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Introduction: The Life and Legacies of Kenneth Kaunda in Southern Africa

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Introduction

Zambia's first President Kenneth Kaunda (known widely as KK) passed away on 17 June 2021 at the age of 97. This marked the end of an era for many, and not only in Zambia. Kaunda belonged to the last of a generation of African leaders who fought for independence from colonial rule and had his own brand of political and economic philosophies (Cheeseman and Sishuwa 2021). Given the momentous occasion of the passing of one of Africa's biggest icons, as editors we felt it was timely to organise a conference dedicated to Kaunda and his legacy, which took place in Lusaka in November 2021.[1] This special issue features papers presented at this conference.

Kenneth David Kaunda was born on April 28, 1924, at Lubwa mission, near Chinsali in what was then Northern Rhodesia and died on June 17, 2021, in Lusaka, Zambia. Kaunda's parents David and Helen were originally from Nyasaland and came to Northern Rhodesia as part of a Presbyterian mission and established a mission station in Chinsali (Kangwa 2016). He trained as a teacher, like his parents, but soon became closely involved in the emerging nationalist movement and joined the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), the first nationalist party in Zambia. He was elected to the organisation's leadership in 1953 at a time when control over the territory by white settlers appeared to be solidifying (Macola 2010, 48). The formation of the Central African Federation, grouping Northern Rhodesia with neighbouring Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), was designed to give white settlers permanent control over the region and dismantling the Federation became the main task of the Congress.

Growing frustration with party leader Harry Nkumbula's political approach promoted a split in the ANC and Kaunda and others broke away to form the more radical Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). This new party was banned and Kaunda imprisoned in 1959. The banned ZANC was re-established as the United National Party for Independence (UNIP) by Kaunda's right-hand man Mainza Chona and Kaunda became president after his release from prison. Although UNIP demanded immediate independence, Kaunda's radicalism was tempered by strong Christian beliefs. Lengthy negotiations with the British Government and the white settler government resulted in elections in 1962 and 1964 in which UNIP won a huge majority. Kaunda became president at independence in 1964.

However, Kaunda soon faced both internal political challenges borne from discontent with the results of independence (Larmer 2006) and external security threats from neighbouring white minority states. Kaunda consequently made Zambia a one-party state, banning other political parties, centralising power around the presidency and imprisoning opponents. Opposition to one-party state intensified with Zambia's economic decline in the 1980s (Mushingeh 1994). There were huge protests over food prices in 1986 and again in 1990, the latter of which was followed by an unsuccessful coup. Rather than attempting to hold power in the face of growing

[1] We would like to thank Grieve Chelwa and Sishuwa Sishuwa for support of the conference and special issue.

opposition, Kaunda agreed to hold multiparty elections in 1991 and lost by a wide margin to the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). Kaunda accepted defeat and committed to a peaceful transition of power, which became an important precedent for subsequent political transitions.

Kaunda was politically marginalised in the 1990s and the MMD government briefly tried to strip him of Zambian citizenship to prevent him standing in the 1996 elections (Ndulo & Kent 1996: 273). However, his reputation was rehabilitated in the 2000s and he came to be widely regarded as a respected founding father of Zambia and credited with establishing a peaceful and united nation. His exhortation of 'One Zambia, One Nation' is still widely remembered and repeated.

Many participants in Zambia's independence struggle wrote autobiographies, or became the subject of biographies, including Dixon Konkola (Vickery 2011), Stewart Gore-Browne (Rotberg 1977), Harry Nkumbula (Macola 2010), Donald Siwale (Wright 1997) and Dauti Yamba (Musambachime 1991), and so have subsequent presidents like Michael Sata (Sishuwa 2016). Given his iconic role in the independence movement it is surprising that Kaunda never produced an autobiography, with the exception of his early memoirs of the liberation struggle *Zambia Shall be Free* (Kaunda 1962) where he describes his role as an nationalist leader. The one academic biography of Kaunda was produced in the early 1970s (MacPherson 1975), though its coverage ends in 1964 and so both the chronology and themes largely overlap with Kaunda's own biography. This narrative of Kaunda's life as an anti-colonial leader subsequently acquired lasting significance in Zambia as it was taught in schools and reproduced in museum exhibitions and national heritage sites (Simakole 2012).

