led to a significant increase in service costs. Consequently, the NRG introduced a bicycle allowance of 3/6d per month for African labourers residing further than 2 miles (3.2 km) away from their workplaces, thus highlighting the need to address the sprawl's financial implications (Buckland, 1967, p. 16).¹¹ Secondly, the sprawl entrenched the separation of the new capital from Old Lusaka. A feasibility study revealed that a mere 5% of African labourers in Lusaka could afford bus fare, and the service would require a government annual subsidy of £500 to operate (*Lusaka African Bus Service*, 1946–1947). However, the bus service failed in 1949 due to erratic fuel supplies and soaring petrol prices, leaving the African working class without a reliable transportation option (*Lusaka African Bus Service*, ca. 1949).

The Bowling/Floyd Plan drew inspiration from Adshead's garden-city concept, but with a key departure: It rejected the separation of the new capital from Old Lusaka. Instead, Bowling and Floyd proposed relocating the city airport, to address noise and safety concerns associated with nearby residential areas, thus aligning with established town-planning principles. However, the NRG rejected this suggestion, along with several others (Collins, 1986, p. 112). The implemented proposals from the Bowling/Floyd Plan were as follows:

- The government acquired Farm 110a (Villa Elisabetta) for industrial development and the construction of railway marshalling yards.
- Plans for commercial plots on Independence Avenue were abandoned, and the Ridgeway Hotel was later built on this site, ending efforts to relocate the commercial centre from Cairo Road in Old Lusaka.
- Land was allocated for the construction of two blocks of flats for European occupancy, between Nasser Road and Raphael Kombe Road.
- The second-class area was redefined to facilitate the development of the Chilenje township suburb.
- The main sewage disposal works were located north of Machinchi Road.

The implemented proposals from the Bowling/Floyd Plan significantly influenced the development of Lusaka, mirroring the colonial government's

¹¹ For an explanation of the currency in use during this period, see Appendix B

priorities and the values of the era. The Lusaka Management Board rejected the Bowling/Floyd Plan, which had been initiated by the NRG; this rejection reflected a common colonial dynamic where central government schemes clashed with the interests of local authorities, fuelling tensions and power struggles over urban development control (Sapao, 2020, p. 273).

The colonial government and European residences on Ridgeway used an outdated gravity-based sewerage system until 1952, when a modern main drainage system and treatment plant were installed. Meanwhile, the CBD and industrial area relied on bucket latrines until 1956, which shows how slowly the infrastructure developed in the capital (Hodgson, 1964, pp. 5–6). Lusaka gained autonomy in 1952 and established its own planning authority. This significant milestone in the city's development marked a shift towards decentralised decision-making and greater autonomy to address its unique urban planning needs (Nag, 1990, p. 111).

The Jellicoe Plan: A Blueprint for Segregation, 1950

In 1950 Geoffrey Alan Jellicoe, an English town planner and landscape architect, developed the Jellicoe Plan (Jellicoe, 1950), by invitation of the Lusaka Management Board. The spatial plan aimed to restrict urban sprawl to make administrative controls cost-effective, and provide for separate development requirements for Europeans and Africans (Miller et al., 2008, p. 43). The plan designated separate areas for Europeans and Africans, with Europeans enjoying spacious, well-drained neighbourhoods and Africans relegated to flood-prone areas (Njoh, 2009, pp. 6, 9, 16). Collins summarised the five industrial, commercial and non-African objectives of the Jellicoe Plan as follows:

- African locations run by the local government would contain the majority of Lusaka's low-cost housing in the next twenty years: Matero in the northwest, and in the southeast, an unbroken stretch of African housing from New Kamwala to Chilenje.
- Heavy industrial area and the bulk storage plants and their railway siding would be located south of Matero.
- Light industrial area would be at the north end of Cairo Road
- General location of several European residential areas ... the development of Roma and Twin Palm with large plots similar to those at Kabulonga.
- The establishment of Thornpark for housing the coloured population and the proposition for the removal of the

railway station to the east side of the railway. (Collins, 1986, p. 111)

This segregation was reinforced by the location of European residential areas near amenities, such as schools, hospitals, and shopping centres, while African neighbourhoods were situated near industrial areas, exposing residents to pollution and health hazards (Collins, 1986, p. 113). The plan's inadequate housing provisions for Africans led to a severe shortage, forcing many to live in unauthorised compounds lacking basic amenities such as sanitation, water, and electricity (Office of the District Commissioner, 1958).

The flaws in the Jellicoe plan included unrealistic population estimates for Africans, which led to inadequate provision of Board-rented housing for African labour, resulting in severe overcrowding, poor sanitation, and inadequate amenities (Nanchengwa, 1990, p. 44). Jellicoe's plan provided for a total urban population of 125,000 in the next 25 years. Of this projected population 100,000 were Africans and 25,000 Europeans in an area of over 130 km² stretching from Ngwerere siding in the north to Chilanga in the south.


The population estimate for Africans was outdated as, at the time, the existing African population within a fifty kilometres radius surpassed this estimate. This oversight perpetuated Lusaka's stark contrasts, exacerbating social and economic disparities. African neighbourhoods struggled with inadequate waste management, poor road infrastructure, and insufficient recreational spaces, perpetuating social and economic disparities (Njoh, 2007, p. 221). It was improvident for the governor to approve non-statutory development plans for Lusaka (Adshead Plan in 1931, Bowling Plan in 1933, and Jellicoe Plan in 1950) without taking them to the territorial Town Planning Board for scrutiny and amendment as required by law; the insubstantial validation meant that such plans could easily be amended to suit those developmental whims more cogent than others (Collins, 1969, pp. 5–6). Over the years, successive planners reduced the scope of Adshead's plan but retained the garden city spatial structure. The resultant fragmentary development diminished the overall laid-down garden city plan for Lusaka (Ng'onga, 2012, p. 4). Understanding this history is crucial for addressing Lusaka's ongoing social, economic, and environmental challenges.

The Jellicoe Plan failed to provide for Africans, thereby perpetuating the housing crisis as the norm for African labour to the extent that the Board-rented houses were inadequate. Subsequently, many African workers lived in unauthorised compounds while Europeans were the prime beneficiaries of buildings worth £392,469 in the building plans passed by the Town Planning Board in 1952 (Nanchengwa, 1990, p. 44; Sampson, 2013, p. 68).

A substitute spatial town plan was subsequently sponsored by the NRG in collaboration with experts from Northern Rhodesia and Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. This 1952 Lusaka Development Plan was statutory. It authorised Lusaka to have its own planning authority (Nag, 1990, p.111). The NRG-sponsored plan discussed below was intended to usurp the Lusaka Management Board's Jellicoe Plan; this was indicative of the ongoing rivalry over control of the development of Lusaka, the new capital of NR.

Map 4

First Statutory Town Planning Scheme for Lusaka, 1952



Note. From "Lusaka: The Historical Development of a Planned Capital, 1931-1970" by J. Collins, 1986, p. 103, *Lusaka and its Environs: A Geographical Study of a Planned Capital City in Tropical Africa*, pp. 95-137, edited by G. Williams, Zambia Geographical Association.

The 1952 Lusaka Development Plan to the Eve of Independence

The 1952 Lusaka Development Plan, illustrated in Map 4, was a landmark achievement as it became Lusaka's first statutory development plan. The plan was driven by the colonial administration's vision for a modern, organized, and segregated city. Its primary objectives were:

- unifying the dispersed development into an urban town
- linking the commercial centre in Old Lusaka and the government centre in New Lusaka
- providing diverse housing categories and public urban services
- establishing industrial areas to create a balanced community
- broadening Cairo Road
- constructing a sewerage treatment plant for Lusaka's commercial centre

According to Home (2014, p. 16), "The milestone was driven by the colonial administration's desire to create a modern, organised, and segregated city". The plan's statutory status made it enforceable, boosting investor confidence and reducing opposition. However, the plan's implementation faced several challenges. External factors hindered its implementation, particularly when NR joined the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. This led to Lusaka being eclipsed by Salisbury, the federal capital, causing a decline in Lusaka's economy and reduced job opportunities. Kapasa (2009, p. 8) noted that "real power over the economy was outside NR in the hands of international companies and their directors".

