Zambia Social Science Journal

Volume 9 2021/2022 Number 1

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Introduction: The Life and Legacies of Kenneth Kaunda in Southern Africa

Mary Mbewe, Marja Hinfelaar and Duncan Money

Introduction

Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda (known widely as KK), passed away on 17 June 2021 at the age of 97. This marked the end of an era for many, and not only in Zambia. Kaunda belonged to the last of a generation of African leaders who fought for independence from colonial rule and had his own brand of political and economic philosophies (Cheeseman and Sishuwa, 2021). Given the momentous occasion of the passing of one of Africa’s biggest icons, as editors we felt it was timely to organise a conference dedicated to Kaunda and his legacy, which took place in Lusaka in November 2021. This special issue features papers presented at this conference.

Kenneth David Kaunda was born on 28 April 1924, at Lubwa mission, near Chinsali in what was then Northern Rhodesia and died on 17 June 2021, in Lusaka, Zambia. Kaunda’s parents David and Helen were originally from Nyasaland and came to Northern Rhodesia as part of a Presbyterian mission and established a mission station in Chinsali (Kangwa, 2016). He trained as a teacher, like his parents, but soon became closely involved in the emerging nationalist movement and joined the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), the first nationalistic party in Zambia. He was elected to the organisation’s leadership in 1953 at a time when control over the territory by white settlers appeared to be solidifying (Macola, 2010: 48). The formation of the Central African Federation, grouping Northern Rhodesia with neighbouring Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), was designed to give white settlers permanent control over the region. Dismantling the Federation became the main task of the Congress.

Growing frustration with party leader Harry Nkumbula’s political approach promoted a split in the ANC, and Kaunda and others broke away to form the more radical Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). This new party was banned and Kaunda imprisoned in 1959. The banned ZANC was re-established as the United National Independence Party (UNIP) by Kaunda’s right-hand man Mainza Chona and Kaunda became its president after his release from prison.

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Although UNIP demanded immediate independence, Kaunda's radicalism was tempered by strong Christian beliefs. Lengthy negotiations with the British Government and the white settler government resulted in elections in 1962 and 1964 in which UNIP won a huge majority. Kaunda became president at independence in 1964.

However, Kaunda soon faced both internal political challenges borne from discontent with the results of independence (Larmer, 2006) and external security threats from neighbouring white minority states. Kaunda consequently made Zambia a one-party state, banning other political parties, centralising power around the presidency and imprisoning opponents. Opposition to the one-party state intensified with Zambia's economic decline in the 1980s (Mushinge, 1994). There were huge protests over food prices in 1986 and again in 1990, the latter of which was followed by an unsuccessful coup. Rather than attempting to hold power in the face of growing opposition, Kaunda agreed to hold multiparty elections in 1991 and lost by a wide margin to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Kaunda accepted defeat and committed to a peaceful transition of power, which became an important precedent for subsequent political transitions.

Kaunda was politically marginalised in the 1990s and the MMD government briefly tried to strip him of Zambian citizenship to prevent him standing in the 1996 elections (Ndulo & Kent, 1996: 273). However, his reputation was rehabilitated in the 2000s and he came to be widely regarded as a respected founding father of Zambia and credited with establishing a peaceful and united nation. His exhortation of 'One Zambia, One Nation' is still widely remembered and repeated.

Many participants in Zambia's independence struggle wrote autobiographies, or became the subject of biographies, including Dixon Konkola (Vickery, 2011), Stewart Gore-Browne (Rotherg, 1977), Harry Nkumbula (Macola, 2010), Donald Siwale (Wright, 1997) and Dauti Yamba (Musambachime, 1991), and so have subsequent presidents like Michael Sata (Sishuwa, 2016). Given his iconic role in the independence movement it is surprising that Kaunda never produced an autobiography, with the exception of his early memoirs of the liberation struggle Zambia Shall be Free (Kaunda, 1962) where he describes his role as a nationalist leader. The one academic biography of Kaunda was produced in the early 1970s (MacPherson, 1975), though its coverage ends in 1964 and so both the chronology and themes largely overlap with Kaunda's own biography. This narrative of Kaunda's life as an anti-colonial leader subsequently acquired lasting significance in Zambia as it was taught in schools and reproduced in museum exhibitions and national heritage sites (Simakole, 2012).
Much remains to be said about Kaunda’s life and legacy. We hope that this special double issue can contribute to this and a reconsideration Kaunda’s legacies almost six decades after he became Zambia’s first president. The papers included are not a comprehensive or definitive account of his life and we hope they will encourage further research and reflection.

**Economic Legacies**

Economic policy is one area of Kaunda’s public life that continues to inspire debate and commentary (Chelwa, 2017). Zambia at independence was effectively a mono-economy and this economy was in the hands of multinational companies. This arguably remains largely true today. The country’s dependence on copper is well-known and efforts to diversify the economy over the last six decades have been unsuccessful. Serious efforts were made to diversify the economy under Kaunda. In the 1970s, for instance, the government initiated a programme of industrialisation through import substitution, though few of these firms survived subsequent privatisation in the 1990s.

Robust economic growth at independence supported by buoyant copper prices lasted for a decade. The need for economic diversification away from copper was raised in these years and this policy became all the more pressing after copper prices slumped in the mid-1970s, dragging down the rest of the economy. As Kaunda later lamented, Zambia suffered “the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths” (Kaufman, 1978).

By this time, copper had become the business of the state. Kaunda had quickly become sceptical of private sector-led development following independence as much of the economy remained in the hands of foreign companies and expatriates. In 1968, in a speech that became known as the Mulungushi Reforms, Kaunda lambasted the mining companies: “I am very disappointed at the virtual lack of mining development since independence” and accused the companies of not having “done enough towards further development of the country in which they make their great profits” (Kaunda, 1969: 69).

This heralded a wide-ranging programme of nationalisation whereby the government took a 51% stake in large and medium-sized businesses in most economic sectors. Most significantly, in 1969 the government took a majority stake in the mining industry and then in 1974 fully nationalised the mines. State control was not reserved for foreign-owned business either. Kaunda also announced that “when a Zambian enterprise developed and reached a certain point we would have to make it a public company and when it grew even further the State would have to take it over” (Kaunda, 1969: 63).
Subsequent assessments of this policy have tended to be harsh. The focus of much of the literature is that this policy was wrong-headed and, as one overview of Zambia’s recent economic history put it, “increased poverty is largely explained by misguided macro-economic and micro-economic policies adopted during the Kaunda era” (Whitworth, 2015: 954). In their article in this issue, Alexander Caramento and Agatha Siwale-Mulenga take a different approach. They focus on the establishment of an emerald industry in the late 1970s to argue that this policy of state-driven diversification was implemented in ways that were contradictory to its stated aims.

Despite an apparent policy of economic diversification and empowerment of Zambians, the government chose to establish a joint venture with a British-listed mining firm. Alternative models of rural development of encouraging artisanal miners were overlooked and a model whereby economic activity was dependent on foreign investment was entrenched. Kaunda spoke sympathetically of small-scale miners while implementing policies that effectively marginalised them. Artisanal miners were criminalised and the most lucrative deposits were reserved for mining in partnership with a foreign company.

This was the outcome of a development process that emphasised the central role of the state. Caramento and Siwale-Mulenga explain that foreign investment and industrial mining were considered to be easier to monitor and tax, while artisanal mining was viewed as an illegal activity that was difficult to formalise and regulate. This fits with one contemporary assessment of Zambia’s indigenisation policy which concluded that “there is practically no shared responsibilities between the government and the indigenous population in economic control” (Chileshe, 1981: 123).

Policy decisions from the early 1980s had long-term implications that extended far beyond the UNIP-era. Caramento and Siwale-Mulenga show that the decision to marginalise artisanal miners contributed to the present-day situation whereby emerald mining in Zambia is dominated by a private company, Kagem Mining. There has been little support for artisanal mining and it is only discussed as a livelihood in times of economic distress.

Kaunda’s government prioritised economic activities that would generate foreign exchange, which became increasingly scarce from the mid-1980s, that was needed to pay for inputs for the copper industry. This points towards structural limitations for economic diversification in this period as the need to sustain the copper industry arguably stifled other economic sectors. Despite stated intent, economic policy was ultimately determined by the need to access foreign exchange.
Caramento and Siwale-Mulenga’s paper highlights another important point about policy inconsistency: the limits of state control in this period. Zambia was officially a one-party state in these years but the state was far from all-powerful. As they show, smuggling remained rife and many artisanal miners evaded restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Mines. Small, light and very valuable, gemstones are ideally suited to evading customs and other forms of taxation and up to K100 million (approx. US$126 million) was lost in 1979 alone. The extent of black markets encompassing government officials, customs officers and police under the one-party state would be worth exploring. More broadly, the inability of the Zambian state to control newly nationalised economic sectors, and why this was the case, deserves wider research.

State ownership of Zambia’s economy was a relatively brief episode. Kaunda’s economic policies were rapidly and comprehensively reversed after the 1991 elections when the new MMD government implemented what Michael Gubser terms “one of Africa’s most striking experiments with rapid liberalisation” in his contribution to this issue. Trade was liberalised with the sharp reduction in tariffs, subsidies for mealie meal and agricultural inputs were eliminated, currency controls were abolished by 1994 and almost all state-owned enterprises were privatised, including the mining industry (Craig, 2000).

Almost the entire African continent was subject to structural adjustment during the 1980s and 1990s and the impact and value of these programmes have been debated extensively (Mkandawire & Soludo, 2003). In Zambia, the aftermath of structural adjustment was devastating for many people (Mususa 2021). Much of this debate has, as Gubser points out, been characterised by a kind of cost-benefit analysis and by the assumption that structural adjustment was inevitable.

This assumption overlooks the wide-ranging debates that took place at the time, which Gubser focuses on. While structural adjustment was championed by the MMD and triumphed over other ideas, this was not inevitable. Ideas not adopted and paths not taken are often forgotten and the eventual outcome of historically contingent and contested processes can seem like the only possible outcome. The moment at the end of one-party rule involved vibrant debate among intellectuals and activists about how to fix the country’s failing economy and it is worth considering the possible futures that Zambians imagined for themselves in a moment of great political change.

Gubser focuses on Lusaka-based intellectual groups, particularly the Economic Association of Zambia headed by Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika. Economic liberalisation was not the only or even the dominant idea in these debates, and some stressed the importance of self-reliance or
the reconfiguration of state planning rather than market economies. It was not automatic that political liberalism required economic liberalism and the equation of the two owes more to the ideas of the Washington Consensus that free-market capitalism and democracy were necessary partners than debates within Zambia.

Local intellectuals soon found themselves marginalised. The new MMD government relied on advisers from the Harvard Institute for International Development and retention of these foreign advisors became a condition for renewal of credit for the World Bank. This was not entirely an external imposition. Gubser identifies a marked intellectual shift in Zambia from the mid-1980s towards free-market economics. The best example is Kaunda’s successor Frederick Chiluba, a trade unionist and opponent of the IMF who became an enthusiastic supporter of free markets and privatisation. Chiluba was part of a general intellectual trend, however, and Gubser highlights others who made the same move. Particularly striking is the case of Mbita Chitala who had been an editor of the *Journal of African Marxists* and was subsequently a staunch supporter of structural adjustment as Deputy Finance Minister; though he later regretted this.

Gubser’s article opens up the possibility for recovering other ideas about possible futures for Zambia. Opposition to UNIP brought together a broad coalition of interests, including mass organisations like churches and trade unions who played a role in establishing the MMD. There is scope for the investigation of the aspirations and debates among ordinary Zambians at the end of Kaunda’s rule. After two decades of one-party rule, how did people imagine their future?

**Liberation Wars in Southern Africa**


Zambia was a “Frontline State”, a term that identified a state on the frontline against white minority and apartheid-ruled states and one that was part of a coalition of states that supported the struggle against settler colonialism. Geographically, Zambia was almost surrounded by white-ruled states at
independence. Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe were all under forms of white colonial rule and this would remain the case for the first decade of Zambias independence.

Kaunda was committed to the liberation of white-ruled states in Southern Africa, and this makes the sparseness of the academic literature on Zambias role in the various liberation movements surprising (Chongo, 2016). This is partly because the emphasis in this literature has mostly been on countries where the actual fighting took place, rather than those who were hosting the liberation movements, like Zambia and Tanzania. This is also reflected in terms of accessibility to liberation sources, i.e. the Mellon Foundation initiative on digitizing the archives of Southern African liberation movements excluded Zambia. Hugh MacMillan’s book *The Lusaka Years* about the exiled South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) in Zambia is a major contribution to the literature (MacMillan, 2013), as is Clarence Chongo’s article in this journal. Both authors emphasize the characteristics of Zambias support to liberation movements: recognition, transit and broadcasting facilities, and financial and material aid; above all, diplomatic backing and negotiations, in which Kaunda personally played such a crucial role.

The literature cited above on Kaunda’s practical and diplomatic support for liberation movements focuses on Zimbabwe liberation movements and the ANC. Kaunda’s role in other anti-colonial conflicts in the region have attracted less attention, especially his involvement in Namibia’s independence. Lack of access to South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) archives is one of the many reasons? Chris Saunders paper on Kaunda’s role in Namibia’s independence addresses this lacuna. It is an initial attempt to place Kaunda’s role in Namibia’s independence, acknowledging that much more research still has to be undertaken. Like MacMillan’s book on the ANC in Zambia, this paper adds nuance to a more generalist view of Kaunda as the unchallenged champion of the liberation movements. While acknowledging Kaunda’s prominence, it highlights the failures and tensions with and within the numerous liberation movements based in Zambia. Over the course of time, SWAPO had several disagreements with Kaunda over the course of action towards Namibia’s independence. The first one was with Kaunda’s manifesto on Southern Africa in 1969, in which he proposed a peaceful approach to Namibia’s transition. Second was the consequent curtailment of SWAPO’s military operations from Zambia.

However, Kaunda supported SWAPO in many other ways, including resisting any kind of transition to independence for Namibia that was arranged by South Africa unilaterally, which would have left SWAPO on the side-lines. Kaunda
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also fully supported the Nujoma leadership against the so-called SWAPO dissidents. After Zimbabwe had become independent, Kaunda resorted to personal diplomacy with the white South African leaders on the Namibian issue, cementing Kaunda's important mediation role in Namibia's independence. A key event took place in 1984, the Namibia Conference, which brought together the different parties, including SWAPO and the Administrator General of Namibia. The United Nations Institute for Namibia was established in 1976 in Lusaka to provide education to Namibians to prepare them to take up roles in an independent Namibia.

Kaunda only received recognition 20 years after Namibia's independence. His approach to mediation, engaging with South African white leaders, was often critiqued by SWAPO. But as elsewhere, Kaunda's iconic stand on the liberation of Southern Africa is now recognized internationally, with some of the underlying tension now forgotten.

There were other contemporary critiques of Kaunda's diplomatic skills and approach that have been forgotten. This is made clear in Jeff Schauer's article on the negotiations between Zambia and British arms manufacturers to secure new weaponry and military technology. Kaunda's engagement with the former colonial power so shortly after independence attracted criticism both from Zambian military leaders and Simon Kapwepwe, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, over the implications for national sovereignty. This focus on Zambia's internal security vis-à-vis its hostile neighbours addresses another gap in post-colonial history. Scholars have mostly focused on the arming of liberation movements, though Andrew DeRoche (2016) looks at Kaunda's efforts to obtain arms from the United States.

Zambia's negotiations with British arms manufacturers and the British government was part of a broader political and military strategy. Based on documentation from the official archives from Britain and Zambia, Schauer shows that the strategy was part of a carefully negotiated neocolonial relationship to elicit security guarantees from Britain that temporarily shielded Zambia against military aggression from Rhodesia after the latter declared independence under white minority rule in 1965. From the British perspective - besides promoting the domestic arms industry - they calculated that neocolonial military entanglements would enhance their influence over Zambia's national security apparatus. Additionally, Britain was worried that Zambia would source arms from other countries, outside of Britain's allies.

Zambia was short of military hardware after the breaking up of the Central African Federation in 1963. The Federation ostensibly had a unified military based in all three territories but when the Federation disintegrated most of the
weaponry was appropriated by Southern Rhodesia. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia in 1965 was a statement of hostile intent towards newly-independent African states around it. Zambia was bombed by both Rhodesian and Portuguese jets in the 1960s and 1970s.

This forced Zambia to arm itself, and it first turned to Britain as a source of weapons. Arms cooperation fell apart in 1970 when the Conservative Party returned to power in Britain and supported arming South Africa, while Zambia successfully and rapidly broadened military procurement with purchases from Italy and Yugoslavia.

As Zambia shifted its international policy, the post-colonial links with the UK went into decline. Schauer sees this brief period of arms negotiations with the UK as:

_ a window through which to think about the politics of neocolonialism, and the manner in which Kaunda’s and Zambia’s diplomacy sought to make the conditions of neocolonial relationships manageable, useful, and impermanent in a world very much in motion._

**Anti-colonialism in Theory and Practice**

The struggle against colonial rule defines much of Kaunda’s life, both in Zambia and, as will be discussed above, across the region. Anti-colonial nationalism was not an elite phenomenon in Zambia and there was widespread popular opposition to the Central African Federation, especially from the late 1950s. Kabula Jackson Chama’s contribution to this issue looks at this popular opposition and provides a wider context for Kaunda’s early political career and his rise to prominence. Opposition in rural Luapula, the focus of Chama’s article, emerged earlier and shortly after the imposition of Federation and the region became the site of intense anti-colonial activism which Chama connects with the politics of food production, specifically cassava.

Scholars often refer to the relatively high level of urbanisation in Zambia and the development of new urban centres attracted considerable academic attention from the 1930s onwards as being emblematic of a major social transformation underway (Potts, 2005). It was straightforward to construct a narrative between colonial oppression, urban discontent and strikes and growing support for nationalists. Most people in Zambia, however, live in rural areas, and this was even more the case in the late colonial period. Here, the colonial state was weak or even barely existent. What motivated politics for the majority of people?

Elsewhere in Southern Africa, the link between land and anti-colonial protest is well-established and scholars have studied this extensively. One
important difference in colonial Zambia was the lack of the kind of large-scale land alienation that characterised settler colonialism in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe and animated politics there. Luapula, like most of the colony, had virtually no white settler farmers, who were concentrated along the line of rail in southern Zambia. How were rural populations mobilised by nationalist political parties? Scholars have discussed rural grievances and opposition to colonial agricultural policies, though often in general terms (for a notable exception see Musambachime (1987)).

Chama draws attention to the specificities of Luapula to explain political discontent, namely the dominance of cassava as a staple crop which elsewhere was displaced by maize. This is a promising approach that could be used to integrate political and environmental histories. Cassava was often dismissed as a famine crop by colonial authorities and after the Second World War there was an effort to discourage its cultivation.

Cassava, however, had particular properties that made it valuable to Luapula residents in the context of the late colonial period. It is drought-resistant, has a high yield, can be easily stored by leaving it in the ground and requires no artificial inputs, which were often supplied by the government. This ensured that production was not subject to shifting marketing policies and it could be traded on markets not controlled by the government. In short, its production allowed many locals to retain some autonomy as agricultural producers.

Chama emphasises that the opposition of the colonial state to cassava production channelled support to newly formed nationalist parties. There are, however, indications in his article about how cassava cultivation informed other kinds of politics beyond political parties. The response to an outbreak of cassava mosaic disease in the mid-1950s was co-ordinated by traditional authorities and local people, while colonial authorities did little, and this points to a degree of independence from the state that survived independence.

Chama concludes his article by noting that UNIP essentially continued colonial-era agricultural policies that promoted maize and marginalised cassava. Disillusionment with UNIP soon set in (Macola, 2008). This points at a tension between nationalist parties and their intended constituents. Luapula residents appear to have been unable to influence government agricultural policy, and perhaps nationalist politicians did not fully understand the nature of support they received from the area.

After independence Kaunda developed what would become Zambia’s governing ideology under the one-party state: humanism. This represented an intellectual effort to distinguish Zambia from the colonial system that came before it, emphasising human equality, egalitarianism and the “non-exploitation
of man by man" (Kaunda, 2007, iv). There was from the outset a tension between whether humanism represented a codification of the ideology of UNIP, or expressed the thoughts of Kaunda himself (Molteno, 1973). Little work has been done on the topic, however, since a smattering of publications in the 1970s (Meebelo, 1973), despite humanism being officially the country’s governing ideology for 18 years. Indeed, the preamble to the constitution of Zambia’s Second Republic in 1973 declared the country to be a “One-Party Participatory Democracy under the Philosophy of Humanism” (Ndulo & Kent, 1996: 266).

Edward Mboyonga’s article in this special issue is therefore a welcome contribution to this neglected topic and takes seriously humanism as an ideology that aimed at decolonising society in Zambia. Mboyonga places humanism in the context of a broader pan-African intellectual history and focuses on the efforts of newly-independent Zambia to create a new education system guided by this ideology. This focus is a timely one. Decolonisation has animated discussion and protest at universities in Southern Africa and across the world in recent years (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017) and the efforts by Zambia’s new government to use higher education as a way to overcome the legacies of colonialism has many lessons for contemporary discussions.

Educational opportunities for Africans were deliberately limited during the colonial period, something Mboyonga notes personally affected Kaunda who almost had to drop out of school following the death of his father. Zambia had one of the least-developed education systems on the continent and in 1966 it was estimated that the country had 1,200 secondary-certificate holders and only 100 university graduates, the latter all trained abroad as there was no institute for higher education in the country (Mwalimu, 2014: 1095). Establishing a university was made a priority after independence; the University of Zambia was established in 1965.

Mboyonga locates the significance of Zambian humanism in higher education within the public good discourse, where the benefits of higher education did not only accrue to the individual, but to the society as well. The new university launched several initiatives to link education to wider benefits, including establishing a Rural Development Studies Bureau, using open theatre techniques as a kind of mass education, and requiring students’ participation in national youth service programmes.

Mboyonga also draws attention to the ideological aspects of humanism and places humanism within broader post-colonial approaches that had emerged on the continent to break the colonial past by focusing on an African worldview. There was a tension, however, between the professed egalitarianism of humanism and academic freedom and the newly-founded university. Kaunda
had appointed himself university Chancellor and Mboyonga explains that he intervened to appoint his own staff at the university, removed academics deemed critical and suspended or expelled students who organised at the new Institute of Human Relations. Exploring the tension between the theory and practice of this ideology would be a fruitful area for future study.

Environmental Legacies

One modestly successful area for economic diversification in Zambia has been the growth of tourism. Wildlife tourism was envisaged in the country’s First National Development plan after independence as a major opportunity for development, though these aspirations were initially frustrated. The escalating conflict against white minority rule across Southern Africa devastated Zambia’s nascent tourist industry. Tourist numbers collapsed after Rhodesia declared independence in 1965 at a time when international tourism boomed elsewhere on the continent (Kenya received half as many tourists as Zambia in 1966, but almost eight times as many by 1976). It was only after independence in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe that tourist numbers revived (Teye, 1986).

There are relatively few histories of tourism in Zambia, especially in the post-colonial period (McGregor, 2002). Moreover, scholarship about wildlife tourism and national parks tends to focus on the relationship between colonialism and conservation, and colonial legacies in modern-day conservation practices. In their contribution to this special issue, Chikondi Thole, Thomas Kweku Taylor and Thor Larsen draw our attention to the post-colonial period and Kaunda’s own prominent role in promoting tourism and wildlife conservation in South Luangwa, which he declared a National Park in 1971.

Often, popular tourist destinations are intertwined with politics. Some, for instance, have a political role as venues for international conferences. Victoria Falls has regularly been the backdrop for such events, perhaps most dramatically in 1975 when Kaunda met Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Ian Smith on a train carriage parked half-way across the Victoria Falls bridge.

The authors show that South Luangwa had a similar political role. Kaunda established two presidential lodges in the park and took regular working holidays there, a practice also adopted by one of his successors, Levy Mwanawasa. These lodges have had a diplomatic purpose, hosting world leaders in a relaxing setting, as well as for more practical political ends. One of the lodges hosted the clandestine meeting between South Africa’s white business leaders and the then banned ANC in 1985, a meeting chaired by Kaunda.
Kaunda’s championing of South Luangwa was not simply for political ends, however. He had a genuine love for the landscape and wildlife and sought to promote tourism there. Thole, Taylor and Larsen argue that Kaunda was ahead of his time in this sense, and his agenda was often opposed even by other UNIP leaders. Indeed, the park only really flourished as a tourist destination after he was out of office as visitor numbers have risen sharply since the late 1990s.

Kaunda’s role in the park also provides insights into political life in the one-party state and how he sought to rule as president. This was an area of policy personally important to him and so he intervened to impose new and stricter anti-poaching policies or to bypass state institutions like the National Parks and Wildlife Services that he thought were ineffective. Connections with overseas donors and prominent conservationists were crucial to facilitating this, and the authors explain how Kaunda reached an agreement with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation to finance a wildlife conservation programme. He had met officials from the agency while on holiday at the park.

There were clear limits to this kind of personal rule, however. Kaunda could take the initiative to issue new policies over the heads of other ministers and state agencies, but these could be quietly ignored. Thole, Taylor and Larsen argue that the punitive anti-poaching measures advocated by Kaunda were unpopular. Only two civil servants were ever prosecuted for poaching, despite Kaunda’s insistence that any civil servant involved in the practice should be sacked. Communities around the park, moreover, had a very different idea about “poaching” and often regarded the increasing number of elephants and other large animals as a nuisance.