Much remains to be said about Kaunda's life and legacy. We hope that this special issue can contribute to this and reconsider Kaunda's legacies almost six decades after he became Zambia's first president. The papers included are not a comprehensive or definitive account of his life and we hope they will encourage further research and reflection.

Anti-colonialism in Theory and Practice

The struggle against colonial rule defines much of Kaunda's life, both in Zambia and, as will be discussed below, across the region. Anti-colonial nationalism was not an elite phenomenon in Zambia and there was widespread popular opposition to the Central African Federation, especially from the late 1950s. Kabula Jickson Chama's contribution to this issue looks at this population opposition and provides a wider context for Kaunda's early political career and his rise to prominence. Opposition in rural Luapula, the focus of Chama's article, emerged earlier and shortly after the imposition of Federation and the region became the site of intense anti-colonial activism which Chama connects with the politics of food production, specifically cassava.

Scholars often refer to the relatively high level of urbanisation in Zambia and the development of new urban centres attracted considerable academic attention from the 1930s onwards as being emblematic of a major social transformation underway (Potts 2005). It was straightforward to construct a narrative between colonial oppression, urban discontent and strikes and growing support for nationalists. Most people in Zambia, however, live in rural areas, and this was even more the case in the late colonial period. Here, the colonial state was weak or even barely existent. What motivated politics for the majority of people?

Elsewhere in Southern Africa, the link between land and anti-colonial protest is well-established and scholars have studied this extensively. One important difference in colonial Zambia was the lack of the kind of large-scale land alienation that characterised settler colonialism in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe and animated politics there. Luapula, like

most of the colony, had virtually no white settler farmers, who were concentrated along the line of rail in southern Zambia. How were rural populations mobilised by nationalist political parties? Scholars have discussed rural grievances and opposition to colonial agricultural policies, though often in general terms (for a notable exception see (Musambachime 1987)).

Chama draws attention to the specificities of Luapula to explain political discontent, namely the dominance of cassava as a staple crop which elsewhere was displaced by maize. This is a promising approach that could be used to integrate political and environmental histories. Cassava was often dismissed as a famine crop by colonial authorities and after the Second World War there was an effort to discourage its cultivation.

Cassava, however, had particular properties that made it valuable to Luapula residents in the context of the late colonial period. It is drought-resistant, has a high yield, could be easily stored by leaving it in the ground and requires no artificial inputs, which were often supplied by the state. This ensured that production was not subject to shifting marketing policies of the state and it could be traded on markets not controlled by the state. In short, its production allowed many locals to retain some autonomy as agricultural producers.

Chama emphasises that opposition of the colonial state to cassava production channelled support to newly formed nationalist parties. There are, however, indications in his article about other how cassava cultivation informed other kinds of politics beyond political parties. The response to an outbreak of cassava mosaic disease in the mid-1950s was co-ordinated by traditional authorities and local people, while colonial authorities did little, and this points to a degree of independence from the state that survived independence.

Chama concludes his article by noting that UNIP essentially continued colonial-era agricultural policies that promoted maize and marginalised cassava. Disillusionment with UNIP soon set in (Macola 2008). This points at a tension between nationalist parties and their intended constituents. Luapula residents appear to have been unable to influence government agricultural policy, and perhaps nationalist politicians did not fully understand the nature of support they received from the area.

By this time, Kaunda had developed what would become Zambia's governing ideology under the one-party state: humanism. This represented an intellectual effort to distinguish Zambia from the colonial system that came before it, emphasising human equality, egalitarianism and the 'non-exploitation of man by man' (Kaunda 2007, iv). There was from the outset a tension between whether humanism represented a codification of the ideology of UNIP, or expressed the thoughts of Kaunda himself (Molteno 1973). Little work has been done on the topic, however, since a smattering of publications in the 1970s (Meebelo 1973), despite humanism being officially the country's governing ideology for 18 years. Indeed, the preamble to the constitution of Zambia's Second Republic in 1973 declared the country to be a 'One-Party Participatory Democracy under the Philosophy of Humanism' (Ndulo & Kent 1996: 266).