Key challenges associated with the plan included the following:

- The railway reserve barrier separated Old Lusaka from New Lusaka, causing problems.
- Development west of Old Lusaka was limited due to the dolomite surface and downwind location.
- The integration plan was unsuccessful.
- Housing provision for Africans was inadequate.
- The plan made no provision for the urban African population.

Despite these challenges, the plan successfully provided for the:

- broadening of Cairo Road, which improved the city's aesthetic appearance
- construction of a sewerage treatment plant, replacing the previous "bucket latrine service" and "night soil wagon"
- relocation of the railway station and boma

The 1952 spatial plan marked a significant turning point in Lusaka's development, envisioning a dual transformation: from a solely administrative seat of government to a multifunctional city that combined administrative and industrial roles. The plan also entrenched racial segregation in Lusaka's urban design, with buffer zones separating African smallholdings from European areas.

Lusaka's economy suffered a significant setback in the mid- to late-1950s due to declining copper prices. This decline, exacerbated by existing challenges, made the 1952 plan untenable, resulting in widespread unemployment. To address the outdated 1952 town planning scheme, the NRG introduced several amendments, including the Town Planning Amendment No. 12 of 1953, the Town Planning Amendment Ordinance No. 20 of 1958, and a land acquisition programme to encompass developments in contiguous areas. A municipal corporation was created in 1954 (Municipal Corporations Amendment, 1954) and Lusaka was upgraded to city council status, though without African representation, in 1960.

The objective of the Lusaka Development Plan, approved by Government Notice No. 289 of 1958, was to legalise various developments adjacent to Lusaka's outer boundaries, to facilitate modifications to land-use zones in existing developments. The plan was regulatory and restrictive in nature. It fundamentally recommended specific future land-use allocation. It also proposed a trunk road and secondary road network for Lusaka. The planning scheme expired in 1961, and gave rise to the Town and Country Planning Ordinance which was passed on 23 September 1961 and amended the following year (Town and Country Planning Ordinance No. 32 of 1961; Town and Country Planning Ordinance (Amendment) No. 25 of 1962). This marked a significant milestone in the evolution of Lusaka's planning framework.

The Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1961 reformed the country's approach to urban planning and development. The ordinance had three key consequences:

- It abolished the Town Planning Board, ending its 32-year tenure.
- It marked the end of centralised planning, ushering in a new era of decentralised planning administration.
- It initiated the decentralisation of planning authority, thus devolving power to local authorities and paving the way for more localised decision-making in urban development.

This ordinance empowered the minister of Local Government and Housing to delegate town-planning authority to Lusaka and the Copperbelt towns of Kitwe, Ndola, Luanshya, Chingola, Mufulira, Broken Hill, and Livingstone. Further, this ordinance required local governments to publicly advertise plans, and invite public inspection of the plans, before submitting them for approval by the

minister of Local Government and Housing, ensuring a more transparent and inclusive planning process (Hamalambo, 1984, pp. 14–17).

The objectives of the 1961 Town and Country Planning Ordinance as amended were as follows:

- repeal outdated legislation, including the Town Planning Ordinance No. 60 of 1929 (chap. 123), Municipal Corporations Ordinance No. 16 of 1927 (chap. 119), and Section 27(a) of the Township's Ordinance of 1929 (chap. 120)
- empower the minister of Local Government and Housing to appoint a planning authority or service
- establish a Town and Country Planning Tribunal to resolve disputes
- provide for the creation and revocation of development plans
- control the development and subdivision of land
- facilitate compensation for individuals affected by development planning decisions

The NRLC enacted the Town and Country Planning Act of 1962, which became the primary planning legislation in NR (Country Planning (Amendment) Ordinance No. 25, 1962). This act authorised the minister of Local Government and Planning to establish the Planning Authority, also known as the Planning Service. The core functions of this entity were:

- preparation of development plans
- execution of functions listed under Section 24 of the Principal Ordinance (Town and Country Planning Ordinance, chap. 475, 1962)

The Planning Authority played a vital role in shaping urban development, ensuring structured growth. The 1962 Town and Country Planning Act established a robust appeals process, allowing individuals to seek redress via the Country and Town Planning Tribunal, thus protecting their rights and ensuring fair and transparent development decisions.


Additionally, the Noxious Weeds Amendment Ordinance of 1963 criminalised the growth or use of harmful plants, including marijuana that were deemed hazardous to public health. These amendments aimed to modernise urban planning, promote sustainable development, and protect public health. The introduction of these amendments marked a significant shift from the colonial-era public health laws that had previously shaped urban planning in NR.

Colonial public health laws prioritised European interests, perpetuating segregation and discrimination, with urban planning benefiting whites first and others incidentally. Map 5 illustrates the administrative and commercial areas, and the residential areas segregated for Europeans, Indians, and Africans in Lusaka by 1963. The Ridgeway area, home and workplace of the colonial elite,

showcased a grand and gracious cityscape, reflecting the intention to create a luxurious and exclusive space for the privileged class.

Map 5

Lusaka City, 1963



Note. From "Lusaka—A City of Tropical Africa" by E. Wilson, 1963, *Geography*, 48(4), 411-414, p. 413.

Conclusion

Lusaka experienced significant growth during the colonial period, transforming from a village management board in 1913 to a township board in 1930, a municipal council in 1954, and finally a city council in 1960. This progression enabled the local authority to better manage increasing demands for public health services and administrative tasks. As of 1963, Lusaka's population was approximately 87,495, comprising 73,645 Africans, 11,810 Europeans, 1,700 Asians, and 340 Coloureds, according to Wilson's estimates. This demographic breakdown highlights the racial dynamics and disparities that characterised the city during the colonial era (Wilson, 1963, p. 412).

Given post-colonial Lusaka's swelling population in its unlawful settlements, aligning with garden-city ideals requires a multifaceted approach. Key strategies include:

- vertical development and urban renewal
- satellite cities and urban extensions
- infill development and green infrastructure
- participatory planning and community engagement
- affordable housing and social services
- sustainable transportation and connectivity

As we move forward, it is crucial to acknowledge the historical context and ongoing legacies of colonial planning. To achieve inclusive, equitable, and sustainable urban development, we can draw on Ebenezer Howard's Garden City ideals, including:

- preserving green spaces and containing urban sprawl
- providing recreation areas and supporting local food production
- effecting reforestation and habitat restoration, thereby mitigating climate change
- relocating population clusters from unlawful settlements to more sustainable and equitable environments

Potential areas for future scholarly research arising from this work include the following:

1. **colonial legacy and contemporary urban challenges:** Investigate how colonial planning has contributed to current urban issues in Lusaka, such as inadequate infrastructure, spatial inequalities, and social disparities.
2. **participatory planning for redress:** Examine the potential of participatory planning approaches to address historical injustices and promote inclusive, equitable urban development in Lusaka.

3. **transferable lessons:** Analyse the applicability of lessons learned from Lusaka's experience to other post-colonial cities, identifying best practices and strategies for contextual adaptation.
4. **urban planning for socio-economic equity:** Investigate the role of urban planning in addressing socio-economic disparities perpetuated by colonialism, including strategies for inclusive zoning, affordable housing, and social infrastructure development.
5. **innovative technologies for sustainable development:** Explore the potential of urban informatics, digital twins, and other innovative technologies to enhance sustainable urban development in post-colonial contexts, by improving resource management, efficiency, and citizen engagement.

In conclusion, this study has examined the colonial legacy of Lusaka, revealing the intricate relationships between town planning, public health, and the creation of a segregated city. Through the lens of power, inequality, and urban development, this research has demonstrated how colonial town planning legislation, particularly between 1927 and 1961, perpetuated racial segregation, advanced capitalist interests, and entrenched social inequities. Paradoxically, these policies ultimately led to Lusaka's transformation into an African-majority metropolis by 1963. As we reflect on Lusaka's colonial past, it becomes clear that the historical dynamics of colonial planning have far-reaching implications for future urban planning, emphasizing the need for inclusive and equitable approaches that address the lingering legacies of colonialism and promote just, equitable, and sustainable cities.