**Remembering Kaunda**

Kaunda’s long life – long enough to outlive those tasked with writing his obituaries (Kaufman, 2021) – meant that popular perceptions of him and his political role changed more than once. Huge protests preceded his ousting as president and he was heavily defeated at the 1991 elections. He was harassed by the new MMD government and, as noted above, even had his status as a Zambian challenged through “constitutional gymnastics” that sought to transform his status from founding father to foreign national (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 403). Yet his reputation was rehabilitated in his later years, perhaps as the prospect he would return to active political life receded. He was restored in popular discourse as a founding father and at his 90th birthday in 2014 billboards across the country, partly sponsored by the government, hailed his legacy and proclaimed “90 years of good deeds.”
How Kaunda was remembered after his death is therefore an important question, and one tied up with perceptions of his legacy. The article by Meldon L. Chama and Beatrice Kapanda Simataa turns to these questions of history and memory, conceptualised within a Zambian mourning process, specifically that of the Nsenga of Petauke District in Eastern Province. They argue that while eulogies and remembrances about Kaunda immediately after his death were celebratory and positive, Kaunda’s memory is a contested one. The mourning period involved “forgetting and choosing what to remember about KK”.

This paper has wider relevance as the funeral discourses of key personalities in Zambia, especially former presidents, have become a site of politicisation, memory work, and nation building. Politicians have often sought to appropriate or associate themselves with the legacies of the recent deceased (Kalusa, 2017). Kaunda's own death became a source of controversy and tension between his position as a national symbol and his position in his own family. All Zambia’s deceased presidents have been buried at a specially designated national memorial site at Embassy Park in Lusaka, a decision that points to efforts to create a national collective memorialization. Some members of Kaunda's own family, however, brought a court challenge claiming that he should be buried alongside his wife Betty. Who could lay claim to his legacy, the state he helped establish, or his own children and grandchildren?

Chama and Simataa focus on the remembrances and eulogies at his state funeral and during the mourning period as a way in which collective memory was created. As might be expected, these emphasised Kaunda’s contributions to Zambia, Southern Africa and the wider world, and were delivered by prominent political figures including the chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa and a British Government Minister. And yet, despite the glowing tributes, well deserved as they may have been, there were mumblings of discontent in unofficial circles about KKS’s legacy, which recalled his 27 years of autocratic rule and the repression it came with.

This discontent is effectively silenced in official memorialization and the authors conclude that “the dominant narrative about KK is hagiographic”. This hagiographic narrative will be monumentalised at Embassy Park. This, Chama and Simataa argue, makes it a site of “dissonant heritage” where the memorialisation of the dead presidents is selective and amnesiac. Hence for Kaunda, his burial place at the park remembers him as “a torch bearer of peace, founding father of the Republic of Zambia, a hero of Africa and a Christian”. These things may be true, but we hope that the papers in this double special issue will encourage broader reflection on Kaunda’s life and legacy.
The final paper in this collection is one that we hope will be particularly useful for this kind of broader reflection. The paper by Victoria Phiri Chitungu is different to the others as it is comprised of a series of interviews conducted by a team tasked by Zambia’s Cabinet Office in 2017 with interviewing the country’s surviving presidents. This team interviewed Kaunda several times and also several people who were personally close to him over his life.

We can see an element here of Kaunda consciously seeking to shape his own legacy and memorialisation. He encouraged the team sent to interview him to instead interview those who were personally close to him and suggested the names of people who should be interviewed. He was an active agent in shaping how he will be remembered. The result is a remarkable document that shows a different side of Kaunda’s life, a more personal side. He was an icon of African liberation to many but he was also a living, breathing human being who needed to eat, sleep, sing and, sometimes, mourn.

These interviews represent a valuable source for scholars and are included here as a primary source. The article contains extended quotes from these interviews along with contextual information. The project was also a timely one. Kaunda’s great age meant that he outlived almost all those who knew him well in his younger days before he became president, including all his siblings and even some of his children. Few people are alive today who could have met Kaunda in the 1950s. Indeed, since Kaunda’s death, the last of his political generation who were prominent in the struggle against colonial rule have also died. Simon Zukas, who first met Kaunda in the late 1940s, died in 2021 and Sikota Wina, the final surviving member of Zambia’s first post-independence Cabinet, died in 2022. It is remarkable then that Chitungu and her team interviewed someone who knew Kaunda as a young man and his mother Helen, Watson Lombe N’gandu. He is a grandson of Chief Nkula IV who welcomed Kaunda’s parents to Chinsali in 1905.

Others interviewed are people who were close to Kaunda in a different sense, those who cooked his meals, cut his hair, prepared his clothes and took his official portrait. They saw Kaunda away from the public eye. It is evident that Kaunda’s personal and political life were closely intertwined and he himself saw little separation between the two. His diet for almost his entire life was shaped by anti-colonial commitments, “having vowed to stop eating meat as part of a boycott of racist practices in Lusaka butchers” shops in the 1950s.

Chitungu argues that these interview narratives “help us see Kaunda through the eyes of people that were very close to him”. Some were very close indeed. Her article finishes with the recollections of Kaunda’s barber and bedroom attendant Benjamin Kachingwe, who was with Kaunda in his final days and dressed his body for the funeral.
We hope that these interview narratives, along with the other articles in this collection, will encourage scholars to look again at the life and legacy of Kaunda, as an image for so many and as a human being who lived in tumultuous times.

End notes

1 The SWAPO archives were housed in Lusaka until Namibia’s independence after which they were moved to Namibia where they have been inaccessible.

2 We would like to thank Grieve Chelwa and Sishuwa Sishuwa for support for the conference and special issue.

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The Life and Legacies of Kenneth Kaunda in Southern Africa


Elusive Empowerment: Emerald Mining in Ndola Rural under Kenneth Kaunda’s One-Party State

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One of the hallmarks of Kenneth Kaunda’s tenure in office was the nationalisation of Zambia’s large-scale copper mines. Yet after the Matero Reforms of 1969, which purported to empower Zambians through the public ownership and management of the country’s largest export industry, President Kaunda and his colleagues curiously decided to partner with a foreign investor (Hagura Mining) in the 1980s to develop the emerald mining sector in Ndola Rural (now Lufwanyama), while Zambian artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM) were sidelined. Drawing upon archival documents, newspaper coverage, and a select number of interviews, this paper seeks to examine this apparent shift in mining governance under Kenneth Kaunda. Instead of facilitating financial access or establishing an equipment hire scheme for ASM, the Reserved Minerals Corporation – a subsidiary of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) –sought to restrict access to emerald deposits and preferred partnering with a foreign investor. These decisions were largely attributable to the “prevailing wisdom” at the time regarding mineral extraction (i.e. a preference for large-scale mining that can be more easily taxed and regulated) and the foreign exchange crunch of the 1980s. By prioritising large-scale production, Zambian policymakers undermined their own stated developmental goals that aimed at diversification and empowerment - both of which ASM would have facilitated - and entrenched an economic model that was dependent on foreign investment. Unfortunately, this model’s failure continues to have reverberations for emerald mining in Lufwanyama today.

Key Words: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining; Emerald Mining; Kenneth Kaunda; Ndola Rural; Lufwanyama; Zambia; Political Economy.

Introduction

Development that is restricted to only a small part of the economic sector, to only a few regions, to only large-scale production, and to only highly capital-intensive techniques is, in my view, no
development at all .... Economic planning must learn to see virtues in rural development, of small industrialisation; it must realise the potential in utilizing human beings where they are and in reaching a self-sustained growth in all the regions and sectors of the economy (Kaunda, 1968: 13).

These were the revolutionary words of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda in 1968 as he heralded the dawn of an economic transition that would consolidate Zambia’s political independence, gained in 1964, with economic independence. The then president charted a stirring vision of inclusive development in which all Zambians would be empowered to participate in the economic prosperity of the country. To this end, a strategy of rural development, that sought to trigger productive activity in areas that had hitherto been neglected by the colonial administration, was pursued through largely Zambian-owned cooperatives. The number of cooperatives increased from approximately two hundred at independence to over nine hundred in 1968 (Kaunda, 1969: 23). Mining was one of the sectors where the economic empowerment of Zambians was called for. Permits for extraction of sand, stone, and other industrial minerals were to be restricted to Zambians, while further mining sector diversification away from copper was encouraged. There were also calls for promotion of labour-intensive economic activity that would enable broad participation in the economy rather than an undue focus on capital-intensive industrialisation that would exclude the participation of most Zambians who lacked capital, skills, and resources to embark on such investments (Kaunda, 1968).

In hindsight, the time was ripe for the rise of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). After all, ASM by definition entails labour-intensive mineral extraction, processing, and trade that typically involves the use of picks and shovels to extract alluvial minerals (G. Hilson et al., 2017). ASM is also often undertaken by those with limited education and skills and yet provides an important source of livelihoods, reducing poverty for many in rural areas (Baffour-Kyei et al., 2021; Yankson and Gough, 2019). All these elements would have predisposed the Kaunda government to support ASM. However, during Kaunda’s presidency, ASM remained largely underdeveloped, seemingly in contradiction with Dr. Kaunda’s stated aspirations. In light of this apparent lost opportunity to develop ASM, this paper poses the central research question: what was the Kaunda government’s policy towards artisanal and small-scale emerald mining and what factors contributed to the underdevelopment of the sector during this time? Another key question posed is: to what extent have decisions made during the First and Second Republics with regards to artisanal and small-scale emerald mining shaped the subsequent development of the sector? To answer
these questions, this paper examines the regulation of emerald mining in Ndola Rural District (present day Lufwanyama District) as an illustrative case study. Kaunda’s government, despite pronouncements to the contrary, prioritised increased access to foreign exchange through heightened emerald production over rural development and the empowerment of ASM. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Kaunda’s government criminalised artisanal operators (and later sought to organise them into cooperatives); monopolised access to the most viable emerald deposits for a joint venture with a foreign investor; distributed licences for less viable sections of the Kafubu area to UNIP-aligned cooperatives and politically connected individuals; and either failed to make the necessary interventions, or made ill-timed interventions, to assist ASM operators (i.e. offer financing, geological services, plant hire, liberalised marketing arrangements, etc). The management of the emerald mining sector under Kaunda has arguably shaped the current governance of the sector and the continued failure to prioritise ASM and rural development.

This paper relies primarily on archival research from the pre-1991 era, including company reports and correspondence, speeches and policy pronouncements, official reports and legislation, and newspaper articles from the period. This data is then supplemented with a few key informant interviews, while current policy documents are used to briefly reflect on how historical antecedents have shaped current developments in the sector. The paper adopts a historical-institutionalist perspective in which the authors contend that “history matters” – thus by understanding Kaunda’s legacy in this area, insights may be drawn to help us understand current dynamics in ASM emerald mining.

The paper is structured as follows: the first section contextualises the evolution of emerald mining in Zambia through a snapshot of Zambia’s colonial legacy and a synthesis of Kaunda’s approach to Zambian empowerment and development in general, and to small-scale mining in particular. The second section of the paper traces the rise of ASM emerald mining particularly during the early 1980s and the government’s response to its emergence, followed by a third section on the policy innovations and pitfalls of the late 1980s. The final section bridges the experiences of the First and Second Republics to subsequent developments in the sector, linking the past to the present.

Section 1: Colonial Legacy meets a New Dawn - Pre-independence Zambia and the Aspirations of Kaunda’s Government

When President Kaunda ascended to power in 1964, he inherited a colonial legacy of economic development that centred on copper extraction. From the 1930s onwards, Zambia’s economic structure was carved into that of a copper
mono-economy (Meyns, 1984). In order to maximise copper extraction, the colonial administration developed a dualistic economy in which a clear rural-urban divide pervaded. "Development" during this time - including mines, towns, factories and large-scale farms - was concentrated along the urbanised line of rail (Evans, 1984: 89). Conversely, the rural areas that lay outside this line of rail were starved of investment and served as labour reserves.

At independence in 1964, Kaunda sought to reverse these structural trends, and other policies of the colonial administration that did not serve Zambian interests. He was a strong believer in “Humanism” as a guiding philosophy for development. He argued for equitable development in which the state served the interests of all its people, and a classless society would prevail. The rural-urban divide cultivated under the colonial administration was therefore problematised and rural development was made a key priority. A Ministry of Rural Development was created and attempts were made to create self-sustaining growth in rural areas primarily through small-scale agriculture, but also by restricting permits for stone and sand mining to Zambians to encourage small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development. Rural development thus signalled an attempted departure from unbalanced development (focused on the line of rail) and a disproportionate focus on large-scale, capital-intensive production that failed to absorb the bulk of Zambia’s unskilled labourers into the formal economy. Rural areas were recognised as being where the masses lived and so needing prioritisation (Kaunda, 1968; 1969).

Artisanal and small-scale mining fed into Kaunda’s aforementioned visions of rural development and labour-intensive production. The Zambia Gemstone and Precious Metal Association, for instance, argued that the scattered deposits of gemstones across the country made it difficult for large-scale exploration to be undertaken, whereas small-scale extraction would be the most feasible approach. They further noted that small-scale mining had opened up remote areas of the country and would serve as a catalyst for rural development through stimulating entrepreneurship and trade among rural actors ("The Gemstone Industry in Zambia: Problems and Prospects", n.d.). However, as will be discussed below, state support to the sector lagged while foreign investors were the main beneficiaries.

With regards to President Kaunda’s approach towards foreign investors, he was not opposed to them per se, but rather challenged the discriminatory policies anchored in racial prejudice of the colonial administration that had favoured foreign capital over Zambians. As he said in his Matero speech:
...we shall welcome foreign capital as in the past. We remain committed to this policy for we need foreign capital in considerable amounts. All we ask of our investors is the understanding that we welcome them as participants and not controllers, of our economic development process. Zambians, like Europeans, Americans, Scandinavians, Soviets or Chinese, in their respective countries, must be controllers of not only the political but the economic destiny of this country ...a responsible government cannot stand by and let its resources be exploited for the benefit of foreigners alone (Kaunda, 1969: xx, 42).

Kaunda, therefore, challenged the mining companies for expatriating up to 80% of their profits and engaging in transfer mispricing as opposed to reinvesting locally and maximising mineral development through diversification. He further lamented the fact that foreign companies had been given special grant rights that allowed them to: (1) hold on to mining rights in perpetuity without payment of royalties to the state, and (2) to transfer them at will and to charge royalties on those rights. Meanwhile, the Zambian government was legally restricted from exercising meaningful control over the mines. The state was thus unable to stimulate increased and diversified mining investment, or revoke licenses of those companies who failed to develop their mineral rights due to limitations in the colonial legal code. He also observed how Zambian SMEs were constrained from accessing finance due to the fact that resident expatriates were prioritised (Kaunda, 1968, 1969).

Kaunda therefore embarked on a project of nationalisation of “major” industries. This move was underpinned by the belief that the state was best placed to offer equitable development and empowerment to Zambians and, that by holding a controlling stake in major foreign enterprises, the evils of profit expatriation and under-investment would be averted and resources channelled to developmental aims for the benefit of all. The government called upon large companies to “invite” the government to hold 51% in their enterprises through the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). By 1969, INDECO comprised 60 major and minor companies that were either fully or partially state owned. Beyond existing foreign owned enterprises, the government actively sought to attract foreign capital to Zambia. To this end, President Kaunda announced a set of incentives for foreign investors, including tax holidays and permission to remit profits. However, this was conditional upon the government receiving a 51% stake in these investments. Zambian citizens were also encouraged to become active economic participants, and to this
end the government pledged to facilitate access to loans through limiting the access of foreign residents to credit-provisioning and ensuring Zambians were prioritised. Foreign nationals were also limited to operating their businesses in only ten urban centres, while Zambians were encouraged to enter into joint ventures with foreign residents and manage small-scale businesses (Kaunda, 1968).

In the specific case of mining, the Mines and Minerals Act of 1970, Section 5 (1) restricted individuals who were not Zambian citizens, or who had not been ordinarily resident in the country, from holding a mining right. Furthermore, only companies that had been incorporated in Zambia could hold a mining right. The Mines and Minerals Act of 1976, Section 6 (1) reiterated the restriction of mining rights to Zambians and companies incorporated under the Companies Act. President Kaunda also condemned what he called the “tribute system” in which small-scale miners, who were mostly Zambians, worked under the Special Mining Grants held by foreign mining companies. President Kaunda argued that “these unfortunate men slave away and sometimes are unable to make a living out of a small mine and yet they have to pay a percentage to the holders of the Special Grant who most of the time are not even residents of the country” (Kaunda, 1969: 34). He went on to state: “I admire these small-scale miners. I admire their self-denial, their hard work and their faith in the country. For this reason, I shall give THEM the right to apply for a mining lease and not the exploiters who have been sitting back and enjoying the fruits of other people’s labour” (p. 34).

President Kaunda, therefore, signalled a desire to support small-scale miners; a desire that was underlined in the first and second national development plans. The First National Development Plan (FNDP), for instance, announced that through the Geological Survey Department, the government would “make use of the latest prospecting techniques to increase knowledge of Zambia’s mineral resources of all kinds over the four-year period” of the plan, with the goal of discovering new minerals (FNDP, 1966). This was echoed in the Second National Development Plan where government went a step further to highlight the role of small-scale mines and gemstones, such as emeralds, in particular:

\[\text{Government will promote development of small mines and mining diversification in general including labour intensive projects. ... Exploration for other minerals aimed at further diversification of the mining industry will continue during the SNDP. ... Non-metallic mines and quarries of amethyst, limestone and emerald will be expanded and additional resources of industrial minerals will be exploited (SNDP, 1972).}\]
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However, the 1977 Mining Act did not explicitly highlight ASM operators as being entitled to special mining rights beyond the restriction of rights to Zambians. Rather, the Minister of Mines was prohibited from granting a mining license for building and industrial minerals unless the applicant demonstrated that “the intended capital expenditure on plant, equipment, and industrial buildings will be in excess of thirty thousand Kwacha” (Section 62). Similarly, Article 19 indicates that an applicant for a prospecting licence who lacks adequate financial resources, technical competence, and expertise to carry out prospecting should be denied a licence. Such requirements would have effectively limited the participation of ASM operators who lacked capital and expertise. Moreover, the reality that unfolded, as demonstrated below, challenged the initial earnestness of Kaunda’s commitment to ASM.

On the whole, Kaunda’s broader approach to Zambian development seems to have been three pronged. On the one hand, he believed that the state played a critical role in ensuring equitable development for all the Zambian people. To that end, the state was to be the primary owner of large enterprises, and principal employer, while all the citizens were employees of the state. Kaunda, however, also acknowledged Zambia’s need for, and dependence on, large-scale foreign capital for development – from independence in 1964 to 1969 when nationalisation was pronounced, the copper mines had reached a production level of 769,000 and directly employed 62,000 people, establishing the importance of large-scale foreign investment (Sikamo, Mwanza, and Mweemba, 2016). However, Kaunda’s UNIP government did not trust the mines to support the government’s economic agenda unless their avarice was tempered by state control (Libby and Woakes, 1980). Thus, the state was seen as a vital player in the economy through joint-ventures or full ownership of large-scale enterprises. On the other hand, Kaunda believed in the participation of all Zambians in the developmental process. This was, however, to take place through joint ventures with foreigners, small-scale enterprises, or cooperatives.

Applied to the ASM emerald sector, it is possible to see this three-pronged approach in the section that follows: on one hand, ASM was encouraged via cooperatives or private ownership, but on the other hand anything that was seen as holding potential to be a large-scale venture was taken over by the state, which then sought to engage foreign investors for the effective development of the gemstone sector. The Reserved Mineral Corporation Limited (RMC) was, for instance, established as “the investment arm of the Government in the gemstone industry” and was the sole authorised marketing agency for emeralds in Zambia, consistent with the dominant role of the state in industry at the time. The RMC,
in a joint venture with a foreign investor, formed Kagem Mining Limited in the early 1980s. The section below explores the rise of emerald ASM in greater detail.


Emeralds were first discovered in the Kafubu area of Ndola Rural District (i.e. the Miku deposit) in 1928, by geologists working for the Rhodesia Congo Border Concession Company. Emeralds from the Kafubu area were initially thought to be of limited commercial value and hence exploration was minimal and production was quite low. MINDECO Small Mines (MSM), a division of the state-owned Mineral Development Corporation (MINDECO), acquired the mining rights for the Miku deposit in 1971 and produced emeralds on a limited scale (Zwaan et al., 2005). By the mid-1970s, unlicencet artisanal emerald mining and black-market smuggling had become rampant across the Kafubu area. Legally sanctioned mining was minimal. From 1970 to 1979, only six prospecting licences and four mining licences had been granted within the Kafubu area (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979). Only two firms had acquired mining licences by 1979: the state-owned MSM possessed three mining licences (for the Miku, Fwaya Fwaya and Fbolele deposits) and Nkurulu Gem Prospecting Company Ltd., co-owned by politician Harry Nkumbula and Asian businessman B.D. Rao, possessed a mining licence for the Kamakanga deposit.

The government began to take a keen interest in the country’s emerald deposits in large part due to the Zambian state’s ongoing fiscal crisis in the late 1970s. If the mining and sale of emeralds were effectively managed, foreign exchange from the sector could potentially aid efforts to combat the country’s persistent balance of payments deficits. "Illegal" artisanal miners were mining without licences, avoiding having to pay various fees and area charges to the Ministry of Mines, and were in turn selling their stones to unlicenced dealers and smugglers who were circumventing the payment of various taxes when selling emeralds in international markets. As a result, it was estimated that Zambia was losing between K50 million and K100 million each year from the illegal mining and smuggling of emeralds. In response to learning these figures, Dr. Kaunda deplored the loss of the money “especially considering that our economy has been suffering and losing money so much” (Times of Zambia, 18 August, 1979).

In an effort to assert control over emerald mining in the Kafubu area, President Kaunda implemented a series of measures in the late 1970s. He enacted Statutory Instrument (SI) no. 194 of 1977, which established the Ndola Rural Emerald Restricted Area (NRERA) as a “protected area” under the Protected
Places and Areas Act, Cap. 107 of the Laws of Zambia. This SI sought to restrict access to emerald deposits by criminalising the presence of “illegal” artisanal miners in the NRERA. In other words, SI no. 194 of 1977 served to restrict access to lands formerly under communal tenure (under the custodianship of Chiefs Nkana, Mushili, and Lumpuma) and reinforce the illegality of artisanal miners operating in the Kafubu area. These artisanal miners were henceforth now not only unlicenced, but also trespassing. President Kaunda also enacted SI 29 of 1979 (under Section 56 of the Mines and Minerals Act of 1976) ordering the cessation of emerald production, and SI 30 of 1979, requiring all uncut emeralds to be placed in the custody of the chief mining engineer. Yet since most emerald mining at that time was performed illegally and emeralds sold on the black market, these measures were largely ineffectual and only served to punish the two licenced mining operators, MSM and Nkuralu. Harry Nkumbula, co-owner of Nkuralu, complained that these SIs, instead of curbing illegal mining, had in fact done the opposite; they enabled illegal miners access to licenced mines and drew the attention of foreign smugglers to the area (Times of Zambia, 19 August 1979). Both these SIs were done in preparation for a substantive probe of emerald mining in the rural Copperbelt. Soon after their enactment, President Kaunda appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the Emerald Industry led by Justice William Bruce-Lyle in February 1979 (Times of Zambia, 2 February 1979).

The Commission of Inquiry uncovered a number of important findings about emerald mining in Ndola Rural. It noted that, despite their unsanctioned status and rudimentary geological knowledge, illegal miners employing the pick-and-shovel method had achieved higher production rates than the state-owned MSM (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 54) and had performed the bulk of the prospecting in the NRERA. With respect to the latter:

_The Commission was informed by many experts that illegal miners had played a large part in prospecting emeralds. Apparently, illegal miners have gained considerable knowledge in identifying areas where emeralds are found. In fact, geologists who appeared before the Commission said they were led by illegal miners to most of the emerald deposits that have been discovered so far (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 12-3)._  

Contrarily, the Commission learnt that MSM was beset by several failings. The state-owned firm was poorly managed, largely attributable to the frequent turnover of senior personnel, which made “continuity in both planning and operations difficult” (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 26-7). MSM’s
operations in the Kafubu area were also undermined by the constant interference of, and lack of coordination with, the Ministry of Mines and its holding company MINDECO. And finally, MSM was undercapitalised and did not possess the requisite funds to fully exploit its emerald deposits (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 27-8).

The Commission also found there were numerous difficulties related to policing access to the NRERA and countering illegal mining and black-market smuggling. Police forces were encumbered by insufficient manpower and equipment (e.g. access to vehicles, firearms, etc.), inadequate security infrastructure, a plurality of authorities empowered to issue entry permits, and interagency conflicts over jurisdictional authority (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 34-54). These problems were exacerbated by the complicity of some police officers in illegal mining activities (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 43-45) and the alleged involvement of senior party and government officials in emerald smuggling. On the later point, the Commission’s Report indicated that the alleged culprits included three members of UNIP’s Central Committee, a member of the Cabinet, and a former Cabinet Minister, and “noted with dismay” that none of these officials came forward to provide evidence to the Commission (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 49-51). The emerald smugglers themselves were reportedly West Africans (Senegalese and Malians) who had mostly married and settled in rural Copperbelt townships, permitting them to “mix freely with the local population”, hence complicating efforts to arrest and deport them (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 77). These challenges severely curtailed the effectiveness of security measures and operations to counter illegal emerald mining and smuggling.

