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**Study on Political Cadres and the Financial Sustainability of
Local Authorities**

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Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR)

Findings

- Cadres have always been present in markets and bus stations, but were dominant during PF's era (2011-2021)
- The financial and social impact of cadres fell mainly on marketeers, bus drivers and customers in terms of double taxation for marketeers and bus drivers, in payments to both council and cadres which undermined livelihoods
- Court documents suggest that at some bus stations, drivers were being levied as much as 15% of their daily income by party cadres
- The cadres collected money on behalf of the so-called Commanders who became notorious not only for overseeing the collection of the fees, but also for creating an environment of intimidation in which they could help themselves to goods and services without payment
- The amounts collected by cadres were substantial, especially in PF strongholds like Mpika, Kapiri Mposhi, Lusaka, Kitwe and Kabwe
- Cadreism was identified by both the former ruling party and a public survey as one of the reasons why PF lost the general elections in 2021
- The presence of cadres in market and bus stations since the 2021 general elections has declined, except in Livingstone and Kapiri Mposhi
- Intolerance of cadres from the presidency has empowered bus drivers/marketeters to resist the re-emergence of cadres, or report them to the police
- Yet, cadreism has been internalised in the bus and market associations, and to some extent the councils, creating the current distrust between marketeers and bus drivers and the institutions
- Some cadres/politicians have established private bus stations, formalising their influence in stations and markets
- The operation of the cadres illustrates the way in which various state institutions were implicated, including the police, prosecution services, Ministry of Local Government, District Commissioners, and councils – amongst others

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Introduction

Whoever wins Zambia's 2021 general elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country's democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. To achieve this, the new administration must have at least four priorities. These are regaining credibility with the international financiers, fighting corruption, curtailing the dominance of the executive branch of government, *and ending the reign of terror by political party vigilantes, known as 'cadres'* [our emphasis] (Resnick, 2021)

The assessment commences with a review and chronology of the history of cadreism in Zambia. The term could speak simply of supporters of any particular party, including elected representatives, but is increasingly used to denote groups of organised young men operating in the public sphere to deploy control and violence, and to collect fees at markets and bus stations. Equally, cadres often serve as groups of "security details" for politicians and are engaged in day-to-day campaigning and rent collection on behalf of political parties – predominantly the ruling party.

With the support of Beardsworth's work (2021) we outline the changes since the transition from legitimized 'vigilantes' deployed in 1985 under the Zambia Police Amendment Act No. 23, to reviled reprobates extorting local municipalities and limiting the institution's authority. In this report, we track the changes in this system over time, and the various ways in which preceding administrations have attempted to rein in the cadres or allowed the system to expand. The review considers an in-depth analysis into the behavioural changes of these cadres, particularly as they coincided with the incoming PF administration in 2011.

Council financial data from 2018¹ is used to highlight the decline in revenue collection from increases in cadre presence and economic activities. In addition, we use 133 interviews with stakeholders (customers, council staff, marketeers and bus drivers) and key informant interviews to bolster the report's evidence base. Financial information, coupled with the literature review provides data that can be extrapolated to shed vivid insight into the negative financial implications for local municipalities, bus drivers and marketeers, as well on as ordinary people's livelihoods.

Defining 'cadres'

In this study we utilise the following definition of cadres: Cadres are "groups of organised young men² operating in the public sphere to deploy control and violence, and to collect fees at markets and bus stations" (SAIPAR policy brief). The definition of cadres has changed over time, it was initially any person who supported the party, but increasingly became those who were 'deployed' on party business across different sectors, both formal and informal. But this becomes so broad as to encompass all employees to the public sector, where party membership became a requirement for certain kinds of posts

¹ None of the councils were able to provide financial data before 2018, even if the goal was to collect data from 2012 onward. This certainly points to weak record keeping at council level.

² Occasionally it includes young women as well

in public service management. Cadreism is implicated in all (significant) political parties, but mostly manifested as an unaccountable and entrenched system under PF rule.

From 2012 to 2021, the first and most prominent were PF cadres who had offices in the markets and bus stations. They were clearly identified with the ruling party and would wear party regalia. In addition, there was a category of cadres who became part of the buses and markets associations as well as the cooperatives. The cadres who were in the PF offices in the markets and bus stations collected money by force from the marketeers and bus drivers, the associations on the other hand would collect money in form of registration (membership), funeral and health contributions and savings groups called *chilimba*. These associations would also lobby for empowerment funds from government. The members usually did not get the benefit, as the funds were distributed among a small group of 'kommando's.'

UPND cadres were active during the 2016 elections and subsequent by-elections, which saw violent clashes between UPND and PF cadres. Being in opposition, UPND cadres did not have as much space to operate, except in their strongholds. UPND was conscious of the negative associations of political cadres and opted to call their official supporters 'foot soldiers' of the party. Like PF cadres, UPND's 'foot soldiers' wore their party regalia.

In some areas, the cadres system operated slightly differently. The cadre system in Kitwe was unique because of the '*jerabos*,' (jail birds), local cadres who were voted into the marketeers and bus drivers associations. While popular and distributive at the beginning, they started terrorizing and collecting fees from their 'constituents' (i.e. daily contributions for the stalls, electricity, water, funerals, health etc).

For the purposes of this study, the definition of cadres goes beyond 'violent, senseless, and machete-wielding hooligans' because over time they have managed to occupy official positions in councils, government departments and other key organisations. Consequently, cadreism becomes internal to government institutions, making it more difficult to tackle this phenomenon. At the end of March 2022, Lusaka City Council started an exercise to remove the political cadres from the council.³

Methodology

The study adopted a mixed methods approach, both quantitative and qualitative. This required triangulation to achieve a complete understanding of the dataset. The information provided allows for a more holistic understanding of how best to improve the administrative function of the councils. It also allows for the identification of certain mechanisms that can be established to curtail the negative impacts of cadres not only on the revenue collection from markets and stations, but on the institutional capacity of these councils. The researchers contacted the respective bus and market association heads, so that information could be provided on the financial impact that political cadres posed and possibly continue to pose. It was crucial to engage with the chairman and members for urban markets and terminuses. Where possible, the consultants engaged

³ The Local Government Service Commission will conduct an exercise to rid local authorities of political cadres believed to be occupying public service positions. The exercise will be beginning with the Lusaka City Council, according to the commission Chairperson Ackson Sejani. *Times of Zambia*, March 30, page 1

cadres, to provide insight into the inception of the trade, the structures that give them capacity over the councils and where the funds are finally dispatched.

The research approach involved sampling a meaningful and representative number of key informants and local authorities within markets and bus-stations. The following local authorities/councils are pre-selected in the TOR for USAID/DAI:

- Nakonde
- Mpika
- Kapiri Mposhi
- Kabwe

And for GIZ/D4D:

- Lusaka
- Choma
- Namwala
- Livingstone
- Kitwe
- Solwezi

Sampling and sample size

In setting the sample at the local authority level, it was assumed that from 2012-2021 (October), political cadres who existed in markets and bus-stations during the PF's administration had established norms and informal rules guiding the illicit charges they applied to marketeers, street vendors, bus operators, taxi operators, etc. Therefore, the enumeration of only a few (5-6) interviewees in each of the sub-groups – marketeers, street vendors, bus operators and owners – at each site (market, street, bus-station) in the respective local authority provides a representative indication of the per unit (daily) charge applied by the PF cadres in that area.

The following sampling design was utilized for USAID:

Local Authority	Province	Sites:	No. of respondents in sub-group			
			Bus-stations	Customers	Market	Adjacent street*
Kabwe City	Central	Site 1	6	3	6	4
		Site 2	6	3	6	4
Kapiri Mposhi	Central	Site 1	6	3	6	4
		Site 2	6	3	6	4
Mpika	Muchinga	Site 1	6	3	6	4
Nakonde	Muchinga	Site 1	6	3	6	4
	Muchinga	Site 2	6	3	6	4

Local Authority	Province	Sites:	No. of respondents in sub-group			
			Bus-stations	Customers	Market	Adjacent street*
	Central					
Total	4		42	21	42	28

Notes:

* Streets adjacent to bus/market sites are an innovation where bus operators and street vendors, respectively will be enumerated

The total sample size across all sites in the 4 councils will therefore be **133 respondents**

And sampling size for GIZ/D4D was as follows:

Local Authority	Province	Sites:	No. of respondents in sub-group			
			Bus-stations	Customers*	Market	Adjacent street**
Lusaka City Council	Lusaka	Site 1	6	4	6	4
		Site 2	6	4	6	4
		Site 3	6	0	6	0
		Site 4	6	0	6	0
Kitwe City Council	Copperbelt	Site 1	6	4	6	4
		Site 2	6	0	6	0
Mansa Municipal Council	Luapula	Site 1	6	4	6	4
Solwezi Municipal Council	North-western	Site 1	6	4	6	4
		Site 2	6	0	6	0
Choma Municipal Council	Southern	Site 1	6	4	6	4
		Site 2	6	0	6	0
Namwala Town Council		Site 1	6	4	6	4
Livingstone City Council		Site 1	6	4	6	4
		Site 2	6	0	6	0
Total	5	14	84	32	84	32

Notes:

* Customers: people were asked if they have been coming to the market/bus area since 2019

** Streets adjacent to bus/market sites are an innovation where bus operators and street vendors, respectively will be enumerated

The total sample size across all 14 sites in the 7 councils is **232 respondents**

In each sampled local authority, the most densely populated (one, two or three) sites, in terms of number of operatives per area, was selected. The size or population density of each site was determined through consultation with the local authority in each council,

to harness their local knowledge. At each site, respondents were randomly selected. In addition, as earlier indicated, the council authorities as well as leaders of associations in respective markets and bus stations were interviewed in key informant interviews (KII). KIIs were also carried out after the fieldwork, in order to fill important gaps.

A history of cadres in Zambia to 2011

The United National Independence Party (UNIP) (1964-1991) had party cadres or so-called “vigilantes”, but these were somewhat regulated. In 1985, Kaunda’s UNIP passed the Zambia Police Amendment Act No 23, which provided the legal basis for the creation of what became known as ‘vigilantes’ (Mwansa, 1986). The creation of the vigilante force was apparently in response to growing violent and property crime in the 1980s. These vigilantes were specifically drawn from the party, as the Act stated “in every Section, Branch and Ward of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) shall be established a vigilante group of such number of persons as may be necessary” (Mwansa, 1986, p. 109). Their functions and responsibilities were then to serve as ‘guardians of moral standards by intervening in any aspect of community affairs’, yet they were also at the helm of what Phiri called an oppressive card-checking campaign. (Phiri, 2001 quoted in Mukunto, 2019, p. 123).