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Appendix A

Tree and Shrub Planting in the European Zone

To achieve a Garden City aesthetic by 1935, the following local and imported trees and shrubs in Table A1 were planted along the streets of the European zone in Map 5.¹²

Table A1

Names¹³ of the Plants Used in the European Zone for the Garden City Aesthetic

(A) Indigenous Flowering Trees	(B) Imported Flowering Trees
<i>Acacia</i> (several varieties)	<i>Caledendron Capensis</i> (Cape-chestnut)
<i>Bauhinia</i>	<i>Jacaranda Momosaefolia</i>
<i>Cassia</i> (several varieties)	<i>Langunaria Petersonia</i>
<i>Ditchcrostachys Glomerata</i>	<i>Markhamia Hildabrandtii</i>
<i>Dombeya</i>	<i>Melia Azedarach</i> (Syringa)
<i>Erythrina Cafra</i> (Kaffir broom)	<i>Milletia Oblata</i>
<i>Gardenia Globosa</i>	<i>Moringa Pteregosperma</i> (Horse-radish tree)
<i>Kigelia Primata</i> (Sausage tree)	<i>Parkinsonia Aculeata</i>
<i>Lonchocarpus Capassa</i>	<i>Poinciana Regia</i> (Flamboyant)
<i>Peltophorum</i>	<i>Spathodea Nilotica</i> (African flame)
<i>Securidaca Longipedunculata</i> (violet tree)	<i>Sterculia Acerifolia</i> (Australian flame)
(C) Indigenous Shade Trees	(D) Imported Shade Trees
<i>Afzelia Quanzensis</i> (Pod mahogany)	<i>Bamboo</i>
<i>Euphorbia Candelabra</i>	<i>Caledendron Capensis</i> (Cape chestnut)
<i>Ficus Sp.</i> (Wild fig. Several varieties)	<i>Cassia Siamea</i>
<i>Khaya Nyasica</i> (African mahogany)	<i>Cedrela Toona</i> (Indian mahogany)
<i>Parinarium Mobola</i>	<i>Ceiba Pentandra</i>
<i>Tamarindus Indica</i> (Tamarind tree)	<i>Cordia Holstii</i>
<i>Trichilia Emetica</i>	<i>Croton Megalocarpus</i>
<i>Zizyphus Jujutra</i>	<i>Cupressus Pyramidalis</i> (Mediterranean cypress)

¹² At the time of writing, many of the imported trees and shrubs still adorned Lusaka's formerly European-designated areas. Notably, the sausage tree was absent from the roads, while Lantana was regarded as a weed.

¹³ The names are written as given in the source, without following the binomial nomenclature convention of the specific name being lowercase. Errors in the names are uncorrected.

(E) Flowering and Ornamental Shrubs*	(D) Imported Shade Trees continued
<p><i>Alstonia Scholaris</i> <i>Amygdalus Persica</i> (flowering peach) <i>Bauhinia Galpini</i> <i>Bolusanthus Speciosa</i> (Rhodesian wisteria) <i>Brugmansia Knightii</i> (Moonflower) <i>Buddleia</i> (white and mauve) <i>Callistemon</i> (Bottle brush) <i>Cassia Grandiflora</i> <i>Cestrum Aurantiacum</i> <i>Crataegus Oxycantha</i> <i>Crataegus Pyracantha</i> <i>Duranta Ellissii</i> <i>Euphorbia Splendens</i> (Christ thorn) <i>Hibiscus Sinensis</i> (single and double) <i>Holmskoldia Sanguinea</i> <i>Iochroma Tubulosa</i> <i>Jatropha Multifida</i> (Coral plant) <i>Lasindra Macrantha Grandiflora</i> <i>Nerium Oleander</i> <i>Poinsettia</i> (single and double, scarlet, white and pink) <i>Punica Granatum</i> (Pomegranate, single and double) <i>Tecoma Smithii</i> <i>Thevetia Nerifolia</i> <i>Wigandia Caracasana</i></p>	<p><i>Eucalyptus Citriodura</i>, <i>Rostrata</i> and <i>Robusta</i> <i>Ficus Macrophylla</i> <i>Ficus Retusa</i> <i>Fraxinus Velutina</i> <i>Grevillea Robusta</i> <i>Maesopsis Emenii</i> <i>Mangifera Indica</i> (Mango) <i>Phytolacca Dioica</i> (Belhambra) <i>Platanus Orientalis</i> (Plane tree) <i>Schinus Molle</i> (Pepper tree) <i>Sterculia Diversifolia</i> <i>Sterculia Platanifolia</i> <i>Tristanea Conferta</i></p>
* (E) and (F) Hedges also used for ornamental purposes	<p>(F) Hedges*</p> <p><i>Callitris Calcarata</i> <i>Cupressus Arizonica</i> <i>Cupressus Lusitanica</i> <i>Cupressus Torulosa</i> <i>Dodenea Viscosa</i> <i>Euphorbia</i> <i>Morus Alba</i> <i>Nerium Oleander</i> <i>Pittosporum Undulatum</i> <i>Rhus Lancea</i> <i>Thevetia Nerifolia</i> <i>Thuja Orientalis</i></p>
<p>*<i>Bauhinia Acuminata</i> *<i>Bauhinia Purpurea</i> *<i>Bixia Orellana</i> *<i>Duranta Plumerii</i> *<i>Lagerstroemia Indica</i> (Pride of India) *<i>Lantana</i> *<i>Poinciana Pulcherrima</i> *<i>Tecoma Stans</i></p>	<p>(G) Climbing Plants</p> <p><i>Allananda Schottii</i> <i>Allananda Violacea</i> <i>Antigonum Leptopis</i> <i>Beaumontia Grandiflora</i> <i>Bigonía Venusta</i> (Golden Shower) <i>Bougainvillea</i> (Terracotta) <i>Passiflora Edulis</i> (Grenadilla) <i>Solanum Wenlandii</i> (Potato creeper) <i>Stephanotis Floribunda</i></p>

Note. Adapted from Lusaka: *The New Capital of Northern Rhodesia* by K. Bradley, 1935/2014, Routledge, p. 111.

Appendix B
Colonial Era Currency

Table B1 provides an overview of the currency used in Northern Rhodesia during the colonial era.

Table B1

Colonial Era Currency

British Pound Sterling (£), Shillings (s), pence(d)	
Six pence	6d
Twelve pence = One shilling	12d
Two shillings and six pence	2/6d
Ten shillings	10/-
Twenty shillings = One pound	£1

Understanding Project Mentality as a Threat to the Sustainability of Donor-Supported Interventions: Insights from a Zambian Reading Intervention

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This article provides valuable insights into project mentality (PM) as a threat to the sustainability of donor-supported interventions. The article examines factors triggering PM through a case study of a donor-supported reading intervention in Zambia and proposes ways to minimise the impact of PM. The study adopted a qualitative-interpretivist-case study approach, including interviews with 35 key stakeholders (eight head teachers, fifteen teachers, six representatives from donor agencies, and six Ministry of Education officials) and data collection through document analysis and classroom observations. Different attitudes and behaviour, such as stereotyping, alienation, and lack of confidence, ownership, commitment, and interest in donor-driven interventions, contributed to the intervention's poor sustainability. The recommendation arising from this study is to employ appropriate strategies, such as fostering a culture of genuine ownership, confidence, commitment, and interest among aid beneficiaries. PM is a multifaceted phenomenon that requires further research. Overall, the article contributes to understanding the dynamics of the PM within donor-supported interventions, and advocates for the development of strategies to mitigate its effects.

Keywords: donor-supported interventions; ownership; project mentality; reading intervention; sustainability; Zambia

Introduction

For several decades, billions of dollars in the form of donor aid have been invested in developing countries, with the stated objective of boosting economic and human development (Andrews, 2009; Easterly, 2006; Makombe, 2022; Moyo, 2009). For example, member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-

Understanding Project Mentality

operation and Development's (OECD's) Development Assistance Committee increased their aid to developing countries from 4.2 billion dollars in 1960 to 152.5 billion dollars in 2015 (World Bank, 2017).