Aside from ramping up policing of the NRERA to deter illegal mining, and the stricter enforcement of immigration laws to curb emerald smuggling, the Commission of Inquiry made several recommendations on how best to organise the emerald mining industry moving forward. These recommendations included:

- offering a general amnesty to those possessing emeralds illegally;
- the formation of a Buying Agency (wholly government-owned body) to purchase emeralds from licensed producers, provide technical assistance, distribute implements, hire out heavy machinery, and market emeralds abroad.
- the formation of a lapidary for cutting and polishing emeralds in Zambia (considered a long-term objective that required considerable capital, expertise and sizeable emerald stockpiles);
- and the organisation of the NRERA into two regions. The first region, with the
largest deposits, would be reserved for state or private companies, preferably wholly Zambian-owned, with the requisite expertise and capitalisation. The second zone would be reserved for 1000 artisanal miners, governed by an association that would issue permits and arbitrate disputes (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 102-5).

The last recommendation, it was argued, would minimise illegal mining by licensing most of the illegal miners and minimise security costs as artisanal miners would ensure the security of their own individual plots.

The government accepted some of the Commission’s proposals and rejected others. A two-month amnesty (20 May - 20 July 1980) was initiated to purchase illegally mined emeralds. The Reserved Minerals Corporation (RMC) was initially established in 1980 to serve as a state-owned buying and marketing agency for precious stones. The company was first tasked with facilitating the purchase of emeralds during the amnesty, negotiating a K1 million overdraft facility from Standard Chartered Bank ("RMC Annual Report for the Period Ending on 31 March 1981"). However, contrary to press reports at the time (Times of Zambia, 6 June 1980), the amnesty faired quite poorly; only K44,699 worth of emeralds were purchased ("RMC Annual Report for the Period Ending on 31 March 1981").

Following the amnesty purchases, emerald mining was also added to RMC’s portfolio. Instead of reorganising and capitalising MSM, as recommended by the Commission of Inquiry, RMC became a buyer, marketer, and producer of emeralds. MSM’s mining licenses were transferred over to the new state-owned emerald mining company, and RMC was granted a prospecting license (PL 180) for an area covering over 1200 km² and encompassing most of the known emerald deposits in the NRERA ("RMC Annual Report for the Period Ending on 31 March 1982"). RMC effectively monopolised licensed access to known emerald deposits and no portion of the NRERA was allotted to artisanal miners, again counter to the Commission of Inquiry’s recommendations. Artisanal miners, who were responsible for most of the prospecting in the NRERA in the 1970s and who had proven more productive than licensed operators such as MSM and Nkurulu, continued to be criminalised. As Siwale and Siwale (2017) suggest, “A picture emerges that the government used the excuse of bringing order into the sector to displace informal miners from the most lucrative, mineral-rich areas, with the aim of seizing control of those locations” (196).

Despite the formation of RMC and efforts to assert more control over the NRERA, the security situation continued to deteriorate in the early 1980s. The illegal mining and smuggling of emeralds continued largely unchecked, with the active involvement of members of the Zambia Police Service ("RMC Managing Director’s Report", 7 September 1981; “RMC Managing Director’s Report”, 7
December 1981). In discussions hosted by the Secretary to the Cabinet on the deteriorating security situation in Ndola Rural, a number of proposals were put forward to address these issues, including the deportation of illegal aliens who were suspected of smuggling emeralds, and the resettlement of villages located within the confines of the NRERA to curb illegal mining (“RMC Managing Director’s Report”, 7 September 1981). Yet these government-sponsored proposals, aside from being punitive and ineffective, failed to address the root cause of the insecurity; the criminalisation of artisanal miners. Practical solutions offered by the RMC’s Board of Directors that would have effectively decriminalised illegal mining and curtailed the smuggling of emeralds from Zambia were rebuffed by government:

_It had been suggested [by the Board] that side by side with its own operations, the Company [RMC] should consider purchasing emeralds from illegal miners as this would go a long way in reducing the outflow of emeralds out of the country and consequent loss of foreign exchange. But the directors felt that since this proposal had already been rejected by the Government, there was no point in pursuing it further (“RMC Board Meeting” 14 September 1981)._  

Grappling with this insecurity, coupled with limited access to capital and expertise, severely hampered RMC’s operations. By the end of the first fiscal year (31 March 1981 – 31 March 1982), emerald production was a paltry 4,419 grams and the company suffered a loss of K770,137 (“RMC Annual Report for the Period Ending on 31 March 1982”).

Kaunda’s Cabinet put forward a politically expedient solution to the problem, while the RMC Board of Directors favoured a more technocratic option. In a memorandum to the Cabinet, the Minister of Mines complained that while he thought RMC should continue serving as a buying agency, “[t]he involvement of this organisation into production will not only lead to disastrous drain of public funds, but will additionally encourage the growth of illegal mining” (Cabinet Memorandum by the Honorable Minister of Mines, 1982). His proposed alternative was that emerald mining in the NRERA “should be handed over to either District Councils or Cooperatives of local people resident in the area” (Cabinet Memorandum by the Honorable Minister of Mines, 1982). Indeed, even prior to the issuance of this memorandum, the government had pressed RMC to allow a UNIP-aligned cooperative to mine for emeralds within the company’s license area, much to the dismay of the company’s Board of
Directors ("RMC Board Meeting", 14 September 1981). This solution offered a select number of artisanal miners access to NRERA, but only as members of UNIP-aligned cooperatives. The subsequent allocation of mining licences in the NRERA to locally-run cooperatives and small-scale mining companies, following extensive petitioning, largely functioned as a patronage exercise. Indeed, many of the small-scale mining operators were former or current UNIP politicians (e.g. Andrew Kashita, Mary Chisala, Bob Litana, etc.). As a result, the number of mining and prospecting licences awarded in the NRERA increased exponentially over the course of a decade; from 4 mining licences and 2 prospecting licences in 1978 to 32 mining licences and 112 prospecting licences in 1988 (see Figure 1). The licences awarded, however, were for plots with questionable prospects and limited viability (Siwale and Siwale, 2017: 196). Their allocation was politically motivated, “to satisfy as many people as they could” (Interview with Mr. Ngwira, 24 October 2018). Whether these ventures were successful or not mattered little. Moreover, upon the awarding of these licences, many of the cooperatives and small-scale miners were not offered any form of financial or technical assistance from the state, contrary to commitments made in the Cabinet Memorandum (Interview with Mr. Musonda, 13 June 2016).

The RMC’s Board of Directors, as early as 1981, began courting foreign investors for a potential joint venture. They believed foreign investment would offer an additional source of capital, provide a convenient way of acquiring expertise, and enable RMC to share the risks involved in prospecting ("RMC Board Meeting", 24 July 1981). The RMC Board of Directors sought to bolster production and profitability to justify its continued existence. Interestingly, the difficult security situation in NRERA delayed the establishment of a joint venture, as potential foreign investors expressed concerns over the continued access of illegal miners to licensed areas and the uncooperative stance adopted by local police forces ("RMC Managing Director’s Report", 7 December 1981). It was not until 1984 that RMC finalised a joint venture with Hagura Mining, a company that was registered in Britain and jointly owned by Israeli and Indian nationals. B.D. Rao, co-owner of Nkuralu Gem Prospecting Company, was also listed as a director of, and presumably possessed a stake in, Hagura Mining. The joint venture was incorporated as Kagem Mining, with RMC holding 55% ownership and Hagura Mining 45% ownership.

Despite the Minister’s stated opposition to the involvement of RMC in mining emeralds, the company was permitted to continue its operations and to establish Kagem Mining together with a foreign investor. The most viable emerald deposits were exploited by Kagem, while the UNIP Central Committee proceeded to offer prospecting and mining licences with questionable prospects
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to party-affiliated cooperatives and politically connected individuals. The awarding of these questionable licences without any modicum of technical or financial assistance served as a political exercise, simply satisfying demands for access to the NRERA, as opposed to offering genuine empowerment. Ultimately, the Zambian government was more concerned with securing foreign exchange from the sale of Kagem's mine production than empowering Zambian ASM.

Figure 1: Prospecting, Exploration and Mining License Areas in the Republic of Zambia (1988)

Source: Geological Survey Department and Mines Development Department, Ministry of Mines

Despite initial setbacks due to the delayed issuances of import licences for machinery and the delayed granting of mining licences, Kagem’s production levels and profitability rose quickly (see Figure 2). Yet there was a significant level of discord and distrust between the joint venture partners, RMC and Hagura Mining. Hagura felt that RMC’s sales agent fee for the auctioning of Kagem’s emeralds (set at 10%) was exorbitant, that they did not possess adequate access to information on Kagem’s operations, and that they did not exercise sufficient influence over managerial appointments (“KAGEM Board Meeting”, 25 March 1986; “Record of Meeting held between the Chairman and Hagura Directors”, 21 November 1986).

![Figure 2: KAGEM Net Profits (Kwacha) and Emerald Production (grams), 1984-1988](image)

**Source:** Kagem and RMC Annual Reports and Board Meeting Minutes, 1984-1988

Much of this mutual distrust stemmed from the deteriorating security situation at KAGEM. Instead of illegal miners accessing KAGEM’s concession, however, the emerald thefts were being perpetrated by the mine’s employees. KAGEM’s deputy head of security and chief geologist, in connivance with several other employees, were allegedly stealing emeralds and smuggling them to international markets (“Security at Kagem Memorandum,” 16 January 1987). It was subsequently noted in a KAGEM salary review that if employees were provided higher salaries and better conditions of service (i.e. living quarters,
medical facilities, etc.) in line with those offered to Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) employees, emerald thefts would inevitably decrease ("Kagem Salary Review," 31 January 1989). Instead, Zambia Police initiated "Operation Stone" to curtail thefts at the KAGEM concession throughout the later half of 1987 (Correspondence between KAGEM General Manager and Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Copperbelt Province, 31 July 1987 - 9 September 1987).

Another smuggling ring that included Zambian customs officials was uncovered following an event dubbed "Gems-Gate," wherein over 2000 kg of precious stones (including emerald, amethyst, garnet and aquamarine) were almost smuggled out of Zambia to West Germany, but were intercepted by authorities at Lusaka International Airport. Most of the suspects (25 of 32) detained by Zambian authorities in relation to "Gems-Gate" were reportedly foreigners, likely West African nationals (Times of Zambia, 18 February 1987). Hence, the Zambian media proceeded to demonise the renewed presence of West African emerald smugglers in Ndola Rural (Times of Zambia, 23 April 1987; 4 June 1987) and President Kaunda chastised Zambian artisanal and small-scale miners for selling emeralds to them (Times of Zambia, 14 February 1987). Yet blaming the persistence of emerald smuggling on the continued presence of West Africans in Ndola Rural masked the actual reasons for its continuation: the involvement of UNIP politicians (see below) and the RMC’s marketing monopoly. Small-scale emerald miners, represented by the Emerald Miners’ Association of Zambia (EMAZ) and the Zambia Gemstone and Precious Metals Association (ZGPMA), complained throughout the late 1980s about the monopolistic marketing arrangements of emeralds under RMC. As the sole legally recognised agent for the purchase and sale of emeralds, RMC negotiated the price of emeralds sold at international auctions and charged a 10% sales commission. These organisations sought to scrap this arrangement, so their members could sell their emeralds directly at international auctions, negotiating their own sale prices and avoiding the RMC’s costly commission (Times of Zambia, 19 October 1986; “The Gemstone Industry in Zambia: Problems and Prospects”, n.d.). More crucially, due to the tight liquidity positions under which cooperatives and small-scale miners operated, they were unable to sustain their operations unless they received prompt cash payments for their emeralds. Hence, cooperatives and small-scale miners tended to prefer selling their emeralds to local dealers who could provide cash payment on the spot, as opposed to waiting for payment from RMC.

By 1987, Zambia’s external debt totalled US$6.6 billion, equivalent to 315% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Rakner, 2003: 56). Following Kaunda’s “divorce” with the International Monetary Fund in May of that year (soon replaced
by the ill-fated *National Economic Recovery Programme*), some commentators noted the heightened importance of emerald exports as a potential source of desperately needed foreign exchange (*Times of Zambia*, 4 June 1987). Soon thereafter, then Minister of Mines Pickson Chitambala expressed his hope that emeralds and other gemstones could become another vital source of foreign exchange, in addition to copper (*Times of Zambia*, 9 September 1987). In sharp contrast to copper production, which had steadily declined since the mid-1970s, sanctioned emerald production had successively increased since the formation of Kagem (see Figure 2). Interestingly, despite the foreign exchange shortage, and perhaps with the intention of incentivising increased emerald production, RMC decided, in late 1987, to appease Hagura by increasing the remittable portion of dividends to overseas shareholders by increasing Kagem’s capitalisation from K100,000 to K20 million (“Kagem Board Meeting,” 7 December 1987).

It was in this context, that the Zambian government began implementing a series of innovations to bolster the emerald mining sector, including measures to assist ASM. One of these measures included the establishment of a revolving fund to facilitate advances on emerald purchases. In 1987, RMC acquired an interest-free loan of K3 million from the Bank of Zambia to operate a revolving fund to offer financing for small-scale miners and cooperatives. The revolving fund paid advances for emeralds sold to RMC, up to 50% of their expected market value. These advances served to discourage small-scale miners and cooperatives from selling stones to black market dealers, by provided them with the necessary cash liquidity upfront (*Times of Zambia*, 9 September 1987). The fund was heavily utilised; by 31 March 1988, over K1.8 million had been paid out to small-scale miners and cooperatives for outright purchases or as advances against emerald production submitted to the company (“RMC Annual Report and Accounts for the Financial Year Ended 31 March 1988”).

RMC also entered a joint venture with a Brazilian investor, ERB Overseas, to establish a lapidary in Ndola—Zambia Emerald Industries Limited (ZEIL)—in 1987 (eight years after the Commission of Inquiry report made its recommendations). According to the RMC’s internal documents, “the establishment of the lapidary is one way by which the country can increase, several fold, the value of its gemstones and thereby alleviate the severe shortage of foreign exchange in the economy” (F. Kaunda to J. Mtonga, “Establishment of a Gemstone Lapidary in Zambia,” 27 March 1987). Unfortunately, ZEIL encountered several difficulties that hampered its operations. The lapidary required a sizeable volume of raw emeralds for cutting and polishing. ZEIL was initially entitled to 51% of Kagem’s production, by virtue of RMC’s majority shareholding. In late 1988, ZEIL sought to acquire access to all of Kagem’s emerald production by pushing
the Zambian government to ban the export of all rough, uncut emeralds. This effort to acquire the entirety of Kagem’s production, of course, was challenged by Hagura who countered that such an action would contravene the 1984 joint venture agreement (E.A. Kashita to Minister of Mines B. Fumbelo, “Alleged Ban of Exports of Uncut or Rough Precious or Semi-Precious Stones”, 11 December 1989). A series of conflicts also emerged between the minority shareholder ERB Overseas, represented by ZEIL’s Managing Director Eric Engel, and the Ministry of Mines. Officials expressed concerns over ZEIL’s failure to communicate and justify to the Ministry, its production volumes, training strategies, and security procedures. Indeed, the Minister of Mines, in correspondence with RMC Chairman Francis Kaunda, expressed his doubts about ZEIL’s feasibility and the reliability of the Brazilian minority shareholder (P.S. Chitambala to F. Kaunda “Emerald Cutting Industry”, 17 April 1987). The joint venture was ultimately short-lived, with ERB Overseas divesting from ZEIL in 1989, leaving the company K84 million in debt (“ZEIL Board Meeting” 14 June 1990).

Finally, ZCCM Small Mines Unit, at the behest of RMC, established a plant hire scheme for small-scale miners in November 1989. The intention of the scheme was to provide small-scale miners with access to the machinery and capital equipment necessary to bolster their emerald mining operations. EMAZ, however, complained that the K4000/hour cost and 25% deposit requirement made it prohibitive for many small-scale miners, and requested that plant hire be provided on credit. In response to EMAZ, ZCCM Small Mines Unit countered that the K4000/hour charge was the break-even price and that anything below that price would require heavy subsidisation. Furthermore, the financial outlay for credit provisioning would be too large, and the risk involved in emerald mining precludes the possibility for long repayment terms (Correspondence between EMAZ and J. Matale “Plant Hire Scheme”, 3 January - 4 February 1990). This dispute between EMAZ and the ZCCM Small Mines Unit underlined the ill-timing of these policy innovations. Arguably, these measures would likely have been more impactful if they were implemented outside the confines of an economic crisis, whereby increased funding (e.g. the provision of credit) could have been made available.

Four patterns emerge from the governance of the emerald mining sector in the 1980s. Firstly, as the 1979 Commission of Inquiry made clear, artisanal miners were responsible for most of the prospecting and were more productive than licensed mines until the early 1980s. Yet the state proceeded to criminalise them by creating the NRERA, assigning licenses for deposits they had discovered to RMC (which were subsequently transferred to KAGEM Mining), and prevented
them from selling their emeralds through sanctioned channels. The only way artisanal miners were permitted to legally participate in the emerald mining sector was either through participation in UNIP-aligned cooperatives, or as employees of licensed mines. These actions were undertaken to ensure access to foreign exchange for a government confronting persistent balance of payments deficits. In other words, rural empowerment was sacrificed at the altar of macroeconomic stability. Secondly, rhetoric about empowering District Councils and locally-based cooperatives to mine emeralds was not matched by reality. The government may have granted a flurry of questionable mining and prospecting licences in the NRERA to cooperatives and politically connected individuals, but the most lucrative emerald deposits were reserved for Kagem Mining. The preference for large-scale mining, through cooperation with a foreign investor, was considered the best means to improve production and secure requisite foreign exchange. Thirdly, we can deduce from the findings of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry (1979) that the failure of the Kaunda administration to effectively curb emerald smuggling was largely attributable to the involvement of UNIP politicians and civil servants in the practice. Politically powerful and connected individuals directly benefitted from a situation whereby emeralds left the country through informal (i.e. tax-evading) channels. Lastly, improvements to the emerald mining sector, which would have effectively advanced Kaunda’s objective of economic diversification, were left largely by the wayside until their implementation became a matter of necessity. Arguably, the most ambitious policy innovations in the emerald mining sector occurred during the confines of the NERP (1987-89). Yet, at the same time, the effectiveness of these policies was hampered by financial constraints caused by the debt crisis.

Section 4: Persistent Policy Deficiencies to the Present Day?

A key question that this paper sought to explore in light of Kaunda’s legacy is whether historical choices have had a lasting impact on the development of Zambia’s ASM emerald sector. The answer seems overwhelmingly in the affirmative, with evidence of persistent policy-related deficiencies to the present day, despite efforts to restructure the economy. Key parallels largely relate to, on the one hand, the persistence of Zambia’s dependence on large-scale copper mining and the sideling of ASM, and on the other hand, the faltering and sporadic support offered to ASM, often as part of rushed efforts to support economic diversification during times of economic crisis.
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Copper Dominance and Failed Diversification

As noted in Section 2, Kaunda inherited from the colonial administration an economy based solely on copper. From the outset, the Kaunda government had emphasised the need to break out of the country’s copper dependence. As was noted earlier, the first and second national development plans, as well as the Mulungushi and Matero Reforms, all expressed a determination to diversify the economy away from copper and towards minerals such as gemstones (Kaunda, 1968, 1969). The Outline of the Government’s Industrial Policy declared: “the basic principle of government policy is to support...the development and diversification of the economy” (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1966).

As was highlighted in the previous section on policy innovations, there were some important measures undertaken in the emerald sector specifically, ranging from creation of ZEIL to cut and polish rough emeralds, to providing ASM with purchase advances (to alleviate tight liquidity), and access to machinery through equipment hire schemes. However, the timing of these innovations tended to be during times of crisis when adequate financing to execute plans was limited. This ill-timing can be significantly linked to the performance of the copper sector. In times of copper booms, the need to diversify the economy waned and only revived when the state was desperate for additional revenues. Remarking on this trend at a macro level, Shafer (1994) writes “Having failed to restructure when it was flush, Zambia now faced the task stone broke” (p.86) – referring to the government’s desperate reform efforts during the late 1990s when copper prices had plummeted and the debt crisis was at its height. Ultimately, the restructuring efforts across the country failed resulting in the demise of President Kaunda and the ushering in of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under President Fredrick Chiluba.

The Chiluba government passionately embraced the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and, between 1997 and 2000, ZCCM was parcelled into smaller units that were sold to foreign investors. Liberalisation under the SAPs entailed offering several concessions to these incoming investors (Lungu and Fraser, 2007). The late 1990s thus won the approval of the IMF/World Bank and wider donor community and harked back to the country’s colonial experience of private sector-led, large-scale mining. Although donors have held on to the notion that large-scale mining is a “growth-pole” that will trigger development in other sectors of the economy, this was not the case in Zambia, nor has it yielded local benefits in other parts of SSA (Caramento, 2020). In Ghana, for instance, a rise in foreign investment indeed revitalised the otherwise ailing mining sector in the 1990s, but retrenchments from privatisations drove thousands into poverty, while large-scale mining
interests displaced ASM mining communities, yielding limited benefits for local communities (Hilson, 2004; Hilson, 2019; Yankson and Gough, 2019).

As was the case during the 1980s, a combination of policy pitfalls and innovations are observable across the 2000s. Similar to the 1980s, innovative ideas and attempts at economic restructuring were launched from a place of economic crisis. In the late 1990s, the Zambian government approached the European Union for a loan from their special facility SYSMIN. This was on the basis that Zambia’s export earnings had precipitously declined between 1993 and 1997 and that diversification into small-scale gemstone mining had potential to bolster the economy. In September 2000, the Mining Sector Diversification Programme (MSDP) was approved by the European Commission with funding amounting to €30 million in favour of the diversification agenda (Müller, Chitah and Simemba, 2008). As part of the MSDP, the European Investment Bank (EIB) established a credit scheme for ASM operators with loan financing of €16.5 million, responding to ASM’s critical need for capital. However, the scheme was doomed to fail due to the onerous conditions that failed to grasp the poverty-driven nature of the activity. ASM operators who are mostly poor and not highly educated were required to present bankable documents with technical studies if they were to access funding. Interest rates for the loans were also high and needed to be repaid in Euros. In the end, ASM operators were unable to access the funding, with only a few medium-scale mine owners accessing the funds (Siwale and Siwale, 2017). Using the case of Zambia’s emerald sector, the paper analyzes the initial wave of ASM formalisation that took place in the country in the 1980s, and finds that contrary to harnessing benefits for operators, formalisation was used as a tool by the state to gain control of the sector and to displace operators to areas with low economic viability. The paper further finds that currently, a lack of state support and a policy framework skewed in favour of large-scale copper mining has worsened the outcomes of ASM operators in Zambia’s emerald sector. As formalisation is such an ambitious undertaking, the process requires not only strong political will but also robust implementing institutions, a point that is particularly crucial in sub-Saharan Africa, where the agencies spearheading formalisation efforts are often weak and limited in capacity. The World Bank, through its Support to Economic Expansion and Diversification (SEED) Project, similarly provided support to the sector, including infrastructure support and assistance in developing an online cadastre system for Zambia (Siwale and Siwale, 2017). However, once the copper prices rebounded, interest in economic diversification once again waned.
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In the late 2000s, the Ministry of Mines and the Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission (CEEC) once again attempted to offer support to ASM on the heels of a global recession. Loans of USD $5,000 or less were offered to miners by both bodies, but these loans were not enough to stimulate production and seemed to have been offered to simply satisfy political demands, rather than provide strategic support (Siwale and Siwale, 2017). Yet despite these varied initiatives implemented throughout the Third Republic, artisanal and small-scale emerald miners languished. A recent site visit to small-scale emerald mines in Lufwanyama District by a Parliamentary Committee tasked with examining the possibilities for mining diversification found that many of the challenges confronted by ASM operators in the 1980s continue to persist: ASM operators continue to lack access to adequate finance, capital equipment, and reliable geological data (Committee on National Economy, Trade and Labour Matters, 2022: 30-1). Conversely, KAGEM, which is now jointly owned by the UK-based multinational, Gemfields (75% ownership) and ZCCM-Investment Holdings (25%), currently boasts being the world’s largest single producer of emeralds (https://www.gemfieldsgroup.com/assets/kagem-mining-limited-emerald-mines/).