Those without UNIP cards could not access markets, shops, or public transport to and from work (Ibid). Markets were controlled by UNIP members through the Market Act, though this was often delegated to co-operative societies which allowed the party – often through its Youth Wing – to control the allocation of stands. As noted by Tranberg Hansen, “UNIP membership became a prerequisite for access to a stand, with stand-holders paying fees or levies to the party” (Hansen, 2010, p. 18). Stallholders, who were often women, would frequently be rounded up by the party to sing and dance at the airport and welcome the President and foreign dignitaries (Hansen, 2010, p. 18).

With the return of multi-party competition from 1991 onward, cadres were de-linked from the UNIP party system, and became increasingly an informal system and often acted as a link from the politicians to the grassroots (ZEAP Policy Brief 6, p. 5). But increasingly, their activities were also focused on the occupation and control of public spaces, notably marketplaces and bus stations and led to the unlawful collection of levies/fees. Under Frederick Chiluba’s MMD, MMD ‘offices’ were established in markets and cadres became prevalent (Hansen, 2010, p. 19), but their presence was significantly reduced under the ‘law and order’ rule of President Levy Mwanawasa (Malupenga, 2008). Together with then Local Government Minister Sylvia Masebo, government managed to reduce the presence of cadres in markets and bus stations, to the advantage of the councils.

In efforts to lessen political involvement in market administration, Masebo in 2004 removed the control of bus stations from politically affiliated groups of transporters (Hansen, 2010, p. 19).⁴ Similar plans were announced for the markets. Boards were established which were intended to minimise the politicisation of market governance, and these boards were expected to represent marketeers, consumer organizations, local

⁴ Hansen does not explain how this was done.

government, commuters' associations, and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Hansen, 2010, p. 19). But instead, according to Hansen, these boards unintendedly reinforced the capacity of political interest groups and powerbrokers to capture market governance structures, through politicised appointments to the boards. As we will describe in more detail below, the present distrust in these committees and associations partially derives from this.

Under Rupiah Banda, who ruled briefly from 2008-2011, the cadre system was enhanced. As noted by the Commission of Inquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence (2019, p. 20): 'The cadres were arguably for a noble cause: to serve as foot soldiers in campaigns and other party activities. But this was not to be, as the cadres, motivated by money, alcohol, and other incentives they received from their political benefactors, soon became militant, lawless and violent in their operations.'

The importance of the cadre issue lies in the fact that the informal sector is a large political constituency. As is well known, markets and street vending play a critical role in providing both food security and employment in Zambia (Siame et al., 2020). They have political significance as well, as the numerical importance of informal workers in Lusaka makes them a key political constituency (Resnick, 2013). This constituency, as it has been throughout Zambia's history, is vulnerable to both co-optation and harassment, depending on whether the ruling regime views them as a source of political support or a threat to their dominance. The contradiction here is that while they want to appease the informal sector, political parties also utilise it as an important source of revenue and political mobilisation.

Cadreism is never a spontaneous phenomenon: people high up in party/government structure allow for this to take place. According to our interviews, the money flows in multiple directions and this affects the capacity and willingness of institutions (political parties, law enforcement) to curb cadre behaviour. Part of the money is given to individuals in the party structure who can pull strings, and some makes its way to other institutions, including the police. The system involves all institutions from the council, police, Ministry of Local Government to District Commissioners, ensnaring people who then act to ensure that the law is not enforced. Details of the flow of money and its beneficiaries will be detailed below.

Political cadres and council revenue under PF

While PF came to power on the back of cadreism, many PF politicians came from council backgrounds and understood the importance of optimizing council revenue for service delivery. In 2012, then Vice-President Guy Scott had given a directive to depoliticise bus stations and markets, and for a short period the cadres were no longer interfering with these facilities. The political backing for this policy was short-lived, and those who were in favour of controlling the cadres were increasingly side-lined within PF. Despite strong statements from politicians such as then-PF Secretary General Wynter Kabimba, and attempts to push the police to enforce urban order, the cadres system continued (Lusaka Times, 2014). This situation worsened when President Sata's ill-health led to an internal power struggle in which cadres played an important role. It is important to realise that

PF saw itself as a 'vanguard party', reminiscent of the UNIP days. The Secretary General of PF was seen as the third most important leader after the President and Vice-President. While this was never formalised, it permeated the way the country was governed. Thus while under Sata there were some attempts to reduce cadreism at the market/bus station, it was also assumed that part of the revenue (and jobs) would go to the party and party members. This revenue stream was actually accounted for and partially redistributed to the marketeers/bus drivers, by way of funeral and health funds. (interview, PF leader).

The presidential by-election of 2015 and the 2016 general elections showed that the PF's popularity was in decline. Consequently, it needed 'dominance' to prevent the rise of opposition United Party for National Development (UPND). This took the shape of growing intimidation by political cadres, shrinking the civic and media space and the application of Public Order Act and later in 2020, Covid-19 health regulations to prevent the opposition from organising and mobilising support in urban areas. The need for PF to be dominant was especially felt in very competitive urban areas such as Lusaka and Kitwe. Consequently, political cadreism was much more pronounced in those places, compared to the PF's strongholds like Mansa. Likewise, there was less cadreism in UPND strongholds. It confirms that:

Party cadres are intimately connected to complex local politics and undermine the capacity of governments at this level to raise revenue, deliver services, and exert their authority (ZEAP Policy Brief no. 6)

Importantly, President Lungu tolerated the cadre system, as he did not enforce party discipline. With factionalism rife, intraparty fighting took hold among the cadres and the beneficiaries to share the illegally obtained bus and market revenue (interview, PF leader).

In short, the political transition that brought in Lungu, 'empowered' the cadres, who started to compete with council officials, co-operative markets and the police. The political transition also led to growing intraparty tension (factionalism), which spilled over onto the cadres and at times led to running battles in the streets on behalf of political principals. From 2015 onward, PF cadres have been competing with each other over revenue, especially in urban areas.

They also became increasingly involved in the allocation of marketplaces, slots in bus stops, rights to pick up commuters and residential land allocation. The revenue was distributed through party structures, all the way up to State House. This money was used to support PF's electoral campaigns, but also for individual gain. Because the cadre network was supported by national level politicians, the police were unable to act against them. The police should have acted as a deterrence to cadres, but instead were overrun by them (p. 6). Police felt unable to act against cadres because of their close links to prominent local and national politicians; these patrons protected cadres from police action, and in some cases the police also received an allocation of the proceeds of cadres' activities.

The continued resistance within certain factions of the PF against the role of cadres showed itself again in 2019, when there was another attempt to reign in the cadres. Miles

Sampa, on becoming the mayor of Lusaka tried to resist cadres in the market and bus stations, stating that he was backed by President Lungu in these efforts:

The Lusaka City Council's revenue from markets and bus stations has increased from virtually nothing to over K90,000 per day following the removal of political party cadres from the public facilities. Lusaka Mayor Miles Sampa said in an interview yesterday that the local authority's revenue has tremendously increased since the President made the directive (Lusaka Times, 2019)

In practice, Miles Sampa did not have the President's backing and his attempts to control the cadres was very short-lived.

Earlier in 2021, the lack of revenue created tensions between the councils and the unions:

The Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union (ZULAWU) has charged that Lusaka City Council is failing to meet its financial obligations due to political interference in the running of markets and bus stations which are a source of revenue for the authority (Lusaka Times, 2021).

LCC deflected the issue and blamed the COVID-19 pandemic for the lack of revenue:

[...] Lusaka town clerk Alex Mwansa says the local authority is having difficulties meeting its financial duties due to reduced revenue collection following the COVID-19 [pandemic but] notes that the council is putting up strategies to address the situation (Ibid).

It is difficult to assess exactly how much money was collected from bus stations and markets during the PF's decade in power. In part, this is complicated in bus stations by the existence of the 'Chilimba' system, a savings cooperative, which is collected and managed by these ruling party-affiliated cadres. Research by Beardsworth in 2020 found that the amounts collected in bus stations were substantial. Drivers pay into the pot every time they come to the station and the cadres (as part of a management committee) collect the money and pay some of it out to drivers at a set time. From the court documents (see next section) provided by a lawyer representing a group of drivers operating from Kulima tower, each driver pays K175 per day, totaling a sum of K63,000 per year. Some routes may have between 30 and 60 drivers, suggesting enormous revenue flows.

One driver interviewed by Beardsworth who operated from Kulima Tower station (not one of the 14 research sites for this report) said that his route from Chelstone to Kulima Tower costs K63 per trip, and he paid that twice or three times per day. A conservative estimate (two payments per day, 6 days per week) puts his annual contribution at K39,000 per year, but he says he only receives the *Chilimba* payout once per year and receives less than K6,000. There are 60 drivers on his route, which means that in a conservative estimate, the cadre system collects K7,560 per day from that route alone, and an annual sum of a K2.76 million. If, conservatively we assume that as an average for each of the 13 routes operating from Kulima Tower, then that station alone could bring in as much as K36 million (K35,872,200) in revenue collected by cadres per year, which is shared out amongst party-affiliated people, though of course a fraction of these funds are also returned to drivers as *Chilimba*. There are three major commuter bus stations in Lusaka: Kulima Tower, City Market and Lumumba, and each would have been bringing in

a substantial sum, though Kulima Tower is said to be the busiest and most profitable. The amount above does not account for the fees collected from markets, or intercity bus station or collected on the roads from street traders and cadres at illegal bus stops. This generated a massive revenue stream for party elites, party structures and cadres alike. In Nakonde, Mpika, Kapiri Mposhi and Kabwe the amounts collected by cadres were not as significant, but still quite substantial given the size of the local economies.

Cadres and the collusion of state institutions, through the lens of court cases

The specifics of the operations of cadres in the bus station are exemplified by two court cases, which provides evidence on the way that cadres are organised and linked to other stakeholders.

On 22 March 2018, a court case was brought against Lusaka City Council by Emelio Chileka and 18 others, represented pro-bono by Mulambo Haimbe (now Minister of Justice) of Malambo and Company. This case commenced through a writ of summons and statement of claim to compel the Lusaka City Council (LCC) to perform its statutory duty to regulate bus stations and collect revenues in accordance with its mandate as set out under the Markets and Bus Stations Act No.7 of 2007. The case also sought a mandatory injunction to force the LCC to allow the 19 plaintiffs unhindered access to Kulima Tower Bus Station and prevent the defendants (Tresford Mwila and six others) from collecting levies and fees and interfering with operations at the bus station.