Education was first included as a beneficiary of foreign assistance in the early 1960s. Since then, the sector has received considerable support in the form of donor aid (Heyneman & Lee, 2016). The education sector is likely to continue receiving a great deal of donor support, considering that the post-2015 United Nations (UN) agenda on development—the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—recognises education as a major means of achieving sustainable development (Educate a Child, 2016; UN, 2015).

Donor aid, also known as official development assistance, has been provided through two main channels: bilateral, where one country directly supports another, or multilateral, where multiple countries pool resources through international organisations like the UN or World Bank. Non-governmental organisation aid, also referred to as non-governmental assistance, has encompassed the financial, material, or technical support provided by independent, non-profit entities to address global challenges and promote positive change in vulnerable populations and communities (Edo et al., 2023; OECD, 2007; Thapa, 2020).

Donor support has often been offered as project aid intended to support specific projects (Cordella & Dell'Ariceia, 2007). This type of aid has been a major modality of aid since the 1950s (Jelovac & Vandeninden, 2008). For example, in 2010 about half of the total aid committed to the education sector in developing countries was given in the form of project aid (Riddell & Niño-Zarazúa, 2016). A major concern that has gained prominence and attention with regard to project aid is sustainability (Gillies, 2010; Riddell & Niño-Zarazúa, 2016; Sondlo & Herman, 2020). Sustainability in the context of donor-supported interventions has been defined as the ability of these interventions to provide a continued flow of benefits, which are “owned by the stakeholders and supported on an ongoing basis with locally available resources” once donor funding comes to an end (Young & Hampshire, 2000, p. 1).

Researchers have found evidence that project managers often achieve less than expected and terminate projects once donor support is exhausted (Hofisi & Chizimba, 2013; Riddell & Niño-Zarazúa, 2016; Sabbil & Adam, 2015). The lack of sustainability has not only wasted fiscal, human, and technical resources but also prevented projects from reaching their anticipated potential (Savaya & Spiro, 2012). Several scholars (Bossert, 1990; Haysom, 2006; Hofisi & Chizimba, 2013; Iwelunmor et al., 2016; Lockwood et al., 2003; Lungo et al., 2017; Olima, 2015; Sabbil & Adam, 2015; Turyasingura, 2022) have conducted studies to

identify the factors that facilitate or impede the sustainability of donor-supported interventions beyond donor aid.

Available frameworks for the factors that influence the sustainability of donor-supported interventions have been categorised into two broad groups. The first group consists of project-level factors, which relate to elements that are inherent in the project design and implementation, such as the quality of the project's design as well as the level of involvement of the beneficiaries. The second group consists of contextual-level factors, which focus on elements that exist in the external environment, such as the level of support for the intervention given at institutional and national levels and the socioeconomic and political stability of the recipient country (European Commission, 2006; Loh et al., 2013).

Despite vast literature on the factors that influenced the sustainability of donor-supported interventions, little has been written about a phenomenon called "project mentality" (PM) and its impact on sustainability. Israr (2005) provided a useful source of literature on the phenomenon with his article, which described PM as an "unexplored and unrealized" threat to the sustainability of donor-supported interventions (p. 457). The phenomenon has been defined as specific attitudes and behaviours among organisational staff and other key stakeholders with a given mind-set towards any donor-funded interventions. PM has influenced the effective implementation and long-term sustainability of donor-funded projects by transforming the organisational culture in the organisation's staff.

The scarcity of literature on PM as a threat to the sustainability of donor-supported interventions has also been evident in the literature on such interventions in Zambia¹. Most of the literature that has discussed the sustainability of donor-supported interventions in Zambia has paid little or no attention to comprehensively interrogating the influence of attitudes and behaviours on the continuation of donor-driven projects (Arden, 2012; Dixey, 2008; IOB, 2008, 2011; Kapambwe, 2010; Kruk et al., 2014; Lungo et al., 2017; Room to Read, 2010; Sitali, 2008).

The purpose of the article is therefore to provide insight into the phenomenon of PM as a threat to the sustainability of donor-supported interventions. Using pertinent literature and Israr's framework (2005, p. 457) for analysing organisational attitudes and behaviours towards donor-funded projects, this article explores PM within the Zambian context. This study examines PM through a qualitative case study of the Primary Reading

¹ As a developing country in the southern region of Africa, Zambia has depended on aid to meet its development expenditure (Appolinario 2009; Beyani 2013).

Programme (PRP), which the British Department for International Development (DFID) initially supported. The article particularly seeks to highlight factors that can trigger PM, and suggests ways of minimising its impact.

The Concept of Project Mentality

Israr's Project Mentality

Israr (2005) identified three basic elements that collectively threatened the sustainability of donor-funded projects: political interference, bureaucratic barriers, and PM, which worked together to undermine project success. This article focuses on the third element, namely PM. According to Israr, PM has been characterised by the following features: alienation and indifference to project initiatives; stereotyping of any funded project; lack of ownership of projects; and gratuitous expectations of personal gain. Israr not only claimed to observe the elements of the PM during the implementation of donor-supported interventions in the health sector in Pakistan but also asserted that the phenomenon cut across the public sector in most developing countries.

According to Israr, PM is triggered by the following scenario: When a new project is introduced in the public sector, it is perceived as an opportunity for personal gain, leading to political interference and nepotism. As a result, less competent project leaders are recruited, prioritising personal gain over achieving project objectives. Through loopholes in the procurement policy that accompanies some donor-funded projects, the incompetent leadership charged to run the project mismanage and embezzle project resources. They do this through low quality procurements and compromised training programmes. In the end, the project beneficiaries are deprived of any benefits emanating from the project. This situation displeases other members of staff who are not directly involved in the project. Consequently, they end up feeling unconcerned about the activities of the project and stereotype the activities as useless and unproductive exercises.

Israr (2005, p. 457) also isolated the continuous influx of donor-supported interventions in recipient countries as a factor that triggered “a peculiar organisational culture” in the public sector, which ultimately affected the effective implementation and sustainability of projects. However, it has not been clearly explained how the situation arises. Therefore, the question is: How does the continuous flood of projects inculcate the peculiar culture that affects sustainability?

Critique of Israr's Project Mentality

Overall, Israr's 2005 article has provided useful insights into what constitutes PM. Although the concept of PM has not appeared frequently in the generic project aid literature, its conceptualisation has been thought-provoking and has provided an unconventional explanation as to why the implementation and sustainability of donor-supported interventions may be ineffective in developing countries.

A major limitation of Israr's conception of PM has been that it is not scientifically sound. First, it was presented without a systematic review of literature. Secondly, the phenomenon has not been tested empirically. For example, while Israr claims that the phenomenon is "observed during the implementation of various donor-funded projects in the public health sector in Pakistan" (2005, p. 457), the argument has not been linked to any scientific evidence. Thirdly, although Israr asserted that the PM "is crucial ... particularly in the public sectors in developing countries" (2005, p. 457), this claim was linked to one example, the health sector in Pakistan; the background of this example was not provided. This presentation of the PM phenomenon therefore lacked applicability to other contexts.

Israr's conception of PM was further limited by its failure to acknowledge existing controls and mechanisms that mitigate informational asymmetries in donor-funded projects. The argument ignored various safeguards, including regular reporting, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, financial audits, and donor guidelines, which have ensured the effective use of funds. By overlooking these controls, Israr restricted the phenomenon's applicability to other contexts, and compromised its scientific rigor. Future research should incorporate these controls to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of PM than Israr did. Israr's narrow perspective on the phenomenon's source has been limiting, as it failed to convincingly explain the various circumstances that could trigger PM other than one factor—incompetent leadership mismanaging project resources and activities. This mismanagement significantly influenced the attitudes and behaviours of other health personnel, leading to alienation and other PM elements. Israr acknowledged the conceptual limitations of PM and called on scholars to explore the complex interactions, dynamics, and effects of PM's various facets (2005, p. 457). Building on this, the next section provides an alternative perspective on PM by identifying key project characteristics that can negatively impact the attitudes and behaviours of aid beneficiaries towards donor-driven interventions.