Currently, Zambia is still struggling to recover from a deep recession. In 2021, real GDP contracted by 4.9% following the adverse impacts of COVID-19, but even before the pandemic, the economy faced significant challenges from “high inflation, widening fiscal deficits, unsustainable debt levels, low international reserves, to tight liquidity conditions” (https://www.afdb.org/en/countries-southern-africa-zambia/zambia-economic-outlook). It is therefore, no surprise that the Seventh National Development Plan (2017-21), prioritised diversification once again, with “a diversified and export oriented mining sector” identified as one of its principal targets, with “emphasis [being]... placed on enhancing the capacities of small-scale miners to increase production” (Ministry of National Development Planning, 2017: 64). The 2022 Budget speech similarly pronounced “the government will promote diversification and value addition, not only to copper, but also to gemstones, manganese and other high value minerals like gold” (Musokotwane, 2021: 16). However, despite these pronouncements and attempts at restructuring, there is a clear pattern of significant copper dependence in the last decade, and accompanying vulnerability to the fluctuations of copper prices on the international markets (see Figures 3 and 4).
Figure 3: Contribution of Mining Sector Exports to Overall Exports, 2011 - 2020 (%)

Source: Committee on National Economy, Trade and Labour Matters, 2022: 11

Figure 4: Contribution of Copper and Non-Copper Mining Sub-Sectors to Overall Mining Exports, 2011 – 2020 (%)

Source: Committee on National Economy, Trade and Labour Matters, 2022: 11

Large-Scale Mining Bias and the Perils of Formalisation

Trends in the Zambian economy thus seem to support the existence of a “large-scale mining (LSM) bias” in which governments in sub-Saharan Africa offer disproportionate support to, and gear mining policy towards, LSM as the preferred avenue to achieving broad-based growth (Hilson, 2019). Michael Shafer (1994) further argues that countries with highly capital-intensive leading sectors, in which state capacity has been honed to taxing large-scale industries,
find it difficult to break out of such dependency. Zambia has, for instance, failed to develop general purpose mechanisms for taxing dispersed ASM operators, hence large-scale mining became that which is easiest to tax and rely upon for revenues (Hilson, 2020).

As noted in the preceding section, a key concern of the Kaunda government with regards to emerald mining in the 1970s and early ’80s was containing the rise of illegal mining activities in Ndola Rural. A frequent refrain in newspaper articles from the ’80s was that Zambia was losing millions of dollars to the illegal mining and smuggling of emeralds. However, most artisanal miners were classified as “illegal” and thus, policies towards them became punitive. To curb illegal mining the NRERA was created to keep illegal miners out, while the government partnered with a foreign investor to establish an LSM operation. Yet the challenges with illegal mining and smuggling continued for some time, as government repeatedly ignored recommendations to facilitate the regulated access of artisanal miners into the NRERA (as recommended by the 1979 Commission of Inquiry); purchase “illegally” mined emeralds beyond the initial amnesty (as recommended by the RMC Board of Directors); or dismantle the RMC’s monopoly over emerald marketing (as recommended by small-scale mining associations).

Although illegal mining has declined over the last two decades, largely due to the depletion of alluvial emeralds that were easily accessible with picks and shovels, challenges remain with regards to state capacity to effectively monitor and support “legal” ASM. The institutional weaknesses of the Regional Mining Bureaus (RMBs) offer an illustrative example. RMBs are designed to serve as extension offices for the Ministry of Mines, providing technical support to artisanal and small-scale miners, as well as monitoring and evaluating their operations. A recent study of ASM in Zambia (Oxfam and ZEITI, 2019: 23-4) found that these RMBs were underfunded and possessed limited technical capacities. Moreover, the Office of the Auditor General (2019: 46-7) determined that the RMBs were severely understaffed, with only 24 of 60 positions filled.

The operational prospects of small-scale emerald miners were also undermined by the problematic formalisation of the NRERA undertaken in the 1980s. The UNIP Central Committee and the RMC’s Board of Directors ensured that geologically surveyed deposits with the most potential were assigned to KAGEM, while ASM operators were awarded unverified mining plots with limited potential. Moreover, the subdivision of these unverified plots, to placate numerous demands for political patronage, made them unviable (Siwale and Siwale, 2017: 196). In 2013, an inter-ministerial taskforce was organised by the
Ministry of Mines to investigate the viability of the 408 small-scale gemstone plots located in the NRERA. This taskforce found that less than 30 of the 408 demarcated small-scale emerald mining plots were actually viable and recommended that they should be amalgamated into ten sizeable plots in order to attract investment for larger-scale operations (Chadukwa, 2018: 47-8). While the taskforce’s recommendations have yet to be implemented, the implications of its findings were clear: formalisation of the NRERA in the 1980s was an effort to assert state control over the emerald mining sector and disempower ASM operators, both legal and illegal. Moreover, instead of assisting the minority of legal ASM operators that were in possession of viable small-scale gemstone licences, the Zambian government’s preferred option was to amalgamate the plots to attract large-scale (presumably foreign) mining investors!

Conclusion

It is evident from the preceding analysis that the Kaunda government’s stated intention, as captured in the Matero and Mulungushi Reforms as well as various National Development Plans, was to facilitate rural development through support to economic diversification that embraced ASM. However, Kaunda’s government prioritised large-scale foreign investment that was more easily monitored and taxed, instead of ASM which was seen as largely illegal and difficult to regulate. In the emerald sector, this was evident in the manner in which the government centralised control over the Kafubu emerald area and awarded the best deposits to a joint venture between the state and a foreign investor, while ASM operators were assigned marginal deposits with limited economic potential.

The decisions of the Kaunda government carries over to present day dynamics in the sector, as copper continues to be the mainstay of the economy, as an avenue for achieving diversification and securing higher revenues, while ASM only gets onto the agenda during times of economic distress. While there have been some attempts to support the ASM sector, this has typically involved ill-timed or ill-designed initiatives that have not yielded much needed support. If the sector is to experience genuine transformation, it is critical that focused attention be given to the sector and necessary resources be assigned to the development of ASM. Without focused state and donor support that allows access to finance, capital equipment, and geological services, the government will continue to pronounce that it supports ASM for diversification but achieve little in actuality.
Endnotes

1 "While it is easy to round up these foreigners and deport them, experience has shown that it is not easy to ensure that they do not re-enter the country" (“RMC Managing Director’s Report’ 7 September 1981).

2 Under Sl no. 194 of 1977, the list of authorities who could issue permits for access to the NREA included: the Permanent Secretary for the Copperbelt Province; the District Secretaries of Kalulushi, Kitwe, Luanshya and Ndola Rural (Lufwanyama); and the Mine Managers of licensed companies operating in the area (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1979: 38).

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Archival Material


Correspondence between KAGEM General Manager and Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Copperbelt Province. 31 July 1987 – 9 September 1987. ZCCM Archives. File: 7/12/3B.


‘KAGEM Board Meeting.’ 25 March 1986. ZCCM Archives. File: 1/6/2B.

‘KAGEM Board Meeting.’ 7 December 1987. ZCCM Archives. File: 7/12/2F.


P.S. Chitambala to F. Kaunda, ‘Emerald Cutting Industry.’ ZCCM Archives. File: 7.2.2F.

‘Record of Meeting held between Chairman and Hagara Directors.’ 21 November 1986. ZCCM Archives. File: 1/6/2B.


‘ZELL Board Meeting.’ 14 June 1990. ZCCM Archives. File: 7/2/2G.

**Key Informant Interviews**

Mr. Musonda, conducted on 13 June 2016, in Chingola.
Mr. Ngwira, conducted on 24 October 2018, in Kalulushi.
Zambia’s Missing Narrative of Structural Adjustment

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In 1991, Zambia launched one of the most orthodox structural adjustments programs (SAPs) in Africa. The last and longest chapter of its fitful history with the IMF and World Bank, Zambia’s SAP commenced during the euphoria following the ouster of long-time President Kenneth Kaunda, when it was presented as the only strategy for dealing with the country’s economic collapse. What followed was one of Africa’s most striking experiments with rapid liberalisation, leading to budgetary stabilisation and increased investment but also sudden unemployment and impoverishment. If in retrospect liberalisation seems inescapable, given the ballooning debt of Kaunda’s last years, Zambians at the time envisioned alternative futures. The years leading up to the 1991 election saw vibrant debate among activists about how to fix the country’s failing economy, with reform plans ranging from marketisation to redistribution. After 1991, however, the newly elected Movement for Multiparty Democracy shelved these proposals in favour of a SAP championed by international donors. As a result, many economic ideas advanced at the time have been forgotten, and structural adjustment has come to seem inevitable. As part of a wider book project on ahistoricism in international development, my paper tries to recover Zambia’s “missing narrative” of economic reform by surveying local debates on political and economic change in the 1980s and 1990s. Examining how SA won out over alternatives has implications for our understanding of the politics of economic reform in the decades of neoliberal ascendency.

In 1997, Joseph Stepneck, USAID’s former Mission Director in Zambia, lamented that even the Agency for International Development, “which talks about ownership, sustainability, and collegiality, often pushes projects ... without ever asking a government official.” He recalled with particular clarity receiving a health program proposal that paralleled a Zambian reform initiative already underway.

I went to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and said: “We’re working with you on this health reform program.
Zambia’s Missing Narrative of Structural Adjustment

We have this tangential effort. I am very interested in knowing what you think of it and whether we should change or modify it. What do you think?” The conversation came to an end, and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health just sat there, stony-faced. I thought to myself: “Oh, boy, I really misspoke this time.” The Permanent Secretary then said: “Joe, you have to give me a minute to collect my thoughts. Nobody’s ever asked me before for my views.”(Stepanek, 1998: 61)

Stepanek served in Zambia from 1994 to 1996, during the lead up to the country’s first presidential election since independence icon Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s president for its first twenty-seven years, lost power. Although the Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s 1991 victory at the polls prompted widespread euphoria, the subsequent five years shattered many hopes that Zambia’s new leader, Frederick Chiluba, might finally lift the country’s economic fortunes. In Stepanek’s tenure, reports of official corruption accelerated, and Chiluba’s 1996 constitutional amendment barring candidates with non-Zambian parentage from running in presidential elections – a swipe at Kaunda, his main opponent, whose parents came from neighboring Malawi (then Nyasaland) – was deemed so offensive that international donors withheld foreign aid, often at the invitation of Chiluba’s critics (Mwondela, 1996: 4).

Kaunda’s resurgence is somewhat surprising given how roundly he was defeated in 1991. Yet already by the mid-1990s it was clear to many Zambians that the MMD’s empowerment had not improved their desperate economic straits. Judging from press reports, the Chiluba honeymoon lasted about a year and a half – from the October 1991 electoral sweep of Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) until mid-1993, when the increasing pain wrought by economic liberalisation and famine started dampening earlier expectations.1 While these experiences were shared across the continent, they were particularly stark in Zambia given the exuberant hopes of the 1991 transition, the vigour of the subsequent structural adjustment, and the memory of Zambia’s earlier economic promise.

At Independence in 1964, Zambia was one of sub-Saharan Africa’s wealthiest and most urbanised countries due primarily to its copper mines, which accounted for two-thirds of the gross domestic product (GDP) and over 90% of government revenue and export earnings. (For these figures, see Larmer, 2005: 32; Obidegwu and Nziramasanga, 1981: 14). On the eve of Independence, Zambia produced almost 14% of the world’s copper output. Yet the collapse of copper prices in the
mid-1970s inaugurated the country’s slide from one of the continent’s richest economies to one of its poorest. The fall was precipitous. By the mid-1980s, Zambia’s share of world copper output had dropped to under 7%, slipping in absolute and relative terms even as imported fuel and machinery costs spiked. (Calculated from chart in Mikesell, 1988: 19-20). By the late twentieth century, Zambia had the unhappy distinction of being the only country whose standing in the Human Development Index had fallen since 1975, with per capita GNP sinking by one-third in twenty years. (Hill and McPherson, eds. 2004: notes 2 and 3. For the GNP figure, see Gulhati, 1989: 3.)

In the face of this slump, Kaunda ultimately had to bow before Western creditors. Zambia took its first IMF Stand-by loan in 1973, assuming it would be a temporary stopgap. An additional loan in 1976 failed to stem the economic slide, and in 1978, Zambia signed another stand-by agreement that is sometimes seen as its first stabilisation loan. Until then, loans had borne minimal conditionalities. The 1978 loan, however, increased the influence of the international financial institutions (IFIs), requiring considerable fiscal restraint on the part of the government. For a list of the loans, see Fundanga, 1989: 143. For more detailed accounts of Zambia’s interactions with the IMF, see Ndulo and Sakala, 1987. Alas, these measures did little. By 1983, with the second oil crisis driving import prices higher, creditors stopped lending to the country, forcing Kaunda to agree to his first structural adjustment program (SAP) - a ten-year rescheduling of Zambia’s 1.3 billion kwacha debt (around one-third of its GDP) in exchange for a pledge to embrace austerity (Sandberg, 1990: 256. For the GDP figures, see https://tradingeconomics.com/zambia/gdp). In 1985, the government introduced a foreign exchange auction, allowing the exchange rate to float according to “demand and supply” at weekly biddings (Ndulo and Sakala, 1987: 31). Predictably, the artificially inflated kwacha tumbled in value, from K2 = $1 to K21 = $1, theoretically reducing the current account deficit by boosting exports and discouraging imports, but also driving up prices on needed imports and bringing “havoc and ruin to a large number of enterprises” (Fundanga, 1989: 144). After urban food riots in 1986 and internal calls for relief, Kaunda pulled out of the SAP in May 1987 and launched the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP), which promised “growth from own resources” (to cite its slogan) and capped debt repayments at 10% of GDP per annum. In response, multilateral and bilateral donors cut programme aid to the country (though it kept some projects running). Despite initial growth due to increased copper prices and a good maize harvest, shortages mounted in the following year. By early 1989, as the ranks of new poor continued to increase, Kaunda returned to the IMF to negotiate a new loan. His efforts, however, were too late: not only
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had donors lost trust in his leadership by the late 1980s, but so had much of the citizenry.

The years leading up to 1991 brought extraordinary change to Zambia – a time when, according to the democracy activist Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, it seemed possible to rekindle hopes lost after Independence, to launch a “re-decolonisation” of the country (Mbikusita-Lewanika, 2017). Most accounts of the transition, however, rely on relatively top-down and abstract economic discussions that marginalise the intellectual and civil society ferment occurring in this short span of years. There is, of course, voluminous writing on structural adjustment, and Zambia has received attention. But much of the work remains ahistorical – as Nicolas van de Walle puts it, “atemporal” (Van de Walle, 2001: 13) – overlooking the wide-ranging civil society debates in favor of econocentric analyses that present structural adjustment as basically inevitable. Lost are the possible futures that Zambians themselves imagined at the time. This paper is an initial effort at recovery.

The Transition

There were several constituencies that made up the small but increasingly oppositional civil society in Zambia. The most obvious was the trade unions, organised through the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (or ZCTU), with Copperbelt mineworkers at the heart (Bates, 1971; Larmer, 2007; Larmer, 2016/2011). Although Kaunda established a one-party state in 1972, he did not concentrate as much power in his hands as other African leaders, seeking instead to balance among competing interest groups and political factions. Economically, he was forced to keep food costs low for urban workers through subsidies and price ceilings, even at the expense of a dwindling budget. Fatefully, as Zambia embraced IMF prescriptions in the mid-1980s, Kaunda lost the support of the mineworkers. Frederick Chiluba, head of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), condemned structural adjustment and became one of Kaunda’s most prominent critics. Miles Larmer describes a famous incident in his rise:

In 1986 Chiluba condemned the IMF for putting African governments on a collision course with their peoples and warned against the proposed removal of food subsidies. Nevertheless, in December 1986 the removal of subsidies led to a doubling of the price of mealie meal, sparking widespread looting and rioting in
the Copperbelt mining towns. In the wake of the riots, Chiluba claimed further concessions to the IMF would make the rich richer and poor poorer. Zambia, he declared, was the only “socialist” state implementing monetarist policies. The rioting, in which 15 people were killed, led to the immediate restoration of food subsidies, and played a significant part in the government’s decision to break off cooperation with the IMF in May 1987 (Larmer, 2010: 47).

Although Chiluba cheered the NERP, the 1986 riots had demonstrated UNIP’s vulnerability to popular protest (Bartlett, 2000: 435).

Churches also participated in the opposition. With over 80% of Zambians claiming church membership, Catholic and Protestant officials (operating through the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ) and the United Church of Zambia (UCZ)) exerted considerable influence, with the former particularly critical of the regime (Bartlett, 2000: 435-36). Individual church leaders joined opposition events in the 1980s and attended the July 1990 Garden House meeting that founded the MMD. Poverty and economic hardship drew particular concern. Cardinal Joseph Mazombwe, for example, advocated debt cancellation during the 1980s, and in 1987, the Justice and Peace Commission, organized by the country’s three main Christian groups, issued a report deploiring inequality and immiseration (Larmer, 2016/2011: 245). Church officials also served as brokers among competing political parties. In mid-1991, after a student-organized convention that brought together the country’s political party leaders, leaders of several denominations arranged a meeting between Kaunda and Chiluba at the Anglican Cathedral of the Holy Cross, helping to reduce political tensions over a proposed multiparty constitution (Bartlett, 2000: 432, 439-40; Mwanakatwe, 1994: 218-23).

Businessmen, too – many trained under UNIP’s educational and parastatal programmes – chafed at the preferences given to state enterprises and price controls, forming what Bates and Collier called a “dissident political faction. Some entered Parliament, and there criticized government policies. Others backed members of the Central Committee who were favourable to business interests. Still others backed the makers of coups” (Bates and Collier, 1993: 119). The business community overlapped with another contingent of Kaunda opponents: former UNIP officials who had fallen out with the regime. Since Kaunda tacked between factions in his coalition, UNIP frequently combined officials who supported and rejected current policy. Committed planners and socialists within Kaunda’s UNIP, such as Leonard Chivuno, resisted structural adjustment and market reforms. Others, such as Humphrey Mulemba, were
more favorable to the free market, rejecting his Humanism but advocating liberal reforms. This jockeying eventually generated an enduring opposition. Arthur Wina, a market advocate, Parliamentarian, and independence-era Minister of Finance and Education, became a founding MMD member in the late 1980s; John Mwanakatwe, also a former finance minister, regularly criticized the government. Former foreign minister Vernon Mwaanga also played a prominent role in the early MMD, leading electoral campaigns and later joining Chiluba’s government. Indeed, “no fewer than 20 MMD candidates in the 1991 elections were former or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 had been cabinet ministers or central committee members. Another six had been UNIP regional secretaries or district governors and four were former army officers” (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992: 83-4). Clearly it no longer ‘paid to belong to UNIP’, as a party slogan once claimed.

In the late 1980s, another small but active set of Lusaka-based organisations entered the political fray, linking Zambia’s intellectual and business elite with the halls of power. It is here that I want to focus my discussion in this essay. The Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ), the Zambia Research Foundation (ZRF), the Zambia Branch of the African Political Science Association, and other intellectual societies helped to generate core ideas and organise critical meetings that fed into the multiparty platform. The EAZ was the hub of this network, partly because it enjoyed funding from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung starting in 1985, which transformed it from a dormant talking club into a vibrant intellectual society that drew 30-50 participants to twice-monthly concourse at Lusaka’s Pamodzi Hotel (Respondent H). Under the presidency of Mbikusita-Lewanika, a US-trained political scientist and economist who had spent his early career managing parastatal companies, the association brought together academics, businessmen, and disgruntled members of Kaunda’s UNIP party.

The EAZ gathered diverse economic viewpoints ranging from staunch liberalism to various forms of planning. Mbikusita-Lewanika argued for state planning of a liberalised economy to serve a nationalist purpose. Upset by termination of the NERP in 1989, he contended that Zambia had never succeeded in decolonizing its economy. As a result, it suffered from two collateral distortions. First, it was grossly imbalanced, with a small and lucrative mining enclave sitting atop a vast population of peasant farmers whose main function was to provide cheap food and labour for the extraction industry. Second, the economy remained disarticulated: its modern enclave did not provide market and production opportunities – backward and forward linkages, to use the Albert O. Hirschman’s terminology – for other sectors. The country, in other words, had never escaped the classic structure of a colonial economy, in
which some areas served as food or labour reserves for others. The “mission of the times,” declared ‘Aka’, must be “to deliver the long-deferred promise of independence: democracy and development to the legions of disenfranchised urbanites in shanties and the de facto-expropriated rural poor in scattered and dilapidating villages.” Kaunda’s structural adjustment program would not do so. Instead, its “trickle-down theory” would perpetuate “economic dependence and underdevelopment.” While Mbikusita-Lewanika, like most Zambian opposition figures, endorsed liberalisation as a necessary corrective to years of government control, he rejected pure laissez-faire and called instead for “an independent nationalistic and country-specific programme based on self-reliance,” (Mbikusita-Lewanika, 1990: 53, 86, 134-35, 142), one that required an activist government and economic planning in order to promote growth and resist outside control. A plan is “a nation’s dreams,” he remarked in a 2019 interview, and without one, ministries become subservient to donor programmes, turning national aspirations into mere “compliance issues.”

Other EAZ members disagreed. There were strong proponents of structural adjustment in the association. According to one interview respondent, attitudes toward the Bretton Woods organisations often depended on one’s specialization. Those trained in macroeconomics (balance of payments, currency, privatisation) generally supported structural adjustment and deplored UNIP’s partial and uncommitted implementation. Situmbeko Musokotwane, for example, currently in his second stint as Zambia’s finance minister, argued in 1988 that the introduction of user fees in health posts was necessary to reduce service consumption, part of a wider need to confront Zambia’s yawning macroeconomic imbalances through austerity and demand management. The reliance on expensive imports was a particular driver of debt.\(^2\) Sectoral economists and specialists in areas like agriculture or health, by contrast, tended to doubt structural adjustment, citing concerns over poverty, equity, service provision, and development financing. (Respondent F). Take the example of Katele Kalumba, a health researcher at the Institute for African Studies and later a minister of Health and Finance under the MMD. In a 1989 article co-written with the American anthropologist Paul Freund, Kalumba called for a new kind of health planning to promote equity. While he condemned the longstanding urban bias of Zambian policy, he also disputed the World Bank’s attack on government regulation and planning: “Planning is needed,” he and Freund wrote:

\[\text{precisely because structural deficiencies in setting priorities exist, and because the constituent political forces registered within the}\]

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state policy planning system do not agree about the structures of authorisation and allocation. ... The range of planning discourses, the themes they address and the strategies they propose are there because consensus on the substantive issues is non-existent. What we want to stress is that 'bad planning' - like the 'bad organization' implicit in models of centralisation and decentralisation that are often prescribed for 'effective administration' in implementation literature - is a superficial diagnosis. The polarity between ... centralisation and decentralisation - in which one masquerades as oppression and the other as freedom - is a myth.

While Kalumba did not oppose market mechanisms or the reduction of free medical services, he felt that these changes should be combined with a “pragmatic” and “dialectical” planning whose “ultimate social function should remain that of redistribution” (Kalumba and Freund, 1989: 225-27). Over the next decade, unsurprisingly, he became a critic of structural adjustment (See for example Kalumba, 2001: 1, 3).

Another prominent voice was that of the University of Zambia economist Gilbert Mudenda, who published regular Weekly Post columns in the years straddling the 1991 election. An advocate for privatisation as an economic accelerant, Mudenda nonetheless worried about “ideological intrusion from IMF and the World Bank, which glorified privatisation as the universal panacea for all economic ills in all societies including Zambia” (Mudenda, July -August, 1991: 5). While Mudenda decried the inefficiency of parastatals and warned against using foreign intervention as a bugbear for staving off economic reform, he affirmed the political motive that led to nationalisation in the 1970s – namely, the desire to end the “predominance of foreign ownership.” This remained an essential item in 1991. After all, most Zambians did not have the money to purchase privatised assets, leaving the field open to foreign investors (Mudenda. August, 1991: 5; Mudenda, November, 1991.). Indeed, through subsidiaries and minority shareholding, foreign firms had been able to disguise ongoing influence throughout the Kaunda years (Mudenda, December, 1991: 5). Parastatals were, in effect, state capitalist institutions, lacking public accountability and unable to cultivate the individual initiative needed to boost industry; they were often denied control over personnel. Markets provided a necessary check on the bloated and chaotic exercise of public power. Yet Mudenda feared a “violent swing from left to right” under the MMD. “We should not apologise,” he insisted, “for the fact that the state plays a role in any economy” by creating an “environment which encourages personal enterprise and minimises individual
excesses associated with the egoistical of [sic] profit” (Mudenda, 1992: 9). While the Zambian budget should encourage production, Mudenda wrote in 1992, it should also promote employment, income, welfare, and depauperization – all goals that structural adjustment regularly undermined (Mudenda, November 1992: 7).

As these summaries attest, there were numerous areas of concurrence among EAZ members. All agreed that the Kaunda economy was in crisis, and they shared the view that some form of privatisation and liberalisation was necessary to combat an overblown public sector. In a decade when many feared the impending exhaustion of Zambia’s mines, there was also widespread discussion of how to diversify the copper economy (Clark, 1989: 8). Furthermore, there was a general consensus among reform-minded EAZ members that subsidies – on food, fertilizer, and other goods – would have to shrink since they constituted an unsustainable budgetary burden. And everyone understood that the artificially elevated exchange rates would have to be abandoned to boost exports and reduce the black market. But these agreements masked considerable diversity about how to structure the post-Kaunda Zambian economy. It is probably true that the broad alignment among intelligentsia on certain key principles helped to ease the way for rapid liberalisation after 1991 by hiding important differences in overall economic vision. But the MMD consensus was always partial and superficial, defined more by what it opposed than what it was for, which helps to explain why it frayed in the years following victory (van de Walle and Chiwele, 1994: 43).