The background to this case was that on 5 March 2018, the 19 plaintiffs were expelled from Kulima Tower station (one of the busiest and most lucrative stations in the country) by Mr Tresford Mwila who was both the PF Chairman of the station, and the President of the Bus and Taxi Drivers Association of Zambia (established to represent the interests of bus drivers). The plaintiffs were expelled from the station by the PF cadres on the basis that they had been seen on national TV proclaiming their allegiance to the UPND. Mwila and others banned them from entry to the station on the basis that “they do not belong to the political party known as the Patriotic Front the membership of which, according to the said Defendants, was a prerequisite to be met by any person wishing to operate from the Bus Station” (*Emelio Chilekwa & 18 Others versus Lusaka City Council, Tresford Mwila and 6 others*, 2018 Statement of Claim, 7). According to the Statement of Claim, Mwila and others had been levying fees at the station since 2015. Judge Zulu, who heard the case, denied both an injunction and a declaratory order. Further litigation collapsed when Chilekwa entered into an informal ‘settlement’ with Mwila (M. Haimbe, personal communication, 26 November 2020)

The second case brought by Malambo and Company also involved Tresford Mwila. On 13 September 2019, Hon. Sakwanda of the Lusaka District Magistrates Court handed down an interim injunction (Cause No. 2018/CRMP/1044) against Tresford Mwila and Steven Silungwe (see Table below) banning them from chasing, threatening, or preventing Charles Musonda from operating at Kulima Tower station. However, Musonda, Limbali and the two others were assaulted and removed from Kulima Tower bus station on 10 January 2020 by Mwila and the rest of the PF committee on the grounds that they were believed to belong to the UPND.

This incident was formally raised with the Lusaka Commissioner of Police, and a formal medical report was made by the Zambia Police following the incident, but there was no follow-up action taken by police. This was despite the fact that an interim injunction was in place, which the police had a statutory duty to enforce. However, there was also no action taken by the police to enforce the injunction. In spite of letters written to the Lusaka Commissioner of Police and Minister of Local Government, the police continued to fail to enforce the injunction and Mwila and the committee at the station continued to operate and refuse access to Musonda and others, including threatening them with violence if they should return. On 28 February 2020, Musonda took Mwila and Silungwe to court again for contempt of court, due to their failure to respect the injunction. According to Haimbe, nothing came of this application, and the file apparently went missing from the registry (M. Haimbe, personal communication, 26 November 2020).

On 30 January 2020, the plaintiffs – Kingsley Limbali and two others – sought to have the PF’s Kulima Tower committees declared as an unlawful society under the Societies Act (1958), an interim injunction served preventing the defendants from levying money from the plaintiffs, and request that they repay all moneys collected from the plaintiffs to a sum of ZMW 378,000 per plaintiff from January 2014 to date. These committees thus constituted a highly formalised infrastructure for the collection of rents and management of the station. In the Writ of Summons, the plaintiffs laid out the costs levied by the committee as being a sum of ZMW175.00 per day, totalling ZMW63,000.00 per annum. The bus drivers declared an income of K1200 per day, which means that they were being levied a sum of 15% of their daily income by the cadres and the committee.⁵

These cases demonstrate a few issues, 1) that the intimidation of traders and drivers on the basis of partisan affiliation was widespread, 2) that the people perpetrating the intimidation were affiliated to the then-ruling party, 3) that they were highly organised and collecting substantial revenues from traders and drivers, 4) that they were operating outside of the remit of the Market and Bus Stations Act, and finally that 5) the police and the Ministry (and judiciary?) were unwilling or unable to act against these cadres, due to their political connections.

This confirms information in the media which suggests that the police were generally fearful of party cadres and unwilling to act against them. Police Spokeswoman Esther Katongo noted in March 2021 that the Police were scared of cadres, and largely unable to act against them:

“You see what happens is, dealing with a cadre, you will hear all sorts of language ‘we are going to make sure that you are going to be fired’ so who would want to lose their job? So others they feel threatened; and not threatened that they can’t deal with that person, they are threatened because they are going to lose their job so political leaders should also talk to their cadres to stop intimidating police officers under the guise that our officers are going to be fired. And also those in the opposition stop courting our officers and intimidating our officers because others will say when we come into power you are gone,

⁵ The case is still pending till todate and is waiting to be heard on its merits – though in late 2020, it was believed that another informal ‘settlement’ had been reached between Mr Mwila and Mr Limbali for the plaintiff to drop the case. We currently have no update on this case.

we are going to lose your job and I have been threatened before and other officers are told the same thing. Those in the ruling party say ‘you will see, you will be transferred.’” (Malunga, 2021a)

Situational analysis

How does cadreism play out in the various locations? The fieldwork focused on council-managed markets and bus stations and did not research into cooperative markets, as they are not connected to the councils and council revenue.

Lusaka

Lusaka has a long history of cadreism, which mainly plays out in the bus stations and the markets. Each market and bus station has its own dynamic, as detailed below:

Lusaka City Market and Bus Station

During the PF era, the Bus Association was infiltrated by PF cadres, who collected informal gate fees and route subscriptions. Cadres also collected fees from bus operators along the routes.

As for the Market, the cadres collected fees from the marketeers, using a similar charges to those levied by the council (for fee structure, see Annex 1).

Intercity:

At this station, bus drivers used to pay double, namely to the cadres and council, with the exception of the big bus companies who had their own private arrangements with the cadres.

The bus drivers paid K300 per bus to the council (‘bus pass’) and K300 to the cadres. In total every time a bus loaded and left the station the bus driver had to pay K600 instead of K300. These extra charges did not however affect the prices charged to the passengers but created a less profitable environment for the bus owners.

Although the cadres had a PF political party office within the station, it did not issue receipts for the K300 paid daily for each bus. The collected K300 was paid directly to the PF youth chairman.

Downtown station:

The council was hardly able collect fees between 2011 and the 2021 elections, except on designated days determined by the cadres.

The Bus Station was managed by Kanyama and Chawama PF constituency branches, who were also the beneficiaries of the informal cadre fees. The drivers used to pay K40 each time the bus loaded and left the bus station and an extra K10 per day for the Cadre Savings Fund. Much of the proceeds went to the Chawama constituency chairperson.

Since the 2021 elections, the council has been collecting money without the interference of the cadres. The council collects K20 daily from each driver. Since some of the council workers are former PF cadres, they are not trusted by the drivers. The drivers indicated that some of the council workers who come to collect money from the bus station were PF cadres from Chawama and Kanyama that had been employed by the council before the elections.

New Soweto Market:

Here, the cadres and council workers worked together, using two receipt books for the daily collection of revenue. One of them was a fake council receipt book. After collections the cadres and the council workers split the collected money with the cadres and council workers taking 60% of the total collected money. Possibly, only 40% of the revenue collections was officially recorded. Because of the collusion between council workers and cadres, council workers were seen as cadres.

Since the 2021 elections, the market has not seen cadres.

Buseko Market:

In this market the cadres completely took over the collection of revenues from the marketeers and only allowed the council to collect money once a week. Marketeers and shop owners had no choice but to pay the cadres.

The collection of revenue which was suspended after the 2021 elections. But part of Buseko belongs to the cooperative (PF, *now* UPND), so the council does not collect anything from that part of the market.

Lumumba Bus Station:

This bus station is run in partnership with Agrofuel (such private-public partnerships are provided for in the 2007 Act) on the basis of a 25-year lease. Because of the private-public partnership, the cadres failed to penetrate and take over the bus station.

Kaunda Square Market:

Cadreism was limited at Kaunda Square market enabling the Council to collect revenue from the vendors. However, there was an informal way of revenue collection by cadres achieved through intimidation: 'they did take products from the shops and never paid' or 'ate meals without paying,' saying that they had the power to do so.

Another informal fee, ranging from K5 to K10 was charged daily for electricity by the market chairman who was said to be a PF member.

Informal collection stopped after the 2021 elections

The presence of the cadres had a dramatic financial and social impact on those who plied their trade at the markets and bus stations: cadreism at the bus stations and markets significantly reduced their personal income and that of their businesses. They felt threatened in their workplace, without having recourse to the law. In general, while the cadres did not deal with customers, customers felt afraid of cadres as they created an intimidating environment in the market.

Impact on bus drivers and marketeers (from interviews)

Because of the huge amounts of fees we had to pay, this seriously affected our daily cash-in target meant for our employers'

'It affected us negatively, we worked in fear and, we were losing large sums of money. It affected operational costs as a business.'

'They would break fights in front of our customers, insult our customers, and stop us from loading the bus until we paid.'

'The cadres had reached a point where they had more power than the police. Our customers were harassed and told not to board/use certain buses, making us lose revenue in the process.'

'Our salaries were seriously affected because most of the income we made went to the cadres.'

Beneficiaries

Each location had a different group of beneficiaries, but overall the system operated as follows: From the money the cadres collected from the bus drivers and vendors, they would make a contribution to the PF constituency, then each constituency contributed to the district and each district to the province and the province to the PF Secretariat. The money moved from the grassroots to the top. Specifically, revenue from downtown market was divided among Kanyama and Chawama constituencies, to support PF structures and individuals. A key witness from downtown market used to deliver 20,000 kwacha a week to Chawama constituency, through the constituency chairperson.

The revenue from Intercity bus station was distributed directly to district and provincial party level officials. The money found its way up to the Secretary General and PF Secretariat who all got some percentages of the revenue.

At the PF secretariat level, none of these collections was accounted for. It was mostly used for private gain, not for redistribution or mobilisation of the PF constituents as before. Those who distributed the money to the PF grassroots built a popular base but were ultimately side-lined by top PF officials who were afraid of losing their grassroots support. One example is that of Innocent Kalimanshi. Kalimanshi and his paramilitary group – the *Amelicans* or *Ama Americans* (Malunga, 2021c) – became extremely powerful in Chawama, President Lungu's former constituency. Kalimanshi was said to have direct links in to State House, and was widely seen as unaccountable (Malunga, 2021b). In July 2021, ahead of the 2021 elections, Kalimanshi and 37 members of his gang were arrested by the Drug Enforcement Commission (Nsofu, 2021). According to an EU election observer, and other local sources, the arrest was instigated by the Chawama MP and President Lungu's daughter, Tasila Lungu, who were claiming that Kalimanshi and *Ama Americans* were unpopular in Chawama and were damaging the party's brand.

Kalimanshi was convicted in December 2021 ('Innocent Kalimanshi Convicted of Drug Trafficking', 2021) and released in March 2022.

Cadres in Lusaka after the 2021 elections:

United Party for National Development (UPND) cadres are still present now, but they are not asking for any fees. This was confirmed by a few bus owners: 'The cadres have lost power to extort money or harass bus drivers.' It seems that the police have also been empowered by the change of Police Command at the national level and in particular by the statements by new Inspector General Remmy Kajoba, in which he gave instructions to the Police to arrest cadres who would continue cadreism.

Despite police efforts, there was re-emergence of cadres in Buseko market in 2022: in early January, two rival groups of UPND cadres clashed over who should take over the cooperative which controls and collects money at the bustling Buseko Market in Lusaka (Nyendwa, 2022). As witnessed during the fieldwork, there is particular section of Buseko Market that is now 'occupied' by UPND.