Edward Mboyonga's article in this special issue is therefore a welcome contribution to this neglected topic and takes seriously humanism as an ideology that aimed at decolonising society in Zambia. Mboyonga places humanism in the context of a broader pan-African intellectual history and focuses on the efforts of newly-independent Zambia to create a new education system guided by this ideology. This focus is a timely one. Decolonisation has animated discussion and protest at universities in southern Africa and across the world in recent years (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017) and the efforts by Zambia's new government to use higher education as a way to overcome the legacies of colonialism has many lessons for contemporary discussions.

Educational opportunities for Africans were deliberately limited during the colonial period, something Mboyonga notes personally affected Kaunda who almost had to drop out of school following the death of his father. Zambia had one of the least-developed education systems on the continent and in 1966 it was estimated that the country had 1,200 secondary-certificate holders and only 100 university graduates, the latter all trained abroad as there was no institute for higher education in the country (Mwalimu 2014, 1095). Establishing a university was made a priority after independence the University of Zambia was set-up in 1965.

Mboyanga locates the significance of Zambian humanism in higher education within the public good discourse, where the benefits of higher education did not only accrue to the individual, but to the society as well. The new university launched several initiatives to link education to wider benefits, including establishing a rural development studies bureau, using open theatre techniques as a kind of mass education, and requiring student's participation in national youth service programmes.

Mboyonga also draws attention to the ideological aspects of humanism and places humanism within broader post-colonial approaches that had emerged on the continent to break the colonial past by centering an African worldview. There was a tension, however, between the professed egalitarianism of humanism and academic freedom and the newly-founded university. Kaunda had appointed himself university Chancellor and Mboyonga explains that he intervened to appoint his own staff at the university, removed academics deemed critical and suspended or expelled students who organised at the new the Institute of Human Relations. Exploring the tension between the theory and practice of this ideology would be a fruitful area for future study.

Liberation Wars in Southern Africa

Internationally, Kaunda is mostly remembered for his support for anti-colonial movements in southern Africa and role as a mediator in the liberation wars that raged across the region from the 1960s to the 1990s. Headlines in international media following his death reflected this: 'Patriarch of African Independence' (Kaufman 2021), 'Champion of Africa's struggles against apartheid' (France 24 2021) ''Founding president and liberation hero' (Al Jazeera 2021), 'Icon of African liberation' (The Economist 2021).

Zambia was a 'Frontline State', a term that identified a state on the frontline against white minority and apartheid-ruled states and one that was part of a coalition of states that supported the struggle against settler colonialism. Geographically, Zambia was almost surrounded by white-ruled states at independence. Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe were all under forms of white colonial rule and this would remain the case for the first decade of Zambia's independence.

Kaunda was committed to the independence of white-ruled states in southern Africa, and this makes the sparseness of the academic literature on Zambia's role in the various liberation movements surprising (Chongo 2016). This is partly because the emphasis in this literature has mostly been on countries where the actual fighting took took place, rather than those who were hosting the liberation movements, like Zambia and Tanzania. This is also reflected in terms of accessibility to liberation sources, i.e. the Mellon Foundation initiative on digitizing the archives of southern African liberation movements, excluded Zambia. Hugh MacMillan's book *The Lusaka Years* about the exile South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) in Zambia is a major contribution to the literature (MacMillan 2013), as is Clarence Chongo's article in this journal. Both authors emphasize the characteristics of Zambia's support to liberation movement: recognition, transit and broadcasting facilities, and financial and material

aid. Above all, diplomatic backing and negotiations, in which Kaunda personally played such a crucial role.