New ideas circulated in other organisations as well. The Zambia Research Foundation (ZRF), under the chairmanship of economist and political scientist Derrick (Mbita) Chitala, and the Zambian chapter of the African Political Science Association provided discussion forums for political change. The Institute for African Studies (IAS), especially after 1988 when it came under the directorship of economist Oliver Saasa, moderated discussions and held conferences. In 1991, at the instigation of UNZA students, Saasa moderated the student-organized talks at Lusaka’s Mulungushi House that brought together UNIP, the MMD, and other civil society organizations. The IAS also housed Dieter Orlowski, a representative of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, which funded and promoted the EAZ, ZRF, and other civil society organisations focused on public policy. The press as well publicised new political and economic proposals – particularly *The Weekly Post* newspaper, founded in 1991 by Fred M’embe; it became the key outlet for opposition voices. Within these organisations, one found various viewpoints, some backing structural adjustment as a necessary tonic, others condemning
it for initiating “economic growth without development” (Respondent C). New economic initiatives found a sympathetic ear in more official institutions as well, including the Bank of Zambia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, they gained traction within UNIP itself, with regime officials not only allowing but tapping into these discussions as a source of new ideas. As one interviewee remarked, officials sometimes attended economic discussion fora or solicited advice from their members. Particularly under the NERP, Kaunda sought innovative economic programmes, bringing together prominent academics and businesspersons who were part of the EAZ, and at times appointing officials who would later join the MMD. Thus, one should not paint too stark a divide between regime and opposition around economic experimentation: As one participant recalled, “on the political side, Kaunda was rigid; [but] on the economic side, he was flexible” (Respondent H).

As this review suggests, the late 1980s saw two intellectual shifts among the activist intelligentsia. Through the middle of the decade, some of those who later advocated staunch liberalisation professed socialist viewpoints, publishing tracts in Zambian and foreign journals promoting anti-capitalist and Afro-Marxist perspectives. Mbita Chitala, for example, worked with the South African Marxist Joe Slovo and edited the Journal of African Marxists. Donald Chanda, a future Economic Advisor and overseer of structural adjustment, published socialist analyses through the Harare-based think tank Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust. Chiluba himself, the trade union leader-turned-president, publicly supported socialist positions. In many ways, theirs was a pragmatic socialism, a product of the anti-Western sentiments common in the independence era. Nonetheless, their shift to market advocacy in the late 1980s was striking. After a devastating economic decade, Kaunda’s inability to control the collapse – whether due to misrule or to international forces beyond his control – tarnished the wider socialist project with which he was associated, and private market activity seemed a way to wrest public power from UNIP, win international support, and try something new.

This set up the second intellectual shift: the turn from economics to politics. If intellectual opposition to Kaunda was stirred initially by the country’s economic collapse, the target that finally mobilised political action was the rejection of UNIP’s governing monopoly. Although a recent addition to the activist portfolio, multipartyism became the rallying cry. In fact, multipartyism did not come up until 1990 (Respondent B). The desire for economic reform long antedated the demand for change at the top, and one should not assume that the call for economic change in the late 1980s necessarily implied multipartyism – for many
activists, it did not – any more than one should suppose that electoral democracy necessitated neoliberal adjustment. Or perhaps better put, insofar as political liberalism required economic liberalism, this owed more to the global neoliberal conjuncture than it did to any necessary coupling of the two. Too often today, the twin transitions are presumed to be an inevitable pair. Yet even in retrospect this was not necessarily so. Thus, one can read in MMD Finance Minister and former UNIP member Peter Magande’s recent autobiography the line: “I hold a strong belief that, if President Kaunda allowed open debate on the state of the nation and presented a reform programme and leadership succession plan to his rule at the Fifth Convention of UNIP in March 1990, Zambia would have taken a different and perhaps a more progressive path towards the twenty-first century” (Magande, 2018: 189).

But in the end, he did not, and as the 1990s opened, Kaunda’s restrictions on political debate increasingly frustrated activists. And where the EAZ felt constrained to speak, other organisations, sometimes with overlapping membership, entered the breach. Chitala recalls proposing discussions of democratic pluralism to the EAZ but detecting “elements of fear in the majority of the members who did not want the Association to be politicised” as well as worry about “arrest and detention” (Chitala, 2002: 26-29). His own organisation, the ZRF, was already set up to discuss governance and it agreed to organise a conference on multipartyism. Thus, at considerable risk and expense, activists convened a fateful two-day meeting on 20-21 July 1990 at the Garden House Hotel in Lusaka, where the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was born.11

The papers delivered at the Garden House, compiled and published by the ZRF, testify to the power of a timely conviction. Arthur Wina’s opening declared the one-party state a “colonial legacy” and tallied its failures, the greatest of which was the political stunting of the Zambian people. In place of UNIP, he proposed a bounded multiparty system, ideally with no more than three parties. For Vernon Mwaanga, the one-time UNIP minister, the greater problem was not party monopoly but “the over-concentration of power in the hands of one man.” Likewise, the lawyer and future Foreign Affairs Minister Remy Mushota dismissed Humanism as a colonial residue of British utilitarianism, which justified unitary sovereign rule in the name of the “common good.” As Donald Chanda put it later in the day: “This country has been a victim of several imported ideologies, ideas and policies which failed and are failing us. The answers lie in ourselves... not externally.” Aka too offered a message of democracy and self-reliance, linking condemnation of Kaunda with criticism of the recently reintroduced structural adjustment: “[W]hile structural adjustment is necessary, it is not sufficient.
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Structural Adjustment Programmes are concerned essentially and primarily with monetarist adjustment – not transformation.” Instead, democracy required true national self-determination, not “[e]conomic liberalisation under a One Party State.” It is worth underscoring how paramount economic concerns were to this multiparty agenda. “We see a situation,” remarked Frederick Chiluba, “where political stability has been over-emphasised on [sic] the neglect of economic development. And indeed, as one scholar has observed: “It is true that for a quarter century, in political lexicon, Zambians have enjoyed peace and stability, but for sure our stomachs have not known peace at all.” Or as Aka quipped: “Zambia is ... a very democratic country – in terms of the breadth of participation in poverty and other socio-economic ailments.” It was perhaps Chiluba, a year away from the presidency, who clinched the point: “The precise problem as I see it is that Humanism fails to distinguish between the rich and the poor. It assumes that the dignity of man derives from mere existence whether that man lives in squalor or high society does not matter. But we know that human dignity derives from ensuring the basic entitlements to man; man must have equal opportunities and access to good shelter, food, education, health and gainful employment.” UNIP, despite its promises, supplied none of these (Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala, eds., 1990/91: 12, 17, 45-7, 49, 55-8, 64, 76, 97, 98).

Meanwhile, political turmoil continued. The new adjustment measures aggravated Kaunda’s difficulties, requiring “a freeze on capital projects and an increase in consumer prices on maize meal of up to 275%” (Baylies and Szefel, 1992: 81. Cf. Magande, 2018: 193 on inflation and GDP decline in 1990-1991). Inflation and shortages provoked food riots and, weeks before the Garden House conference, a coup attempt led by Army Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe. Donors were ill-inclined to sympathy: they rejected Kaunda’s effort to lighten the austerity measures in the lead-up to elections. The MMD’s summer call for multiparty elections sparked the popular imagination, leading Kaunda to concede a referendum on the issue (which he ultimately cancelled) and then a constitutional amendment to allow for multiple parties by year’s end. Weeks after the December amendment, in January 1991, the MMD registered as a political party and launched its campaign. In October 1991, it swept Kaunda from power. By this point, University of Leeds political scientist David Bartlett reminds us, business elites committed to staunch liberalisation had already outmaneuvered more progressive and egalitarian forces represented by churchmen and intellectuals to take control of MMD policy planning. Chiluba’s sudden conversion to structural adjustment advocacy drew them behind his leadership, forging an unlikely business-trade union pairing that directed the
MMD’s future course. In this regard, the election of 1991 reflected primarily an elite transfer, despite the active energies and popular support of large segments of Zambia’s population. Indeed, the debates we canvassed here were overwhelmingly intra-elite.

**Structural Adjustment under the MMD**

The MMD electoral victory in 1991 ushered in a period of domestic euphoria that the new government used to introduce dramatic reform, including renewed structural adjustment in such an orthodox vein that it would likely have sparked riots under UNIP. In the first year, the package involved devaluing the kwacha, freeing the exchange rate, deregulating prices, launching free trade, removing food subsidies, introducing service user fees, and initiating the privatisation of parastatals. As one veteran of that administration remarked in 2019, “We implemented structural adjustment probably to the book” (Respondent 1). The result was severe – somersaulting inflation, slashed public services, and ballooning unemployment – but also hopeful – the rapid appearance of goods in stores and the launch of infrastructure projects. By 1993-94, as privatisation and job losses accelerated, the government imposed fiscal controls – including a cash budget requiring all expenses to be covered by existing resources – that gradually restrained inflation. (For a detailed list of the reforms through 1995, see McPherson, 1995: 41-46). This was, in sum, a rapid and thoroughgoing adjustment, and the population bore it. While the years from 1995 onward saw burgeoning corruption and the erosion of SAP implementation integrity, the first few years of adjustment did indeed make Zambia into an IMF model.

How is it that Zambia came to embrace one of the most orthodox SAPs on the continent? Given the various postures espoused by activists during Kaunda’s final years, why did this one prevail? There are a number of reasons. International circumstances contributed to the choice. The collapse of East European communism (widely cited by Zambian activists) coupled with the dominant Washington Consensus on market-led development seemed to confirm the fact that liberalisation was the only game in town. This message was reinforced by the success of the export-driven economies of East Asia and the concomitant failure of African socialist projects, especially in neighboring Tanzania, where Julius Nyerere was Kaunda’s model and mentor. Of particular importance in these years was the tight coupling of democracy and marketisation – political and economic liberalisation – which made the latter seem an inevitable partner of the former. Indeed, international debates generally revolved around which came first – democracy or marketisation – not whether they had to be joined.
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Another factor was the influence of the aid community. International aid increased steadily after the 1960s, growing from 1.8% of GDP in 1971-74 to 18.2% in 1989-93 (Saasa and Carlsson, 1996: 48). It spiked after 1991, as donors worked to bolster Zambia’s transition. As Rakner, van de Walle, and Mulaiho put it,

The importance of aid to Zambia cannot be overstated. At their peak in 1992 the disbursements from multilaterals and 22 bilaterals amounted to US$1,479 million, equal to 67 percent of export earnings and 77 percent of total public expenditure. More than 35 percent of the government’s budget is financed by the donor community, and donor financing accounts for on average 80 percent of the budget for capital expenditure, according to the Zambian government’s 1999 budget address.

Given this dependence, and international willingness to withdraw aid to combat economic backsliding, donor commitment to structural adjustment factored into Zambia’s compliance, making the country a “receiver of policy rather than an initiator” (Rakner et al, 2001: 537, 539-40, 548). By the time of the MMD’s accession to power, Zambia had a $7.3 billion debt – over 230% of its GDP – placing it among the most indebted countries on earth (Musonda and Adam, 1999: 451-52). Mounting arrears left the new government scant negotiating power, prompting Chiluba booster Richard Sakala to assert that there was “no choice,” that structural adjustment was “inevitable,” to cite a widely used word (Sakala, 2001: 69, 72, 69-91).

Another reason for Zambia’s embrace of orthodox adjustment was the nature of donor negotiations themselves, which transpired far from Zambian borders. As Matthew Martin has shown, decisions about IMF loans and debt rescheduling were taken in secretive meetings in Western cities under conditions of limited debtor empowerment and knowledge. With Zambians often ill-informed of procedures and expectations, it is little surprise that creditor concerns about loan or arrears repayment took priority over long-term development and poverty alleviation (Martin, 1991: 92, 149). Despite reforms in the late 1980s that brought in greater transparency, the negotiations conveyed a sense of fait accompli whereby external priorities determined domestic policy, contributing to what Miles Larmer described as Lusaka’s “limited capacity” to “reflect popular opinion when [it] conflicts with donor priorities” (Larmer, 2005: 30).

In addition to external pressures, the view that markets were essential to economic and even political reform was broadly shared by the domestic intelligentsia. “The political change we wanted was tied to liberalism,” explained
one participant in 2019. “Initially we felt we needed political liberalism, but we then realized it was tied to economic liberalism since the only way to engage the economy was to engage private actors” (Respondent I). If this elite agreement, as we have seen, was superficial, it no doubt facilitated adjustment. If everyone appears to support liberalisation, it is hard to maintain a language of alternatives. The preference for rapid and thorough structural adjustment was also reinforced by the negative example of Kaunda’s inconsistent adjustment measures, a failure that MMD leaders were keen to avoid. One respondent argued that Kaunda never “believed” in the SAP program: his implementation was partial; he focused primarily on foreign exchange; and he resisted multilateral calls for privatisation and the lifting of price controls (Respondent J). And as we have seen, the rise of businessmen and economists within the broad MMD coalition gave them a policy advantage. There were also darker motives. Amidst falling life expectancy, increased user fees, dramatic cuts in education, and agricultural decline, liberalisation had its beneficiaries: A privileged elite increased its wealth by purchasing company stock in “the opaque processes of the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA).” Among the payees were former finance ministers, overseers of process (Larmer, 2005: 31, 29-32). In this way, liberalisation had a powerful insider constituency.

The fate of the EAZ is instructive in this regard. The Association threw itself behind the MMD in the election campaign, and many of its members took posts in the new government. But after the election, it decided not to align with Chiluba’s administration, preferring instead to retain its independence by distancing the club from a trade unionist-turned-president who had never been fully comfortable in its intellectual ranks. According to one respondent, the EAZ found itself increasingly marginalised as Chiluba turned to a new source: a group of advisors sent in 1990 by the Harvard Institute for International Development. Initially requested by Kaunda’s Minister of Finance, the foreign advisory team eventually became a World Bank requirement for the renewal of credit (Hoover and McPherson, eds., 2004: 389). Staunch advocates of rapid liberalisation and structural adjustment, the “Harvard Boys,” as many Zambians knew them (though not all of them were men), soon won out in debates over economic reform, steering the country toward more rapid liberalisation than many local advisors preferred (Respondent E).13 Economist Caleb Fundanga may have had this team in mind when he wrote that “[t]he main players have become foreign experts and those local anchormen or ‘creatures of the IMF and World Bank’ as they are often called. This, to a large extent, has compromised the quality of SAP programmes that have emerged.” While acknowledging that
local experts played a key role in designing SAPs and winning buy-in from “political leadership” and “recipient bureaucrats,” Fundanga worried that they became tools of foreign authority (Fundanga, 1996: 92-93). This dominance was not only a matter of policy. Despite a few government programmes to support those who lacked purchasing power, most Zambians lacked the means to invest in privatised parastatals. As a result, foreign investors gained sway, purchasing former state assets, launching new construction, or selling goods once offered by shuttered industries. As a respondent in 2019 remarked, multiparty politics brought not only increased marketisation but also growing “domination by international actors” (Respondent I).

The MMD itself contributed to the sense of disempowerment. Chiluba is a fascinating figure in this regard. He joined the MMD at the Garden House meeting despite little involvement in prior discussions among the intellectuals that led to it. Retrospectively, some commentators describe him as an interloper, a public figure who jumped to the top of the movement and cut short the wider discourse on economic options. Yet while Chiluba is widely disparaged today because of the corruption associated with his second term, at the time he had a solid national reputation as the head of the ZCTU, and his MMD leadership rested on at least three credentials. He was one of the few widely known Zambians outside of the UNIP governing party, and thus he brought name recognition. He was untainted by compromise with UNIP, as opposed to the many senior MMD members who once worked in Kaunda’s government. And he led the trade union congress, which had for years been the leading voice of opposition to Kaunda and structural adjustment (Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala, eds., 1990/91: vii-viii).

The MMD, like UNIP, embraced a top-down leadership model. One respondent likened the pattern of presidential deference under Chiluba to that cultivated by his predecessor, with ministers attempting to anticipate presidential wishes and refusing to offer counterargument on controversial policies (Respondent I). Indeed, “the constitution did not change the balance between executive and legislative power,” report two Zambia analysts. “Presidential power and patronage continued to be the centre of political attention.” As under Kaunda, a “presidential court” held sway (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992: 89). Negotiations with donors abroad were also restricted to a small cohort, usually led by the finance minister, and economic deliberation did not reflect the openness of 1991. Indeed, Chiluba’s powerful finance ministers, Emmanuel Kasonde and, after 1993, Ronald Penza, defended structural adjustment so vigorously that the latter earned kudos from the World Bank and the IMF magazine Euromoney as one of the best Ministers of Finance in Africa (Saasa and Simutanyi, 2007: 20-21).
Michael Gubser

The choice for shock therapy also reflected the sense among MMD leaders that they had only a short “honeymoon period” (Respondents M and I) during which the population, desperate for change, campaign promises, and candidates in 1991 had warned of coming sacrifices, a message that citizens seemed to accept (MMD Manifesto, 1991: 1; Respondent P). As one trade union leader recalled in 2003:

*I think the first few years of MMD in power, you know we had given them the benefit of the doubt. Most of the people in Government came from our [trade union] movement, including the President. They made an appeal in 1991. They wanted people to sacrifice, and we agreed, all of us. In most of the campaigns the question was asked ‘Are you ready to sacrifice?’ and we said ‘yes’* (Quoted in Larmer, 2005: 38).

This message was part of a wider commitment that Chiluba himself had pledged at the Garden House meeting. Addressing the role of workers in the ongoing opposition, Chiluba condemned Kaunda’s Humanism in the name of “social justice,” and called for greater income equality, “equal opportunities” for all Zambians, and improved “access to good shelter, food, education, health, and gainful employment” (Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala, eds., 1990/91: 95, 98). How jarring the shift when, a few years later, the newly elected Chiluba directed trade union leaders to convince their “workers to die a little so that prosperity is not overburdened with a crippling debt and an economy shattered beyond redemption” (Quoted in Larmer, 2005: 38).

The Zambian economy slipped further during the mid-1990s. Although most economists acknowledge that structural adjustment leads to short-run dips in production and purchasing power, growth that was supposed to follow from new efficiencies never seemed to manifest. Part of the problem was natural disaster. Adjustment measures began in 1992 as a severe drought struck Southern Africa, and even as bilateral donors struggled to distribute food relief, price controls were lifted and subsidies removed on fertilizer and maize meal (the main staple).14 In agriculture, early and hasty market reforms, sometimes ill-conceived or under-prepared, often led to confusion that cost farmers desperately needed income (Magande, 2018: 200-206). By 1993, grim reports of impoverishment and official corruption signalled the waning of the MMD’s honeymoon, and in the second half of the 1990s increased corruption
and macroeconomic backsliding soured relations with the IFIs. Citizens also evinced a growing cynicism toward Zambia’s “nyu katcha” (new culture) of personal responsibility, holding little hope that their circumstances would improve in the face of reduced consumption, dire inflation, falling salaries, and rampant unemployment. (For an account of the economic hardships in the early years, see Saasa, 1994: 23-31.) Despite the appreciation of new opportunities for free expression and initiative, many felt that MMD officials were capturing the riches of the free market for themselves. Indeed, “the democratically elected MMD Government,” wrote Aidan Cox of the UNDP and John Healey of the Overseas Development Institute, seemed to “manifest less concern with social equity issues than its predecessor UNIP, although poverty reduction features as a national goal in policy documents.” Fully 84% of the population was classified as poor or very poor by the World Bank and UNDP in 1997, with the percentage rising throughout the decade. “The early years of the democratically elected MMD suggest that the new government has moved away from balanced regional and district budget allocations towards a system built on political favouritism” (Cox and Heale, 2000: 4-5, 9, 15-16). How much of this can be laid at the feet of structural adjustment, as opposed to political corruption or incompetence? What is at least clear is that SAPs did little to stop the descent. As one academic warned about Africa in general, “[p]olitical liberalization is not likely to guarantee the appearance of new political alignments that favour sustained neoclassical economic reform” (Callaghy, 1994: 243. Cf. Simutanyi, 1996: 825).

Ultimately, the choice for shock therapy over gradualism, simultaneous reforms over stepwise change, proved destabilising. Agricultural services such as marketing boards and cooperatives were dismantled before the private sector was ready to fill their niche; subsidies were removed during a time of privation and price hikes; and parastatals that might have survived with timely injections of cash simply collapsed, increasing unemployment and glutting the informal sector. (On the challenges to agriculture, see Zukas, 2002: Chpt. 13; Saasa, 1996.) As one rural respondent recalled in 2019, she gave up her fishmongering business because competition for goods and buyers became too fierce; the newly retrenched all entered the local informal market (Respondent N). The austerity associated with debt reduction meant that growth and development were curtailed, and in the absence of investment funds, bilateral donors took over sectoral programming, often in desultory fashion. Given the hardship of the 1990s, it is not surprising that some rural Zambians today recall fondly – if also selectively – the days when NAMBoard, Kaunda’s farm marketing parastatal, reliably purchased produce (albeit at below-market prices). As Peter Dwyer and Leo Zeilig tell it,
From 1992 to 1998, Zambian GDP declined by an average of 0.2 percent per annum. Formal-sector employment fell from 544,200 in 1991 to 436,066 in 2004. Social indicators drastically declined under the MMD. ... The percentage of Zambians living in poverty rose from 70 percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 1998 (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012: 141).

This is a sobering record of reform. (Seshamani and Kaunga 1996, discuss a range of views on SA.)

Workers faced particular disorientation under the MMD, in part because the party was led by one of their own and its policies came as a bitter fruit of victory. (On this general despair in the Copperbelt, see Ferguson, 1999.) In the mid-1990s, new laws stripped ZCTU of its “legal monopoly over union affiliation,” capping a steady decline in trade union power (Larmer, 2010: 48). Churches, too, were disappointed: While priests and bishops welcomed the end of Kaunda’s rule, they condemned growing poverty and corruption, criticising structural adjustment for its impact on the poor – and sometimes becoming targets of attack. Some MMD proponents ended up disavowing their early support for liberalisation. Mbikusita-Lewanika left his post as Minister of Technical Education and Vocational Training in 1992, the MMD the following year, going on to help form the opposition National Party and later Agenda for Zambia (Bartlett, 2000: 431 n.15). Mbita Chitala stumped for privatisation and attacked structural adjustment opponents when he was Deputy Minister of Finance from 1991 to 1995. But ten years later, he felt “ashamed” of “defend[ing] structural adjustment programmes with such zeal ... I was just parroting bourgeois nonsense with attractive words” (Chitala, 2002: 50, 59).

Added to these economic struggles was a growing rural-urban divide, with cities attracting migrants from the countryside and development from abroad, while rural residents watched their infrastructure languish. This gap is vividly illustrated in the experiences of Nasula, the heroine of Binwell Sinyangwe’s 2000 novel A Cowrie of Hope, as she travels to Lusaka to vend her last bag of Mbaa beans and earn money for her daughter’s schooling. When the bag is pilfered by a seedy businessman, a shattered Nasula determines to get justice. The story resonates with its era: Nasula is not only deprived of her goods but dismissed as irrelevant by a big man with no time for her needs. She desires not only remuneration, but recognition, cathartically supplied in the penultimate scene, when she finally gets payment through the intervention of an upstanding police officer. Alas, this was a fantasy for most. Because the Zambian economy
was “unprepared” for shock, the 1990s became “a lost decade in GDP growth” (Respondent O; Rakner et al, 2001: 536). Sinyangwe puts it bluntly: “The years of the rule of money. The years of hvelessness, bad rains and disease. The harsh years of madness and evil!” (Sinyangwe, 2000: 122).

There were, of course, defenders of structural adjustment. Advocates acknowledged short-term dislocations but argued that they were needed to promote macroeconomic stability, with bilateral donors providing a cushion for those most hurt. One senior Zambian advisor noted that although the IMF stood firm on core principles, it was open to requests for modification and slower pacing; it was, in other words, more flexible than critics allow (Respondent J). Rural respondents, too, reported taking advantage of new opportunities to launch businesses that were previously barred (Respondent Q). Supporters of the orthodox liberalisation often argue that it wasn’t the speed so much as the sequencing of reforms that caused problems: privatisation and structural reform occurred too early, before fiscal balance and macroeconomic stability had been achieved (Adam, 1995; and Saasa, 1996). Furthermore, the delayed privatisation of Zambia’s Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) deprived reformers of essential taxes, exports and jobs that the rejuvenated private mines might have generated (Respondents F and H). In the extreme, the defense of structural adjustment takes the form of an acknowledgement of the decade’s severe developmental losses as the lamentable but necessary price for establishing a macroeconomic “enabling environment” and allowing debt cancellation through the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program launched at the century’s end.