A review of the literature (Cleland & Ireland, 2004; Cordella & Dell'Araccia, 2007; Project Management Institute, 2000; Riddell & Niño-Zarazúa, 2016; Turner & Müller, 2003) on the salient features of projects has indicated that

projects were temporary undertakings that were meant to achieve desired results, including creating a new product/service or piloting an innovation within fixed time frames. These aspects of projects could have triggered specific attitudes and behaviours that may have contributed to the ineffective implementation and lack of sustainability of donor-supported interventions. Particularly, the short-term nature of projects may have created a predisposition among project stakeholders to stereotype interventions as detached and time-limited activities, or services that ought to “end when the grant runs out”. This type of mindset contributed “to fragmented approaches and the marginalization of the initiative” (Dwight, 2004, p. 1). The situation also worked against the effective large-scale replication and sustainability of interventions (Dwight 2004; Sondlo & Herman, 2020).

In addition, projects were meant to create a new product or service, which entailed change, and literature (Vakola et al., 2004; Yılmaz & Kılıçoğlu, 2013) has shown that change can be a source of apprehension and resistance among stakeholders, which may have jeopardised the sustainability of interventions. Furthermore, the short-term nature of projects may have caused urgency to achieve the intended results within specified periods. This could have put pressure on stakeholders, resulting in anxiety and burnout, especially among project staff, to keep pace with deadlines. The situation could have worked against the development of the firm foundation needed for substantive change and sustainable outcomes once external funding ended. Sometimes, a project may have failed to produce the desired outcomes. Such a situation could have resulted in disappointment and a loss of confidence in successive donor-driven interventions, which may subsequently have reduced the prospects of sustainability (Cunningham & Gresso, 1993).

Unlike other forms of aid such as budget support,² project aid has involved the direct involvement of donors in the design of projects. Donors may also have retained control in the implementation of projects with regard to their financing and management (Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2007). This control could have led to a situation where interventions lacked coherence with the recipients’ priorities and preferences. The rigidity exhibited by donors, which has been typical of the “traditional blueprint” mode of project management (Islam, 2007, p. 65), could have caused interventions to experience resistance and lack of interest from stakeholders, and thus undermine the necessary dialogue, consensus and ownership needed for sustainability (Conyers & Mellors, 2005; Loh et al., 2013).

² Budget support is an aid modality in which international development aid is channelled directly to the recipient government’s budget using local allocation, procurement, and accounting systems (Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2007).

Additionally, because projects were meant to pilot innovative ideas, a substantial amount of material and financial resources were usually invested. Such resources could have been a source of certain attitudes and behaviour, among the recipients of aid, that could have affected the success and sustainability of donor initiatives. For example, direct incentives (per diem paid to public officials that participated in a project) were provided to motivate public workers to perform project tasks, as the tasks were considered to be additional responsibilities. However, the practice could have led to a situation where officials were reluctant to perform project-related duties without any direct incentives. Ridde (2010, p. 1) described the situation as a “long-neglected disease” that subverted public health projects in Africa.

A study conducted by Vian et al. (2013) to explore perceptions about per diems among government and non-governmental organisation officials in Malawi and Uganda indicated that, despite the advantages of increasing motivation and supplementing salaries among officials, per diems had several disadvantages. Reported drawbacks included conflict among officials, and a negative organisational culture where people expected to receive payment for all the tasks they performed. The study also observed the abuse of per diems through the manipulation of work practices, for example slowing down work in order to obtain maximum financial gains.

While projects were a source of frustration, alienation, conflict, and other negative attitudes and behaviours, which contributed to the unsustainability of initiatives, projects also had the potential to influence stakeholders positively (Wittig, 2012). Projects could have been a source of excitement and motivation and might have led to great opportunities among stakeholders. Projects could also have been agents for social change. A typical example was a school improvement intervention called the “Bright Beginnings Fantastic Follow Through Program,” that was implemented at one school in the U.S. A study conducted by Dickerson (2001, p. 2) investigated the key elements that sustained the “exemplary” intervention; results showed that both the parents and the entire community were so motivated by the intervention to change the quality of life for their children that, even when external factors such as the lack of resources posed a threat to the intervention, they were determined to sustain the project.

In view of what has been discussed, this article defines PM as any indifferent way of thinking and conduct, among the recipients of aid towards donor-funded initiatives, that affects the effective implementation of project activities and/or the subsequent sustainability of project activities once external funding is completed. This negative frame of mind and behaviour involves stereotyping donor initiatives as temporal undertakings that are imposed on the aid

beneficiaries and abruptly disappear without achieving any tangible results, and is typified by the absence of confidence, genuine interest, commitment, and ownership.

The Primary Reading Programme

In 1999, Zambia, in collaboration with DFID, launched the PRP to implement a new initial-literacy policy for initial instruction in literacy to be in a child's local language (Linehan, 2004). It was anticipated that the intervention would improve literacy skills among Zambian primary school learners, as stakeholders perceived the sole use of English in schools as the main explanation for the high illiteracy levels in the country. Studies indicated that, on average, learners' reading skills fell far below their grade level (Kelly, 1995; Williams, 1993). Between 1999 and 2005, Zambia received a total grant of £10.2 million from DFID to implement the PRP to support the monitoring of programme activities in schools, the training of teachers and other implementers, the procurement of teaching and learning materials, staff overheads, and other programme needs (Sampa, 2005).

According to Sampa (2005, p. 73), the PRP has revolutionised teaching and achieved a remarkable improvement in literacy levels in schools. For instance, the 2003 National Assessment Survey conducted by the Zambia Ministry of Education indicated that learners in schools where the PRP had been scaled up generally performed better in both English and the Zambian languages than their counterparts in schools where the PRP interventions had not yet been introduced (Kanyika, 2004). Other major changes associated with the PRP during the period when it was under the support of the DFID included:

better all-round teaching, successful learning, motivated teachers, supportive parents and communities, and a pupil-centred approach that promoted children's confidence and higher attendance rates ... well-resourced environment and improved participation that motivated children to come to school. (IOB, 2011, p. 97)

The PRP ceased to be a project after the DFID handed it over to the Zambian government in 2005 (Allsop et al., 2005; Ministry of Education, 2005). In 2013 and 2014, a case study of the PRP explored the sustainability of the intervention and factors that influenced its sustainability (Meki Kombe & Herman, 2017). The study findings indicated that PRP was poorly sustained after the end of donor support in 2005 due to several factors, including high staff turnover, lack of funds, discontinuation of monitoring and capacity-building activities, and unavailability of teaching and learning materials, as documented by Meki Kombe

and Herman (2017). The findings also indicated that the PM was one of the factors that constrained the sustainability of the intervention; this finding is discussed in detail below (Kombe, 2016).

Theoretical Conceptions

The study employed the stakeholder theory as a theoretical framework to investigate and address the PM as a potential threat to the sustainability of donor-supported interventions, and focused specifically on a reading intervention in Zambia. Stakeholder theory, recognised for its significance in organisational management, emphasised the consideration of the morals, values, and interests of all relevant stakeholders during decision-making processes. By adopting this theory, organisations could make inclusive and responsible decisions that enhance performance and sustainability (Bailur, 2006; Phillips et al., 2007).

To comprehensively analyse the PM and its impact, the study identified and analysed key stakeholders, including aid beneficiaries, donors, local communities, and teachers. Through stakeholder analysis, the researcher gained insight into stakeholders' expectations, concerns, and interests, thus shedding light on the factors that contributed to the PM. The study also examined the conflicting interests among stakeholders, thus aiming to consider the concerns and expectations of all parties involved.

The importance of engagement by stakeholders was emphasised in the context of the stakeholder theory. The study employed rigorous methods, such as interviews and document analysis, to assess the level of engagement. The goal was to determine whether genuine ownership, commitment, and interest had been fostered among stakeholders, leading to improved project outcomes.

Ethical considerations during the intervention played a pivotal role in the study, aligning with the principles of the stakeholder theory. The intervention's adherence to principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability was evaluated alongside the evaluation of the empowerment and sense of ownership felt by stakeholders throughout the intervention process.

Drawing from the insights derived from the stakeholder theory, the study proposed strategies to mitigate the negative impact of the PM on intervention sustainability. Specifically, fostering a culture of genuine ownership, confidence, commitment, and interest among aid beneficiaries was recommended as a means to enhance sustainability and project outcomes.