The above literature on Kaunda's practical and diplomatic support for liberation movements focuses on Zimbabwe liberation movements and the ANC. Kaunda's role in other anti-colonial conflicts in the region have attracted less attention, especially his involvement in Namibia's independence. Lack of access to South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) archives is one of the many reasons.[2] Chris Saunder's paper on Kaunda's role in Namibia's independence addresses this lacuna. It is an initial attempt to place Kaunda's role in Namibia's independence, acknowledging that much more research still has to be undertaken. Like MacMillan's book on ANC in Zambia, this paper adds nuance to a more generalist view of Kaunda as the unchallenged champion of the liberation movements. While acknowledging Kaunda's prominence, it highlights the failures and tensions with and within the numerous liberation movements based in Zambia. Over the course of time, SWAPO had several disagreements with Kaunda over the course of action towards Namibia's Independence. The first one was with Kaunda's manifesto on Southern Africa in 1969, in which he proposed a peaceful approach to Namibia's transition. Second, the consequent curtailment of SWAPO's military operations from Zambia.

However, Kaunda supported SWAPO in many other ways, including resisting any kind of transition to independence for Namibia that was arranged by South Africa unilaterally, which would left SWAPO on the side-lines. Kaunda also fully supported the Nujoma leadership against the so-called SWAPO dissidents. After Zimbabwe had become independent, Kaunda resorted to personal diplomacy with the white South African leaders on the Namibian issue, cementing Kaunda's important mediation role in Namibia's independence. A key event took place in 1984, the Namibia conference, which brought together the different parties, including SWAPO and the Administrator General of Namibia. The establishment of United Nations Institute for Namibia in 1976, which main purpose was to have a facility for the education of Namibians in preparation for taking up roles in an independent Namibia.

Kaunda only received recognition 20 years after Namibia's independence. His approach to mediation, engaging with South African white leaders, was often critiqued by SWAPO. But as elsewhere, Kaunda's iconic stand on liberation of southern Africa is now recognized internationally, with some of the underlying tension now forgotten.

There were other contemporary critiques of Kaunda's diplomatic skills and approach that have been forgotten as these conflicts recent in time. This is made clear in Jeff Schauer's article on the negotiations between Zambia and British arms manufacturers to secure new weaponry and military technology. Kaunda's engagement with the former colonial power so shortly after independence, attracted criticism both by Zambian military leaders and Simon Kapwepwe, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, over the implications for national sovereignty. This focus on Zambia's internal security vis-à-vis its hostile neighbours addresses another gap in post-colonial history. Scholars have mostly focused on the arming of liberation movements though Andrew DeRoche (2016) looks at Kaunda's efforts to obtain arms from the United States.

Zambia's negotiations with British arms manufacturers and the British government was part of a broader political and military strategy. Based on documentation from the official archives from Britain and Zambia, Schauer shows that the strategy was part of a carefully negotiated neo-colonial relationship to elicit security guarantees from Britain that temporarily shielded Zambia against military aggression from Rhodesia after the latter declared independence

[2] The SWAPO archives were housed in Lusaka until Namibia's independence after which they were moved to Namibia where they have been inaccessible.

under white minority rule in 1965. From the British perspective - besides promoting the domestic arms industry- they calculated that neocolonial military entanglements would enhance their influence over Zambia's national security apparatus. Additionally, Britain was worried that Zambia would source arms from other countries, outside of Britain's allies.

Zambia was short of military hardware after the breaking up of the Central African Federation in 1963. The Federation ostensibly had a unified military based in all three territories but when the Federation disintegrated most of the weaponry was appropriated by Southern Rhodesia. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia in 1965 was a statement of hostile intent towards newly-independent African states around it. Zambia was bombed by both Rhodesian and Portuguese jets in the 1960s and 1970s.

This forced Zambia to arm itself, and it first turned to Britain as a source of weapons. Arms co-operation fell apart in 1970 when the Conservative Party returned to power in Britain and supported arming South Africa, while Zambia successfully and rapidly broadened military procurement with purchases from Italy and Yugoslavia.