Ultimately, Zambia’s economy did grow in the first decade of the 2000s – according to the World Bank, over 5% annually between 2005 and 2013 – though this was likely driven by rebounding copper prices more than by SAP reforms. While Bank statistics indicate some decline in the poverty level, it remained stubbornly high, at 54.5% nationally in 2015, including over 75% in rural areas (World Bank estimate, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/zambia/gini-index, CSO (1996, 2006, 2010, 2015; cited in Cheelo et al, eds., 2022: 1)). As the latter statistic suggests, inequality persisted, with growth alleviating poverty at the upper margins, but barely touching the country’s majority rural poor. Paradoxically, then, Zambia can be classified as both a lower middle-income country (as it was in 2012 by international institutions) and a least developed country in the same volume, testifying to the stubbornness of its century-long economic bifurcation (Cheelo et al, eds., 2022: 1, 118, 30). Indeed, economic duality, argued University of Zambia economist Venkatesh Seshamani, is not just a result but a cause of poverty’s self-perpetuation: “High growth has led to
slower poverty reduction in Zambia due to persistent high levels of inequality. ... [T]he lack of a pro-poor stance in the distribution of the benefits of growth (seen from the shares of the bottom 10% and top 10%) and the persistent levels of high inequality (seen from the Gini coefficient values), have contributed to the unabated levels of poverty in Zambia (Seshamani and Ndhlovu, 2022). Even as Chiluba’s successor Levy Mwanawasa directed new growth revenues to the social sectors, much of the country’s poverty remained obdurately growth-resistant, with revenue accruing disproportionately to those with higher incomes.

Multiparty politics, in sum, did not yield multiple economic choices. In the political and economic literature, structural adjustment is typically cast as either a morality tale of bracing reform and common sense, with adjustment a necessary astringent on the way to economic recovery; or as a counter-morality tale of neocolonial cruelty, of industrial nations and neoliberal cons boosting their power and profit. Both of these narratives lack local voices. Perhaps what is most striking about the history limned in this essay is how little it is known outside Zambian circles. For the most part, the intellectual history of Zambia’s transition is not formally written, and clues to it are scattered in people’s heads, in a few published memoirs, and in newspaper back issues, grey literature, and unpublished reports lodged in Lusaka archives or abroad.17 Recovering this “missing historical narrative” is not simply an exercise in historical reconstruction; it also affords the chance to revive other economic possibilities, to recover alternate Zambian visions of its own future.

End Notes

1 In The Weekly Post, for example, see the articles “Pot-holes on the Road to Reform,” (5 – 11 March 1993: 10-11); “Everything Seems Wrong in Public Sector” (11-18 March 1993: 8-9); "What People Think about the MMD" (18-24 June: 1993), np; and "What People Think about Chiluba" (25 June -1 July: 1993), np.
2 For this and other sections of the essay, Rakner, 2003 has been extremely valuable for both reference and analysis.
3 For a review of some of these debates, see van de Walle, 2001: 6-15.
4 For a detailed account of these shifts in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Sandberg, 1990: Chpt. 4.
5 The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, based from 1985-89 in an office at the Institute of African Studies, ran a programme designed to promote exchange of ideas between researchers and an “adequate public,” which in practice generally meant the UNIP government. It also worked with the Zambian Bar Association, Chiluba’s ZCTU, and the Farmer’s Association of Zambia. Respondent B.
6 Interview, May 2019.
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8 Although IAS focused its research programmes on social and cultural rather than economic topics, Saasa’s interests brought it into the political and economic debates of the day, and the Institute’s pedigree and international standing lent weight to the opposition. For a history of the institute -- née Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, now Institute for Social and Economic Research (INESOR) -- see Schumaker, 2001.

9 The talks were chaired by Deputy Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube. (Bartlett, 2000: 439)

10 Numerous respondents pointed out to me that Chiluba named three of his children after socialist leaders: Tito, Castro, and Mikoyan. For a published recollection of Chiluba’s early socialism, see Scott, 2019: 81.

11 The Garden House was a last-minute change of venue, since other hotels refused to host the meeting.

12 For reference, the U.S. debt in 2020 was just over 100% of GDR.

13 For accounts of these years by the Harvard advisors, see the essays collected in Hill and McPherson, eds., 2004.

14 Reports of the drought appeared in papers by March, and the cuts listed were either introduced or continued after that.

15 Before launching his weekly column in The Post in 1999, Father Joe Komakoma was arrested for protesting the 1995 constitutional changes that barred those without dual Zambian parentage from competing in elections. Komakoma, 2008: 7.

16 Against donor wishes, the sale of such an important and complex national asset to a foreign company – there was no Zambian firm capable of buying it – was deferred until the decade’s end.

17 In addition to the memoirs mentioned earlier, see Sardanis, 2014, a memoiristic history written by one of the participants in the transition.

References

All but one of the interviews referenced in this essay were conducted between May and June 2019 in Lusaka and a village near Kafue Town. The names have been de-identified. The one exception is an interview conducted by phone in January 2020.


Zambia's Missing Narrative of Structural Adjustment


Zambia’s Missing Narrative of Structural Adjustment


Kaunda and the Liberation of Namibia: Towards an Assessment

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When he died in June 2021, Kenneth Kaunda was widely hailed for his support for Southern African liberation movements. This paper considers the case of Namibia and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and asks how Kaunda went about trying to bring about the liberation of Namibia in the 1970s and 1980s. He initially let SWAPO military operations take place from Zambia. SWAPO had its headquarters in Zambia in the 1970s, and many thousand Namibian refugees settled in Zambia. In international fora Kaunda gave SWAPO full support, and he backed the establishment of a United Nations (UN) Institute for Namibia in Lusaka. But he was willing to engage with the apartheid regime to try to facilitate the UN process towards independence for Namibia, he ended SWAPO's military activity from Zambian soil, and he intervened decisively against democratic forces in an internal crisis in SWAPO. Though he continued his personal attempts at mediation in the early 1980s, they achieved little, and his most important contribution to Namibia's liberation was probably the influence he wielded as a key figure in the meetings of the leaders of the Frontline States.

Key words: Kaunda, Zambia, Namibia, liberation, SWAPO

When Kenneth Kaunda addressed his United National Independence Party (UNIP) at the Mulungushi International Conference Centre in Lusaka in September 1990, six months after Namibia's independence, he told his audience that Zambia had "worked in a spectacular manner to bring freedom to the rest of Southern Africa" (Chan, 1992: Appendix 3, 207). When he died over three decades later, in June 2021, he was widely heralded for his contribution, as president of Zambia, to the liberation of Southern Africa. Kaunda will be remembered, wrote one obituarist, "as a giant of 20th century African nationalism – a leader who, at great cost, gave refuge to revolutionary movements..." (Evans, 2021). Under Kaunda, others said, Zambia had played an important role in aiding the independence struggles in the region, inter alia by hosting liberation movements at great political and economic cost. While such statements were
not incorrect, they glossed over the complex relationship that Kaunda had to the various liberation movements of Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, a relationship that changed over time and as circumstances altered. At times Kaunda acted in ways the liberation movements were deeply unhappy about. In this paper, I use the example of Namibia to illustrate some of the ambiguities in Kaunda’s support for Southern African liberation from the 1960s to Namibian independence in 1990.

Namibians shared the positive assessments of Kaunda as a “symbol of African liberation” (Smith, 2021) that were made at the time of his death. On hearing that Kaunda had passed away, Hage Geingob, the Namibian President, proclaimed a week of mourning in his country and praised what he called Kaunda’s “selfless contribution to Namibia’s independence” (Xinhua, 2021). The Speaker of the Namibian Parliament, a veteran of the struggle, said that Kaunda had “deserved a Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa, and the role he played in support of the national liberation movements” (Katjavivi, 2021). When Geingob attended Kaunda’s funeral in Lusaka, accompanied by his Minister of International Relations, he again hailed Kaunda for the support he had given to SWAPO and Namibia during the liberation struggle. Geingob mentioned in particular Kaunda’s support for the establishment by the United Nations (UN) of an Institute for Namibia in Lusaka. Geingob himself had headed UNIN from its inception in 1976 until his return to Namibia from exile in 1989 (Geingob, 2021). Having been resident in Lusaka all those years, Geingob had not been at the forefront of SWAPO’s armed struggle, which was fought mainly from Angola, but he of course knew of the controversial role Kaunda had played in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to Namibian liberation, and chose not to recall it.

There can be no doubt that Kaunda was always a strong supporter of the liberation of Southern Africa. He actively promoted that cause in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, the UN and other international organisations. In 1970 he was chair of both the OAU and the NAM. In 1974 he was one of the founders of the informal alliance of the leaders of the Frontline States (FLS), an alliance born in Lusaka, and he chaired that influential grouping on a number of occasions. His precise role in FLS meetings is, however, unfortunately unclear; for the FLS kept no record of its proceedings (Anglin and Shaw, 1979: 303 n. 4; Khadiagala, 1994: Chapters 4 and 5). It is similarly unclear to what extent Kaunda acted, on certain occasions, on the advice of his foreign policy advisors, of whom the most important in the 1970s were Mark Chona and, until 1976, Rupiah Banda (Chan, 1992; Onslow,
2015). But there can be no doubt that Kaunda himself was the central figure in
the making of Zambia’s foreign policy, on Namibia as on other issues.

Kaunda saw the liberation of Southern Africa as advancing in stages, with
South Africa, the hardest nut to crack, the last phase in the long struggle to
achieve the liberation of the entire region. In the late 1970s he devoted most
of his diplomatic attention to help end the escalating war in Rhodesia, not
least because of the Rhodesian attacks on Zambia because his country hosted
camps of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). To help bring about
the independence of Zambia’s southern neighbour, Kaunda was prepared
to engage with the South African Prime Minister John Vorster and then, from
1976, with Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, hoping that they
could influence the Rhodesian settler regime of Ian Smith to surrender power.
Kissinger, however, thought Namibia might be easier to “solve” than Rhodesia
because it involved South African occupation and he could put direct pressure
on Vorster (DeRoche, 2016: chapters 3 and 4; Khadiagala, 1994:103). At the
same time, Kaunda was insistent that, for both Rhodesia and South West Africa/
Namibia, nothing short of “genuine independence”, which meant a form of
transition to majority rule endorsed by the liberation movements, would be
acceptable. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Lusaka
in 1979, he helped persuade the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,
not to support an internal settlement for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from which the
liberation movements would be excluded (e.g., Scarnecchia, 2021).

Although there is a considerable literature on Kaunda’s role in aiding the
liberation of Zimbabwe (e.g., Chongo, 2015; Moore, 2005), his role in relation
to the liberation of Namibia has received hardly any attention. An examination
of that role will reveal some of the ambiguities involved in the complex story of
the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Once Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in
1980, Kaunda could focus more exclusively on trying to bring about the end of
the South African occupation of Namibia, seeing that as a forerunner to his goal
of helping to end apartheid in South Africa itself. As in the 1970s, his tactics did
not always meet with the approval of SWAPO and its supporters. How successful
were his efforts to try to end the war in northern Namibia and southern Angola
and bring about the independence of Namibia? Why did he act as he did? What
forms of support did he provide to SWAPO? What assessment can be made of
that support in retrospect?

SWAPO was among a number of Southern African liberation movements
that were able to establish offices in Lusaka as Zambia moved to independence.
Before he became Zambia’s president, Kaunda had encountered Sam Nujoma, the founder and president of SWAPO, at meetings of the NAM and the short-lived Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). Over time, as the two men met regularly at NAM, OAU and other fora, Kaunda and Nujoma became relatively close (Nujoma, 2001:122, 125; Leys and Saul, 1995:43). Within weeks of Zambia’s independence, the Caprivi African National Union, which had strong links with Zambia’s United National Independence Party (UNIP), merged with, and in effect was absorbed by, SWAPO, and this increased ties between Zambia’s leadership and that of SWAPO. Kaunda was always firm in his support for the SWAPO leadership and never gave any significant assistance to its main rival in the 1960s, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU).

Even before SWAPO launched its armed struggle in 1966, recruits for that struggle travelled via Zambia from Namibia to Tanganyika for military training. Once trained there, they returned, with Kaunda’s consent, through Zambia, crossing from Sesheke into the Caprivi Strip in occupied Namibia, from where they made their way westwards to Ovamboland. As SWAPO began to get its armed struggle under way in the late 1960s, Kaunda covertly gave permission for it to set up guerrilla bases in south-western Zambia, despite the danger to his own country in doing so, for it was always likely that South Africa would launch attacks on SWAPO’s bases if the war escalated. At the same time, Zambia allowed refugees from Namibia to settle in camps in different parts of the country. The number of such refugees increased greatly once Namibia’s northern border opened in 1974, after the coup in Portugal heralded the Portuguese withdrawal from Namibia. Between four and six thousand Namibians entered Zambia in 1974-5 alone (Williams, 2015:94).

SWAPO not only had an office in Lusaka from 1964, but in 1972 it moved its headquarters from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to the Zambian capital. In Lusaka the SWAPO leadership worked out of rooms in the complex of buildings, surrounded by a high wall for security reasons, known as the African Liberation Centre, in Kamwala Township. That Centre also housed the offices of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, and other liberation movements in exile. Nujoma and members of the SWAPO leadership spent long periods in Lusaka in the 1970s and 1980s, where they interacted with Zambian officials and others who were involved in the struggle to liberate the rest of Southern Africa. Though SWAPO, unlike the ANC, moved its headquarters from Lusaka to Luanda in Angola in 1979, after SWAPO had established its main military bases and
refugee camps in that country, few in the SWAPO leadership spoke Portuguese and Nujoma and others continued to spend considerable time in Lusaka. There Nujoma mostly occupied a modest three-bedroomed house in Kamwala, but he was sometimes able to stay, at Kaunda’s invitation, in a government house in the grounds of the President’s State House (Nathanael, 2002: Chapter 4; Lister, 2020:173).

In the OAU, and then at the UN General Assembly, Zambia supported the idea that SWAPO, as the only Namibian liberation movement engaged in an armed struggle, should be accorded the title of “authentic” then, in 1976, “sole and authentic” representative of the Namibian people (Dobell, 2000:35). While Kaunda never wavered in his support for the SWAPO leadership under Nujoma, he sometimes worked independently of that organisation to try to bring about Namibia’s liberation, acting in ways SWAPO did not approve. To understand this, it must be remembered that landlocked Zambia was in a very difficult and vulnerable position in the late 1960s and 1970s, with neighbouring countries still under white rule. Zambia’s economic situation was extremely precarious, even after the completion of the railway from Zambia to Tanzania. From the mid-1970s the aggression of the apartheid regime in South Africa increased. The South African Defence Force (SADF) launched raids into neighbouring countries, including Zambia. Kaunda, walking a tightrope between South Africa and the liberation movements, was desperately keen to prevent the conflicts between the liberation movements and the white-dominated regimes from intensifying and spilling over into his country.

It was in that context that in 1969 he played a major role in the drafting and then circulation of the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted by a summit of the leaders of East and Central African countries. That Manifesto accepted that negotiations with the white minority regimes were necessary to bring the various Southern African conflicts to an end. In the case of Namibia, the Manifesto called for a peaceful solution to the conflict and a transition to independence involving a UN presence in the territory. 7 SWAPO, which was not consulted on this formulation, did not approve of it, for, after the International Court of Justice had thrown out a case against South African occupation of Namibia in 1966, it had no faith that the UN would take effective action to oust South Africa from Namibia. Instead, SWAPO was beginning to ramp up its armed struggle against the South African occupation of the country. In the early 1970s guerrillas of its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) routinely travelled from bases in western Zambia through the Caprivi Strip into Ovamboland to launch attacks on South African installations there.
By the time the Lusaka Manifesto was issued, Kaunda had already begun to correspond secretly with the South African Prime Minister John Vorster, to try to bring about settlements of both the Rhodesian and the Namibian conflicts. Though this exchange came to nothing, after the coup that took place in Lisbon in April 1974, which meant that Portugal would withdraw from Angola and Mozambique, Kaunda was willing to go further and meet Vorster publicly. This seemed to many in the liberation movements, including SWAPO, not only to be foolish, because it was unlikely to achieve anything, but reprehensible because it would give legitimacy to apartheid. Some in SWAPO spoke of Kaunda’s détente policy with Vorster as naïve collaborationism, amounting to selling out the liberation struggles. In as far as Namibia was concerned, such scepticism was justified, for Kaunda did not win any concession from Vorster when the two met in August 1975 at the Victoria Falls on the Zambia/Rhodesia border. Vorster not only warned him against continuing to aid the armed struggles of the ANC and SWAPO, but threatened military retaliation if he did so. The South African Prime Minister is said to have shown Kaunda pictures of the aftermath of a South African attack on a military base of a liberation movement and to have asked him “if he had such powerful weapons in his arsenals?... A stunned Kaunda was said to have promptly given an order for Zambian forces to surround and disarm SWAPO bases on Zambian territory” (Beukes, 2014:218; Nathanael, 2002:101, n.1).

Though Vorster was not successful in getting Kaunda to put pressure on SWAPO to abandon its armed struggle, as the South African government wanted, Kaunda did, immediately after the Victoria Falls meeting, call together the leadership of SWAPO, with those of the Angolan rebel group UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola), in Lusaka. He told them that SWAPO must end its military activities from Zambian territory, because of Vorster’s threat of South African retaliation (Nathanael, 2002:956). The Zambian army was told to disarm SWAPO military bases, and new arms supplies were prevented from reaching the liberation movement. In April 1976 between one and two thousand PLAN fighters in south-western Zambia, having expressed dissatisfaction with their commanders because the armed struggle was not being pursued as they thought it should be, were disarmed by Zambian troops. They were then taken from the border area to the Mboroma camp near Kabwe. Some were later taken from there to another camp far from the border for “re-education”, while others “disappeared”, presumed killed (e.g., Leys and Saul, 1995:chapter 3).
The curtailment of SWAPO’s military operations from Zambia was a major setback to the armed struggle being waged by PLAN against the South African occupation of Namibia, even though, after Angola had obtained its independence in November 1975, SWAPO was able to conduct military operations from the new military bases it established in southern Angola, instead of through the Caprivi Strip. After Kaunda’s Victoria Falls meeting with Vorster, Zambia began to curtail SWAPO’s activities in Zambia in other ways. From late 1974 tensions had been building up in Zambia between the SWAPO leadership and those who were critical of that leadership and wanted a congress to be called at which that leadership and its strategy could be challenged. Nujoma appealed to Kaunda for assistance in clamping down on the so-called dissidents, and Kaunda agreed that the Zambian army should intervene to do that. Those who had been living in SWAPO’s Old Farm refugee settlement some 40 kilometres outside Lusaka were rehoused in what some called “concentration camps” much further from the capital (Nathanael, 2005:99; Williams, 2015:111). Andreas Shipanga and other leading figures in SWAPO who had both called for a new congress and been critical of Kaunda’s détente policy with Vorster were arrested in Lusaka and taken to Nampundwe camp outside the city, where they were detained in brutal conditions for two months. When a court ordered their release, the Zambian authorities arranged for them to be transferred to prisons in Tanzania (Shipanga and Armstrong, 1989:102ff). A leading Namibian exile then in Lusaka, Hans Beukes, made an impassioned plea to Kaunda, telling him that he had made a “terrible, terrible mistake”. Beukes urged him to arrange a process of dialogue between the Nujoma leadership and the dissidents, but Kaunda ignored his long letter (Beukes, 2014: 247-51). The dissidents were crushed thanks to Kaunda siding with the Nujoma leadership against those who wanted to democratise the exiled liberation movement. Kaunda’s harsh treatment of the dissidents enabled the Nujoma faction to triumph, though at the cost of a major split in SWAPO, for Shipanga and others formed a rival SWAPO-Democrats in 1978.

Despite Kaunda’s order that it do so, PLAN did not immediately stop its military operations from south-western Zambia. In August 1978 it launched rockets across the border onto the town of Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi, killing ten South African soldiers and wounding another ten. This resulted in swift and massive SADF retaliation into western Zambia. That in turn led Kaunda to act more firmly to put an end to PLAN’s operations from Zambia, which did now effectively cease, though there were further SADF raids into western Zambia early the following year (Scholtz, 2013:99). Further involvement of SWAPO military forces from Zambia in the liberation war had effectively come to an end, however. From the perspective of the SADF, this was what General Geldenhuys
called a "big breakthrough" because "It made East Caprivi free from insurgence" (Scholtz, 2013:100. Cf. Geldenhuys, 2009: Chapter 8). 8

While in this way Kaunda weakened PLAN's military activity, he stood firm in his support for SWAPO in other ways. Those who were critical of his détente policy feared that he might be persuaded by Vorster, or his successor, to agree to a form of independence for Namibia that fell short of one that would bring SWAPO to power, but such fears proved groundless. Kaunda not only totally rejected any idea of dividing Namibia along Bantustan lines, as the South African government proposed, but he would not consider any kind of transition to independence for Namibia that was arranged by South Africa unilaterally. While it was South African strategy to try to arrange a process by which it would transfer power to internal leaders, Kaunda insisted that a free and fair election should be held, expecting that that would bring SWAPO to power. After the South African invasion of Angola had failed by early 1976, and the Soweto Revolt taken place in June of that year, Kaunda briefed Kissinger on what he should say to Vorster on Namibia, (Serfontein, 1976:355) and for a time gave up the idea of trying himself to get the South African government to agree to the independence of Namibia. Instead, in 1977 he gave his full support to the plan for a transition to independence worked out by the so-called Western Contact Group, made up of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. That plan provided for an election for a Constituent Assembly that would be certified by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative as free and fair (e.g., Khadiagala, 1994:105ff).

Having supported the Nujoma leadership against the so-called SWAPO dissidents, Kaunda had a strong hand to play, and he used it to pressure that leadership to accept what the Western Contact Group proposed. He had Nujoma invited to attend some of the FLS meetings. At one of these, in Luanda on 12 July 1978, Kaunda was crucial in persuading the SWAPO leadership, despite the massacre that had taken place at the SWAPO camp at Cassinga in southern Angola less than three months earlier, to accept the Contact Group plan for a transition to independence. Some in SWAPO thought an election unnecessary, for they believed in SWAPO's right to govern Namibia as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people", (Dobell, 2000:35) but the SWAPO leadership came to see that the plan, which was embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of September 1978, was the most realistic route to Namibian independence. That they did so was in large part thanks to Kaunda's influence and pressure.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the South African government, fearing the prospect of SWAPO coming to power in Namibia, refused to allow the UN
plan to be implemented. Instead, it raised objection after objection to specific aspects of the plan. SWAPO rejected the South African government’s demands, and the FLS, with Kaunda playing a leading role, had to try to mediate to keep the discussions going. When the FLS leaders met in Lusaka on 2 June 1980, for example, they put pressure on Nujoma to accept the South African demand for a demilitarised zone along the Angola/Namibia border, in the hope this would lead to an agreement to implement the UN plan (Khadiagala, 1994:126).

Because the South African government remained intransigent, Kaunda again, now that Zimbabwe had become independent, resorted to personal diplomacy with the South African leader on the Namibian issue. After an exchange of letters with Vorster’s successor; Prime Minister P.W. Botha (Larmer, 2011:221-2), he agreed to meet the South African prime minister. When the two men met on the South Africa/Botswana border in April 1982, Kaunda urged Botha to agree to the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia. In the event, it would be another six years before Botha was to agree to that, very reluctantly and under great pressure, but the 1982 summit was not without consequence, for from it came a significant mediation role that Kaunda played in 1984.

His mediation that year had two related but separate aspects. He first helped facilitate in February 1984, with the assistance of the United States, the Lusaka Accord between the South African and Angolan governments. He not only met with the two delegations in the Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka, but, to quote the then American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, “maintained an open door at State House for delegations to seek his counsel or lobby their cause” (Crocker, 1992:4; Chan, 1994:54). The parties agreed that South African forces should withdraw from southern Angola, in return for which Angola would ensure SWAPO would no longer operate from an area north of the Namibia/Angola border. South Africa would also make “progress towards Namibian independence under Security Council Resolution 435” (Chan, 1992:54). Hoping that the Lusaka Accord would pave the way for the implementation of that resolution, Crocker called the February meeting in Lusaka “a sweet success”, and “the high-point of Kaunda’s involvement in the Namibia-Angola peace process” (Crocker, 1992:194). For Crocker, "Kaunda was tickled with the high visibility pay-off for his gamble on hosting talks that had stopped the war between his neighbours" (Crocker, 1992:196).

SWAPO had not been a party to the Lusaka Accord, however, and critics of it saw it “an apparent breach of African solidarity” (Soggot, 1986:308). Though Kaunda “chose to characterise it as an ‘historic opportunity to make progress’” (Ibid), and may have played some role in securing the release of Toivo ya Toivo, a leading SWAPO activist, from South Africa’s Robben Island in March 1984, the Accord proved of very limited value in advancing Namibia’s independence. A Joint
Monitoring Commission attempted to implement the Accord until May 1985, but the process was never completed because of the numerous violations, mostly by SWAPO, that continued. Though there was no major conflict for a while, there was no progress towards the implementation of Resolution 435. In May 1985, when a covert South African raid into Angola was discovered, the Accord fell away, with Namibian independence no nearer (e.g., Scholtz, 2013:189).

Crocker nevertheless credits Kaunda with helping to facilitate a development that followed the signing of the Lusaka Accord, what he calls “the first authoritative MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] bid on Cuban withdrawal” (Crocker, 1992:207, 459). This was the offer that the Angolan representative Kito Rodrigues handed to Crocker in the Mulungushi conference centre in September 1984. Crocker believes this led to the eventual agreement at the end of 1988 that provided that there should be a parallel withdrawal of all the Cuban troops from Angola as the UN plan for a transition to Namibia’s independence was implemented (Crocker, 1992:207, 459). In patronising terms Crocker, in his account of these events, calls Kaunda “a fair-weather friend of our strategy [meaning linkage] [and]...the closest thing to constructive leadership we could come up with among the English-speaking Front-Line States” (Crocker, 1992:459, and cf. 184-7).