Quotes on UPND cadres on marketeers/bus drivers in Lusaka

'It has changed but not completely, we still have cadres that want to continue collecting money and harass customers. I was personally attacked, fortunately the person was arrested'

"Sometimes UPND cadres come and ask for lunch or transport money, but when we refuse, they just walk away. They say we owe because they feel they fought for us during the elections. The other day we had UPND people who came from the secretariat with a letter saying they were fundraising for a trip which would cost K50,000 and were asking bus operators to contribute; we didn't, and they went away. Some of the Call boys who were part of the cadres are still here and some bus operators pay them money to bring customers to their buses.'

Choma

Choma is the provincial capital of Southern province and has an urban council. It is a UPND stronghold in which there were no political cadres during the PF administration. There was a perception that the new bus station, opened 2021, was 'owned' by the PF probably as a result of the 'sontapo' campaign in which PF was pointing out to the new bus station as their achievement in providing for the Choma community. Despite that, there were no PF cadres.

In the run up to the 2021 elections, one of the councillors promised UPND supporters (potential cadres) to get 'jobs' if he won. After the elections, he took them to the new bus station presumably to emulate PF cadres revenue collection system that was happening elsewhere in Zambia. Fighting between drivers and cadres ensued and the council, with the help of the police, managed to remove the cadres.

Quote on cadres and bus operators.

The [UPND] cadres tried to take over the bus station and collect free money, but we managed to prevent them from taking over because we came together and organized ourselves well as bus drivers.

It needs to be pointed out however, that there are UPND cadres hanging around at the newly constructed bus station but they have not been able to exert themselves as there is successful resistance to cadreism.

The market has had no cadres and that continues to be the case until now.

Namwala

Namwala is a rural district council. It is also a UPND stronghold. No cadres in Namwala were observed. The bus stations and markets are very small and as a result, they do not generate much revenue, not even for the council.

Marketeers pay to the Council K1 a day as business levy, K15 per year as personal levy 2 kwacha for each time use of the council ablution block. A business levy license of K448 per year is lumped on marketeers who operate from shops in the market.

Bus operators pay Gate fees of K200 per bus, and an Operational fee K1500, levied annually. All revenue is collected by the Council and receipted.

On paying council fees, marketeers and bus drivers had the following observations:

‘They have built a new market, however, the council is taking a long time to open and finish, other people do not have trading places.’ ‘They clean the market collect garbage. We just need lighting when trading at night.’

‘We don’t have a proper place to operate and no shelter. We need the council to build us a taxi station.’

‘The council needs to educate us on how they come up with these charges because they are too high for a small town like Namwala. They do not provide security and cleaners to maintain the station, we even have no toilets.’

Livingstone

The council stated that there had not been cadres in Livingstone; that the markets did not have cadres and big bus companies had never had problems with cadres. However, evidence collected point to the facts that smaller and individual bus companies had been

charged irregular fees by PF. Some bus drivers were part of the PF group and benefited from the revenue collected.

After the 2021 elections, UPND cadres appeared at the exit bus stop in Livingstone, and big and small buses were told to pay fees to the cadres. It was not established where the money was intended to go. This has continued even up until now; bus drivers still pay cadres at this exit bus station.

Monze:

Monze was not part of the study and it was not possible to obtain any revenue figures from the Council. However in contrast to other UPND strongholds, Monze presented an interesting reality worth noting. During the PF rule, Monze had UPND cadres who behaved like PF cadres in PF strongholds.

Even in the post 2021 election period, UPND cadres continue to collect revenue from the 207 registered Bus operators with amounts of approximately K40 per day.

Kitwe

Kitwe is a large city which used to be a PF stronghold. It saw extremely high levels of political competition during the 2021 elections in which the PF won most politically contested seats. The City Council is said to be predominantly PF dominated and given that it has a long history of cadreism it was difficult to collect information openly during the field trip. The Council was not willing to providing information related to the subject of cadres as some managers claimed there was no presence of cadres in the bus station how ever the bus drivers indicated the presence of and narrated how this had affected their business operations.

Cadreism was rife during the period prior to the 2021 elections. PF cadres created small associations in bus stations and markets to collect revenue from bus operators and marketeers. If the marketeers did not pay the cadres what they demanded, they were evicted from the shops and stands or they would have their electricity cut off until they paid, these shops and stand would then be sold off to other marketeers and for they bus drivers they would not be allowed to operate in the bus station. The PF Government provided these associations with empowerment funds of different amounts one of them was K50,000 which the cadres saved and later shared earned interest. The idea behind this fund was for the drivers to borrow the money return at an interest rate and when the money multiplied they were supposed to share. In the end, the PF cadres took all the money and shared among themselves without the drivers benefiting from the empowerment fund.

PF cadres became owners of the buses themselves, mostly running the NOAH buses. Council saw these PF Noah bus drivers as illegal, as NOAH buses are not public service vehicles, but could not stop them. Currently these buses have crowded out what the Council approves as legitimate passenger buses.

PF cadres collected money and this was shared with councillors and other unnamed PF party officials. These were informal and undocumented transactions.

It is not clear what the prevailing situation is in the post 2021 elections period as there is a lot of tension in this matter given the that the PF won most of the leadership positions during 2021 elections and Kitwe remains predominantly PF.

Solwezi

Solwezi has historically seen low levels of political competition because it has been a UPND stronghold for the last decade. Cadreism was introduced under PF where cadres charged marketeers. But it did not become as widespread as on the Copperbelt.

PF cadre activity was especially centred at the intercity bus station. After the elections however, the cadres were removed. There are some leftover 'cadres' in the form of 'call boys' who charge up to K50 to fill up a bus, but they do not wear any party regalia.

Quote from a Marketeer

'Cadres would be taxing marketeers and getting more money than the council, they would tax figures higher than what the council taxed. So in some instances when the council attempted to collect from marketeers, they would complain and say they had already been visited by cadres.'

'Things were not good; they were thieves and criminals. We do not want them in the markets. The old councillor wanted to bring committees in this market, and we chased him. Committees were problematic, some of them were working with, or even cadres.' Former Chairperson of Solwezi bus association

Mansa

Mansa is characterised by low political competition. It is a PF stronghold and politically homogenous, with an apparent leverage of marketeers over local authorities. Coupled with a low revenue base cadre activity was low even during the PF era. The marketeers had a strong community that not only prevented extortion by cadres, but it had the power to bargain down increases in levies and fees by the council. Marketeers had been known to protest and even take their issues to either the District Commissioners office or the provincial minister's office, if at any point they came into contention with the council.

Notwithstanding the above, cadreism did exist at the bus stops. It was mostly the taxis and the smaller buses (Rosa) which were charged by the cadres. This was not at the expense of council revenue, as drivers paid both fees. This did not affect the customers, but the bus operators.

The cadre payments at the bus stops ended after the 2021 elections.

Quote from a Bus Operator

'Cadres would organize all the drivers and tell us to pay K50 each, saying it was going to the Mansa Drivers association... If you refused, they would trouble us. They would also force customers off the bus and give them to other drivers – those they favoured.'

'It meant we would knock off without any money, money that could be used for bread – while these people were going with enough money for meat'

Nakonde

Nakonde is a border town and provides several avenues for informal revenue collection (such as customs and cross-border trade). The presence of cadres in markets was very limited to non-existent, as financial opportunities were limited. Financial opportunity for cadres was found at the overnight bus stations. Because Nakonde is a final destination, buses are often stationed overnight. Trucks also make use of overnight parking facilities at the bus stations. PF cadres took advantage of the activities at the bus stations, by charging K100 per bus load, and k300 for an overnight stay. In addition, the cadres demanded payments for food, transportation, and funerals, which meant that bus operators could end up handing over sums of K600 in total, per day.

With the cadres after collecting the K100 from us, they would still ask for money. They would come and ask us for contributions to funerals, they would also say they needed lunch money, they would say their commander needs money for transport etc. So, at the end of the day, they could walk away with sums over K500 – it never just stopped with the K100 loading fee, they would take as much advantage of us as they wanted (interview, Nakonde bus operator)

These informal costs were often borne by the bus operators (who are always present at the bus station) rather than the drivers (who only pass through). The drivers did experience the humiliation of being abused, and times were forcefully removed from the stations if they or their operating managers did not have funds available to pay off the cadres. The bus operator's association was able to negotiate with the cadres if drivers were chased from the stations in case of non-payment of extortion fees. Aside from that, the operators had very limited bargaining power, especially when it came down to the fees that had to be paid.

The cadres claimed they would collect the funds for PF party activities. The money went both to PF and individual cadres. The council confirmed that despite the presence of

cadres, it was able to collect money at the bus stop, at ZMW 250 a bus load. Consequently, bus operators faced 'double taxation.'

'The ones under PF were very constricting; we still have cadres now, but they do not harass us.' 'We would try and negotiate with them whenever they chased people from the stations.' (Chair of Nakonde Bus Station)

'Cadres had more power than the police. They said they had gotten their powers from the top (president) and called themselves his 'soldiers' (Nakonde bus driver)

Since the 2021 elections, the cadres are still around but they have no power to extort anymore.

Mpika

Bus stations

Mpika bus station is a transit place for buses traveling on the Great North Road to either Nakonde or Kasama. Because of the transitory nature (i.e., the buses do not stay long, and never overnight) council fees are relatively low at K50 per load. Prior to the 2021 elections, Mpika's council chairperson instructed that bus operators did not have to pay rent to the council for their stands, but only the daily fees. This was the result of the support that bus operators had shown to PF through campaign funding. In short, the bus operators were rewarded for their support of PF.

At Mpika bus station, the bus station committees were PF-allied and would collect fees of K10 from bus operators passing through the station. Despite the fact they did not wear regalia, they were perceived by the bus drivers as PF cadres. If the drivers/operators refused to pay, they risked suspension from the station. The PF-allied bus committee allowed the council to charge the first four to five buses loading fees. The committee would charge all subsequent buses and keep the proceedings. This was an unwritten and unspoken law at the stations. This was the council chairperson's way of allowing those that mobilised for the party to generate their own revenue.

The TAZARA bus station was not affected by cadres or committees in any way. Bus drivers indicated that on their way to Nakonde, they used to pay fees in Chinsali to the call boys/cadres who ran the stations.

The cadres are still around as freely moving individuals, but they have no power to extort as before.

Market

Two markets were sampled in Mpika, namely BP market and the Musakanya market. The BP market is based at the bus station and there is no market committee.

At the Musakanya market there is a market committee and it had an office from which it controlled the marketplaces by issuing fines and punishments. The composition of these

committees was determined by PF party officials in the market. The marketeers felt that the market committee brought in some sort of order and semblance to market activities. The committee would also ensure security within the marketplace. Yet, it was also felt that the market committee took advantage of their powers, especially by the way they handed out fines, as it was seen as an informal revenue generating opportunity.