As Zambia shifted its international policy, the post-colonial links with the UK went into decline. Schauer sees this brief period of arms negotiations with the UK as:

> a window through which to think about the politics of neocolonialism, and the manner in which Kaunda's and Zambia's diplomacy sought to make the conditions of neocolonial relationships manageable, useful, and impermanent in a world very much in motion.

Economic Legacies

The other area of Kaunda's public life that continues to inspire debate and commentary is his economic policy (Chelwa, 2017). Zambia at independence was effectively a mono-economy and this economy was in the hands of multinational companies. This arguably remains largely true today. The country's dependence on copper is well-known and efforts to diversify the economy over the last six decades have been unsuccessful. Serious efforts were made to diversify the economy under Kaunda. In the 1970s, for instance, the government initiated on a programme of industrialisation through import substitution, though few of these firms survived subsequent privatisation in the 1990s.

Robust economic growth at independence supported by buoyant copper prices lasted for a decade. Economic diversification away from copper was raised in these years and this policy became all the more pressing after copper prices slumped in the mid-1970s, dragging down the rest of the economy. As Kaunda later lamented, Zambia suffered "the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths" (Kaufman 1978).

By this time, copper had become the business of the state. Kaunda had quickly become sceptical of private sector-led development following independence as much of the economy remained in the hands of foreign companies and expatriates. In 1968, in a speech that became known as the Mulungushi Reforms, Kaunda lambasted the mining companies: "I am very disappointed at the virtual lack of mining development since independence" and accuses the companies of not having "done enough towards further development of the country in which they make their great profits" (Kaunda, 1969: 69).

This heralded a wide-ranging programme of nationalisation followed whereby the government took a 51% stake in large and medium-sized businesses in most economic sectors. Most significantly, in 1969 the government took a majority stake in the mining industry and then in 1974 fully nationalised the mines. State control was not reserved for foreign-owned business

either. Kaunda also announced that “when a Zambian enterprise developed and reached a certain point we would have to make it a public company and when it grew even further the State would have to take it over” (Kaunda, 1969: 63).

Subsequent assessments of this policy have tended to be harsh. The focus of much of the literature is that this policy was wrong-headed and, as one overview of the Zambia’s recent economic history put it, “increased poverty is largely explained by misguided macro-economic and micro-economic policies adopted during the Kaunda era” (Whitworth, 2015: 954). In their article in this issue, Alexander Caramento and Agatha Siwale-Mulenga take a difference approach. They focus on the establishment of an emerald industry in the late 1970s to argue that this policy of state-driven diversification was implemented in ways that were contradictory to its stated aims.

Despite an apparent policy of economic diversification and empowerment of Zambians, the government choose to establish a joint venture with a British-listed mining firm. Alternative models of rural development of encouraging artisanal miners were overlooked and a model whereby economic activity was dependent on foreign investment was entrenched. Kaunda spoke sympathetically of small-scale miners while implementing policies that effectively marginalised them. Artisanal miners were criminalised and the most lucrative deposits were reserved for mining in partnership with a foreign company.

This was the outcome of a development process that emphasised the central role of the state. Caramento and Siwale-Mulenga explain that foreign investment and industrial mining were considered to be easier to monitor and tax, while artisanal mining was viewed as an illegal activity that was difficult to formalise and regulate. This fits with one contemporary assessment of Zambia’s indigenization policy which concluded that “there is practically no shared responsibilities between the government and the indigenous population in economic control” (Chileshe, 1981: 123).

Policy decisions from the early 1980s had long-termer implications that extended far beyond the UNIP-era. Caramento and Siwale-Mulenga show that the decision to marginalise artisanal miners contributed to the present-day situation whereby emerald mining in Zambia is dominated by a private company, Kagem Mining. There has been little support for artisanal mining and it is only discussed as a livelihood in times of economic distress.

Kaunda’s government prioritised economic activities that would generate foreign exchange, which became increasingly scarce from the mid-1980s, that was needed to pay for inputs for the copper industry. This points towards structural limitations for economic diversification in this period as the need to sustain the copper industry arguably stifled other economic sectors. Despite stated intent, economic policy was ultimately determined by the need to access foreign exchange.