Overall, the application of the stakeholder theory provided a robust theoretical foundation for understanding and addressing the PM of this donor-supported intervention. The study contributes to the existing knowledge of PM

dynamics and advocates for the development of strategies to minimise its effects, thus providing valuable insights for practitioners and policymakers in the field.

Methodology

This article drew its data from the study conducted by Meki Kombe and Herman (2017). The scholars conducted semi-structured interviews with thirty-five key stakeholders in the education sector, analysed documents, and made non-participant classroom observations. Eight public primary schools in the Lusaka district of Zambia, that had been expected to continue the implementation of the PRP after the end of external funding, were randomly selected for the research.

From the sampled schools, all the eight head teachers and fifteen of the teachers who were involved in the PRP from its inception were interviewed. Other participants included six representatives of donor agencies and six Ministry of Education officials, who had played significant roles in the initiation and implementation of the PRP. To ensure accurate data, Ministry of Education officials who played a pivotal role in the PRP were identified to participate in the study; these officials were from three relevant directorates, namely the Directorates of Curriculum and Standards, Planning, and Teacher Education. Relevant documents were reviewed, including programme evaluation reports, and policy documents. Twenty-one classroom observations were conducted during Grade 1 literacy lessons; in this grade literacy was expected to be taught solely in local languages. An inductive approach, which sought to identify emerging themes, was used to analyse the data obtained from the three methods (Creswell, 2017).

Ethical values were observed by obtaining permission from the sampled schools to carry out the research. Consent was also obtained from the participants, and they were informed of their voluntary participation and right to withdraw from the study. Confidentiality was guaranteed by not revealing details of any participant and the sampled schools throughout the study. In addition, no financial benefits were attached as a way of enticing respondents to participate in the research (Creswell, 2017).

Findings and Discussion

Factors That Can Trigger Project Mentality

While the study findings of Meki Kombe and Herman (2017) indicated that a number of factors influenced the sustainability of the programme, this article focuses on the findings that indicate that the PM contributed to the poor sustainability of the PRP in Zambia.

About a quarter of the total study participants, including donor agency representatives, head teachers, education officials, and teachers, identified some form of behaviour and attitude related to the PM as a factor that influenced the continuation of the PRP. The donor agency representatives and some head teachers were the main participants who extensively discussed the PM and referred to the PM (attitudes and behaviour) as a factor in sustainability. Considering the low numbers involved in the study, this could have occurred by chance. However, a possible explanation could be that the two categories of participants had more insight into the topic because of their administrative roles.

Statements such as “those things are for the White people”; “we have seen so many projects come and go so this one is not special”; and “people see the project as a means to make money” (Head teacher 2, School B) are examples of quotes that signalled the elements of the PM. Strikingly, the data also showed a number of ways that could trigger the PM.

To begin with, the data indicated that the mere implementation of too many projects at the same time in one sector or community (project fatigue)³ can be a source of exhaustion and frustration. The situation could evoke feelings of indifference and alienation, including lack of commitment to and ownership of donor-supported interventions, among the implementers of the project. As one school head teacher put it: “Particularly in the education sector ... many programmes like the PRP have been difficult to sustain ... we are tired of implementing different programmes.” (Head teacher 2, School B)

To substantiate this point, the head teacher cited three donor-supported interventions that were being implemented at the school at the time of the interview. While acknowledging the efforts of the interventions in assisting the school to improve learning outcomes and other areas, the participant strongly

³ Project fatigue is a situation that occurs when an organisation implements too many projects at once.

<https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbescoachescouncil/2022/08/02/how-to-overcome-project-fatigue/>

suggested that the Ministry of Education should put in place a system that could protect schools from being overwhelmed with interventions.

The findings also indicated that project fatigue affects the commitment of implementers at school level and of government officials. For instance, one participant observed that, when full-time government employees get involved in two or more projects at the same time by virtue of their positions, they are bound to see the projects as distracting them from their routine work. Competing priorities may put them in a position where they end up developing indifferent attitudes and less commitment to project activities. An example was given of a project that struggled to meet its targets on time because some of the education officials assigned to the project indicated that they had “too much on their plate.”

A donor agency representative remarked:

It can become a problem if there are too many projects running, especially if the same staff is involved in different projects. It can create competing priorities among the officers to respond to the project needs and to their core business. As a result, they may not be committed to the project. They are bound to say, “We have seen so many projects come and go, so this one is not special.”

The finding that project fatigue can overwhelm intervention implementers is in line with Fullan’s argument (2001) that “in schools... the main problem is not the absence of innovations but the presence of too many ... projects ... that seem to sap the strength and spirit of schools and their communities” (p. 119).

The current national policy document on education in Zambia, *Educating Our Future*, also noted the challenges associated with project fatigue: “The increase [in the number of donors] has not been without challenges. One is the sheer scale of dealing with so many different donors, each with its own needs” (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 169).

The view that interventions come and go was a recurring theme, with one participant stressing that many stakeholders developed indifferent attitudes towards donor projects because interventions usually disappeared or vanished unceremoniously “without really achieving anything at all” once external support came to an end. One donor agency representative lamented the fate of PAGE,⁴ a donor-supported education intervention in Zambia which was initially vibrant when it was supported by the donor agency but “got lost when it was

⁴ The Programme for the Advancement of Girls' Education (PAGE) was a Ministry of Education – Zambia project developed in 1996 with initial funding from the Canadian International Development Agency. The programme sought to deliver quality primary education to all children, but especially girls, and to reduce gender disparities in primary education enrolment, retention, completion, and achievement.

<https://www.unicef.org/zambia/stories/unicef75-advancing-girls-education-zambia-1990s>

mainstreamed” into the ministry following the end of external support. Such situations can give rise to stakeholder apathy, especially when useful interventions are unexpectedly terminated. This finding supports Cunningham and Gresso’s study (1993), which found that, when an educational intervention that was producing good results was discontinued and replaced by another intervention, the community did not show the same level of dedication to the new intervention. These scholars therefore concluded that, when interventions are not successfully sustained for one reason or another, not only is stakeholder indifference created but the long-term success of future interventions is also negatively affected.

The results of the current study suggest that interventions that do not produce desired outcomes can trigger negative reactions, such as lack of confidence, commitment, and interest, which may in turn contribute to decreased prospects of project sustainability (Dickerson, 2001; Swerissen, 2007). For instance, because the PRP failed to attain and sustain its intended purpose of increasing the levels of performance in literacy among learners (Brombacher et al., 2015; Room to Read, 2010), teachers and other stakeholders lost the confidence that was necessary to sustain the intervention. Eventually, several stakeholders called for the removal of the intervention. In 2014, the intervention was replaced by a new literacy programme known as the Primary Literacy Programme. Several participants who were interviewed after the new intervention was put in place said that the move was overdue because, after the withdrawal of donor support, the PRP had died and only existed hypothetically in many schools.

The findings also demonstrate that when projects are designed to meet the interests and demands of the donors rather than those of the recipient countries, beneficiaries are likely to view projects as foreign ideas that concern the White man (as one interviewed head teacher put it). The situation can cause loss of confidence, resulting in hostility to and unconcern for donor-supported interventions. For example, a salient finding of this study was that the new methodology and unique materials that were introduced by the PRP were perceived unsuitable for the Zambian context and not user-friendly. The situation created dissatisfaction and resistance among some teachers as well as other implementers, which ultimately constrained sustainability:

The methodology was too demanding and not very fit for Zambia.
... How can one teacher give adequate attention to 80 learners in one class? That is why we made short cuts when using the methodology. (Teacher 15, School H)
It [the methodology] was quite ... frustrating. (Teacher 8, School D)

Zambia is like an experiment for new things by the foreigners. Yesterday it was PRP; today it is the PLP. We don't know what tomorrow holds. (Head Teacher 2, School B)

Evidence from the current study also suggests that the unreceptive attitude and behaviour towards the PRP methodology and materials was triggered by insufficient consultation of key stakeholders, such as teachers, over the design of the intervention. As one teacher indicated, "They [developers of the PRP] didn't adequately consult teachers in making a programme that would stand a test of time" (Teacher 12, School F).