Their revenue was derived from penalizing marketeers, each penalty was K50. No receipts were issued, but the amounts were recorded in a book by the 'PF treasurer'.

While less extortion took place in the market in comparison with the bus stations, Musakanya market was clearly a PF domicile and those perceived to be sympathetic to the opposition were more heavily penalised. There were few isolated instances in which cadres, or market committee members would charge farmers and suppliers for bringing their produce.

Since the 2021 elections, there are no cadres.

Kapiri Mposhi

Kapiri Mposhi is another transit hub, connecting Lusaka, the Copperbelt, and Northern Provinces.

Markets

Kapiri Mposhi has 5 markets in total but in terms of financial reporting these have been merged into two markets. These are Old Market and Tambalale Markets.

Prior to the 2021 elections, the Market Association was made up of PF cadres who took over the council's function of allocating stands and shop spaces. The marketeers complained to the council about this practice, but they never got a response. If a marketeer did not come to the market for a day or two, they would allocate the shop or stand to another person who will pay for it and when the owner returned, they would have to pay another charge to allocate them a new stand or shop.

Cadres would also extort money from the farmers for their merchandise preventing the council from levying full fees from the farmers. The cadres called themselves 'agents' and farmers could only sell their produce through these 'agents.' The agent would charge the farmer e.g., K35 per bundle of fish. From the K35 the agent would keep K20, while the Council cashier was given K15.

This practice has continued up until now outside the main market, in a temporal makeshift market called Njanji where these cadres have built shelters where they keep the farmers' merchandise. The council had allocated a different place for farmers to trade away from Njanji but after a few days farmers were threatened by the cadres after which they returned. The cadres are said to be supported by the present PF Councillor who has told the cadres not to follow any of the council's directives. When one of the cadres was arrested for illegalities, the Councillor went and bailed him out.

Currently the markets have a new executive which is made up of UPND party members. The marketeers are afraid that the old system of cadreism will continue and would prefer

if these associations and market committees would be disbanded, and the running of the markets be left to the Council only.

‘The council revenue had gone down because we only depended on what the cadres gave us for bus stations for markets the council used to collect though sometimes marketers would refuse to pay because they had paid cadres and some would say the chairman has exempted them from paying the council levy’ (council worker, Kapiri Mposhi)

Bus Stations

Kapiri Mposhi has only one bus station. The drivers originally elected their own bus driver’s association executive, but under the previous PF administration, PF cadres removed the executive and put their own in its place. Consequently, the council was not allowed to collect any money from the bus station. Instead, cadres would collect money from the drivers. The council revenue collectors received K180 a day from the cadres. The council did not know what the cadres were charging the bus drivers.

The cadres were based at the PF constituency office, and this is where the revenue went.

Kapiri Mposhi has 10 levy check points, namely Oldwell Bridge, Lwanshimba, Chisamba, Chibwe, Fichisa, Chembwe, Waya, Kapunda, Shamabanse and Mpula. During the period of PF administration, the council had given a contract to a company belonging to one of the cadres to be collecting revenue on their behalf, even though the council had their own revenue collectors. Shortly before the elections the contract for this cadre was terminated, some of the employees still work at the same check points, but now as council revenue collectors.

The UPND cadres have taken over the bus association and are charging bus drivers K70 per bus per load while the council revenue collectors collect K10. This situation has created dissatisfaction at the bus station.

‘Political party cadres are not supposed to be in stations as the Head of State declared. But the cadres are still here in forms of the associations’ (Interview bus station manager, Kapiri Mposhi)

Kabwe

Kabwe markets are in two constituencies, namely Kabwe Central and Bwacha. Kabwe Central is currently in the hands of UPND, and Bwacha of PF. The lack of harmony and recurrent political tensions has an impact on the interaction of bus drivers/operations, marketeers, and the council.

The town has one main bus station where minibuses are found. This was the focal point for activity amongst cadres under PF. Whilst with the marketplaces, it seems they had some form of presence, but did not use it to exploit or extort marketeers out of their income. They are a total of 11 functioning markets within the city and 1 station formally under the council's control – within the station they are buses that operate within town and those that operate out of town. The researcher looked at Mine Market, Green Market and New Kasande Market.

Market

The council has no grip on Kamanda market, which has an occupancy of 500 marketeers. The marketeers feel that the infrastructure and services are adequately provided by their own community.⁶ Council workers were expelled when they tried to enter. Consequently, no council revenue is derived from this market. This is the only market out of the 10 that has failed to adhere to the rules stated in the Bus and Markets Act 2007 No. 7.

The council had introduced an e-payment system to collect revenue. But there has been a reluctance on the part of marketeers to join the e-payment system. They do not feel the need to do so, as in their view, the council failed in their duties to limit the numbers of street vendors who have taken away business from them. In their view, this has created an uneven playing field. Vendors have proliferated to the extent that they have closed off a whole road. The lack of services was another reason for not wanting to subscribe to the e-payment system.

Kabwe council is showing progress with the establishment of board to oversee the activities of markets. Currently under discussion is implementation of membership fees for marketeers to create a fund that can address sporadic costs like funeral fees etc. This is currently awaiting confirmation by the Minister of Local Government.

Bus Station

There is one bus station that the council controls. It contains mostly minibuses, which provide local and out of town transportation. Under the PF they were extorted by cadres in which they were charged per load (in town) or per week (out of town). The cadres charged short distance bus operators K10 per load and between K700 and K1000 for long distance buses.

‘They used to force us to join them in the party and if you refuse you are labelled opposition and are chased’ (interview, bus driver)

⁶ Perspective from the council: The Kamanda market community has been resisting paying the council the fees they collect from the committees. Their argument was that the money collected goes towards supporting the aged and underprivileged within the community. The market was initially established by the local community, since the council has failed to establish a presence within it and enforce any form of revenue collection from operations; the Kamanda community states they look after themselves and have not needed the help of the council. A similar attitude is present at Nakoli market.

Tension had also been brewing between the council and the former Kabwe Central MP. He established his own private station (Sonnet) in which large buses do drop offs and pick ups, which is still operational to date. He has failed to compensate the council the necessary fees that are due to them. The council has taken the case to court, where it is still pending.

The bus driver community is tightly knit, with power centralised in the president of the Bus Driver Association of Central Province. It appears that currently there is a dialogue between the Bus Association and the council, showing that relations are quite cordial. There is general excitement by bus drivers regarding the ePayment system, as they prefer to deal with a digital system rather than cash. They understand the purpose of the system and have bought into it.

Since the 2021 elections, the cadres are there but no longer have the power to collect fees.

‘At the moment we appreciate the directive from the president – we are free to load and interact with the council workers. The cadres had more power than the council back then’ (Interview bus driver)

Financial performance among sample councils: Overall and in markets and bus stations

The overall assessment of financial performance on revenue generation presented here was for samples of councils that were taken from groups of respective GIZ and USAID supported districts. Under the GIZ group, eight districts were original sampled, aiming to collect financial data for the period 2018-2020. Out of the eight, six councils provided full data, namely: Choma, Kitwe, Livingstone, Lusaka, Namwala and Solwezi (Mansa did not provide sufficient data to enable the financial assessment; and Monze did not provide any data at all).

Under the USAID group, the study originally sampled four councils, covering the period 2018-2020 of financial data. All four councils – Kabwe, Kapiri Mposhi, Mpika and Nakonde – provided sufficient data for financial assessment.

Therefore, overall, the financial performance of councils covered 10 districts, namely: Choma, Kabwe, Kapiri Mposhi, Kitwe, Livingstone, Lusaka, Mpika, Nakonde, Namwala and Solwezi. The reference period for the financial performance assessment was 2018-2020.


The assessment was based on data in the financial statements provided by the respective councils. The financial performance assessment focused on the following revenue items, which form part of the revenue profile of a typical council: (i) Owner rates (for property); (ii) Local taxes; (iii) Fees and Charges, wherein bus station and market fees are included; (iv) Licences; (v) Levies; (vi) Permits; (vii) Local Government Equalisation Fund; (viii) Constituency Development Fund; (ix) Other Grants; (x) Borrowings/debt; (xi)

Commercial Venture; and (xii) Other Receipts. The study considered only items (i) to (vi) since the rest are outside the direct control of the councils, being from Central Government and/or other Local Government financial supporters and sponsors. In their respective financial statements, the sample councils did not always uniformly report on all the revenue items. This imposed some data constraints on the study. Nonetheless, some insightful observations are made.

Overall revenue performance

At the aggregate council level, the 10 councils for which both *budgeted revenue* (“budget”) and *revenue “outcome”* data were available typically, underperformed on revenue generation relative to the final annual budget target was observed (see, Figure 1). This was observed consistently across the three years of observation, except for the cases of: Nakonde in 2018, when the budget target of K28 million was exceeded by a revenue outcome of K30.4 million; and Solwezi in 2018, with a lower budget target of K55.5 million compared to the revenue outcome of K63.1 million. Thus, revenue collections in the sample councils were relatively weaker than what the councils had anticipated in their planning and budgeting processes.

Figure 1: Overall revenue performance in selected councils (K millions)



Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Although Mansa is included in Figure 1 and shows an increasing trend in revenue collection overall, the financial performance relative to the budget targets could not be assessed given the aforementioned data limitations.

The specific magnitudes of underperformance and overperformance among the councils are presented in Table 1 below. In agreement with Figure 1, all councils saw various levels of underperformance – ranging from 49% to 85% of the budget – over the reference year,

expect for Nakonde and Solwezi in 2018 when the councils collected 108% and 114%, respectively, of their budget targets.

Table 1: Revenue performance in selected councils (Outcome as % of Budget)

<i>District/council</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>
Choma	69%	58%	59%
Kabwe	Not available	59%	57%
Kapiri Mposhi	60%	74%	51%
Kitwe	68%	73%	70%
Livingstone	78%	62%	68%
Lusaka	69%	61%	49%
Mpika	74%	68%	85%
Nakonde	108%	50%	72%
Namwala	82%	62%	73%
Solwezi	114%	72%	70%

Notes:
The breakeven threshold on revenue performance was 100%, implying that any outcome less than 100% depicted revenue underperformance relative to the budget while any outcome greater than 100% reflected overperformance.

Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

An important underlying question to this financial performance assessment is: did political cadres affect the revenue collection performance of the sample councils and if so, how and to what extent? The sub-sections that follow consider the case-by-case revenue performance of the five sample councils in an attempt to answer the question. The focus was generally on the following revenue items: (i) Owners rates; (ii) Local taxes; (iii) Fees and charges, including bus station fees and market fees (where data was available); (iv) Licences; (v) Permits; and (vi) Levies. Other revenue items were also included based on relevance of data that was provided by the councils. It was anticipated that the adverse influences of strong political cadre informal payment systems on council revenue performance would be partially observed through suppressed or declining revenues only or mainly in items where the cadres compete with the councils for collection, such as bus station fees and market fees as well as levies; and much less so or completely absent where cadres had no purview or authority to interfere (e.g., owners rates, licences and permits).