Caramento and Siwale-Mulenga’s paper highlights another important point about policy inconsistency: the limits of state control in this period. Zambia was officially a one-party state in these years but was far from all-powerful. As they show, smuggling remained rife and many artisanal miners evaded restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Mines. Small, light and very valuable, gemstones are ideally suited to evading customs and other forms of taxation and up to K100 million (approx. US$126 million) was lost in 1979 alone. The extent of black markets encompassing government officials, customs officers and police under the one-party state would be worth exploring. More broadly, the inability of the Zambian state to control newly nationalised economic sectors, and why this was the case, deserves wider research.

State ownership of Zambia’s economy was a relatively brief episode. Kaunda’s economic policies were rapidly and comprehensively reversed after the 1991 elections when the new

MMD government implemented what Michael Gubser terms “one of Africa’s most striking experiments with rapid liberalization” in his contribution to this issue. Trade was liberalised with the sharp reduction in tariffs, subsidies for mealie meal and agricultural inputs were eliminated, currency controls were abolished by 1994 and almost all state-owned enterprises were privatised, including the mining industry (Craig 2000).

Almost the entire African continent was subject to structural adjustment during the 1980s and 1990s and the impact and value these programmes have been debated extensively (Mkandawire & Soludo, 2003). In Zambia, the aftermath of structural adjustment was devastating for many people (Mususa 2021). Much of this debate has, as Gubser points out, been characterised by a kind of cost-benefit analysis and that by the assumption that structural adjustment was inevitable.

This assumption overlooks the wide-ranging debates that took place at the time, which Gubser focuses on. While Structural Adjustment was championed by the MMD and triumphed over other ideas, this was not inevitable. Ideas not adopted and paths not taken are often forgotten and the eventual outcome of historically contingent and contested processes can seem like the only possible outcome. The moment at the end of one-party rule involved vibrant debate among intellectuals and activists about how to fix the country’s failing economy and it is worth considering the possible futures that Zambians imagined for themselves in a moment of great political change.

Gubser focuses on Lusaka-based intellectual groups, particularly the Economic Association of Zambia headed by Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika. Economic liberalisation was not the only or even the dominant idea in these debates, and some stressed the importance of self-reliance or the reconfiguration of state planning rather than market economies. It was not automatic that political liberalism required economic liberalism and the equation of the two owes more to the ideas of the Washington Consensus that free-market capitalism and democracy were necessary partners than debates within Zambia.

Local intellectuals soon found themselves marginalised. The new MMD government relied on advisers Harvard Institute for International Development and retention of these foreign advisors became a condition for renewal of credit for the World Bank. This was not entirely an external imposition. Gubser identifies a marked intellectual shift in Zambia from the mid-1980s towards free-market economics. The best example is Kaunda’s successor Frederick Chiluba, a trade unionists and opponent of the IMF who became an enthusiastic supporter of free markets and privatisation. Chiluba was part of a general intellectual trend, however, and Gubser highlights others who made the same move. Particularly striking is the case of Mbita Chitala who had been an editor of the *Journal of African Marxists* and was subsequently a staunch supporter of structural adjustment as Deputy Finance Minister, though he later regretted this.

Gubser’s article opens up the possibility for recovering other ideas about possible futures for Zambia. Opposition to UNIP brought together a broad coalition of interests, including mass organisations like churches and trade unions who played a role in established the MMD. There is scope for the investigation of the aspirations and debates among ordinary Zambians at the end of Kaunda’s rule. After two decades of one-party rule, how did people imagine their future?

Environmental Legacies

One modestly successful area for economic diversification in Zambia has been the growth of tourism. Wildlife tourism was envisaged in the country’s First National Development plan after independence as a major opportunity for development, though these aspirations were initially frustrated. The escalating conflict against white minority across Southern Africa devasted Zambia’s nascent tourist industry. Tourist numbers collapsed after Rhodesia declared

independence in 1965 at a time when international tourism boomed elsewhere on the continent (Kenya received half as many tourists in Zambia in 1966, but almost eight times as many by 1976). It was only after independence in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe that tourist numbers revived (Teye 1986).