Kaunda meanwhile had made another bold attempt to bring about a Namibian settlement, In May 1984 he organised a Namibia conference in Lusaka that brought together SWAPO and the main Namibian parties based within the territory, then grouped in the so-called Multi-Party Conference. Nujoma was very reluctant to meet these parties, seeing them as clients of the South African government, and he insisted that SWAPO would only engage with the South African-appointed Administrator General of South West Africa, representing the South African government. In the event, “SWAPO submitted to pressure from President Kaunda to take part in a conference in which his [i.e., Kaunda’s] co-chairman was none other than Willie van Niekerk”, the Administrator-General, and in which the internal parties participated (Soggot, 1986:312).

Though a somewhat similar so-called “pre-implementation” meeting that had been arranged by the UN in Geneva, Switzerland, three years previously had achieved nothing, the Zambian president hoped that by bringing all sides together again he could achieve consensus on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435. But feelings ran high, with one leading SWAPO figure publicly calling Kaunda a sell-out because of the way he had given in to the South African government’s demands on who should attend the meeting (Lister, 2020:140). For Kaunda, getting the various parties around the same Southern African table was in itself a major achievement, but he soon found that the South
African government and the internal Namibian parties insisted that the Cuban forces in Angola must withdraw before the UN plan for Namibia's independence could be implemented. As a result, the meeting soon broke up in disarray (Lister, 2020:chapter 26:136-42).

That same year Kaunda persuaded Nujoma, who was then living in a former colonial residence on the grounds of State House in Lusaka, to meet some South African generals, but again nothing significant was achieved (Lister, 2020:173; Nujoma, 2001:340-3). After 1984 Kaunda never again played as active a role as an independent actor in the process leading to Namibia's independence, but now worked on the issue primarily as a leading member of the FLS. After the conflict in southern Angola had intensified and, with the winding down of the Cold War, helped lead to the breakthrough to a negotiated settlement in 1988, Kaunda and the FLS were not directly involved in the lengthy negotiations of that year that culminated in the December 1988 agreement that provided for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and the independence of Namibia. But, in early 1989, Kaunda was active in arguing, on behalf of the FLS and the NAM, that the military component of the UN mission to be sent to Namibia should not be reduced in size. That argument was not won, Kaunda also wrote to the UN Secretary-General on behalf of the NAM demanding the appointment of Frontline nationals to key posts in the UN mission, again without success (Thornberry, 2004:39).

After implementation of the UN transition began on 1 April 1989, it was rumoured in Harare, Zimbabwe, that it was Kaunda, rather than the Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe, who had advised Nujoma to send armed SWAPO guerrillas from southern Angola into northern Namibia on the day of implementation. It was even rumoured that some Zambian military personnel had accompanied the SWAPO guerrillas into northern Namibia and been slaughtered there when they clashed with the South African forces that the UN Special Representative agreed to allow out of their bases. There is, however, no evidence to support such claims of Zambian involvement, and it would have been quite out of character for Kaunda to have given Nujoma such advice.9

As a leading member of the FLS, Kaunda was kept in touch with the way the transition unfolded in mid- to late-1989, and he kept his "channels of communication with South Africa open" (Macmillan, 2013:224). When the South African Foreign Minister, "Pik" Botha, heard that the FLS were considering asking the UN Security Council to authorise the UN Special Representative in Namibia to disband the Koevoet para-military unit in northern Namibia, he asked Kaunda, who was chair of the FLS, for a meeting to discuss the matter (Papenfus, 2010:599). Kaunda's acceptance of such a meeting helped precipitate Botha's
resignation as president, and on 28 August 1989 Kaunda met Pik Botha and P. W. Botha's successor, F.W. de Klerk, in Livingstone. The three discussed the way the transition to Namibian independence was proceeding (DeRoche, 2016:217; Chan, 1994:144). Kaunda continued to monitor that process. On 5 March 1990 he wrote to the UN Secretary-General to say that, while the UN mission “had acquitted itself admirably, so far, it could not ‘afford to’, as it were, abandon Namibia at this critical time in her history” (Thornberry, 2004:358). His concern was unnecessary, for by then the aim of the mission had been achieved, and it formally came to an end on 21 March, when Namibia became independent.

Conclusion

A fuller assessment of Kaunda’s role in bringing about the independence of Namibia will need to rest on archival research and interviews that could not be done for this paper. Key archives, such as that of SWAPO in Windhoek, remain closed to researchers, while the author of this paper has not been able to access the Zambian archives in Lusaka and has only been able to look briefly at the UNIP archive online in London at the British Library. A future assessment will set Kaunda’s Namibian role more firmly in the context of the ways in which he interacted with other Southern African liberation movements, such as ZAPU or, say, the Mozambique resistance movement COREMO. In his relations with the neighbouring countries, including those still under white minority rule, Kaunda, as we have noted, walked a tightrope. Were his actions “characterised by a ruthless pragmatism based on Kaunda’s interpretation of Zambia’s national interests, rather than on an idealistic vision of political liberation” (Larmer, 2011:188)? Jamie Miller has pointed out that Kaunda’s “pursuit of regional stabilisation reflected internal pressures to focus on domestic rejuvenation amid increasing economic stagnation, rather than continuing to bear the heavy costs of being a frontline host for liberation movements” (Miller, 2016:131). Larmer draws too stark a dichotomy between national interests and pursuit of regional liberation, for Kaunda was able to combine “ruthless pragmatism” with adherence to the goal of the political liberation of all of Southern Africa.

This inevitably led to contradictions and ambiguities. On the one hand, he allowed thousands of Namibian refugees to settle in Zambia in camps tightly controlled by SWAPO. Without his crucial support for the SWAPO leadership, the movement’s very survival might have been in jeopardy before it was able to move its operations and headquarters to independent Angola. Kaunda also played a crucial role in the establishment of UNIN, which continued until the eve of independence to help prepare Namibians for the day when South African
rule would end, and they would take over the running of the country. Opening the Institute, which was supposed to be non-partisan, on Namibia Day, 26 August 1976, the day on which, in 1966, SWAPO claimed it had launched its armed struggle, Kaunda claimed that it was the first time that the international community had taken such an initiative for a non-self-governing country. He added then that “The time for the liberation of Namibia is one minute past midnight” (Rogerson, 1980:676), not knowing that it would not be until March 1990 that the day of independence would finally dawn. Almost a decade after he opened UNIN he wrote a Foreword, dated 30 April 1986, to its major publication, *Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development*. That thousand-page “blue Bible”, as some Namibians called it from the colour of its cover, began with a highly SWAPO-centric historical overview, briefly referred to socialism in a macro-economic survey, then went on to describe the sectors of the Namibian economy and how they could be revived and reconstructed in an independent Namibia. In his Foreword, Kaunda wrote that while the “most urgent concern and collective conviction is to support in every way possible the struggle for immediate genuine independence for Namibia”, the “second and equally urgent and important task is to prepare Namibia for economic independence” (United Nations, 1986). He was pleased “that Namibians themselves under the leadership of SWAPO have determined their goals, policy objectives and priorities” (United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1986; Vigne, 1987).

Though Kaunda tried hard to end the conflict between SWAPO and the South African rulers of Namibia, and bring about Namibia’s independence, his engagements with successive South African leaders, Vorster and Botha, were not successful in advancing that cause. While Kaunda gave SWAPO support in many ways, like other supporters he turned a blind eye to gross human rights abuses within the movement, and was complicit in the detention of many of SWAPO supporters in what they called “concentration camps” (Beukes, 2014:270-1). He actively facilitated the way in which the SWAPO leadership turned on some of its own people in Zambia in 1976, in a manner that was to be taken to even worse extremes in the human rights abuses that the liberation movement perpetrated in Angola in the 1980s. In Larmer’s words, as with a crisis involving the cadres of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) a year before, “the Zambian authorities presented themselves as the neutral arbiter of an internal split”, but “the Zambian state was in fact a major participant in that dispute, ensuring that the incumbent leadership was able to resist widespread demands for organisational accountability” (Larmer, 2011:210).
Yet while Kaunda was helping crush the resistance to the Nujoma leadership in SWAPO, 1976 was also the year in which, as we have seen, he began to try to end SWAPO's military operations from Zambia, and in which he opened UNIN. Two years later he played a vital role in persuading the SWAPO leadership to support the plan for a transition to independence approved in UNSC Resolution 435, while at the same time further weakening SWAPO's struggle by finally closing down its military operations from Zambian soil.

These ambiguities can of course largely be explained by the situation in which Zambia found itself, and by Kaunda's belief in personal diplomacy and dialogue. As host to SWAPO, he could influence how it acted. He could have compelled the Nujoma leadership to be more accountable to the SWAPO membership, or could even have thrown his support behind those who in the mid-1970s called for a congress to elect a new leadership. As Lauren Dobell perceptively wrote, without Kaunda’s active assistance, “SWAPO leaders might have had to come to terms with contradictions in the movement, and find ways to incorporate the more radical views of elements of its rank and file into the struggle” (Dobell, 2000:51). Kaunda could also have more fully supported SWAPO’s armed struggle, allowing it to continue to operate from Zambian territory, but then Zambia would probably have suffered more severely from South African attacks than it did. What he did was give SWAPO a measure of support that changed over time: having turned a blind eye to its guerrillas operating from Zambia, he effectively stopped this from 1978, but allowed thousands of SWAPO refugees to continue to live on in Zambia until they were repatriated to Namibia on the eve of independence in 1989. Though he was prepared to negotiate with South African leaders and officials, he did not sell out the Namibian liberation movement by agreeing to a settlement that would have left it out in the cold.

In the crucial final phase of the movement towards independence Kaunda lobbied on behalf of the FLS and the NAM but with little success. Within months of Namibia's independence, he was caught up in protests in Lusaka and elsewhere that heralded his ouster from power in 1991. It took time for him to be accorded elder statesman status in Zambia and over twenty years after Namibia's independence before Nujoma fully recognised his contribution to its liberation: on a visit to the Namibian capital in 2013, he was given a house there, perhaps in part because Nujoma remembered how Kaunda had given him accommodation in Lusaka. On the same visit, a leading road in the upmarket suburb of Klein Windhoek was renamed Dr Kenneth David Kaunda Street (New Era, 2013). Behind this, and the current Namibian president's words of praise
for the support Kaunda gave the liberation movement during its struggle to end South African occupation and usher in an independent nation, lay, as this paper has begun to show, a complex history of relations between Kaunda and the liberation movement in the years of the liberation struggle.

Endnotes

1 For a brief and limited account see Hennig, n.d.. Leading scholars who have written on aspects of this topic as part of larger studies include Stephen Chan and Christian Williams: see their work in References. In 2017 President Donald Trump notoriously conflated Namibia and Zambia and referred to “Namibia”.
2 The office was established by Hifikepunye Pohamba in September 1964: see the interview with him in Blanch, n.d., 62.
3 Beukes says Nujoma was not close to Kaunda, at least compared to Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU: Beukes, 2014, 254.
4 These camps included Senanga on the banks of the Zambezi River, 600 kilometres southwest of Lusaka, and, established later, Central Base near the Kwanza River. For a map showing the various SWAPO camps in Zambia see Williams, 2015, 98. Williams provides a detailed examination of the various camps in Zambia in the mid-1970s.
7 In 1967 Vorster had told Kaunda that in the event of an attack on South Africa, he would ‘hit Zambia so hard that she will never forget it’: quoted Anglin and Shaw, 1979, 282.
8 Minor skirmishes continued into the early 1980s between SWAPO guerrillas and the SANDF in Western Zambia. Cf. e.g., Macmillan, 2013, 129.
9 See the discussion of this in Chan, 1992, 167-170. There is no mention of it in Chan, 2011, 47.
10 To begin with, it had SWANU lecturers and students (e.g., Beukes, 2014, 252), but became more and more exclusively SWAPO over time.

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Arming Zambia in the "dark forest of international politics":
Kenneth Kaunda, Britain, and Arms Diplomacy, 1963-1971

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From the breakup of the Central African Federation in 1963 until the departure of British officers and trainers in the early 1970s, Kenneth Kaunda led the Zambian government in negotiating arms purchases from British arms manufacturers, with the assistance of the British government. These transactions were intimately connected to security guarantees against Rhodesian aggression that Kaunda negotiated with the former colonial power, and British attempts to foster Zambian foreign policy and technological dependency. While this decade of negotiations had its origins in the contentious local distribution of military resources at the end of Federation, by the time it ended, it provided a stepping stone to a much broader global economic and security network, one which reflected the international-minded rhetoric associated with Kaunda in the arena of international affairs.

As the Zambian government's negotiations with the British government and arms manufacturers came to involve sophisticated technology and weaponry, the politics of Britain's own arms sales and the framing of national security in Zambia provoked considerable debate. Young Zambian officers believed the conditions and technology of the arms purchases limited Zambian sovereignty, while Kaunda and his government appear to have believed that those limitations came with substantial benefits because of the guarantees they implicitly drew from British authorities.

Correspondence around these transactions offers a window into Zambian calculations about national security in the context of a fraught regional context and concerns about British neocolonialism. Far from merely constituting bilateral negotiations, Kaunda undertook arms diplomacy with Britain amidst a growing diversity of potential global weapons and security suppliers, reflecting the weight of Zambia's colonial history and its national-era global orientation.

Keywords
Zambia; British Empire; Decolonisation; Kenneth Kaunda; Neocolonialism: Security; Technology
In the second half of the 1960s, Zambian officials negotiated the purchase of weapons from British arms manufacturers, an exchange mediated by representatives of the British government. Then fresh from training at Britain’s Sandhurst military academy, a young Zambian officer who later commanded the country’s armed forces, bemoaned what he and other young officers regarded in the 1960s as an arms deal gone wrong. There were “terrible limitations” to the viability of arms purchased from Britain, and the purchases themselves, Francis Sibamba believed, locked Zambia into a neocolonial relationship with Britain that made a mockery of the young nation’s sovereignty in the realm of national security (Sibamba, 2010: 97). Such a diplomatic error on the part of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, Sibamba suggested in his memoirs, was particularly perilous because of Zambia’s outspokenness against powerful and antagonistic regional powers (Sibamba, 2010: 52-53, 97). South Africa and Rhodesia viewed Zambia with considerable hostility because of its decisions to host liberation movements and their armies, and to pursue policies aimed at the diplomatic isolation and political destruction of the two settler states. Relying on arms deals with the former colonial power left the country militarily vulnerable.

I propose, however, that Kaunda and Zambia undertook negotiations with British arms manufacturers and the British government—to purchase missiles, aircraft, and vehicles—as part of a broader, more clear-eyed political and military strategy. A close reading of official archives from the UK and Zambia suggests that this strategy used a carefully negotiated neocolonial relationship to elicit security guarantees from Britain that temporarily shielded Zambia against Rhodesian aggression. Vocal diplomacy on the one hand, and the purchase of weapons that were never intended to be used on the other, were a set of tools through which Kaunda engaged with the same British authorities who sought to use Kaunda and Zambia as their own political pawn in Southern Africa, all the while directing funds toward the British arms industry. For British authorities, arms sales to Zambia allowed the state to combine diplomatic and commercial objectives. The British state worked to ensure that as Zambia armed itself, it did so with weapons from British firms rather than arms produced by other states. This was not just a boon to a domestic British arms industry; it allowed British policymakers to structure and constrain the capabilities of the Zambian military. However, the existence of a global arms market, and Kaunda’s vacillation, gave Zambia leverage in its negotiations with Britain. Purchasing arms from a ready supplier like Britain was a political act which signalled to domestic audiences the government’s ability to defend the nation, and which committed Britain to Zambia’s defence.
Such neocolonial military entanglements left the British government confident that it could continue to exert domineering influence over Zambia’s national security apparatus. However, Kaunda’s calculated unravelling of arms deals with Britain at the end of the 1960s was similarly a part of a wider reorientation away from entanglement with Britain—something that had served its purpose for the first five years after independence—toward a wider constellation of political and military relationships. Exploring Zambian negotiations with Britain over the purchase of arms is, in this context, not simply a story of the two countries’ militaries and the relationship between them. Rather, it is a window through which to think about the politics of neocolonialism, and the manner in which Kaunda’s and Zambia’s diplomacy sought to make the conditions of neocolonial relationships manageable, useful, and impermanent in a world very much in motion.

**Arms, Nations, Empires, and Late-Colonial Security**

Weapons played a variety of roles in colonial conquest and the anti-colonial movements that ended some European empires. Industrialisation and gun manufacture were essential to the eighteenth and nineteenth century expansion of the British Empire, and gun manufacture, modification, and ownership reflected trajectories of people’s social and political lives in Central Africa (Satia, 2018; Macola, 2016). Service in colonial militaries, to which firearms and violence were central, also shaped lives and possibilities, reflecting and altering relationships and claims between people and colonial states (Tembo, 2021; Moyo, 2014; Mann, 2006; Costello, 2015). During the 1960s and 1970s, the acquisition of arms became central to the emergence of national states in Africa. The ability to purchase and wield weapons and other forms of military machinery and expertise was a marker of sovereignty, a source of national pride, and a mechanism for self-defense on a continent shaped in part by its own cold—and sometimes very hot—war between remaining European colonies, settler states, and nations dedicated to a fuller version of decolonisation. Trading weapons and training soldiers in their use was an avenue for renegotiating commercial relations, and through them, for situating new states within global orders and alliances, affirming ideological affinity, utilitarian alignment, or commercial dependence (Mavhunga, 2011). Arms sales were but one part of the connections that emerged between decolonisation and security (Wyss, 2021; Clune, 2017; Parsons, 2003; Douek, 2020; Shishuwa, 2019). For former colonial powers like Britain, the sale of weapons, training in their use, and influence over who wielded them became a part of the post-imperial economy, an instrument
in diplomats’ toolkits, and a marker of expansive influence even after formal rule from London unravelled, part of a broader British institutional approach to decolonisation (Stockwell, 2018). For settler states in Southern Africa, fighting within and across boundaries, and evading patchy global sanctions to equip themselves to do so, was essential to security (White, 2021; Van Vuuren, 2018).

The global arms trade that took shape in the postwar years was similarly complex and multifaceted (Drohan, 2003; Feinstein, 2012). Timothy Mitchell observed how the geopolitics of arms sales saw Britain and the U.S. arm oil rich states in the Middle East as a form of “financial recycling,” a way of returning currency flows to the West that had been imbalanced by resource dependency after decolonisation (Mitchell, 2011: 155). British arms sales to Zambia recycled political power rather than currency, using what was ostensibly British “aid” to Zambia to subsidise British industry and political capital in Africa. Mitchell argues that the growing acquisition of arms by states in the Middle East became a form of “institutionalised uselessness,” because the arms in question were important less for their potential use than for the relationships and counter-dependencies, they forged (Mitchell, 2011: 155). As we shall see, this is not a bad analogy for what Zambia sought from arms purchase from Britain. Zambia sought to deploy this arms diplomacy in the context of a wider attempt “to assert African agency” in the context of the Cold War and Southern African liberation struggles (DeRoche, 2019: 467).

The story of Kaunda’s attempts to arm Zambia have more modest beginnings, in the contours of the Central African Federation that for a decade bound Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland in an ultimately-aborted experiment in imperial statecraft. Federation involved the centralisation of some policy areas and resources, among which was defence. At the end of Federation, resources were distributed between the three territories that went their separate ways—Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to independence as Malawi and Zambia; Rhodesia to its own rogue decolonisation (White, 2015). Many of the resources associated with the federal—as opposed to the territorial—government were disproportionately allocated to Southern Rhodesia at the end of Federation in 1963. To the chagrin of Zambian officials and Zambian officers in the country’s emerging military, the majority of serviceable weaponry fell into this category. In the words of Francis Sibamba, who later commanded Zambia’s armed forces, this left the military at Kaunda’s disposal “with a few transport aircraft only”, bereft of the material required for either offensive or defensive action (Sibamba, 2010: 83; Lungu and Ngoma, 2005). Participants in the Victoria Falls Conference determined principles for the allocation of armed forces, and these departed from the premise that “units were to pass to [Southern Rhodesian
or Northern] commands according to their present dispositions." Because the entire Rhodesian Royal Air Force (RRAF) was stationed in Southern Rhodesia, the government in Salisbury—and later the rogue settlers—secured almost the entirety of that service.¹

The more concrete division of military hardware was decided at a 1963 meeting in Salisbury.² British officials praised the "concessions" they extracted from both sides, but the handful of aircraft the Southern Rhodesians offered to their northern counterparts were the oldest and least operable. In the end, Northern Rhodesia secured a mere six aircraft from the RRAF’s 91-strong fleet. The agreement also dismantled several of the more effective army units in Northern Rhodesia.³ British mediators claimed that the meeting to settle the distribution of resources was characterized by "goodwill." Moreover, Northern Rhodesia’s Executive Council, a body that included among its members Kenneth Kaunda, Simon Kapwepwe, and Reuben Kamanga (all of whom later inveighed against the deal), endorsed the outcome of the meeting.⁴ Agreement by such figures—who later regretted the trade-offs they sanctioned—was critical in allowing the British government to alleviate concern stemming from the international scrutiny of the Victoria Falls agreement, including from the United Nations Security Council. At the UN, the Ghanaian government offered the prescient claim that the well-armed Southern Rhodesian colony that emerged from the breakup of Federation would pose a threat to the region.⁵ Although out of power and so unable to affect government policy, left-leaning members of the British Labour Party’s National Executive Council offered a motion in 1963 that "the Southern Rhodesian government should not be left in eventual charge of the Federal Air Force, because that would give them considerable power in that part of the world," while leaving Zambia and Malawi "bereft of the necessary force for self protection." Party leader Harold Wilson, who would soon contend with the fallout from Rhodesia’s UDI, refused to take up the issue (Benn, 198; 62-3). Dissatisfaction with the results of the dissolution of Federation, a dissatisfaction that deepened into the 1960s, generated the arms diplomacy of the decade that followed.

Kaunda and Britain

Kenneth Kaunda was the central figure in the political drama that followed. In the first decade of Zambian nationhood, British interlocutors variously described
the Zambian president as capricious, generous, wily, inscrutable, emotional, and janus-faced. On the one hand, they regarded him as a “corrective” to what they argued were the “racialist” views among UNIP’s “rank-and-file.” On the other hand, they grew frustrated by the consistency and vigour with which Kaunda and members of his government used the Rhodesian issue as an excuse to flay the British government publicly. Rhodesia, they believed, was a “useful issue transcending internal [Zambian] political differences,” and the British High Commissioner ‘explained’ that “extravagant words are the African substitute for disagreeable deeds.” British officials feared that more radical—in their criticism of British Southern African policy—voices were rising to prominence in Zambia in a way that threatened to turn Kaunda into a “cypher.” At one point, fury over an incoming Zambian High Commissioner’s undiplomatic remarks relating to Britain’s Rhodesian policy—Aminan Simbule referred to Britain as a “humbled, toothless bulldog”—held up his appointment in London. In a sign of the contempt with which senior Zambian politicians held Britain, Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe defended Simbule by doubling down on the critique, calling British politicians “cowardly, toothless hyenas.” Harold Wilson, meanwhile, referred derisively to Simbule as “this youth” in correspondence. This particular flashpoint was representative of the strength of feeling against Britain in Zambia over the Rhodesian issue, and indicative of British fears of the tenor of other voices in UNIP.

As British politicians and diplomats sought to engage Kaunda over the Rhodesian issue, and to prime the pump for weapons sales, they solicited opinions of Kaunda’s character, security in office, and style from diplomats, expatriates, and others, all of whom drew diametrically opposed conclusions, solidifying the narrative of Kaunda as an enigma. The High Commissioner in Lusaka reassured London that Kaunda was “impressionable,” with a “third rate brain,” and likely to be influenced by the last figure in the room with him. Colin Morris, who collaborated with Kaunda on a number of books, contended that Kaunda was “not influenced at all by the many opinions that are pressed upon him,” but simply adept at suggesting that he was, and in fact made “his own devious and calculated decisions.” Some thought that Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe called the shots. Morris maintained that “Kaunda wants to run his own foreign policy” and that Kapwepwe was merely situated in the Foreign Office to “fire Kaunda’s bullets for him.” Reflecting centralized decision-making under Kaunda, British officials bemoaned what they saw as the habit of lower ranking Zambian officials of “pushing [political and military matters] straight up onto President-PM level. It is a strange way of doing business.” Narratives like
these appear to have also shaped scholarly conventional wisdom about Kaunda as the dominating force in Zambian foreign policy, making decisions in a vacuum of advice from foreign policy experts (Chan, 1992: 3-4).