Choma

The revenue collection performance of Choma Municipal Council in 2018-2020 is presented in Table 2. Data on bus station and market fee collections was missing. However, using the fees and charge, generally, it is observed that Choma over performed in 2018 and significantly underperformed in 2019; in 2020, the revenue collection was markedly better than in 2019, despite that COVID-19 ensure during this latter year. Local tax collections following a very similar trend over the three years whereas revenues on licences and permits rebounded considerably during the COVID-19 year of 2020. Levy revenues recorded consistent overperformance throughout the period in Choma. The patterns of revenue collection suggest that the influence of any sort of external

interferences such as political cadre competition were relatively weak or possibly non-existent. The patterns were most likely more significant driven by the council's own capacity to plan and budget properly and to collect the targeted revenues.

Table 2: Revenue performance Choma (Outcome as % of Budget)

	Performance ((outcome/budget)x100)		
	2018	2019	2020
Owners rates	n.a	31%	n.a
Local taxes	204%	31%	43%
Fees and charges	124%	39%	67%
o/w Bus station fees	n.a	n.a	n.a
Market fees	n.a	n.a	n.a
Licences	17%	159%	114%
Permits	77%	72%	143%
Levies	184%	523%	208%
Notes: n.a = not available o/w = of which			

Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Livingstone

Livingstone City Council's revenue performance in 2018-2020 is presented in Table 3. Overall, Livingstone recorded the best revenue collection outcomes (relative to budgets) in 2018. Performance data on bus station and markets fees collection were available for only 2020. In that year, market fees overperformed, recording 130% of the budget target whereas bus station fees underperformed, reaching only 24% of the budget, most likely on account of COVID-19 related travel restrictions which reduced activities in the bus stations. The data does not suggest any strong influence of the presence of political cadres on Livingstone City Council's performance in collecting revenue. The overall patterns suggest internal capacity circumstance were more important in influencing collections.

Table 3: Revenue performance Livingstone (Outcome as % of Budget)

	Performance ((outcome/budget)x100)		
	2018	2019	2020
Owners rates	108%	93%	53%
Local taxes	97%	121%	99%
Fees and charges	61%	36%	73%
o/w Bus station fees	n.a	n.a	24%
Market fees	n.a	n.a	130%
Licences	103%	22%	10%
Permits	147%	50%	98%
Levies	112%	57%	84%
Notes: n.a = not available o/w = of which			

Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Yet, when we look at the “Formal and Informal Fees Structures in Sample Councils” schedule (Annex 1), other survey respondents reported having been charged an informal daily bus station fee of K100 in bus stations (but no informal cadre fees in markets). Assuming the cadre system was able to apply or execute these daily fees on the 70 buses operating in Zimbabwe bus station and 13 buses in Livingstone Intercity bus station, over 261 days a year (or 5 out of 7 days a week), the informal system would have collected an estimated K2,163,929. Over 365 days a year (or 7 of 7 days a week), the total informal collections would be K3,029,500. These collections were in the range of 254-355% of the K853,289 budgeted as formal Market fee collections by the Council and 1,037-1,452% of K208,685 actually collected as Market fees in the same year.

Considering that, formal Council bus station fees underperformed, reaching only 24% of the budget in 2020, the relatively higher estimated informal cadre collections could have had a strong influence in lowering the Council’s performance in market fee revenue collection.

Namwala

The revenue collection performance of Namwala District Council is presented in Table 4. Namwala had data on revenue collections on bus station and market fees for two years (2018 and 2020). The patterns in the council records show that Namwala underperformed consistently across all field and years, except in relation to local taxes in 2018 and 2020 and permits in 2020. The stronger general performance in 2020 as well as the stronger performance on collection of bus station and market fees in that year are somewhat paradoxical, given the COVID-19 pandemic, which emerged during the year and subdued economic activity. However, since Namwala is a remote rural district, the influence of COVID-19 restrictions might not have been so strongly felt there. The patterns of revenue collection on bus station and market fees were not markedly different from other collections, suggesting a weak or non-existent influence of political cadres in revenue collection.

Table 4: Revenue performance Namwala (Outcome as % of Budget)

	Performance ((outcome/budget)x100)		
	2018	2019	2020
Owners rates	56%	n.a	11%
Local taxes	144%	55%	110%
Fees and charges	31%	40%	28%
o/w Bus station fees	7%	n.a	40%
Market fees	41%	n.a	52%
Licences	18%	13%	41%
Permits	66%	24%	105%
Levies	32%	42%	75%
Notes: n.a = not available o/w = of which			

Solwezi

The revenue collection performance of Solwezi Municipal Council is presented in Table 5. In general, across the board, revenue collection in the municipality was strongest in 2018 and weakest in 2020, though this was only marginally weaker than in 2019. The fees and charges revenue item – proxy for bus station fees and market fees in the absence of data on those specifically – did not exhibit a pattern that was significantly different from the other items, suggesting limited, if any, influence of cadres on revenue collection in the local areas.

Table 5: Revenue performance Solwezi (Outcome as % of Budget)


	Performance ((outcome/budget)x100)		
	2018	2019	2020
Owners rates	n.a	n.a	n.a
Local taxes	129%	77%	73%
Fees and charges	65%	53%	33%
o/w Bus station fees	n.a	n.a	n.a
Market fees	n.a	n.a	n.a
Licences	42%	12%	10%
Permits	93%	81%	84%
Levies	186%	95%	75%
Notes: n.a = not available o/w = of which			

Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Kabwe

The revenue collection performance of Kabwe Municipal Council in 2019-2020 is presented in Figure 2. The data did not include any specific entries on bus station and market fee collections. Therefore, using the fees and charge (wherein bus station and market fees are situated) as a proxy, it was generally observed that Kabwe underperformed most significantly in relation to the fees and charges collections in both 2019 and 2020, with respective collections of only 18% and 25% of the annual budgets, respectively. Local tax collections in 2019 and permits receipts in 2019 and 2020 overperformed by 142%, 142% and 110% of the annual budgets, respectively. The CDF recorded full underperformance (0% of budget) in 2019 and parity performance (100% of budget) in 2020. The rest of the receipt items underperformed by varying degrees but nowhere near the magnitude of underperformance in fees and charges. This suggests that the informal cadre system may have impeded fees and charges collections by the council in Kabwe.

Figure 2: Revenue performance Kabwe (Outcome as % of Budget)




Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Kapiri Mposhi

The revenue collection performance of the Kapiri Mposhi District Council is presented in Figure 3. The data in the council records included revenue collections data on market and bus station fees. The revenue collection patterns across the various budget categories show consistent underperformance in some categories, consistent overperformance in others and a mixed picture in other still. Revenue collections on Rates, (overall) Fees and Charges, Bus station fees, Permits and Charges consistently underperformed over the entire period 2018-2020. Local taxes and Levies consistently overperformed throughout. Market fees and Licences were mixed, both overperforming in 2018 and then subsequently underperforming in 2019 and 2020. Overall, the weakest underperformance on revenue collection was in relation to Charges. The Local Government Equalization Funds (LGEF) receipts seemed to break even in the two years for which data was available.

Ultimately, the mixed pattern of revenue collection of Market fees coupled with the consistent but better off underperformance of Bus station fees were not unusual; they were not different from patterns in categories where no cadre influence was expected. This suggests that the weak revenue collection performance in Kapiri Mposhi might have more to do with the underlying weaknesses in the council's general revenue collection ability. A significant dampening influence of cadres in the revenue collection of Market and Bus Station fees could not be established. The relatively very low outcome of Bus Station revenues in 2020 could have also be associated with COVID-19 related travel restrictions, which reduced overall activity in the bus station in Kapiri Mposhi.

Figure 3: Revenue performance Kapiri Mposhi (Outcome as % of Budget)




Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Mpika

Mpika District Council's revenue collection performance in 2018-2020 is presented in Figure 4. Overall, the council recorded the best revenue collection outcomes (relative to budgets) in relation to Local taxes in 2018, with an outlier overperformance of 695% of the budget target. Specific bus station and markets fees collections were not available for any other the reference years; thus, the study focused on the fees and charges revenue category as the main proxy where cadre system informal collections could be anticipated to interfere. Fees and charges revenue collections were systematically the lowest in the range of collection items across all three years, except for: local taxes in 2018 (at 25% of budget) and Licences in 2019 (at 27% of budget). The relatively much lower underperformance of fees and fines suggests possibility of underlying cadre interference in council revenue collections.

Figure 4: Revenue performance Mpika (Outcome as % of Budget)




Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Nakonde

The revenue collection performance of Nakonde District Council is presented in Figure 5. Nakonde had data on revenue collections on bus station and market fees. Therefore, the fees and charges revenue category was used as a proxy of what might happen in relation to bus station and market fees. The patterns in the council records show that Nakonde underperformed consistently across all categories and years, except in fees and charges in 2018, levies in 2019, permits in 2019 and marginally CDF in 2019 and 2020. There was no discernible systematic pattern of significantly lower revenue collection underperformance in the fees and charges category compared to the other categories. This is indicative of the possibility of rather limited or non-existent underlying interferences by cadres in council revenue collections.

Figure 5: Revenue performance Nakonde (Outcome as % of Budget)




Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

Lusaka

Lusaka City Council was by far the largest council reviewed. Its revenue performance in 2017-2021 is presented in Figure 2. Overall, Lusaka experienced improving trends in revenue collection in Owner rates (whose performance improved from 51% in 2018 to 104% in 2021), Ground rents (improved from 23% in 2018 to 86% in 2021), Permits (improved from 77% in 2018 to overperformance of 196% in 2021) and Other incomes (increased from 1% in 2019 to an impressive 241% in 2021). On the other hand, Local taxes overall declines from 71% in 2018 to 40% in 2021 albeit an improvement from a period low of 15% in 2019; Market fees declined from 77% in 2018 to 52% in 2021 in spite of a peak period spike of 97% in 2019; Bus Station fees reduced from 79% in 2018 and 48% in 2021; Licences declined from 97% in 2018 to 14% in 2021; and Levies overall declines from an impressive 177% in 2018 to 89% in 2021 albeit an improvement from a period low of 23% in 2020. Finally, State support in terms of national Grant support and

Local Development Funds were both flat, although with interim declines in 2019 and 2020.