There are relatively few histories of tourism in Zambia, especially in the post-colonial period (McGregor 2002). Moreover, scholarship about wildlife tourism and national parks tends to focus on the relationship between colonialism and conservation, and colonial legacies in modern-day conservation practices. In their contribution to this special issue, Chikondi Thole, Thomas Kweku Taylor and Thor Larsen draw our attention to the post-colonial period and Kaunda's own prominent role in promoting tourism and wildlife conservation in South Luangwa, which he declared a National Park in 1971.

Often, popular tourist destinations are often intertwined with politics. Some, for instance, have a political role as venues for international conferences. Victoria Falls has regularly been the backdrop for such events, perhaps most dramatically in 1975 when Kaunda met Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith on a train carriage parked half-way across the Victoria Falls bridge.

The authors show that South Luangwa had a similar political role. Kaunda established two presidential lodges in the park and took regular working holidays there, a practice also adopted by one of his successors Levy Mwanawasa. These lodges have had a diplomatic purpose, hosting world leaders in a relaxing setting, as well as for more practical political ends. One of the lodges hosted the clandestine meeting between South Africa's white business leaders and the then banned ANC in 1985, a meeting chaired by Kaunda.

Kaunda's championing of South Luangwa was not simply for political ends, however. He has a genuine love for the landscape and wildlife there and sought to promote tourism there. Thole, Taylor and Larsen argue that Kaunda was ahead of his time in this sense, and his agenda was often opposed even by other UNIP leaders. Indeed, the park only really flourished as a tourist destination after he was out of office as visitor numbers have risen sharply since the late-1990s.

Kaunda's role in the park also provides insights into political life in the one-party state and how he sought to rule as president. This was an area of policy personally important to him and so he intervened to impose new and stricter anti-poaching policies or to bypass state institutions like the National Parks and Wildlife Services that he thought were ineffective. Connections with overseas donors and prominent conservationists were crucial to facilitating this, and the authors explain how Kaunda reached an agreement with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation to finance a wildlife conservation programme. He had meet officials from the agency while on holiday at the park.

There were clear limits to this kind of personal rule, however. Kaunda could take the initiative to issue new policies over the heads of other ministers and state agencies, but these could be quietly ignored. Thole, Taylor and Larsen argue that punitive anti-poaching measures advocated by Kaunda were unpopular. Only two civil servants were ever prosecuted for poaching, despite Kaunda's insistence that any civil servant involved in the practice should be sacked. Communities around the park, moreover, had a very different idea about 'poaching' and often regarded the increasing number of elephants and other large animals as a nuisance.

Remembering Kaunda

Kaunda's long life – long enough to outlive those tasked with writing his obituaries (Kaufman 2021) – meant that popular perceptions of him and his political role to change more than once. Huge protests preceded his ousting as president and he was heavily defeated at the 1991

elections. He was harassed by the new MMD government and, as noted above, even had his status as a Zambian challenged through “constitutional gymnastics” that sought to transform his status from founding father to foreign national (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 403). Yet his reputation was rehabilitated in his later years, perhaps as the prospect he would return to active political life receded. He was restored in popular discourse as a founding father and at his 90th birthday in 2014 billboards across the country partly sponsored by the government hailed his legacy proclaimed “90 years of good deeds.”

How Kaunda was remembered after his death is therefore an important question, and one tied up with perceptions of his legacy. The article by Meldad L. Chama and Beatrice Kapanda Simataa turns to these questions of history and memory, conceptualised within a Zambian mourning process, specifically that of the Nsenga of Petauke District in Eastern Province. They argue that while eulogies and remembrances about Kaunda immediately after his death were celebratory and positive, Kaunda’s memory is a contested one. The mourning period involved ‘forgetting and choosing what to remember about KK’.