The above findings demonstrate that donor-driven interventions which are imposed or perceived to be imposed on beneficiaries, and are void of active involvement and extensive consultation of the beneficiaries at the point of initiation and implementation, are likely to encounter discontent, opposition and lack of interest (Conyers & Mellors, 2005; Loh et al., 2013; Owston, 2006). Additionally, projects that do not consider the local demands and setting, and fail to conform to the context of the recipient country, community, or institution, may be considered inappropriate and are ultimately resisted (White et al., 2005; Young & Hampshire, 2000). The findings of the current study also support the literature, which has indicated that projects with activities and materials that are too complex to understand, use, or implement can cause resistance and lack of interest, and thereby fail to achieve sustainability (Blanchet & James, 2014; Hofisi & Chizimba, 2013).

Donor-based interventions often provide attractive foreign funds. The findings suggest that some stakeholders became involved in project activities largely for monetary gain. Consequently, some stakeholders were not committed to ensuring that the project achieved its objectives if there was no reward. One participant asserted:

The wrong mind-set is ... that people see the project as a means to make money and therefore the necessary commitment will be absent. Their attitude will be "let's get it done because it is a source of livelihood". (Donor Agency Representative)

Likewise, a habit of expecting some reward before participating in any donor-related intervention had developed in the public sector. For example, a head teacher who was involved in the PRP from the start of the intervention expressed disappointment that some education officials, including certain teachers in his school, showed little enthusiasm for implementing the PRP after the end of donor support. The PRP had been integrated into the day-to-day routine of public schools and the entire Ministry of Education. Therefore, no one was to be rewarded for any activities related to the programme:

When donors left and there was no money attached to the PRP,

some teachers had to be forced to dedicate their time without any benefit ... it is unfortunate ... a culture that is growing silently.
(Head Teacher 2, School B)

This finding confirms findings in the literature, which show that “the gratuitous expectations for personal gains” can breed negative attitudes and behaviours that may hold back the implementation of interventions before and after external support is provided (Israr, 2005, p. 457; see also Ridde, 2010). In particular, when stakeholders’ commitment is largely driven by personal gain, the sustainability of interventions may be challenged by the lack of genuine commitment, interest, and support for the interventions.

The findings also suggest that the PM can be triggered in a situation where selected members of staff in a given government department get more involved in project activities than others do. One participant explained that, in such a scenario, members of staff who are left out are likely to be de-motivated and end up feeling that the project only concerns the employees who are directly involved in the intervention. Their feelings of alienation regarding the project may make it difficult for them to participate meaningfully during the implementation phase and after the end of donor support. This is particularly applicable in circumstances where participation in donor activities is rewarded with certain allowances. This finding is aligned with the results of a study conducted by Vian et al. (2013), which found that per diems (allowances) given to staff involved in project activities created mistrust and jealousy between lower-level workers and their superiors—a situation where subordinates felt that the allowances given to their superiors provided unfair advantages to staff members who were already better-off.


Some participants also observed that implementing interventions through structures that are or seem to be detached from established government structures could attract hostile attitudes and behaviours. For example, one participant observed that it is possible for other members of staff, who may not be directly involved in a project that operates as a separate structure, to view the project as something that does not concern them. Stakeholders may also develop incorrect perceptions that the intervention is a special temporal entity with a specific assignment and, as such, its activities ought to cease after the end of donor funding. As a donor agency representative warned, “We [donors] need to situate our work in established systems so that interventions are not seen as special projects that go with us when support is over.”

As argued by Bossert (1990), interventions that are designed and implemented to operate outside established structures as separate entities or “vertically-run separate hierarchies” may be perceived as disconnected activities (p. 1019; see also Adelman and Taylor, 2003). The situation could also generate

antagonistic feelings such as institutional jealousy, particularly if staff who are directly involved in the project are seen as having “gained extra resources and salaries in relation to similar services that are not receiving donor funds” (Bossert, 1990, p. 1020). In addition, projects that operate or seem to function as separate entities could cause turf wars—fights among departments or even individuals to decide who controls the project after the end of donor support (Bossert, 1990, p. 1020). For example, Arden (2012) isolated conflicts between two government departments under the Ministry of Education in Zambia as being among the factors that challenged the effective sustainability of the PRP.

Figure 1

Framework for Analysing the Project Mentality vis-à-vis the Sustainability of Donor-Supported Interventions



Note. Project mentality triggering factors are not arranged in any special order.

The identified triggering factors and circumstances of the PM discussed in this article and summarised in Figure 1 are by no means exhaustive. Figure 1 shows how the PM can work against the effective sustainability of interventions, as its elements can negate that which makes projects sustainable—genuine ownership, confidence, interest, and commitment to interventions (Greenlee & Bruner, 2004; Israr, 2005; Sindelar et al., 2006). Adelman and Taylor (2003, p. 6) aptly summarised the importance of stakeholders' motivation, confidence, interest, and commitment when they stated that “although concepts and procedures are invaluable guides, building a cadre of stakeholders who are motivationally ready and able to proceed is the first and foremost consideration” in the successful implementation and sustainability of any intervention, including those that are donor funded.

Proposals for Mitigating the Impact of Project Mentality

As acknowledged by Israr (2005, p. 458), devising appropriate strategies to avert the effects of the PM, “the deep-rooted misperceptions, myths, mindsets and the unlawful practices in order to ensure their sustainability and effectiveness,” is perhaps one of the most challenging tasks.

The PM can be minimised when genuine confidence, commitment, interest and ownership are cultivated among the beneficiaries of aid; the literature (Conyers & Mellors, 2005; Edgren, 2003; Loh et al., 2013; OECD, 2007) has recurrently indicated that the absence of these elements can jeopardise sustainability. To cultivate these elements, it is vital that the people who should benefit from the project perceive the value of it or believe that the intervention has merit and value. When beneficiaries understand how the intervention will benefit them, they are likely to support and own it with commitment (Owston, 2006, p. 17). It is therefore essential for donors to take a participatory approach with the recipients of aid, in identifying and planning for the intervention (Swerissen, 2007). Sufficient time must be invested to allow key stakeholders to contribute meaningfully to the design process. It is recommended that the initiation phase be extended to allow for a “progressive design process” during the implementation stage (Young & Hampshire, 2000, p. 4).

A “mutually respectful negotiating process between funders and host government” is also highly recommended (Shediak-Rizkallah & Bone, 1998, p. 98). Rather than just “receiving a share of project benefits,” the beneficiaries of aid should not only have some active involvement in and control over the design of the project but also influence the implementation decisions and actions, such as the project budget and the procurement of inputs (McCommon & Yohalem, 1990, p. 6; see also Edgren, 2003). Capacity-building and sensitisation activities targeted at re-culturing, or changing those stakeholder attitudes and behaviours

that may challenge sustainability, are equally essential steps for developing confidence, ownership, commitment, and interest.

It is also important that donors support locally initiated projects and ensure that the interventions suit the setting of recipient countries (European Commission, 2006). Interventions should also be implemented through existing structures (Bossert, 1990) so that they are not perceived as temporary undertakings that must cease when donor support is exhausted.

To avoid the abrupt disappearance of interventions, a sustainability analysis could assist in the important identification and scrutiny of the significant factors that are likely to influence the sustainable delivery of benefits (Young & Hampshire, 2000). It is also of paramount importance to formulate a sustainability strategy that outlines the benefits to be sustained and stipulates exactly how each constraint to sustainability will be addressed. It is recommended that the sustainability strategy cover at least two years of the activity beyond the cessation of donor support (Adelman & Taylor, 2003). The strategy must be incorporated into the design of the project, and evaluated and reviewed during the implementation period in order to learn lessons.

It is also suggested that, as early as possible, the strategy should be tabled for ratification by policy makers, and adequate resources secured for sustainability (Loh et al., 2013; Young & Hampshire, 2000). This is important because, without securing pertinent resources for continued implementation, the strategy may simply remain on paper. For instance, an education official in the current study indicated that, although the district resource centres were identified as structures to spearhead the sustainability of the PRP through the training of teachers and other activities, when donor funding came to an end the centres did not receive sufficient resources, and thus the structures became worthless.