Figure 2: Annual revenue performance Lusaka (outcome as % of budget)



Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

On average over 2018-2021, revenue performance in Lusaka City Council was highest in the Permits revenue class, at 104% per year and local taxes were the lowest as 38%. Market fees (66%) and Bus Station fees (56%) were below the average on Total revenues (68%). Plausibly, Market fees and Bus Station fees were not significantly adversely affected by the cadre collection system. The performance comparability with revenue items that did not face any significant interference from the cadre system such as Ground Rent, Licences and Local taxes.

Figure 3: Average revenue performance Lusaka over 2018-2021 (Outcome as % of Budget)



Source: constructed from council Financial Statements

The revenue collection outcomes of Lusaka City Council across bus stations and markets over 2018-2020 are presented in Table 6. Lusaka revenues from markets steadily increased from K23.4 million in 2018 to K25.1 million (or by 8%) in 2019 and further to K44.5 million (by 77%) in 2020, despite COVID-19 in 2020. On the other hand, bus station fees increased from K16.2 million in 2018 to K19.4 million (by 20%) in 2019 and then dramatically declines by 68% to K6.1 million in 2020 (plausibly COVID-19 given the sudden drop, but possibly cadreism as well, given the informal evidence). From the overall financial outcomes, Lusaka is clearly a far larger market and station for buses. For instance, Lusaka’s revenue from markets was 54 times the markets revenue of Livingstone and 1,214 times that of Namwala in 2020. Similarly, bus station revenues for Lusaka were 29 and 125 times the bus station revenues of Livingstone and Namwala, respectively. Incentives for political cadre activity to proliferate in bus stations and most so, markets were possibly highest in Lusaka City Council areas. However, the evidence suggest that the political motivated cadre system did not unduly influence low revenue collection performance in terms of Market fees and Bus Station fees.

Table 6: Revenue Outcomes Lusaka

	2018	2019	2020
Markets (K)	23,351,322	25,108,949	44,491,832
Market (% change)		8%	77%
Bust stations (K)	16,208,914	19,382,883	6,116,803
Bus stations (% change)		20%	-68%
Sub-total (K)	39,560,237	44,491,832	50,608,636
Sub-total (% change)		12%	14%

Source: constructed from council Financial Statement

Social and political impact of cadres

In a resource-poor setting, the complete insulation of a political “public sphere” from contests over the distribution of wealth and life opportunities is implausible. There just is not enough money and there are not enough jobs to go around, or a sufficiently dynamic capitalist market present for an emerging “owning class” or for potential employees, to conclude that they ought to avoid political networks, and instead stabilise their strategies through the acceptance of a neutral “policeman state” (policy brief, 9). It is particularly difficult to collate accurate information on the ways in which the ubiquity of party cadres affected the 2021 elections. We do not currently have a nationally representative survey that asks a question about the impact of party cadres on popularity of political parties. During the 2021 election campaign, party cadres played an active role in campaigning for their parties, but also in intimidating supporters of other political parties.

In the Zambian Election Panel Survey, run by the Programme on Local Governance (GLD) at the University of Gothenburg, the researchers asked a non-representative sample of Zambians about their views on a variety of issues related to the 2021 polls (*The Zambian*

Election Panel Survey (ZEPS), 2021).⁷ The analysis below comes, in part, from a draft brief by Nicole Beardsworth and Matthias Kroenke (UCT) on behalf of the GLD.⁸ The survey was conducted in three Rounds, two before the elections and one following it: Round 1 (June 8-July 3, 2021), Round 2 (July 15-Aug 10, 2021), and Round 3 (Aug 25-Oct 3, 2021).


Instilling fear in urban neighbourhoods

We asked survey respondents what activities party members were most likely to perform at the local level, in Round 1 (R1, blue column) respondents were asked if they had heard about cadres collecting money and evicting people from bus stations and markets, and in Round 3 (R3, orange and grey columns) we asked about money collection and evictions separately. Ahead of the election in survey R1, the survey found that urban and peri-urban respondents were much more likely to come into contact with cadres than those in rural areas.

In Round 1, 61 per cent of urban respondents and 52 per cent of peri-urban ones reported that cadres collect money or evict tenants from markets and bus stations. Only 32 per cent in rural areas said the same. Clearly, party cadres were much less active in rural areas than in urban locations. Overall, 75 per cent of urban Zambians surveyed said that cadres collected money from bus stations and markets, while 61 per cent had heard of cadres evicting people from these public spaces.

This urban bias remained throughout the campaign period (R3) and was confirmed by our fieldwork which found that party cadres were more likely to operate in more urban areas, with stronger local economies and greater opportunities for rent extraction.

Figure 2: Cadres: Collect money + evicting people| by location | Wave 1 & 3



⁷ The Zambian Election Panel Survey was conducted predominantly in Eastern, Lusaka, and Muchinga Provinces

⁸ Draft policy brief: Matthias Kroenke, Nicole Beardsworth, Ellen Lust, Michael Wahman, and Jeremy Seekings. "Playing Politics: Party cadres and Zambia's 2021 election," *The Program on Governance and Local Development at the University of Gothenburg*: March, 2022.


Impact on Zambians' everyday lives

Overall, significant numbers of urban Zambians reported fearing violence and intimidation by party cadres when going about their everyday activities – such as buying food at a market and taking local transport (Figure 3).

Ahead of the polls, 22 per cent of urbanites and 16 per cent of peri-urbanites feared experiencing intimidation at the market, versus just 13 per cent of rural residents, respectively. We see a similar response to facing possible intimidation at bus stations. Interestingly, this difference disappears during the campaign period, and increased again after the election. This may have been a result of the ECZ's temporary bans on campaigning in some urban areas, due to scattered incidents of inter-party violence.

The blue column is Round 1 (R1), orange column Round 2 (2), and grey column Round 3 (R3).

Figure 3: Citizens fear violence and intimidation at market and bus station | by location | Round 1 - 3



In their election post-mortem, the PF identified party cadres as one of the key reasons why they lost the 2021 polls.⁹ In the ZEPS survey we asked whether the actions of PF party cadres had changed people's view of the ruling PF party. In urban and peri-urban areas prior to the election, more than 40% of respondents said that their view of the then-ruling party was damaged by the actions of party cadres.

The clear takeaway from this survey and from our broader research on party cadres is that they were deeply unpopular, and that this unpopularity reflected on the political party in power. In order to avoid a repeat of the dramatic defeat suffered by the PF in

⁹ (Yambani, 2021)

2021, the new UPND ruling party should carefully consider the future political costs of allowing a flourishing party cadre system.

Findings, scenarios and recommendations

Findings:

- 1) The likelihood of the emergence of a cadres system is conditioned by: 1) national-level political will; 2) local level dynamics – where local politicians make use of this system as a reward for political support/loyalty, marketeers/bus operators and council workers have insufficient authority to push back against opportunistic elements; 3) limited opportunities for revenue – in places where there is a smaller local economy, it is less lucrative and thus fewer opportunities for rent extraction. With the new administration, opportunities for cadres have reduced significantly, except in Kapiri Mposhi.
- 2) The impact of political cadres on livelihoods in Lusaka, Livingstone, Kapiri Mposhi, Mpika, Kabwe, Nakonde and Kitwe was substantial. In several of our research sites, the cadres were collecting money over and above that which was being collected by the council – leading to a double taxation of bus drivers and marketeers. In several interviews conducted by the team, the workers noted that – especially during COVID – this double taxation had a dramatic negative effect on their livelihoods. Evidence from the court cases provided above suggests that the bus drivers at Kulima Tower bus station were being levied 15 per cent of their daily income by party cadres, leading to a substantial loss of income of up to ZMW63,000.00 per annum. Cadres charged informally for slots/stands, daily fees and ad hoc fees for election contribution, electricity and other ‘services.’ Additionally, cadres would take goods, or use services, without paying for them.
- 3) The impact of cadres on council revenues was most significant in Livingstone, Lusaka, Kitwe, Kapiri Mposhi, Mpika and Kabwe. But in all cases, except for Solwezi, it shows the weak capacity of councils to collect revenue and negate the impact of party cadres. It must be noted that the cadres were collecting money outside of the bus stations and markets, which deprived council collection of getting revenue. This practice has continued beyond the 2021 elections.
- 4) There is fieldwork evidence that at Downtown Market and to some extent Intercity bus station in Kitwe, the council was prevented by cadres from collecting levies. We can infer from this that in these spaces, cadres had a substantial impact on council revenues – but without the disaggregated financial data, we are unable to state the exact amount (see appendix 1 for informal revenue collection).
- 5) Social impact: Data from the Zambian Election Panel Survey (ZEPS) suggests that the cadres had a serious and substantial negative effect on society and on politics around the 2021 elections. They made a substantial proportion of urban residents feel fearful of going about their daily lives, may have impacted on voter turnout, and may well have contributed to the PF’s dramatic election loss in August 2021. As a system of urban control and rent extraction, cadres became extremely unpopular and were seen as contributing to a climate of fear and intimidation that bedevilled urbanised areas.

- 6) There was some indication that the Markets and Bus Stations Act (2007) had played into the politicisation of councils, but our analysis seems to suggest that this is an unintended consequence of the Act, rather than a key foundational part of it. Instead, the political will from the centre and local political interests seem to have a greater effect on determining whether or not a cadres system operates in each location.

Possible scenarios:

1. Scenario 1: Successful reform of the Bus Stations and Markets Act (2007) which will lead to de-politicisation and the end of cadreism. This is bolstered by an awareness-raising campaign in markets and bus stations, and reform of the legislation governing political parties.

Markets and Bus Stations Act: Possible steps would include the introduction of elective boards chosen from among registered marketeers and all operating in the location. This could be supported with a revision of the Market Act to make it an offence for not only active participation in party politics for any elected member of the board, but also any form of connection to a political party. The Act should also punish holding party campaigns in markets and any form of roadshows in and adjacent to markets.

Another avenue would be to revise the Act by making changes in which only appointed and salaried Council Revenue collectors are legally mandated to collect revenue in markets, and that receipts must be provided for every transaction. Give Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) who is the disciplinary superior to local government employees a stronger mandate to prosecute corruption in the form of council workers and councillors colluding with political cadres. Committees should be restricted to other functions such as ensuring a clean environment, and they should be banned from collecting revenue. They should be barred from allocating stands and stalls so that only Council Revenue collectors could perform this role. Any involvement of a Revenue Collector in party activities should be an offence. Make use of e-payment systems.

Civil society campaigns: Revamping of neighbourhood watch groups who monitor cadres in their respective communities. An active role of CSO's is to create awareness of the illegality of cadreism and create a safe whistleblowing mechanism. This could be bolstered with public signage which outlines 1) that the collection of fees and levies is illegal and carries a legal sanction, 2) that all payments must be accompanied by a formal council receipt and the failure to produce a receipt is an offence, and 3) signage should include a toll-free number to call in case of harassment by cadres.