This paper has wider relevance as the funeral discourses of key personalities in Zambia, especially former presidents, have become a site of politicisation, memory work, and national building. Politicians have often sought to appropriate or associate themselves with the legacies of the recent deceased (Kalusa 2017). Kaunda’s own death became a source of controversy and tension between his position as a national symbol and in his position in his own family. All Zambia’s deceased presidents have been buried at a specially designated national memorial site at Embassy Park in Lusaka, a decision that points to efforts to create a national collective memorialization. Some members of Kaunda’s own family, however, brought a court challenge claiming that he should be buried alongside his wife Betty. Who could lay claim to his legacy, the state he helped establish, or his own children and grandchildren?

Chama and Simataa focus on the remembrances and eulogies at his state funeral and during the mourning period as a way in which collective memory was created. As might be expected, these emphasised Kaunda’s contributions to Zambia, Southern Africa and the wider world, and were delivered by prominent political figures including the chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa and a British Government Minister. And yet, despite the glowing tributes, well deserved as they may have been, there were mumblings of discontent in unofficial circles about KKs legacy, which recalled his 27 years of autocratic rule and the repression it came with.

This discontent is effectively silenced in official memorialization and the authors conclude that ‘the dominant narrative about KK is hagiographic’. This hagiographic narrative will be monumentalised at Embassy Park. This, Chama and Simataa argue, makes it a site of "dissonant heritage" where the memorialisation of the dead presidents is selective and amnesiac. Hence for Kaunda, his burial place at the park remembers him as ‘a torch bearer of peace, founding father of the Republic of Zambia, a hero of Africa and a Christian’. These things may be true, but we hope that the papers in this double special issue will encourage broader reflection on Kaunda’s life and legacy.

The final paper in this collection is one that we hope will be particularly useful for this kind of broader reflection. The paper by Victoria Phiri Chitungu is different to the others as it is comprised of a series of interviews conducted by a team tasked by Zambia’s Cabinet Office in 2017 with interviewing the country’s surviving presidents. This team interviewed Kaunda several times and also several people who were personally close to him over his life.

We can see an element here of Kaunda consciously seeking to shape his own legacy and memorialisation. He encouraged the team sent to interview him to instead interview those who

were personally close to him and suggested the names of people who should be interviewed. He was an active agent in shaping how he will be remembered. The result is a remarkable document that shows a different side of Kaunda's life, a more personal side. He was an icon of African liberation to many but he was also a living, breathing human being who needed to eat, sleep, sing and, sometimes, mourn.

These interviews represent a valuable source for scholars and are included here as a primary source. The article contains extended quotes from these interviews along with contextual information. The project was also a timely one. Kaunda's great age meant that he outlived almost all those who knew him well in his younger days before he became president, including all his siblings and even some of his children. Few people are alive today who could have met Kaunda in the 1950s. Indeed, since Kaunda's death, the last of his political generation who were prominent in the struggle against colonial rule have also died. Simon Zukas, who first met Kaunda in the late 1940s, died in 2021 and Sikota Wina, the final surviving member of Zambia's first post-independence Cabinet, died in 2022. It is remarkable then that Chitungu and her team interviewed someone who knew Kaunda as a young man and his mother Helen, Watson Lombe N'gandu. He is a grandson of Chief Nkula IV who welcomed Kaunda's parents to Chinsali in 1905.

Other interviews are people who were close to Kaunda in a different sense, those who cooked his meals, cut his hair, prepared his clothes and took his official portrait. They saw Kaunda away from the public eye. It is evident though Kaunda's personal and political life were closely intertwined and he himself saw little separation between the two. His diet for almost his entire life was shaped by anti-colonial commitments, having vowed to stop eating meat as part of a boycott of racist practices in Lusaka butchers' shops in the 1950s.

Chitungu argues that these interview narratives 'help us see Kaunda through the eyes of people that were very close to him'. Some were very close indeed. Her article finishes with the recollections of Kaunda's barber and bedroom attendant Benjamin Kachingwe, who was with Kaunda in his final days and dressed his body for the funeral.

We hope that these interview narratives, along with the other articles in this collection, will encourage scholars to look again at the life and legacy of Kaunda, as an image for so many and as a human being who lived in tumultuous times.

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