This article asserts that, while it is justifiable for people involved in the project to fulfil their personal interests and be remunerated for their work, the problem is their failure to find a balance between self-interest and getting project work done. To develop this balance, it may be useful to help all stakeholders to appreciate the value and benefits of the intervention (Owston, 2006). However, this is not easy to achieve because the task of changing attitudes and behaviours is challenging (Fullan, 1992). National policies and a coordinating body to oversee donor projects are also recommended, not only to avoid project fatigue but also to assist in making aid more effective and efficient (Heyneman & Lee, 2016; Lawson, 2013).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Donor aid will continue to play an important role in assisting developing countries to drive their development agendas. For example, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO, 2016) indicates that, even if low-income countries step up domestic resource mobilisation, a financing gap is predictable. To ensure that the scarce resources that are invested in current and future donor-supported interventions meet their intended purpose, sustainability must be promoted; “escaping” the PM (Adelman & Taylor, 2003, p. 10) is likely to contribute to achieving this sustainability. This statement is made in the light of the practical evidence provided in the current paper that the PM is an existing factor that can frustrate donor-supported interventions in the public sector in developing countries, as Israr (2005) claimed. In this instance, while Israr discussed the PM in the context of the health sector in Pakistan, this study identified the PM in another developing country—Zambia—and in a different public sector—education.

This article also notes Easterly’s (2001, p. 143) statement that one of the major reasons for the failure of many donor-supported development efforts is that donors do not “take heed of the basic principle of economics: people respond to incentives.” From this perspective, donor-driven interventions are likely to become unsustainable when recipients’ reactions (attitudes and behaviour) to donor support are overlooked or underestimated. Appropriate strategies must therefore be devised and employed to alleviate the effects of the PM. Building genuine ownership of, confidence in, commitment to, and interest in donor-supported interventions among the beneficiaries of aid is perhaps one of the key strategies.

However, overcoming the PM is not an easy task because it is a “multifaceted ... phenomenon” (Israr, 2005, p. 458). Understanding the PM therefore requires more research. Future research could examine more closely the links between the PM, ownership of interventions, and the sustainability of donor-supported interventions. In addition, further studies that focus on organisational culture within the project are suggested.

Study Limitations

While this study provides valuable insights into the management of foreign aid and its effectiveness, it has limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings. Firstly, it does not account for the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, which have significantly influenced foreign aid management in developing countries since 2005. This

omission may limit the study's ability to accurately reflect current aid-management dynamics. Additionally, the theoretical framework has two limitations: It assumes project managers operate without structural constraints, such as legal frameworks, and it does not fully address informational asymmetries and principal-agent innovations. These limitations affect the study's ability to provide a deeper understanding of project-management dynamics and aid effectiveness. Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the understanding of aid effectiveness, and highlights areas for future research. Furthermore, the qualitative methodology employed, while providing rich insights into the impact of PM on project sustainability, is based on a single case study. This design choice limits the generalizability of the findings, as the findings may not apply to other contexts, but it could be transferable to similar contexts. The small sample size and single-case design are also acknowledged limitations. Future research should consider addressing these limitations to enhance the validity and generalizability of the findings.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The author confirms that there are no financial or personal relationships that could have potentially influenced the findings presented in this paper.

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Book Review

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Garfield Todd: The End of the Liberal Dream in Rhodesia
by Susan Woodhouse (Harare: Weaver Press, 2018)

Susan Woodhouse spent 25 years writing this biographic book about Garfield Todd. Todd was the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia for five years from 1953 to 1958. The book is derived from the author's memory of working for Todd for two years while he was in office. More importantly, the author gathered data for the book from archival research in Zimbabwe over a period of seven years.

When Todd's term of office as prime minister expired, Woodhouse continued working for Todd for six years at his cattle ranch. While she worked for Todd, Woodhouse lived with him and his family. This gave the author the rare opportunity of knowing the family better. Todd asked her to write his biography because he was convinced that she knew him better than anyone else did.

Todd, who was a descendant of nineteenth century Scottish emigrants to New Zealand, died in 2002 following an illustrious career. The story which Woodhouse has written takes the reader from New Zealand to Rhodesia and now Zimbabwe. The story captures the 94 years of Todd's life. Garfield Todd and his wife, Grace, began their lives in New Zealand and moved to Southern Rhodesia as Christian missionaries in 1934. For Todd, the future of Rhodesia was non-racial and multicultural—a view which was not shared by many others. As explained by the author, this led to the ousting of Todd in a cabinet coup under pressure from the largely White electorate.

The 624-page book was released in 2018 and consists of eight parts, each of which has several chapters focussing on different aspects of Todd's life history. Part I of the book, "Scottish Background" (pp.1-17), gives the historical family background. Part II, "Dadaya Mission" (pp.18-99), discusses Todd's life as a missionary in Southern Rhodesia, especially his role at Dadaya Mission. Part III, "Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia" (pp.100-279), is the longest part of

the book with 31 chapters covering different aspects of Todd's political life and contribution to Southern Rhodesia from a liberal perspective. This is perhaps the most informative part of the book in that it examines the work of Todd in greater detail than has been done before. Part IV, "'Inspiring and Prophetic Unguided Missile', July 1958 to December 1960" is dedicated to the decline of Todd's political career and his exit from politics. Part V, "Co-operating with the Inevitable, 1961 to April 1980" discusses his life as a rancher and the political challenges he faced under the regimes that followed his. Part VI, "Zimbabwe" looks at Todd's life in independent Zimbabwe from 1980. Part VII, "Retirement, 1992–2002" looks at the last years of his life till his death in 2002.

All in all, the book comprises 96 chapters. The introductory chapter of the book was authored by Trevor Grundy who first met Susan Woodhouse in 1993. As Grundy pointed out, the book under review was not the first book about Todd. What distinguishes this book from many others published before this one is that this provides an advanced narrative of Todd's involvement and contribution to the liberal history of Zimbabwe. This aspect has thus far been sidelined in the pre-independence history of Zimbabwe. While the book is about southern Africa's long walk to freedom and the overturning of colonial rule in the northern territories, it relates to the dissolution of White settler suzerainty first in what became Zimbabwe and then in South Africa. Chapters on the individual countries detail the stages along their sometimes complicated and tortuous struggle to attain their political independence. The book discusses the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and why it failed. Furthermore, the book provides an elaborate examination and analysis of how and why the apartheid system of government was created in South Africa and why it eventually collapsed. More importantly perhaps, the book dwells on the various components of the heavily White-conquered and later White-oppressed domain that transitioned via diverse fits and starts into the modern fragmented nation-states.

The author pointed out that a politically-approved view was the backdrop to Europeans doing little to further the Zimbabwean nationalist freedom movements before independence in 1980. Consequently, the book is educative and lays a firm foundation regarding the role of liberal Europeans in this political history of the country. It thus deals with the misconception that Whites were universally against African political independence.

Todd's story as narrated in the book, including his various roles as Christian missionary, liberal prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, and high-profile opponent of the unilateral declaration of independence and its architect, Ian Smith, from 1965 to 1980, is undoubtedly an eye-opener for political historians

of central and southern Africa. The story of Garfield Todd in the political history of Zimbabwe has for the first time been eloquently narrated in depth for those who know something of his story and for those who may never have heard of this great man who spent his life in education and public service in Zimbabwe. The roles of Garfield Todd and some of the people who worked with him have been effectively reinterpreted to provide an interpretation that is alternative to the official Zimbabwean history.

Susan Woodhouse has deliberately provided an alternative interpretation by narrating the story of a small but influential group of men and women who dared to hold a different approach to racism in Africa after World War II. It is a story told with warmth, personal insight, and often great humour. This Edinburgh-based author, who Sir Garfield said knew the Todds better than anyone else did, has introduced a new generation of readers to a small but dedicated group of long-forgotten activists. The book is a must-read for anyone seeking to learn about how liberal and racist politics crossed paths in Southern Rhodesia before independence, as well as what role White liberal Rhodesians played in support of the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.