Zambian archives make clear, however, that Zambian missions abroad fed Kaunda a regular stream of information from diplomats. The Zambian High Commission in London—which with independence moved from the Northern Rhodesian commissioner's office in Haymarket to Cavendish Place—sent regular reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lusaka. Often, substantial portions of those reports were devoted to evaluating the approach of the British government and its press to UDI, and forecasting how other events and trends in the UK might affect its officials' and the public's evolving views of the Southern African crisis. Although the High Commissioner acknowledged the impossibility of submitting "a report on Rhodesia which will not be out of date by the time it is read", due to the fast moving nature of events, Kaunda received a steady and detailed flow of broad information and concrete analysis from his diplomatic personnel in London. Indeed, one of the reasons Kaunda and other Zambian figures advocated so widely for the British use of force to curb Rhodesian UDI—both before and after UDI actually occurred—was the High Commission's accurate forecasts about the extent to which Rhodesians, with tutoring from Pretoria, had prepared to circumvent sanctions. With considerable prescience, Zambian diplomats in London described how Rhodesia was likely to evade sanctions with ease. Zambia's diplomatic mission in London also took on a broader role in diplomacy across Europe, one which saw its High Commissioner and other personnel charged with building relations across Europe, including with France and Germany, and travelling widely to explain how the Rhodesian crisis—in its various stages—was affecting Zambia, and what supportive action European governments could take. The High Commission also shared intelligence on potential threats to Zambia, leading to at least one figure being listed as a "prohibited immigrant" in the country. In the early stages of the post-UDI era, the High Commission also actively recruited white officers—British, Canadian, and Irish—on a contract basis to the Zambian military. During election season, the High Commission sent profiles of leading political figures in Britain back to Lusaka, along with diagrams of British political parties' stances on issues of interest to Zambia. These included receptiveness to talks with the Smith government absent preconditions; use of force in Rhodesia; immigration to Britain; the Common Market; defence spending, and the role of the Ministry of Overseas Development.

The broader diplomatic and political context in which arms sales occurred were very much shaped by these factors. The personality of Kaunda—or rather,
perceptions of that personality—proved central to British calculations about his value as a potential ally or agent for the conduct of British policy. And the indeterminate and contradictory conclusions British policymakers sought to draw about that personality, as demonstrated above, ensured that they were unaware about the degree to which Zambian foreign policy as it related to arms purchases was not conducted in a personalised, British-managed vacuum, but shaped by flows of information from Zambian diplomats in London and, as we shall see, keen attention to the range of alternative interlocutors for the arming of the new nation. This is borne out by substantial scholarship on the relationship between Zambia and the United States during this period (De Roche, 2016, 2007).

Arms for Zambia

It was in light of the unequal distribution of federal military forces, and the security risks arising from Rhodesia’s 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain, that Kaunda led the Zambian government in seeking to arm itself. Francis Sibamba, among the higher ranking Zambians in the military at the time, recalled that Zambia had “inherited a pocket-sized army, only good enough, and meant, for counter-insurgency operations.” Such operations were designed to focus on ending labour disputes and intervening to separate combatants in feared racial violence on the Copperbelt (Sibamba, 2010: 96). For the next several years, Britain was the primary source from which the Zambian government sought to purchase arms.

On the same date as Rhodesia’s UDI, Kenneth Kaunda wrote to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson seeking aid from a British firm—and a recommendation from Wilson as to how to approach such a firm—in opening an “ammunition and small arms” factory in Zambia. This appears to represent the beginning, albeit a modest one, of exchanges that would grow in complexity over the coming five years in linking the Zambian government and military to British arms manufacturers, with the British government playing a key intermediary role. In this case, British officials responded promptly, suggesting that Kaunda or military experts should visit the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, or the Royal Ordnance Factory at Radway Green to examine models and discuss Zambian needs with experts. In fact, the Controller of the Royal Ordnance Factories was practised at undertaking such work in relation to newly-decolonised nations, having built up commercial and security relations through exchanges in expertise and material with Australia, Pakistan, India, and other Commonwealth nations. Another early stratagem that Kaunda attempted to pursue in relation
to arms, was to better animate the claim that Rhodesia unfairly benefited from the distribution of military resources at the end of Federation by claiming that Rhodesians “withheld” weapons and supplies from Zambia. However, the government misfired when the Secretary to the Cabinet suggested that Britain help Zambia to replace this “withheld” material by giving to Zambia any arms and supplies on order in Britain from Rhodesia, allowing the Lusaka High Commission to point out that Rhodesia had no equipment on order from British arms manufacturers, dodging the central point of the original claim.

As early as 1965, the British government provided funds for “minor items of Zambia’s military hardware,” but Kaunda steadily agitated for British support for more significant arms purchases. He agitated in parallel with his efforts to prod Britain to offer Zambia security guarantees against Rhodesian aggression. Kaunda’s insistence that Britain intervene militarily against Rhodesian UDI is better documented—in scholarship and archives—but he was equally concerned that Britain commit to military intervention in defence of Zambia’s borders, should the need arise. Along with Kenya and Malawi, Kaunda won loosely-worded guarantees of support against external threats and internal security problems from the British government, concessions Britain was loathe to provide during the 1960s, but that were successfully weaponised in East Africa during the 1960s when governments there faced security challenges, perhaps signalling their potential utility to Kaunda.

As Zambia shifted gears to seeking more significant weaponry, the British government responded enthusiastically to these overtures. The close relationship between the British state and industry—animated in the late-1960s by the Labour government’s call to embrace the “white heat” of technology and its corporatist ambitions—meant that the British government positioned itself as an intermediary between arms manufacturers and their prospective Zambian clients. A considerable proportion of the funds that Zambia deployed to purchase British arms actually came from Britain itself. The Commonwealth Relations Office deployed millions of pounds across Africa on “military technical assistance expenditure.” The funds declined as the ’60s wore on due to economic retrenchment, but the Ministry of Defence (MOD) also provided funds.

British personnel in Zambia—in high ranking civil service posts, at the head of the armed forces, and in intelligence work ostensibly on behalf of Kaunda’s government—were a clear part of Britain’s strategy to exert influence in the former colony. In discussing the pace of Zambianisation, which threatened to push many of these individuals out of their posts, British High Commission officials in Lusaka were frank in assessing how British personnel shared information about what should have been internal Zambian deliberations, and
Arming Zambia in the ‘dark forest of international politics’: Kenneth Kaunda, Britain, and Arms Diplomacy, 1963-1971

ensured that in those deliberations British objectives were “not lost sight of.” The British High Commissioner in Lusaka also advised that maintaining British command of the Zambian Air Force—the most technical of the armed forces, and the one from which major defence expenditures were most likely to emanate—could yield “some commercial advantage to ourselves,” as British commanders and trainers could steer the Zambian government toward the purchase of British arms, a fillip to both British industry and British diplomacy. The Defence Advisor to the British High Commission was also extraordinarily well informed about the disposition of expatriate officers commanding the Zambian military. To facilitate both arms purchases and the recruitment of contract officers in London, the Zambian government assigned a Defence Liaison Officer (DLO) to the London High Commission. Lieutenant Colonel F. D. Slater had served in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment before independence, and occupied the DLO role, with assistance from two other expatriate officers. Slater played a role in arms procurement by examining equipment at British military and industrial facilities and sending information and recommendations about equipment—especially that “suitable for Zambian conditions”—to the Zambian Army in Lusaka. Therefore, by the time civil servants and politicians in the Zambian government made decisions about arms procurement, British military personnel, former colonial officers posted to the Zambian High Commission, and the British leadership of the Zambian Army and Air Force had all shaped the parameters of advice and decision-making.

Civil servants and military officers also shared details about potential rivals for arms sales with the British government. Details about a rumored Italian offer to sell Marconi aircraft and provide the ground crews and training personnel for their use spurred the British government into action in support of its domestic industries. Another leak—also likely from British personnel embedded in the Zambian civil service—in January 1968 warned that in Kaunda’s speech to open the year’s parliamentary session, the Zambian president would mention a programme of armament. Acting on the leak, the MOD signalled to British arms manufacturers that they should submit proposals for packages to the Zambian government, to get ahead of any competition. The MOD also set up a sales team to assist companies. As British companies without previous interests in Southern Africa contemplated doing business in Zambia, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office also provided briefings and risk assessments. State intervention to facilitate profiteering from technology was not restricted to the arms industry during this period. Partly in sync with its attempts to modernise both Britain and its vision of social democracy, and partly to show itself to be a friend to new
African governments, the Labour government led by Harold Wilson also worked with industry when it came to the sale of computing equipment to a developing African market as a part of its techno-political agenda (Hicks, 2018: 120-21).

British anxieties about contracts with Italian or other unnamed firms were well-founded. Kaunda took advantage of a global arms industry that swelled as a result of the Cold War, and approached Italy, Yugoslavia, and other nations: “flirting with other air forces” as one frustrated British official put it. As the British state and arms industry manoeuvred for Zambian business, Kaunda held his cards close to his chest, declining to disclose the extent of his ministers’ conversations with other states. On the one hand, the connections Kaunda was building with other members of the Non-Aligned movement gave him leverage in working with the British. On the other hand, many of the Zambian officials who participated in the nation’s review of its defence needs were British contract officers or expatriates, who shared details with the British High Commission in Lusaka.

During the 1960s in Britain, multiple government departments promoted arms industries, also subsidising sales by providing loans or grants for defence purposes to former colonies under the assumption—sometimes unwritten, sometimes in writing—that those funds would be directed toward the purchase of weapons from British firms. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the newly-formed Ministry of Technology (Minotech), and the MOD were among the institutions continuing a longer historical tradition (Edgerton, 2012, 2013). Defence advisors in embassies and high commissions facilitated the negotiation of these contracts. In the Zambian case, the British High Commission in Lusaka coordinated with companies like British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) to maximize its impact at fairs in Lusaka and Ndola. When direct subsidies for arms sales were in short supply, the British government looked to use subsidised training opportunities for the weapons systems in question as an inducement for the Zambian government and armed forces.

The ministries and departments privy to these negotiations developed mechanisms and regulations to ensure that Britain's own armed forces would always have access to a superior and more updated product than other purchasers. As a result, the MOD had to downgrade weapons before they could be sold to the armed forces of other states. The levels to which weapons had to be downgraded depended on the relationship between the British government and the state in question, and potential security risks. Zambia, for example, had a “restricted” rating that constrained sales, though less severely than for some other states. They also depended on assessments of how long the secrets associated with a particular technology were likely to remain secret. For example, when
it came to the P10 Rapier system Britain later sold to Zambia, British officials estimated it would take 12 months after initial testing in the Hebrides for the Soviets to break security screens. Assessments were generated by a Release of Military Information Policy Committee, made up of representatives from the aforementioned ministries, the army, navy, RAF and security services. In the context of these newly formalised procedures, the British government joined companies in lobbying the Zambian government and armed forces to promote British weapons. However, MOD regulations and British diplomatic objectives meant that any arms Zambia purchased from British firms had to be purely defensive in nature. This was among the constraints that made some figures in the Zambian government and military uncomfortable.

Decisions and negotiations around substantial arms purchases moved slowly. But by May 1968, discussions grew more serious when a Zambian mission toured BAC, Short Brothers, and Harland Ltd facilities in Britain to evaluate weapons systems and aircraft. The Ministry of Technology took the lead in facilitating the visit, and a ministry official guided the Zambian delegation. BAC recommended that the Zambian military acquire a Rapier missile package, pressuring the delegates to make a quick decision on the product by emphasizing that delay would mean slower delivery given the widespread interest from other nations’ militaries in the weapons system. Short Brothers prepared a similar package deal for scrutiny for the Blowpipe missile system. The companies flew the Zambian delegation to demonstration sites on aircraft that they also sought to market as suitable for the Zambian military’s transport needs. The delegation exhibited the most interest in the Rapier missiles, which brought the parties to a discussion of payment. British officials believed that the Zambian government had the ability to pay in cash for the BAC deal, which included a Rapier battery and supporting equipment, training provided by BAC for Zambians, and a guarantee of spare parts for two years, all at the cost of six million pounds. The cash payment model involved a two million pound payment up front, 20% more of the total cost after 12 months, and the remainder paid upon delivery. If the Zambian government sought a British government subsidy for the purchase, a similar down payment would be followed by payments spread over five years.

Soon after the visit, the Zambian government opened formal negotiations with BAC, facilitated by a defence advisor from the MOD. The Zambian government paid one third of the total cost for a delivery of 12 Rapier projectors and 360 missiles, with delivery scheduled for 1970. During negotiations, BAC pressured the British government to emulate the aggression of the Italian state in supporting bids by Italian firms. The British government also fielded inquiries from Portugal, whose officials in Portuguese East Africa feared that the Rapier
missiles would fall into the hands of guerrillas operating from Zambian territory. The British response had been to reassure the Portuguese, in part by noting that British control over the supply of replacement missiles would constrain the actions of the Zambian military. The limitations of the supposedly cutting edge weapons technology quickly became apparent. Downgrading the missiles for sale—done by Mintech—meant a year delay for delivery. Zambian officials were not originally informed that the product they purchased—while broadly similar to the missiles in use by the British military—would be modified, and this, along with delays, created mounting frustration with the deal. In fact, already in 1968, British experts knew of serious flaws in the product. The need to concentrate missiles to ensure their efficacy led to signal channels interfering with each other. Mintech was clear on the need for the technical issue to be resolved before British armed forces used the product, but suggested there was no reason that Rapier could not be sold, potentially-fatal flaws and all, to foreign customers. In contrast, the MOD insisted that whatever product was sold abroad, delivery could not take place until British forces had 18 months’ access to the technology. Similar issues—faulty technology, the length of the downgrading process and prohibitive regulation—plagued British sales of Blowpipe missiles and Zambian access to the Camberley training college in the coming years, resulting in “embarrassment” to the British government and British industry.

Zambia had also considered purchasing arms from the U.S., although the U.S. Congress’ 1968 deliberation on a Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill, which limited access by foreign states to U.S. weapons, made such a transaction unlikely. Nevertheless, a Zambian mission made its way to an arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama to see a demonstration of a Hawk missile. There, Zambian delegates unburdened themselves to U.S. military officials about their “continued reliance on British personnel.” The Zambian military, the mission told Americans, also considered purchasing Czech weaponry, but the British military advisors who dominated the Zambian security establishment had disparaged the quality of weapons. Among the delegation was Simon Kapwepwe, a harsh critic of Britain’s Southern Africa policy (DeRoche, 2007: 233-4). He expressed open disbelief in British advice, suggesting that political concerns rather than the technical qualities cited by advisors informed the guidance from British military advisors. U.S. officials, who regarded the Zambians as unserious customers, gamely sought to talk up the value of British weapons and advice, and recommended that if dissatisfied, Zambia should seek a second opinion from Canadian, Swedish, or Swiss advisors. Detailed documentation of these interactions appears in British
archives because the U.S. military attaché in Zomba, Malawi, shared information with his British counterparts, also instructing the British government about the advantage it could win for its firms if it was willing to provide a subsidy.

Zambian frustration with British advice and British products was fuelled by broader communication about British orientation toward Zambia and British industrial capacity from the Zambian High Commission in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lusaka. The High Commission reported that British media complained that “Zambia is determined not to give a major contract to British firms,” noting that in reality “a number of major projects have been carried out in Zambia by British firms [and] if they have failed to win other tenders they have themselves to blame.” “British industry,” the High Commissioner remarked acerbically, “is simply inefficient and is just now learning to abandon out of date ideas of dumping their products in their colonies. It is really in a sense a period of painful mental as well as technological adjustment for the British people.”

Accusations in the British press continued into the early 1970s, to the point that Kaunda felt compelled to write to then-opposition leader Edward Heath (soon to be Prime Minister) to set the record straight.

The mistrust of British motives, contempt for British technology, and concern about being locked into neocolonial dependency in the security realm was shared by figures like Kapwepwe, at the top of government, and Sibamba, then a rising officer in a military still commanded by British officers. Sibamba regarded the transformation of the Rapier exchange from deal to debacle as anything but an accident. The British, he later recalled, “capitalizing on our inadequate knowledge and inexperience in defence matters...especially in tactical and strategic deployment of modern, sophisticated equipment, sold us the initial version of the Rapier SAM system” with all of its “terrible limitations” (Sibamba, 2010: 97). Examined narrowly, as an arms purchase, the archival evidence supports Sibamba’s interpretation. However, examined in its larger context, in which the weapons were less significant for their potential to ever be used than they were for the diplomatic relationship they sealed and the guarantees they helped to establish, the exchanges reflect considered politics rather than naive purchases.

This becomes clearer when examining other transactions that unfolded—or failed to unfold—in the years after the Rapier debates. In 1970, a sale of Beagle Bulldog aircraft disintegrated when the British company went into receivership. These aircraft were part of the Zambian Air Force’s pilot training programme. British diplomats noted the personal attachment of Kaunda to the Zambianisation project this represented. In a missive to the Ministry of Technology asking for the state to intervene to prevent the manufacturer from going under, diplomats
noted that “President Kaunda himself attended the recent passing out parade of six Zambians who had qualified for their wings,” worrying that if the deal fell through with the company, it would likely “provoke a reappraisal of British ability to meet Zambian defence requirements.” The FCO advocated that the government inject capital into Beagle long enough to allow the company to deliver aircraft to Zambia and two other strategically significant nations—Kenya and Sweden—awaiting orders, but the Treasury rejected the suggestion. Ultimately the company Scottish Aviation took advantage of Beagle’s collapse and continued production of the aircraft for Sweden and Kenya. However, the Zambian government cancelled its order.

During the same year, the British government worked to shepherd two other arms purchases by the Zambian government to fruition. One involved the purchase of Skyvan transport aircraft from Short Brothers of Belfast, and the other the purchase of the 167 Strikemaster, an attack aircraft, from BAC. With Strikemaster as with Rapier, the British government kept abreast of meetings between BAC representatives and Zambian ministers and military commanders. British diplomats and manufacturers also worked to persuade Zambian authorities that Skyvan, a “short-range transport” aircraft with a “simple and rugged” design was well suited to Zambian needs. However, although the Zambian government signed a “letter of intent,” it withdrew from the deal in July 1970, also signalling its disinterest in Strikemaster. In the case of Skyvan, British authorities first learned of Zambian reticence when the High Commission in Lusaka shared internal Zambian memos with London. How the High Commission came by these memos is unclear, but the foregoing suggests a number of mechanisms through which sensitive Zambian information was shared with the British. Kaunda later told the British High Commissioner that the decision to abandon Skyvan had to do with “development in [Zambian] military thinking”, particularly in relation to the capacity to shift troops eastward to meet threats from Portuguese East Africa. However, the High Commissioner noted that Skyvan had already been modified to suit Zambian needs for expanded flight range. The British High Commissioner in Lusaka became convinced that the Minister of Defence, Grey Zulu, was hiding details of the exchange from Kaunda. While the British High Commission and UK Foreign Office officials scrambled to get Kaunda back on side (including the High Commissioner meeting Kaunda at State House in the midst of a thunderstorm that prevented the President from getting the Defence Minister on the phone), Grey Zulu instructed the Zambian Air Commander to order Canadian and German aircraft. While British officials saw Zambian duplicity in cancelling the Bulldog, Strikemaster, and Skyvan orders (and misjudged the extent of Grey Zulu’s authority), Kaunda’s decision—as with the successful if drawn-out Rapier
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purchase—was likely about more than aircraft. Kaunda and his government were demonstrating broad discontent with British advisors and technology, and signalling ahead of an anticipated rupture with the British government in the summer of 1970 over the Conservative Party’s victory in the June general election. Conservatives had indicated a desire to resume arms sales to South Africa, something Kaunda vocally opposed. Kaunda did instruct the military to use up the balance of the British Defence and Aid Grant funds, but they were spent on lower profile items like armoured cars.

Disappointment over the aborted arms deals with Zambia, and the British government’s clear understanding that these represented a political response to its South African policy, provoked discussion in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Diplomats debated whether the British government should scale back South African arms sales, or restrict the range of products it was willing to sell to the apartheid state in order to repair relations with Zambia, recover the influence of expatriate military advisors on Kaunda, and regain the centrality of British weapons systems to the Zambian armed forces. But it was too late. Kaunda’s pivot away from Britain was partly in response to the South African arms sales, and partly the product of a broader international and military policy reorientation. “Until 1969,” British officials in Lusaka claimed, “British influence in shaping the future of the Zambian defence forces was almost total.” The unravelling of this state of affairs had actually begun in 1968, when the Zambian government gave 12 months’ notice that it intended to terminate the lifespan of a British military training team in the country. They were replaced by an Italian team, and during the coming years Italy also became a source of weapons for the Zambian military, along with Yugoslavia, as both countries successfully undercut bids by British firms. Yugoslav businesses became closely involved in Zambia’s construction sector, and British officials regarded this beachhead, together with Yugoslavia’s “comparatively developed” nature, and the friendship between Tito and Kaunda, as responsible for the Eastern European country’s success in breaking into Zambia’s hydroelectric, steel, and national security sectors (Sardanis, 2014: 91). Soon after earlier ruptures with Britain, Kaunda dismissed the British head of the Zambian Army, who initially survived the departure of the training team. Ten more British expatriates were fired in January 1971.

As the Zambian government barred British expatriates from the Ministry of Defence, it replaced them with at least one Senior Liaison Officer from the Yugoslav military. A Zambian military delegation also visited China during this period. With these moves, Kaunda not only replaced what had long been regarded as openly neocolonial British influence on Zambian defence affairs. The nature of the new relationships with Yugoslavia and Italy were different, continuing
to give Zambia access to technical expertise, but disentangling foreign trainers and advisors from roles that gave them policy influence in defence and national security realms. Unlike their British predecessors, Italian trainers lived off base and took no part in the administration of the airport or in military planning, and with the exception of the liaison officer, the same was true of Yugoslav influence in the army. British onlookers somewhat huffily believed Zambians would grow disenchanted with the “drop in standards” they were sure would result from this change in relationships, and return to the British fold. But such a prediction underestimated the extent to which military technology in general, rather than in the particular potential for its deployment, became an important benchmark for the development of new, modern-looking states in the postwar world. It also failed to account for what Mitchell describes as “institutionalised uselessness,” or the procurement of weapons and military know-how designed not to be deployed in any conventional fashion, but rather wielded as a display of network-power that generated reciprocal obligations and displayed political attachment to different constituencies in the international order, and the support and security such attachment brought with it.

Kaunda’s change in policy also coincided with his chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of African Unity. These posts gave Kaunda a wider platform from which to build alliances, allowed him to “[practise] a bolder non-alignment” (DeRoche, 2016, 4), and generated their own kind of pressure on his government to repudiate links with Britain over its South African and Rhodesian policies. These new (or newly important) relationships generated other reforms to the Zambian military. In 1970 Kaunda discussed cultivating “participatory democracy” in the military to infuse the decolonising armed forces with a more revolutionary political ethos. Figures from the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force quietly attended the officers’ seminar at which Kaunda raised this issue, and officers were later sent to what British officials derided as a TDAP “indoctrination course.” The numbers of Indian and Pakistani officers in and trainers attached to the Zambian military were also expanded. Zambia’s reorientation in a search for military expertise and personnel, in other words, both mirrored and facilitated broader changes in the nation’s international policy (DeRoche, 2019; Schler, 2018). It also occurred during a decade when—especially during its mid-point—relations with South Africa and Rhodesia stabilized, partly due to Kaunda’s role as a mediator, something that ironically eroded some of his moral authority (Miller, 2016; Chan, 1992: 137-8).

Conclusion
In June 1971, the British High Commissioner in Lusaka wrote to the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call attention to an autumn Defence Communications Symposium in London, sponsored by the British National Export Council, to give armed service personnel "insight into defence communications for the next ten years and to show how the UK intends to meet this requirement." The High Commissioner invited the Director of Signals in the Zambian army to attend on an all-expenses paid basis. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed the invitation to the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who replied, icily, that the military could not spare a representative for the symposium. Perhaps there were real scheduling conflicts behind the spurned invitation. But the disinterest in British weapons systems and weapons training also reflected a dramatic reorientation of Zambian military procurement. The changes—in interlocutors and suppliers—seemed in some regards to occur in the space of about a year. But in reality, they had been building for a longer period of time; perhaps since Zambian independence, and certainly since Britain failed to halt Rhodesia’s UDI.

In leading Zambia to negotiate and then sometimes abandon arms purchases from British industry, guided, subsidized, and encouraged by the British government via its influence in Zambia's security sector, Kenneth Kaunda was buying more than weapons. He was buying time—“temporising,” to borrow a term Thomas McDow deploys in another context. Writing about Indian Ocean social and economic exchanges and relationships, McDow notes that “to temporise is to adopt a course of action to conform to circumstances; to wait for a more favorable moment; or to negotiate to gain time” (McDow, 2018: 8-9). Arms purchases were both a means to pursue larger international policy goals, and a metric by which historians and others might evaluate the pursuit of that policy. And because of the long time scales on which the negotiations and sales operated in relation to the harried pace of diplomatic correspondence surrounding them, the economic stakes they involved (ultimately greater for Britain than for Zambia), and their entanglement with other debates and discussions around national and neocolonial security, they were a method of diplomacy that were well-suited to navigating the fraught first years of independence and UDI alike. They were but one thicket in the “dark forest of international politics” that Kaunda evoked when describing Zambia’s national-era wanderings on the first anniversary of the nation’s independence, but one that proved significant for setting the pace for the further decolonisation of institutions and relationships between Zambia and Britain.

Acknowledgments
My thanks to Marja Hinfaelaar, Duncan Money, and Sishuwa Sishuwa for hosting the "Remembering Kaunda" conference that gave rise to this paper, and the two anonymous reviewers who offered useful feedback on the piece. I am also grateful to staff at the National Archives of Zambia and the UK National Archives, and to colleagues in the Department of History at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas who read an earlier version of this paper in a Faculty Seminar.

Endnotes

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