Police: There is the need to ensure that the police control the problem of cadreism and do not collude with the cadres for their own benefit. Disciplinary action should be taken when collusion takes place, and police in urban areas should be given training on their independence from political actors. This must be reinforced by strong statements by the IGP.

Political Parties: Creating awareness among political parties, by way of evidence-based research, that cadreism is unpopular with the wider population and diminishes their

popularity. It also leads to intraparty factionalism which potentially undermines the unity of the party.

A new law governing political parties was under consideration during the previous parliament. Legislation governing the actions of political parties should be passed in this parliament, and it would be worth considering provisions which stipulate that the collection of levies/fees/taxes from citizens, outside of government taxes and party dues, is prohibited by party members. This legislation could also consider changes to political party financing – which was clearly one of the key drivers of the informal party cadres system – including the possibility of public financing for political parties, which includes provisions mandating increased transparency in party financing. Useful examples here (of legislation) are those adopted in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

2. Scenario 2: Internalisation of cadreism. The appointment of cadres to formal institutions leads to a change of norms within those institutions. They become a part of corrupt practices and criminal networks, thereby undermining trust in governance mechanisms.

Under this scenario, the public extortion by cadres in markets and bus stations appears to disappear but is in fact merely incorporated and legitimised within existing institutional forms. Thus the council's workers may be collecting levies, but also work as cadres to intimidate workers and push them to pay additional fees for which they do not receive a receipt. This works to further undermine the credibility of local governance institutions, and the council become increasingly unable to regulate markets and stations, or to effectively remit money to the treasury, as these key institutions are captured by political interests.

3. Scenario 3: Resurgence of cadreism. Cadreism is never a spontaneous phenomenon: people high up in party/government structure enable or facilitate this to take place.

Political leaders and parties have an important role to play to prevent the re-emergence of cadres. The risk is that ahead of a tightly contested election in 2026, the ruling party (UPND) resorts to cadreism to mobilise voters in the markets and bus stations, to obtain revenue for their political activities and to use intimidation to 'dominate' the urban electorate.

The current decentralisation process might take away the 'central command' system of political parties, replacing it with political strongmen on the ground. They in turn might resort to cadreism to sustain their activities on the ground. The risk of this, increases the value of early interventions at public education campaigns in markets, training for police and revision to the governing legislation for political parties.

Recommendations toward fulfilling scenario 1:

1. Use leverage with Hichilema and his advisors to get the research findings across his desk which show how unpopular cadreism was, and how damaging it would be for UPND if it returned in force.

2. If GIZ/USAID has any programming with police, to work with them on the law around regulating markets and council responsibilities.
3. If GIZ/USAID works with councils, organise trainings on the Markets Act, and policing of cadres out of markets and enable the putting up of signs in markets and stations about the rights of marketeers/bus drivers.
4. Work with bus drivers and marketeers associations so that they know their rights and are empowered to 1) refuse to pay cadres and 2) to report cadre activity to the police.

General recommendation regarding the councils:

- 1) The need to strengthen council's capacity to collect revenue and reinvest in the markets/bus stations.
- 2) There needs to be greater training on and enforcement of the Public Financial Management Act (2018), to ensure that councils are operating within the bounds of the law.
- 3) The need to ensure that there is improved access to financial data for all councils, and greater data transparency.
- 4) Give LGSC and Ministry of Local Government a greater role in prosecuting corrupt local council employees and councillors

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Appendix I: Formal and Informal Fees Structures in Sample Councils

Province	Luapula		Copperbelt		Southern		Lusaka		Southern		Southern		Southern		N/western	
Council	Mansa		Kitwe		Livingstone		Lusaka		Choma		Monze		Namwala		Solwezi	
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)
1. Council fees, fine, levies & other charges																
1.1 Bus Stations																
i.	Mansa-Lusaka Loading Fee	K250	Taxis	K5	Big Buses per load	K100	Big bus Levy (City Market)	K100	Per bus load	K20	Loading fee	K20	Big Buses Loading Fee	K200	Big Buses	K150
ii.	Mansa – Mpulungu Loading Fee	K250	Noah	K10	Annual Levy	K5000	Big bus Levy InterCity	K300	Monthly Rentals	K450			Taxis Loading fee	K5	Small Buses	K100
iii.	Mansa – Nakonde Loading Fee	K250	Local Toyota Hiace	K10	Small buses per load	K50	Small Bus Levy	K40							Taxi Levy	K5
iv.	Mansa – Kitwe Loading Fee	K150	Local ROSA	K11.50	Transit fee	K50	Intercity rent for bus companies	K10,000 K2500								
v.	Mansa – Kashikishi Loading Fee	K100	Inter	K12.50												
vi.	Mansa – Chembe Loading Fee (SB)	K10	Long Distance Coach	K125												
vii.	Mansa – Samfya Loading Fee	K10	International Coaches	K600												

Province	Luapula		Copperbelt		Southern		Lusaka		Southern		Southern		Southern		N/western	
Council	Mansa		Kitwe		Livingstone		Lusaka		Choma		Monze		Namwala		Solwezi	
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)
viii.	Mansa – Chipili Loading Fee (SB)	K10	Annual Subscription	K2500												
ix.			Slot Allocation Fees	K1500												
x.			Intl Bus Registration	K3000												
1.2 Markets																
i.	Fish Levy Wholesalers	K10														
ii.	Fish Levy Retailers	K4	Space Allocation Annually	K1500	Shop Fee	K3	Market Levy	K3	Stands	K10	Daily Fee	K5	Market Fee	K2	Market Fees	K2
iii.	Tomato Levy Wholesalers; per box	K2	Nakadoli Market (Shops)	K500	Tomatoes, Vibuyu, Dry Foods, Salaula, & Charcoal	K3	Market Levy	K5	Annual Business Levy	K1165	Electricity Monthly	K5	Toilet Fee	K1	Market Fees incoming goods	K50
iv.	Cabbage Levy Wholesalers	K10	Toilets	K2	Vegetables, Watermelon, Village chicken	K2	Market Levy	K10	Daily Fee	K2	Security Monthly	K5	Personal Levy Annual	K15		
v.							Electricity (shops)	K100								
vi.							Market Fees incoming goods	K50								
vii.	General Market Levy	K2			Sweet Potatoes, Onion,	K5	Toilet Fee	K2	Toilet Fee	K2	Toilet Fee	K2				

Province	Luapula		Copperbelt		Southern		Lusaka		Southern		Southern		Southern		N/western	
Council	Mansa		Kitwe		Livingstone		Lusaka		Choma		Monze		Namwala		Solwezi	
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)
					Cabbage, Sour Milk, Goats/Pigs & Beans/Kapenta											
viii.			Market Stall	K2.50	Groundnuts, Maize Bran, Cabbage (Red Label), Fresh Maize & Dry Maize	K10	City market shops	K335.50 K252.50 K80								
2. Political cadre fees, fine, levies & other charges																
2.1 Bus Stations																
i.	Daily Fee	K100	Fuel Interest Payback	K20	Daily Fee	K100	Offloading Timber (Truck)	K50			Membership Charge	K270			Parking Slot	K20
ii.			Loading Fee	K70			Daily Loading fee	K300			Daily	K40			Loading fee	K50
iii.							Small buses loading fee	K50								
2.2 Markets																
i.			Subscription Fee (Weekly)	K5			Trading Space (daily)	K10	Land Fee	K200					Table Slots	K2000
ii.			Slot Fee	K500			Illegal Space Allocations (Weekly)	K30								
iii.							Stands, Booths, Containers	K2000								

Province	Luapula		Copperbelt		Southern		Lusaka		Southern		Southern		Southern		N/western	
Council	Mansa		Kitwe		Livingstone		Lusaka		Choma		Monze		Namwala		Solwezi	
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)
							etc. (Once Off)									
iv.							Stands, Booths, Containers etc. (Once Off) Peak areas	K5000								

Province	Muchinga		Muchinga		Central		Central			
Council	Nakonde		Mpika		Kabwe		Kapiri Mposhi			
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)		
xi.	Big buses per load	K250	Big buses per load	K50	Local bus loading fee	K15	Check points per bag	K10		
xii.			Mini buses	K5	Out of town loading fee	K30	Taxi daily charge	K5		
xiii.			Luggage fees	K2-K20	Green Inn	K30	Big bus charge daily	K120-K200		
xiv.			Parking fees	K5	Brimas (3 people and above)	K40	Rosa buses daily	K180		
xv.					Brimas (4 people and above)	K70	Fuso/ trucks daily	K10		
xvi.					Brimas (8 people and above)	K120				
xvii.					Vwalika	K60				
xviii.					Sombai	K4				

Province	Muchinga		Muchinga		Central		Central			
Council	Nakonde		Mpika		Kabwe		Kapiri Mposhi			
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)		
xix.					Taxi Parking Fees	K4				
ix.					New Kasanda Market operating fees	Inside K1 Outside K3 Toilet K1				
x.			Market fees	K2	Chimanmani operating fees	K1	Shop Registration	K100		
xi.			Storage fees	K2	Mukobeko operating fees	K1	Plan	K205		
xii.	Storage fee	K20	Toilets	K2	Kachulu Farmers Fee (Canters)	K5, K10 and K20	Shop Plot	K1000		
xiii.	General Market Levy	K2			Kachulu Market fees	Stands K2 Toilets K2	Annual licenses	K900-K1650		
xiv.					Njanji Market	Stands K2 Toilet K2 Water K0.5-K1	Market Levy Daily	K1-K2		
xv.					Green Market	Stands K1 Toilet K1	Toilet fees	K1		
xvi.					Pollen Market fees	K1	Fish/Kapenta	K35		
xvii.					Mine Market Fees for Farmers	Tomatoes, Rape and ALL CROPS K10-K40				
xviii.						Cabbages K20-K40				
xix.						Watermelons K40-K60				

Province	Muchinga		Muchinga		Central		Central			
Council	Nakonde		Mpika		Kabwe		Kapiri Mposhi			
	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)	Fee Description	Amount (K)		
xx.					Market and street fees for vendors	K3				
iv.	Daily Fee	K100	Loading fee	K50-K100	Daily loading Fee (local buses)	K10	Kapiri – Loading fee long distance	K80		
v.			Bus stall fee (daily)	K10	Weekly loading fees (out of town buses)	K650-K1000	Taxis daily fee	K5		
vi.							Check points	K10 per bag		
vii.							Big Bus	K5 per person		
viii.							Monthly subscription fee	K20		
v.			Committee Disciplinary fee	K50-K100			Farmers per bag	K30		
vi.							Annual Subscription fee	K20		
vii.							Stand Shop Allocation	K150 K200 K300 K500 K1000		
viii.							Daily Charge	K5		
ix.							Monthly Storage	K20		
x.										
xi.										

